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5Preface
This book presents a uniquely democratic perspective on all aspects of UK politics, at the 
centre in Westminster and Whitehall, and in all the devolved nations. It returns our focus 
firmly to the ‘big issues’ around the quality and sustainability of the UK’s liberal democracy. 
The last decade has seen a global rise of debased ‘semi-democracies’ (like Putin’s Russia) 
where authoritarian rulers maintain (rigged) elections and a managed, only superficially 
open political process and institutions as a façade, disguising parts of their corruptly run or 
dictatorial regime from view. In these troubled times it is more important than ever before 
for exponents of liberal democracy to take a critical look at their own political practices, and 
to identify where improvements can be made. 
As our final, concluding chapter makes clear, this means paying attention not just to how 
the big and obvious macro-institutions in a liberal democracy work (like a voting system or a 
parliament) – but also to much less visible ‘micro-institutions’, the highly detailed rules that 
often govern how macro-institutions work out in practice. The need to cover how macro- 
and micro-institutions operate together is one reason why our book has 37 chapters. The 
other reason is to cover properly the vital contributions to UK democracy being made by 
the devolved governments and legislatures, and by politics at a local level – a task that 
takes up nine chapters in Part 6 of the book. 
The book’s overall plan follows this sequence. Part 1 is an introduction that sets the scene 
for the book as whole by looking at three overall aspects of the UK’s situation as a liberal 
democracy. Part 2 examines the UK’s main electoral systems and shows how they work. 
Part 3 surveys the other ‘political input’ processes, that is all the ways (besides voting) in 
which citizens can communicate their preferences, needs and priorities to decision-makers. 
Part 4 covers the heart of government in the Parliament at Westminster. And Part 5 looks 
at UK executive government in the Cabinet system, how ministers and the civil service 
operate in Whitehall, and the public services. Part 6 covers the devolved governments in 
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, London and some parts of England, and local politics. 
Part 7 addresses the effects of democracy in terms of defending human rights and 
achieving core levels of equality between British citizens. The brief Part 8 summarises and 
ties together our judgements of the UK’s changing democratic performance.
Each of our short chapters follows a very similar structure. We always start by setting out 
clear criteria for what democracy requires in that aspect of a nation’s political life. We 
then outline some key recent developments in the UK, so that readers can gain an overall 
picture of the most important current controversies in this institutional or policy area. 
The heart of each chapter is a SWOT analysis (see Chapter 1.2 for an explanation of our 
approach and methods). Finally, for readers deeply interested in that topic, the last part of 
each chapter discusses in somewhat more detail a small number of core aspects where 
issues arise for the democratic quality of political life.
6How to find things in this book
This is a big book, but because it is available primarily in digital form to all its readers there 
are two main ways of instantly and easily finding the things that you are interested in.
1. Use digital search for any bit of text (such as a theory, the name of an institution 
or organisation, or even a person) that you are interested in. Simply use the normal 
search keystrokes for the device you are reading on. This takes you straightaway 
to every occurrence of that term anywhere in the text. Try using close synonyms or 
substitute words in your search if you do not find what you expected.
2. The book also has a full index. And because this is a digital book clicking on any 
of the index links takes you to the pages you are looking for. The topics covered 
include theory words and political science or constitutional law terms, as well as 
more factual subjects. 
About our digital links referencing system
We believe strongly in making as much of the modern social sciences as possible open to 
all citizens, and any reader worldwide. So this is not just a digital book, but also a fully open 
access (OA) one – and we have avoided using any conventional (numbered) footnotes or 
endnotes. We have tried to make not just our text but also the evidence and sources that 
support the analysis as open and visible for readers as we can. 
(i) Wherever possible we have sought to link to digitally available sources. Not only this, 
but when you click on any URL in the text it should also take you to a completely free and 
open access source for further information or reading. So far as we possibly can arrange it, 
whenever you click on our hyperlinks you should never go just to a paywall.
This commitment has some costs as well as benefits. Much the best academic sources are 
articles or books that are now published in fully open access form from the outset. Where a 
published paper or book sits behind a paywall then wherever feasible we have linked to an 
alternative manuscript copy of that text deposited in an open access university repository, 
or on sites like ResearchGate and Academia.edu. 
(ii) Where no freely readable version is feasible for papers or for books we have linked to 
blogs, press articles or other short pieces where academics outline their work in accessible 
ways. (Students and academics with university library access can easily move on from there 
to the full texts.) 
Costly books that are only available in paper copies or as ebooks inside university libraries 
present by far the biggest problems for our strategy – and so we tend to cite them less. 
However, sometimes books are key sources and here we want to give the widest possible 
range of readers a fuller idea of what these book authors are arguing. To do this we often 
link to digital reviews of books, such as those on the LSE Review of Books blog – an 
indispensable open access source now across the social sciences. (Again readers with 
university library access can easily move on from reviews to access the full texts.)
(iii) On factual matters (such as election data) we have linked a great deal to official 
statistics, and the many invaluable reports and databases from the House of Commons 
7Library and Institute for Government. Our links to Wikipedia also reflect the fact that its 
coverage is increasingly broad, reliable and up to date, although we have carefully checked 
the items used here.
(iv) In addition, for interested readers we have provided a full set of references at the end 
of the book. For each chapter we show the trigger words in the main text that lead to links, 
arranged in the sequence they occur. For each we provide a conventional endnote text 
version of the link. We also include a small number of non-OA sources not triggered by 
links but which the chapter authors feel have especial value as follow-on reading.
Reusing materials from this book, and citing it
As part of our commitment to open science this book has a Creative Commons (CC BY-
NC-ND) licence. For academics, teachers and librarians who may not be familiar with CC 
licence this version means that you are completely free to re-use all our materials in your 
own teaching and non-commercial publications so long as you accompany each use with a 
readable acknowledgement of this text as the source, and do not alter our text or figures in 
any way. For any commercial re-use, which go beyond extracts for the purpose of review, 
please contact LSE Press.
If you are citing this book, we recommend including a micro-quotation of five or six words 
from it within your own text, and then linking to the relevant book chapter (each of which 
has its own DOI number). Do not rely on page numbers, because this book is digital from 
the outset, and is published by LSE Press in many different versions (with only the PDF 
versions including page numbers). 
Commenting on our analysis
Finally, an important motto of the open sources movement in IT is that: ‘Given enough 
eyeballs, all bugs are shallow’. In any text of this length there may be mistakes, or issues, 
sources and arguments that we have not appreciated. We aim to revise and update this 
book (if we can) annually, so your comments, corrections, criticism or suggestions can really 
help us. Please email, Tweet or message us on Facebook at any of the addresses below. 
And if you have enjoyed reading the book, and want to advance open social science too, 
why not give us a retweet, a ‘like’ or another form of positive mention on social media?
Patrick Dunleavy   p.dunleavy@lse.ac.uk  
  @PJDunleavy
Alice Park    democraticaudit@lse.ac.uk  
and       @DemocraticAudit 
Ros Taylor   facebook.com/democraticaudit 
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Auditing the UK’s changing 
democracy – Patrick Dunleavy
1
The UK is one of the world’s oldest and leading liberal democratic states. So the fortunes 
and performance of democracy in these shores matters intensely not just to the citizens 
of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland but to the wider world as well. By liberal 
democracy we denote a complex balance between four key goals:
✦	 (large) majority control of government via free and fair elections, genuine party 
competition, a vivid interest group process, and diverse other forms of political 
participation;
✦	 the maintenance and development of human rights and civil liberties for all citizens, 
ensuring equal treatment even for unpopular minorities or causes;
✦	 the conscious development and pursuit of greater political and social equality; and
✦	 widespread political legitimacy for the state, in part based on the existence of multiple 
(plural) centres of power, information and influence within society.
We seek to give a thorough-going review of how well British government is now performing 
in meeting these criteria across all the salient aspects of the political process.
I begin by establishing a wider context for liberal democracy globally, where prospects 
have generally been deteriorating in recent times, for varied reasons. Many disturbing 
trends elsewhere provide important pointers to possible grounds for concern within the UK 
itself. The factors that are currently going wrong for democratic advance across the world 
mostly have their counterparts in modernisation changes within Britain itself.
Chapter 1.2 then describes how the Audit implements a detailed and disaggregated 
(section-by-section) analysis of the current performance of UK institutions and of recent 
developments in how they operate. We have undertaken a qualitative analysis, assessing 
various kinds of evidence and argument across a wide range of key topics. Readers will 
also find numerous charts and tables allied to a systematic effort to present different 
perspectives within each chapter. 
The final section considers the ‘British political tradition’, or the so-called ‘Westminster 
system’, which continues to define the almost unique political and institutional development 
of the UK. With the 2016 Brexit referendum decision to ‘take back control’ of all aspects 
of nation state operations, the UK public voted essentially to revivify one-nation practices, 
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turning our back on many processes of converging towards a more general ‘European’ 
pattern of working that had previously seemed in train. For some observers, the UK’s 
unique features and lengthy constitutional traditions and history are unquestionable 
sources of strength. Yet for others (as we shall see) the legacy of the UK’s long imperial 
history and lagged transition to modernity are the origin of much that remains problematic 
and flawed in contemporary democratic politics.
When the UK’s Democratic Audit was established, in 1989, the prospects for liberal 
democracy globally seemed very encouraging. The Berlin Wall had fallen and countries in 
eastern Europe and within the former Soviet Union itself were beginning to separate out from 
the previous Communist bloc in ways that held out great hopes for a transition to democracy 
in many of them. In other continents too, like Latin America, decades of authoritarian 
dictatorship seemed to be crumbling, with democratic constitutions emerging and attracting 
popular enthusiasm. The 1990s indeed saw one of the largest and most sustained increases 
in the proportion of the world’s population under democratic rule since the late 1940s.
Yet in the last two decades evidence of further liberal democratic advances has dried up. 
The new period began with the 9/11 massacre in the USA and the wars that followed, and 
intensified after the global financial crisis of 2008 struck with devastating force in many (but 
not all) advanced capitalist countries. Since then, worrying signs of democratic stagnation 
or malaise have multiplied across a wide range of countries, including some of the ‘core’ 
established democracies themselves. 
One of the most disturbing of these trends occurred in countries that are mostly far from 
being liberal democracies, with the rise of versions of extreme Islamic jihadism in some 
Muslim-majority countries, and in other areas where conflicts have occurred between 
Muslims and Christians, or between Islamic zealots and more secular groups (often 
including moderate Muslims). The new jihadist movements reject western civilisation 
in many aspects, but with particular force for democracy and human rights. Through a 
‘wicked’ cycle of terrorism and counter-response invasions and military actions by the USA, 
UK and other western powers in Arab countries and Afghanistan/Pakistan, Islamic jihadist 
movements in varying forms and strengths have spread across many countries. Their 
influence now extends from northern Nigeria in western Africa, throughout north Africa, 
the Middle East and across through Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and into parts of Pakistan, 
even reaching Bangladesh. Jihadist movements reject liberal democracy, civil liberties and 
all respect for human rights in perhaps a more thoroughgoing way than any other political 
movement since European fascism in the 1930s. This change has serious consequences 
too for the domestic security of the UK and other European states, dramatised by the three 
major terrorist outrages undertaken by home-grown jihadist supporters in Britain in the run-
up to the 2017 election. 
The worsening context for liberal 
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A second key trend has been the growth of ‘semi-democracies’ where authoritarian 
governments undermine political competition from non-incumbent parties. They erode 
political equality, the rule of law and civil liberties behind a veneer of rigged elections 
and manipulated media that confer repeated popular endorsements on the regimes 
involved. Often closely allied with the development of macro-level political corruption, this 
disguised authoritarian pattern has been exemplified in the decades-long domination of 
Russian politics by Vladimir Putin. Long regarded with a degree of complacency by western 
governments, the evidence is now mounting that semi-democracies are dangerous for their 
neighbours and for world peace. For instance, Russia began by seizing tiny enclaves of 
territory by force from Georgia, but then moved on to lead a covert (if bloodless) occupation 
of Crimea. Later Putin backed a covert civil war that has wrecked much of eastern 
Ukraine and caused the deaths and ethnic-cleansing of thousands of people there. This 
return to naked power politics has been allied with overt Russian efforts to disrupt liberal 
democracies in the USA and western Europe that go far beyond the defence of national 
interest by covert means. Russian threats to frontiers along the entire eastern borders have 
also triggered a large-scale rearmament process in NATO’s European countries, but met 
with only constrained responses by western democracies.
The rapid economic and social development of China under overtly authoritarian 
government, with one-party control and no elections beyond highly constrained contests in 
Hong Kong and at village level in some areas, has also powerfully eroded the association 
between economic improvement and liberal democracy. As something like 350 million 
people have moved out of poverty and into reasonably prosperity in each of the last two 
decades under Communist Party strategies, so China has become the second largest 
economic power globally. Its powerful state apparatus has used its new taxation resources 
to rebuild the foundations for a traditional Chinese foreign and defence policy, focused on 
achieving ‘suzerainty’ over its immediate neighbours. This has involved a degree of limited 
military expansion, seizing islands in the South China Sea to establish a maritime zone, 
and investing heavily in resource-rich developing countries to secure materials (ironically 
mirroring decades of similar ‘realist’ US policies). Yet China has also broadly maintained 
support for international political, trade and economic institutions that have facilitated its 
recent rapid growth.
The examples offered by the Russian and Chinese regimes have been influential for 
many other incumbent authoritarian elites needing to engage the support of rising 
middle class groups in industrialising countries. Semi-democratic ways of running the 
political system have been adopted in many countries and have spread back into some 
newly democratised countries. For example, in Thailand a military coup overthrew civil 
government after a long period of rancorous inter-party conflict. And in Turkey the popularly 
elected Prime Minister used his electoral majority to convert his office into an apparently 
near-permanent presidency, restricting press freedoms and civil liberties for his opponents 
and skewing election processes in his favour. 
Some observers detect behind these changes a wider ‘revolt of the middle classes’ in 
industrialising countries. These economically important groups were previously prepared 
to take action against legacy authoritarian regimes in their countries, in order to secure 
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economic liberalisation and the security of their private property, along with legal 
protections of civil rights and free movement across borders for themselves and their 
families. But as democratisation has extended so the middle classes became much less 
keen on securing genuine rights for trade unions or for workers (especially migrants), or 
on taking action to improve the living standards of the poorest sections of their societies, 
especially in the booming favelas and slums of the world’s mega-cities. The thesis can draw 
some support too from the growth of mass, ‘bourgeois’ protest movements, often against 
newly elected governments and corruption in countries like Venezuela, Thailand and Brazil, 
with de-stabilising consequences. In many industrialising countries there has been an 
increased conditionalisation of support for liberal democracy. The ideals of majority control 
and political freedom continue to be endorsed by sizeable majorities of public opinion, but 
criticism of democracy’s operations in specific party-competition and public-policy contexts 
threatens to weaken core processes in practice. 
An additional argument points out that: ‘Over two-thirds of countries that have 
transitioned to democracy since World War II have done so under constitutions written by 
the outgoing authoritarian regime’. This often creates ‘hangover’ problems and anomalies 
somewhat similar to those still affecting former authoritarian or imperial states in western 
Europe (see below).
In the longer-established liberal democracies of western Europe, north America and 
Australasia for a long time both the governing elites and much of the public at large 
seemed to regard the adverse trends in the rest of the world as something remote and 
external to them. They affected ‘far away’ geographical areas, or regions at earlier stages 
of economic and political development, or countries that broadly lacked long-lived and 
firmly founded liberal democratic traditions. These problems proved how hard it was to 
become an established liberal democracy, but on this view they did not represent any great 
internal threat within the ‘core’ countries of the democratic bloc.
Yet modern insights into ‘how democracies die’ suggest a different picture. Past 
complacency has been pretty comprehensively shattered within the last five years by the 
growth of very large and successful populist movements in many countries across western 
Europe, the UK and the USA itself – exemplified most dramatically in the Brexit referendum 
decision of 2016, the election of President Trump on a radically populist platform in 2016 
and its subsequent chequered implementation, and the decisive rejection of all established 
Italian parties by voters there in 2018, in favour of both left- and right-leaning populist 
parties. 
A key source of popular support for right-wing populists has been the increased salience 
of immigration issues. The whole world land-surface has solidified into an apparently now-
immutable geographical arrangement of 186 states claiming sovereignty, and seizures of 
terrain have become a thing of the past (apart from Putin’s adventures). So the political 
salience of defence has generally declined, while regulating the still large movements of 
peoples across the immutable borders has increased in importance. 
Right-wing populism has been sustained by a reaction against ‘foreigners’, plus the 
‘securitisation’ of immigration because of jihadic Islamism (especially strong in Europe), 
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and because of extreme drugs-related violence in Mexico (a strong fear factor in the USA). 
Reactions to increasing public fears focusing on migration have amply demonstrated the 
potential ‘lynch law’ qualities of populism, with measures appropriate for tiny minorities of 
people being extended to whole categories. The ‘naïve statism’ that often fuels populism 
is also well demonstrated in the ‘build a wall’ reaction of President Trump, who is apparently 
committed to constructing a 1900-mile long set of southern frontier defences for the USA. 
These developments have culminated in some liberal democracies moving sharply 
downwards on international democracy league tables and seeming vulnerable to a long-
term democratic malaise. The USA is the most prominent country affected. Its former ‘city 
on the hill’ ideals have been tarnished by clear evidence of prisoner torture, redaction and 
imprisonment without trial, with a disdain for international law shown in the 2000s ‘war on 
terror’, and again since 2017. The 2003 invasion of Iraq on a pretext; drone assassinations 
of opponents deemed terrorists in Afghanistan and elsewhere (without trial); apparent 
mass intelligence surveillance of allies’ citizens; and deals to monitor even US citizens, 
enacted outside the rule of law, have all seemed to create a modern apparatus of ‘imperial’ 
rule (despotic overseas and on state security, but democratic at home). (Many of the same 
charges can be made in a minor key about the UK’s roles as American ally in the 2000s.) 
The intensification of acrimonious partisan controversies in the USA marks a key 
change. The integrity of US elections has sharply declined due to the rise of systematic 
‘voter suppression’ policies, especially practised by Republican state legislatures against 
poor and black voters whom they expect to be Democrat supporters. Shockingly, these 
administrative practices (such as removing non-voters from the electoral roll altogether) 
have been endorsed by the conservative-dominated Supreme Court. Their range has 
multiplied so greatly that an international project on electoral integrity in 2018 rated North 
Carolina as no longer a liberal democracy.
A weakening of the two major US parties’ appeals seems to have stimulated more 
unprincipled elite efforts to retain control by bidding up the intensity of partisan advocacy. 
Politicians have sought to engage populist supporters via ever-more vitriolic campaigning 
that converts into more polarisation amongst voters themselves, rancorous legislative 
obstructionism and a collapse of previous bipartisan co-operation. The USA remains the 
only liberal democratic country where a two-party system as predicted by Duverger’s Law 
still operates, but increasingly without providing the strong and stable government that 
‘majoritarian’ arguments always said would be its corollary. The stalemate over any form of 
restrictive limits on who can buy guns – despite successive US school and other massacres 
carried out by anomic gunmen – is one of the most prominent symptoms of political over-
polarisation. Little wonder then that one prominent index of democracy (V-Dem, Figure 1, 
and see below) has the USA dropping from a score of 85% in 2015 to one of 72% in 2017, 
making it the fifth most prominent democracy ‘backslider’ in that period.
Amongst political scientists the implications of these disturbing developments remain quite 
strongly disputed. An ‘old guard’ of analysts, who place their trust in the study of long-run 
responses to ‘values’ questions about liberal democracy, argues that in the USA and other 
established democracies public opinion remains broadly stable, with only small declines 
in the numbers of survey respondents agreeing with pro-democracy statements. However, 
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another group of analysts point to sharp increases in support for clearly ‘undemocratic’ 
responses (such as favourable attitudes to military rule or government by non-elected 
experts) in the USA, and in some other European democracies including the UK. Similarly, 
the proportion of the population who say that it is essential to live in a democracy has fallen 
markedly since the 1990s, in the US, UK and some other established democracies. These 
responses perhaps cannot be taken at face value, but the increasing proportions of citizens 
prepared to endorse them is worrying.
At the least, then, the global context for liberal democracies has clearly worsened radically 
since 2000, semi-democracies and authoritarian regimes show few signs of transitioning 
to democratic norms, and many liberal democracies have shown signs of ‘backsliding’ and 
distortion of the political process to favour incumbents. Even in previously ‘core’ liberal 
democracies, like the USA, respect for essential civil liberties has apparently declined, 
and the proportion of citizens impatient with party politics and elections as the means for 
settling policy disputes has apparently increased substantially. Thus the context for our 
Audit of the UK is a darkening one, and the number and range of threats to democratic 
performance have multiplied.
These developments are one reason why this book offers a detailed, section-by-section 
evaluation of the changing state of UK democracy, and not the simplifying, summative 
assessment that has been widely offered by quantitative assessments and rankings or 
‘league tables’ of democracy. The changes involved are subtle ones, and their effects 
cumulate and interact in ways that the aggregate indices find difficult to capture.
However, there are now quite a number of these indices and before explaining our methods 
in more detail, it is useful to look at the alternative treatment they provide. Figure 1 shows 
some of the main indices and how they currently rate the UK, plus any overall classifications 
they give, together with a brief note on the methods used to compile them. The indices 
covered here are up to date or relatively recent. They are orientated to measuring relatively 
fine-grain changes, and have reasonably sophisticated methodologies. They are arranged 
in Figure 1 in a rough descending order of their influence, with the EIU’s Democracy Index 
much the most widely quoted, although its methods are not entirely clear. The next three are 
academic productions, with better explained methods. The IDEA index has been adopted by 
the UN. The Zurich ‘Democracy Barometer’ accords a lot of influence to the proportionality 
of the electoral system, which other measures more or less ignore. The ‘Democracy Ranking’ 
has not been updated and is relatively obscure compared to the others.
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Figure 1: Some current quantitative rankings of liberal democracies and how they rate the 
UK in 2017–18
Name of 
index
Produced by Rating of the UK UK rank Lowest scoring 
elements
Methods 
(linked to UK 
data page)
Democracy 
Index
Economist 
Intelligence 
Unit (EIU)
8.5 out of 10 
Classed as ‘Full 
democracy’
14 ‘Functioning of 
government’ = 
7.5 out of 10
Varied, not 
entirely clear
Varieties of 
Democracy
V-Dem at 
University of 
Gothenburg
87% on 
the Liberal 
Democracy 
Index
16 68% on the 
‘Participatory 
component’
Quantitative 
data 
analysis, 
aggregated 
into six 
components
Global 
State of 
Democracy
International 
IDEA
83% average 
score across 
16 political/
institutional 
dimensions
not 
given
17% on ‘direct 
democracy’; 
60% on 
electoral 
participation
Varied, but 
data-heavy
Democracy 
Barometer
University of 
Zurich  
(in 2014)
58% on overall 
‘democratic 
quality’ index, 
across 9 political/
institutional 
dimensions
2014 
rank not 
given, 
but was 
26  
in 2011
49% on 
representation 
dimension; 
53% on popular 
control and 
social equality
Quantitative 
data 
analysis, 
aggregated 
into six 
components
Democracy 
Ranking
Austrian 
NGO, 
Democracy 
Ranking  
(in 2014)
75% across 
seven political, 
economic and 
other dimensions
14 62% on the 
economy; 64% 
on knowledge 
of democracy
Varied 
indices, but 
uses data
Note: URL links to all sources are included above (see also References section).
What picture do these scorings give about UK democracy? All agree that the UK is one of 
the world’s top group of democracies, but none of them put it within the top ten positions. 
However, the top-scoring countries tend to be small or very small countries, especially the 
Scandinavian countries with some tiny additions (like Estonia). Arguably it is much easier to 
run a liberal democracy with (say) six million people than with the UK’s current 66 million. 
And, of course, it is harder still to run a democracy with 300 million people (as in the 
USA), and very hard to do so with 1.2 billion people (as in India). Smaller states are more 
straightforward to operate, and organising public participation and consultation is simpler. 
So perhaps this explains the UK’s absence from the top ten. Five of the six rankings score 
participation-related aspects as the UK’s weakest area. However, EIU scores it lowest on 
how well government operates.
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(Side note for geeks: In addition to the indices above, there are literally hundreds of 
different classification schemes that are of no use to us here, because they are primarily 
orientated towards the comparative classification of countries over time [for example, 
across the last century]; use simplistic typologies [where the UK is just always in the top/
best ‘democracy’ category], or are very out of date. They have been discussed extensively 
by political scientists and development economists, but they are useless for our purposes 
because the UK achieves a ‘ceiling’ score in them. A well-known example is the Polity 
IV score, which updates every year but always gives the UK a ‘perfect’ 10 out of 10 score 
[along with the USA] – whereas other democratic countries [like France] are often scored 9 
out of 10. It is produced by a US think tank, and funded by the CIA.)
In addition to the overall democracy rankings, there are a large number of other measures 
of single aspects that are highly relevant to democratic performance. Figure 2 shows how 
the UK compares with other countries on some key institutional criteria: freedom of speech 
and media, civil service effectiveness and corruption. Their importance for democratic 
performance is clear-cut – with corruption and media manipulation by political leaders 
especially emerging as central means of contemporary democratic decline. 
Figure 2: Some current rankings of partial institutional aspects of liberal democracy, and how 
they rate the UK in 2017–18
Name of 
index
Aspect of democracy 
covered
Rating of the 
UK
UK rank Methods
Freedom 
House Index
Freedom, political rights, 
civil rights
94% out of 100% 
Also: Score = 1 
(‘fully free’) on 
a seven-point 
scale
16 2018 rating Both 
Press and Net 
freedom status = 
free
Transparency 
International
Corruption, bribery etc. 81% out of 100 10 Survey evidence 
of perceptions of 
corruption 
INCISE 
Index of 
Civil Service 
Effectiveness 
How well national 
bureaucracies operate, 
using objective 
indicators and expert 
judgements. Produced 
by UK think tank, the 
Institute for Government 
(with UK civil service 
funding).
Implied average 
score of 
87% 
across three 
macro-indices
4 
out of 31 
countries 
assessed
76 metrics 
aggregated into 
12 component 
scores (see p.63). 
UK ranked top for 
3, but below 50% 
for capabilities and 
digital services.
On both freedom measures and the absence of corruption the UK does well, but does not 
score exceptionally highly. The INCISE measure of civil service effectiveness gives the UK its 
highest ranking of any comparative measure, at fourth out of 71 countries covered. However, 
INCISE could be seen as generous to the UK – for example, in giving the UK top marks 
in regulatory effectiveness for 2017, despite the crisis of building regulations revealed by 
Grenfell Tower, and the earlier neglect of macro-prudential regulation of bank liabilities.
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Another relevant set of partial criteria to consider for liberal democracies are shown in 
Figure 3, which covers output-related measures – in terms of meeting people’s basic 
needs, achieving well-being or happiness for citizens, and levels of social equality (or 
inequality). Their relevance for democratic performance lies in the salience of including all 
citizens in political life on relatively equal terms, which clearly requires that some measure 
of social equality is maintained. Again, the UK is placed in a rather familiar ‘good but not 
outstanding’ category, except on social inequality where it is placed in the bottom group of 
OECD countries, alongside the USA.
Figure 3: Some current rankings of output/political equality aspects of liberal democracy, 
and how they rate the UK in 2017–18
Name of 
index
Aspect of political 
equality covered
Rating of the UK UK rank Methods
Social 
Progress 
Index
Index of how far 
society meets 
people’s basic needs, 
creates well-being 
foundations and offers 
opportunities
89% out of 100 12 Index aggregated 
from 12 underlying 
indicators, then 
normalised
World 
Happiness 
Report
Happiness index 
based on healthy life 
expectation, social 
support, generosity, 
choices
6.7 out of 10  
(top country’s  
score = 7.6)
19 Mix of survey 
data and country 
statistics
OECD late 
2000s
Inequality after taxes 
and transfers (GINI 
coefficient)
0.345 
(Best country = 
0.25. Worst country 
= 0.48)
27 (out 
of then 
34 OECD 
countries)
Country statistics 
on income levels 
across social 
groups
Summing up, quantitative assessments and league tables of democratic performance tend 
to have a problem with ‘ceiling’ effects, with ‘advanced’ countries bunching near the top. 
Even allowing for this, the UK rarely makes the ‘premier league’ of excellent performers, 
coming in instead in the ‘first division’ of good but at times somewhat flawed democracies. 
For any one ranking it is always possible to make an argument that the measures being 
considered are problematic in some degree, or have been put together into component 
indices in ways that reflect value judgements – which indeed are inevitable in this field 
of work. However, the UK’s recurring placement across multiple rankings is not so easily 
dismissed – for the inaccuracies or potentially questionable features of indices tend to 
wash out when we look at many different measures. Aggregated quantitative indices are 
also rather ill-adapted to assess the democratic quality of advanced countries, especially 
where they take the established democracies as an unproblematic standard for the 
assessment of developing countries, which is potentially a rather smug assumption.
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Democratic Audit’s disaggregated approach
One of the founders of Democratic Audit (along with Stuart Weir) was the philosopher David 
Beetham. He claimed that:
‘Our conception of democracy is more comprehensive, and our assessment 
criteria more rigorous, than those employed in other democracy 
assessments. We have not limited democracy to the two areas of electoral 
competition and inclusiveness and civil and political freedoms that have 
become standard since Dahl’s Polyarchy… In addition, we have used the 
principle of political equality as a key index of democratic attainment 
throughout our assessment of political rights and institutions.’ (Beetham, 
1999, p.569).
And he rejected trying to define an overall ranking:
‘because aggregation into a single score is inappropriate to the distinctive 
purpose of a democratic audit, which is to help differentiate between those 
aspects of a country’s political life which are more satisfactory from a 
democratic point of view and those which give cause for concern. For this 
purpose, keeping the different aspects separate, and making a discursive 
assessment of each in turn, is both a more appropriate and a more 
defensible procedure’. (Beetham, 1999, p.569).
This approach was an influential one, and adapted well to comparative use in different 
countries.
In addition, we need multiple criteria because we are assessing a democratic state – and 
modern political theory emphasises that a state is never a single unity (as both Marxists 
and neo-liberals used to claim), nor ever just a ragbag of miscellaneous institutions (as 
pluralist liberals used to claim). Instead states are composed of multiple connected parts, all 
of which must work harmoniously together if the state is to survive and work effectively. In 
one perspective the state is a ‘multi-system’ – like the human body, composed of multiple 
partly independent systems (muscles, bones, nervous system, respiratory and blood 
supply systems) that must work jointly within narrow limits if effective operation is to be 
maintained. A more post-structuralist view sees the state as ‘many things’, so operating in 
a differentiated way, but also strongly unifying. 
For our purposes, though, the key implication is the same – namely that a disaggregated 
or bit-by-bit evaluation can offer many more useful and differentiated insights into the UK’s 
changing democracy. In each chapter that follows in sections 2 to 7, we look at one of 32 
components that we identify as critical building blocks of a liberal democratic polity. And 
because democracy is a local thing we devote nine of these chapters to following this 
analysis through into the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and 
England at sub-national level.
In the qualitative methods we have used throughout our analysis: 
‘Popular control and political equality comprise our two key democratic 
principles and provide the litmus test for how far a country’s political life can 
be regarded as democratic’. (Beetham, 1999, p.570).
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However, we have also made two innovations on the original Democratic Audit schema for 
evaluation, so as to develop and make fully transparent the basis on which we have made 
judgements of performance and assessed recent trends and changes.
First, for each of the topics that we analyse we seek to specify clearly and comprehensively 
what are the democratic criteria applying in that area. We set out these bases for 
judgement in a box at the start of every chapter. All of these evaluations:
✦	 relate to core liberal or democratic (majority rule and popular control) principles;
✦	 are sufficiently generic to apply across all (or a viable sub-set) of countries;
✦	 are ranked, so that we would expect established liberal democracies to pass all criteria 
that more recent democracies pass;
✦	 are realistic (i) in recognising that perfect or utopian principles always conflict, and so 
how they are reconciled is critically important; 
✦	 and realistic (ii) in recognising that liberal/democratic principles and state viability/
efficacy must sometimes conflict. 
Many philosophers have also expressed these last two ‘realism’ requirements as the 
problem of ‘dirty hands’. Any leader or government will sometimes face choices where one 
ethical principle must be violated if another ethically desirable goal is to be achieved. Some 
choices are necessarily dilemmas (with undesirable costs attaching to whatever course 
of action you take). To be useful (and not just utopian) the criteria for democracy must 
acknowledge such conflicts, where needed.
Second, we have used a framework called Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats (SWOT) to provide clearly visible overall judgements of the UK’s performance 
against the democratic criteria. The ‘strengths’ section sums up how many aspects of the 
UK’s arrangements conform with democratic requirements, explaining why it is a leading 
democracy in these respects. The ‘weaknesses’ section considers where democratic 
criteria are not currently being met, briefly tracing their causes and effects. (We also expand 
on some strengths and weaknesses in the discussions of key topics that follow the SWOT 
analysis.) 
Because democracy is a living, changing focus of many different people’s practices, 
hopes and aspirations, our SWOT analysis also covers future trends and developments. 
‘Opportunities’ are areas where current strengths can be expanded or deepened in future, 
or where new approaches might extend the value of current democratic practices. ‘Threats’ 
are adverse possible developments, where democratic performance may worsen in 
future – either because of wider trends (for example, digital social media eroding ‘legacy’ 
media’s coverage of politics), or because of distinctive UK state actions that inhibit or 
damage existing freedoms or democratic practices. (These two parts of the analysis are 
also discussed more empirically, either in the ‘recent developments’ sections that come just 
before the SWOT analysis, or in one or two sections that follow it.)
Central to the UK’s strengths as a democracy is its stability, with constitutional changes and 
democratisation both happening gradually and in manageable increments, so creating a 
long political tradition on which voters and elites can draw in resolving new problems. Yet 
the recurring mirror weakness in British democracy is that for much of its history, the UK 
state was first oligarchic (run by an aristocracy) – and later a mixed imperial state. From the 
late 19th century, the political system was in part (slowly) democratising at home, but at the 
same time it operated in essentially despotic ways across India and colonies with hundreds 
of millions of (non-white) subject peoples. 
Political scientists assign a lot of importance to a phenomenon called ‘path dependency’: 
once a country starts off with a given set of core institutions, it tends to move down a 
particular direction of change that is influenced by the initial conditions. So a country 
usually cannot go back and do something different. Nation states cannot (easily, without 
some unusual crisis) reset their constitutions or established institutions into a fresh or 
modernised set-up adapted to a new age with new problems. Instead political systems 
mainly adapt the institutions they already have, or make only those changes that seem 
feasible from their previous direction of travel. Sometimes the influence of earlier stages 
of development is benign, providing key foundations for new responses, with changes 
then happening in peaceful increments. But at other times ‘legacy’ institutions endure into 
very different conditions despite operating poorly or in non-democratic ways, and here 
citizens and politicians are forced simply to accept that ‘this is the way things are’ and that 
a majority will for change is not sufficient to be effective. 
The Westminster tradition as an asset
British political historians have overwhelmingly taken a strongly favourable view of what’s 
called the Westminster tradition, summed up by Anthony King as ‘Britain’s power-hoarding 
constitution’ [p.81]. Its central elements combine the apparently different doctrines of 
parliamentary sovereignty (there is no constitutional or judicial or any other limit on what 
Parliament can legislate), with the actual subordination of Parliament almost all the time to 
the executive elites of the two main, highly disciplined parties. In practice, a single-party 
government with a solid Commons majority was the normal peacetime situation in the late 
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19th and 20th centuries. Thus Parliament in fact became dominated by the Prime Minister, 
ministers and the executive. In this set-up, as King [p.49] aptly remarked: ‘[Walter] Bagehot 
[the leading constitutional commentator of the 1860s] and most of his successors… were 
right to observe that there is one and only one crucial institution in the British system: 
the government of the day’. Yet the mighty executive has marched under the apparently 
paradoxical banner of parliamentary control, reconciling the two by claiming to embody the 
electoral will of the people.
The allegedly positive features and consequences of the Westminster tradition have also 
been expounded by dozens of political science, and constitutional and legal commentators. 
The UK has an unfixed constitution, written down only haphazardly in numerous different 
documents. Its operations are subject to a lot of interpretation. And how things work in 
practice often depends on the existence of limiting conventions, which sustain a degree of 
consensus on the rules of politics between the competing major party elites. (Conventions 
are akin to ‘rumble strips’ on the sides of roads, but they are not crash barriers. You can 
easily drive over or through them, if you don’t care about the ugly noise created.) The 
constitution can be easily changed – sometimes by a single vote in the Commons, as with 
the 2015 introduction of ‘English votes for English laws’ (EVEL). This change brought in 
novel legislative procedures at Westminster for processing laws only relating to England, 
from which non-English MPs were excluded (see Chapter 4.1 on the House of Commons). 
The unfixed and uncodified constitution is said to be adaptable, to facilitate elite consensus 
on fundamental values and norms that conduce to effective government, and yet to 
respond sensitively to (most) public demands. These claims are often allied with a macro-
narrative of steady democratic progress, first in the 19th century towards limited democracy 
from a liberal monarchical constitution, and then in the modern era towards universal 
franchise, the full extension of civil liberties, a welfare state and (since 1997) a more 
devolved and participatory democracy. 
Gradual change amidst strong traditions is said to have developed a ‘civic culture’ 
engendering benevolent habits and instinctive actions amongst citizens that support 
democratic debate without rancorous divisions. This is something like a political equivalent 
of fast/slow thinking as analysed by Daniel Kahnman, with the ‘fast’ impulse here being an 
almost instinctive closure to extremism amongst British voters, and recognition of the need 
for collective decisions to respect the rights of all. For example, UK civic attitudes are said 
to shut down (most) rancorous political extremism before it flowers, and to be successful 
in attracting new generations of citizens and also inward migrants to operate within the 
existing institutions via ‘soft power’ and rational logics.
More differentiated accounts
The key danger of the literature justifying ‘the British political tradition’ and the Westminster 
model is that it becomes a myth-building exercise, positing a smooth linear development 
that ignores repeated disjunctures and crises that have shaped the UK’s political evolution. 
Many modern political science accounts claim to be sensitive to the dangers of ‘meta-
narratives’, which often end up justifying the status quo as something like Voltaire’s 
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‘Everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds’. These revisionist accounts 
assign more significance to the persistence of strong disagreements about how the 
political system does and should work between different parties and political groupings 
within parties. For example, Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes argue that four main ‘narratives 
of governance’ have contested the nature of the UK’s polity for a century or more, shown in 
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Four alternative traditions/interpretations of the UK polity
Contesting traditions
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liberal)
Tory Whig Socialist
Core locations Conservative 
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wing Liberal 
Democrats
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Conservatives, 
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public services
‘Governance 
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Markets and 
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husbanding
Intermediate 
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wrecked
An ‘organic’ 
constitution and 
polity is needed 
and can be 
returned to via 
reforms
Government 
needs to be 
joined-up to serve 
welfare needs 
‘Storyline’ Markets need to 
be restored and 
state overload 
reduced
Preserving 
traditional 
authority and 
institutions is 
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Evolutionary 
change in 
institutions
Reconfiguring 
the bureaucratic/ 
administrative 
state is key
Source: Derived from Bevir and Rhodes, 2004, Table 1. 
These positions are not just academic creations (although each has many academic 
exponents). Rather Bevir and Rhodes claim that these traditions are live and current 
elements in the thinking of UK political and administrative elites. Their effects can be 
observed at work in debates and controversies over constitutional and policy issues. They 
are embedded in the everyday practice of ministers and civil service elites. According 
to these authors they can be seen threading through elite behaviours when observed 
by ethnographic techniques, like shadowing top officials or ministers through their daily 
activities.
The legacies of imperialism 
There is a singular omission in the accounts of both the conventional defenders of the 
Westminster tradition, and the more recent culturalist accounts of its enduring role. Both are 
strongly selective in their historical picture of the UK state, with their focus narrowly drawn 
only on the core UK territories and processes that relate to them. 
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Most conventional descriptions (especially by modern political scientists) include nothing 
more than isolated, passing references to the British empire. A few fuller accounts 
stress instead that the empire always had only minimal effects on the core institutions 
of Westminster, Whitehall and intra-UK government. For instance, in describing ‘Britain’s 
traditional constitution’, King (2007) wrote [p.47]:
‘The traditional constitution was also remarkably self-contained. So long as 
the British Empire existed, important British institutions, notably the Colonial 
Office, the India Office, the Dominions Office, and the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council (which acted as the empire’s supreme court), did intersect 
with the outside world; but the constitutional traffic was, so to speak, almost 
entirely one way. It was overwhelmingly outwards... In constitutional terms, 
inbound traffic was almost non-existent. Britain felt no need to learn from 
the institutions and practices of other countries’.
The empire appears in most recent UK political histories chiefly as an aberrant episode of 
history – one that should never have happened, was always destined to disappear, and 
anyway was relatively benign by the standards of the times. It therefore has only a limited 
significance for the development of the home UK state and polity, chiefly confined to the 
(predictable) loss of Empire in the period 1945–70, with its main impact on voters and public 
opinion being that ‘by the mid 1960s the British were no longer special. They were ordinary, 
very ordinary’. (King, 2007, p.65). The implications for UK elites were (as Dulles put it) that 
the country had ‘lost an empire but not yet found a role’. Similarly, despite their stress on 
understanding political and administrative cultures, Bevir and Rhodes’ works (such as 2010) 
actually mention the UK’s imperial recent past only once, to note how nostalgia for empire 
was an integral part of Enoch Powell’s anti-immigration stance. Thus, most conventional 
accounts and the culturalist analyses of political traditions both practice a kind of UK 
‘nativism’ in which they ignore or marginalise anything in the path development of UK 
governance not relating directly to the British heartland.
The key thing about organisational and institutional cultures, however, is that they are 
very long-lasting, and also very hard to change. Developed over decades, they may last 
centuries. So is it really credible that the imperial state which lasted in the UK for more than 
three hundred years, and which existed in a recognisably modern form as a consistently 
and strongly unified apparatus from the 1860s to 1970, has so few implications for the 
modern UK? 
One interesting pointer to an answer is that the Brexit referendum and the rejection by 
voters of 43 years of pro-EU policy-making was apparently closely linked amongst older 
voters with a nostalgia for times past, including the imperial period. In January 2016, 
YouGov found that 44% of UK respondents were proud of Britain’s history of colonialism 
while only 21% regretted that it happened; 23% held neither view. The same poll also asked 
about whether the British empire was a good thing or a bad thing: 43% said it was good, 
while only 19% said it was bad; 25% responded that it was ‘neither’. A 2014 YouGov poll 
found 59% of respondents supporting the view the British empire was ‘more something 
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to be proud of’, compared to 19% feeling it was ‘more something to be ashamed of’. One 
columnist observed that: ‘The sun may never set on British misconceptions about our 
empire’.
And surely one of the most salient facts about the modern UK state is that throughout 
its most formative century (1850 to 1950) it was not just a liberal constitutional state, still 
less just a slowly evolving liberal democracy. It was instead a mixed polity, where the 
liberal and democratic parts co-existed with a huge apparatus of overseas empire that 
was for the most part governed despotically (and on racist lines). Figure 2 shows how 
these arrangements operated in 1910, with four very different kinds of political system all 
channelled through the same Westminster Cabinet system and Whitehall civil service. 
(i) Perhaps the dominant part of the system was the home or ‘island’ state (shaded orange 
in Figure 2). Inside the UK’s ‘metropolitan territories’ of Britain and Ireland a recognisably 
democratic political process operated. It still involved only a small minority of male voters, 
but already the UK elites had worked out how to do peaceful political succession as strong 
parties alternated in government, and they in turn created a well-organised home civil 
service. By 1900 there were even the beginnings of a welfare state. Of course, the home 
state dominated much of the business of the apex state, shown shaded purple, and many 
of the issues that preoccupied politicians and parties.
Even in the ‘metropolitan core’, however, the inclusion of Ireland caused huge anxieties 
to UK elites – with the elite (and mass) fearing that Irish nationalists might come to hold a 
balance of power at Westminster and use that leverage to advance their independence 
cause. To stop this from happening, from the 1870s onwards Tory and Liberal party elites 
agreed a whole range of restrictive practices limiting the power of the Westminster 
Parliament in favour of the government of the day. These included the ability to close 
down and guillotine Commons debates, force votes and, very significantly, a ban on MPs 
proposing any new public spending without a certificate from ministers (which was never 
given). These measures consolidated major party elites’ ability to dominate their MPs, 
but they also meant that, with some cross-party agreement at leadership level, Irish MPs’ 
influence could be minimised. This was a key reason why MPs’ influence was so radically 
reduced at just this time, and why the executive and opposition came to so thoroughly 
dominate the Commons.
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Figure 2: The British imperial state in 1900
(ii) A second, rapidly growing element in Figure 2 (shaded white) consisted of the white 
settler states that would later evolve into ‘dominions’ (chiefly Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa), plus the white settler minorities in India and in other colonies. It 
is rarely appreciated in the UK now how vast was the scale of emigration from Britain and 
Ireland to the imperial territories:
‘Between 1815 and 1914 around 20 million Britons left the country, a massive 
exodus relative to the total population. By 1900 the British population was 
about 41 million; without emigration it would have been over 70 million.’ 
(Kennedy, 1992, p.6).
Some of this out-migration was voluntary, but much was not, especially in Ireland. There, 
compared to 1800: ‘By the 1840s starvation and emigration had reduced the population by 
one-fifth [on its 1800 level]’ (Kennedy, 1992, p.10). Nevertheless, by 1900 white populations 
in the countries that later became the ‘white’ dominions were organising and operating 
their own democratically elected governments. Hence, as Figure 2 shows, their political 
elites were accorded a measure of influence by the UK’s imperial command.
In (iii) India (shaded green) and (iv) the other UK colonies (shaded blue), the white 
populations exerted an important if less direct and formalised influence on imperial officials 
– who relied a good deal on their support and co-operation in regulating sometimes 
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turbulent local politics. All colonies were expected to be self-supporting in budgetary terms, 
and to contribute when needed to ‘imperial defence’. In return, they knew that the same 
UK protective naval and military umbrella could apply to them if ever needed, and that they 
would enjoy the benefits of imperial trade preferences. So for the white populations only 
the rightmost columns in Figure 2 included channels of influence that were also liberalising 
(albeit in a revenue-constrained way) and moderately responsive to local opinion.
However, for the non-white populations, the same two leftmost columns in Figure 2 show 
that governance was run on entirely despotic lines, with native populations coercively 
governed and policed. Beyond law-and-order roles, almost nothing by way of state services 
was organised for the non-white population (let alone any form of welfare services). The 
350 million people governed in this way dwarfed the 60 million home island and later 
dominion populations, creating a huge military/policing tensions. Managing them required 
constant attention from the centre and its pro-consuls in each territory.
The main difference between the two rightmost columns in Figure 2 was that India and 
its surrounding regions were recognised as the chaotic legacy product of multiple past 
civilisations, whereas in Africa especially native peoples were seen as uncivilised and 
prone to purely tribal reactions. Accordingly, law was seen as an important weapon for 
maintaining imperial predominance in India, so that UK despotism there was always 
somewhat more constrained. For Weiner (2009) ‘Law lay at the heart of British imperial 
enterprise’. As James Fitzjames Stephen observed in the early 1870s:
‘British Power in India is like a vast bridge... One of its piers is military power: 
the other is justice, by which I mean a firm and constant determination on 
the part of the English to promote impartially and by all lawful means, what 
they (the English) regard as the lasting good of the natives of India. Neither 
force nor justice will suffice by itself… Strike away either of its piers and it will 
fall, and what are they?’ (Porter, 2010, review of Weiner, 2009).
(Of course, no Indian court had any jurisdiction over the UK officials operating the imperial 
apparatus in India for any act done in a public capacity, from the Viceroy down to the 
lowest district administrator.)
In the era of free trade, none of this could protect the Indian economy from opening up to 
UK trade, however devastating the consequences of imperial globalisation were for the 
domestic economy:
‘whereas the British and Indian peoples had roughly similar per capital 
levels of industrialisation at the outset of the Industrial Revolution (1750), 
India’s level was one hundredth of the United Kingdom’s by 1900… India 
imported a mere one million yards of cotton fabric in 1814, but that figure 
had risen to 51 million yards by 1830 and to a staggering 995 million yards 
by 1870’. (Kennedy, 1992, p.11).
Some revisionist historians have recently argued that the theme of British exploitation of 
India can be overdone, and that some economic change did occur. But the basic picture is 
at best a severely mixed one.
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The idea that the development of the UK state was largely uninfluenced by the imperial 
period historically relied on a range of other supportive beliefs – such as that the British 
empire was distinctively liberal, benign and interested in the welfare of its subjects (at least 
by comparison with contemporary empires); or the equally powerful ‘myth of effortless 
control’ whereby hundreds of millions of Indians were ruled by a few hundred thousand 
(white) British officials and troops. In fact, estimates by Subrahmanyam (2006) show that at 
its peacetime peak around 1910 the imperial state involved more than 2.5 million people – 
in a period when world populations were a fraction of their current levels. 
And recent studies of the millions of lives lost in repeated and perfectly avoidable Indian 
famines (the last in 1943) and of ‘barbed-wire imperialism’ have demonstrated that 
(whatever the self-beliefs of the officials involved) the UK empire could not escape the 
worst consequences of despotic rule. Concentration camps, for instance, were invented in 
British India to warehouse otherwise itinerant victims of famines, long before their more 
notorious use against a complete (white) people during the Anglo-Boer war. Forth notes:
‘The scale of internment is shocking: in the final decades of the nineteenth 
century, Britain interned more than ten million men, women and children in 
camps during a series of colonial, military, medical and subsistence crises’. 
The increasing demands of the imperial state often lead the way in British officials 
developing all the varied technologies of modern government, including the management 
of extended chains of command, military and political intelligence systems, and modern, 
centralised communications:
‘The number of telegrams and dispatches at the Foreign Office rose 
markedly – from 9,060 in 1825 to 91,430 in 1895 – as did registered papers 
at the Colonial Office. The number of papers handled by the Colonial 
Office doubled between 1868 and 1888. Its telegraph bill rose more than 
twelvefold between 1870 and 1900–1, and the number of telegrams it 
dispatched rose sevenfold between 1907 and 1915.’ (Harrison, 1996, p.63).
The imperial state provided a template for the modern UK civil service (which developed 
from an Indian civil service blueprint) and its technologies defined some of the most 
advanced governance practices of the era:
‘In the case of the nineteenth-century British high civil service, the code 
of “honorable secrecy”, maintained by a whole new technology of 
“administration”, reasserted aristocratic, part-patrimonial, powers within 
government and the often highly dishonorable exchanges of information 
and favors by which political work gets done by state agents’. (Joyce and 
Mukerji, 2017, p.16, quoting Vincent [1998]).
Above all, the routing of all imperial issues through the Westminster apparatus of Prime 
Minister, Cabinet and Parliament, and the Whitehall apparatus, created a radically 
bifurcated situation in the policy-making environment – where one item on the agenda 
for decision-makers involved domestic, democratically influenced politics, and the next 
would relate to the despotic government of other races. Keeping both ways of thinking 
and proceedings going in tandem required that decision-makers develop a kind of ‘split 
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personality’ culture. Little wonder then that over 150 years a cross-pollution of each sphere 
occurred. Imperial policy was increasingly infected by the myths of a ‘white man’s burden’ 
creating ethical issues for imperial administrators. And the exigencies of repeated imperial 
crises required the development in the apex state of a culture of secrecy, cross-party elite 
‘bloc’ rule, the suppression of all parliamentary initiative in spending or legislation, and the 
insulation of much of government from any effective popular control.
These effects were most apparent amongst the aristocratic ‘pro-consuls’ who kept the 
imperial state’s multiple contradictions in working order:
‘[Lord Alfred] Milner’s private correspondence is peppered with scorching 
comment on the problems resulting from “this rotten assembly in 
Westminster” where “the whole future of the Empire may turn upon the 
whims of men who have been elected for their competence in dealing with 
Metropolitan tramways or country pubs”.’ (Harrison, 1996, p.62).
Similarly, Lord Selborne told Lord Curzon in 1907: ‘One of the great problems you and I 
have to try to solve is how to develop the constitution so as to remove things really imperial 
from the control of the House of Commons.’
The safe operation of the empire, insulated from destabilising, democratic politics, 
required increasing deformations in how the executive and legislative branches acted 
in order to reconcile contradictory impulses. While these changes could be more easily 
accommodated within the uncodified constitution, the reliance on restrictive political 
and administrative cultures changed the purely ‘island state’ history of the UK polity into 
something far more onerous and with adverse legacy effects. The American conservative 
thinker George Santayana wrote in his 1922 Soliloquies from England:
‘When a people exercises control over other peoples its government 
becomes ponderous even at home; its elaborate machinery cannot be 
stopped, and can hardly be mended; the imperial people becomes the 
slave of its commitment.’ (quoted Kirk, 1982, p.468).
Did all this change from 1947 with Britain’s overly delayed and badly botched retreat from 
empire in India (where decades of earlier ‘divide and rule’ policies contributed to millions killed 
in Hindu and Muslim ethnic riots)? Not much, in fact, because as Harrison (pp.64–65) noted: 
‘The administrative consequences [of empire] for Whitehall of Britain’s 
world role persisted well into the 1960s and were wound down less from 
inclination or design than in response to economic crises… The empire in 
decline made greater bureaucratic demands than in its days of prosperity.’ 
Of course, the imperial state overseas shrank back progressively. Yet if we consider the 
contemporary structure of the UK state in 2018 (half a century after the colonial dream was 
finally given up in the retreat from Aden) there are some substantial continuities still with 
the earlier imperial period, as Figure 3 shows. The almost complete dominance of the UK 
domestic state is clearly shown, although the development of devolved governments and 
inter-governmental relations is beginning to qualify it. The old apparatus of empire lingers 
on only in the vestigial form of the Commonwealth.
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Figure 3: The UK state in 2018
However, there is a more substantial relic of imperialism in the persistence of a substantial 
‘dark state’ that encompasses: 
✦	 the UK’s nuclear defences and facilities (created and retained by a post-war Labour and 
Conservatives elite ‘bloc’ as a substitute for empire in international affairs);
✦	 an extensive apparatus of fighting ‘small wars’ (for example, now including special forces 
and drone warfare) that has seen UK forces involved in overseas conflicts (as well as in 
Northern Ireland) in every post-war year, often in ex-colonies – most recently in Libya, 
Iraq and Syria;
✦	 a ‘cold war’ alliance-state legacy, including a ‘special relationship’ with the USA; 
✦	 a highly developed intelligence state (forming part of the ‘Five Eyes’ linkage of the USA 
and the UK and three former dominion states);
✦	 a highly developed procurement state, which requires that the UK be a leading 
armaments exporter in order to survive, and which increasingly underpins the UK’s 
dwindling manufacturing and high-tech sectors.
This part of the state is ‘dark’ not because its activities are necessarily nefarious or directed 
to wrong purposes, but because so much of its operations are kept away from Parliament 
and public debate, shrouded still in a pervasive secrecy that is yet another enduring legacy 
of decades of imperial rule. 
Now, just as in the past, a whole series of conflicts inside the UK’s political parties can be 
traced to ‘dark state’ operations – such as the status of the Trident missile programme in 
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Labour’s policy; or the operation of the Faslane nuclear base in the Scottish independence 
debates); or the August 2013 Tory–Liberal Democrat government move to start bombing 
Syria, which was the first foreign policy case where a majority of MPs rejected a Prime 
Minister’s war-making initiative in the post-war period. 
The continuities in state practices and modes of decision-making between the imperial 
state in its heyday and the contemporary ‘dark state’ are striking. For instance, Ledwige’s 
2017 book Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in the 9/11 Wars is strongly reminiscent 
of Callwell’s classic (1896) treatise on Small Wars (still in print), and different from the still 
‘business as usual’ gloss in Mockaitis. The UK’s failures in Basra, Afghanistan and Libya 
show an almost spooky continuity with the UK’s imperial past – both within the UK armed 
forces and Ministry of Defence, and in the very heart of the state in the core executive as 
it authorised repeated, failed overseas interventions. And the burdens of managing an 
overwhelmingly democratised polity while masking the continuation of the ‘dark state’ from 
the public’s gaze, still continuously creates deep-lying structural and institutional tensions. 
These cloud and obstruct the impulse for democratic reforms to ‘normalise’ the institutions 
of UK democracy. For instance, the UK has been a consistent laggard on recognising 
international human rights issues, partly because of fears that UK armed forces’ actions 
overseas would trigger claims – just as in the imperial era the UK shunned any declaration 
of ‘human’ rights, and any clear specification of citizenship rights, lest they should be 
thought applicable within their territories by the empire’s subject peoples.
This history of split democratising/despotic government co-management within the 
same institutions, and its diminished but still substantial implications even half a century 
later, is one of the primary factors sustaining islands of undemocratic practice across UK 
government. These legacy ‘dark state’ effects largely account for why the UK typically ranks 
outside the top 15 liberal democracies. They also explain why the institutional landscape of 
UK government is so jumbled and capable of generating almost simultaneously evidence of 
strong responsiveness to public opinion and extensive influence over policies by citizens, 
and strongly centralising and coercive initiatives whenever governments come under 
pressure from new issues – as with the recent ‘securitisation’ of immigration issues. 
One recent danger of these contradictory impulses lies in their interaction with populist 
movements of public opinion and with media campaigns feeding on them. The 2016 Brexit 
referendum result was driven in part by a populist nostalgia amongst older voters for a 
return to imperial times. All populist movements tend to advocate complex mixes of ‘anti-
state’ policies, but also ‘naïve statist’ policies (like Brexit), where a crude assertion of state 
power is used in ‘lynch law’ ways that (could) ride roughshod over the rights of socially 
unpopular minorities. After the decision to leave the EU, 3.2 million non-British European 
citizens living in the UK faced not only an uncertain future, but also a social backlash from 
a minority of voters who apparently saw their anti-foreigner prejudices as ‘validated’ by 
the referendum outcome. To be sure, state authorities took action to clamp down on any 
serious threats, yet still the livelihoods and families of those affected seemed for a long 
time no more than a bargaining chip in the UK state’s Brexit negotiations.
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Thus contemporary political cultures at both elite and popular levels continue to be 
shaped by the ‘British political tradition’ in diverse long-lived ways, both benign (from 
the slow evolution of democratic practices with deep roots) and malign (from the legacy 
effects of the 150 year traumas of imperial rule routing through the same UK apex state as 
democratising impulses). 
Conclusions
Liberal democracy is a complex construct. Its operations require many different 
components to work together, mesh with, and be able to control a wider state apparatus 
that is arguably essential to modern civilisation. In the rest of this book we provide a 
detailed, section-by-section coverage of the UK’s changing democracy. From the wider, 
worsening context of modern political changes (discussed in Chapter 1.1) we are alert to 
the many ways in which democratic decay or backsliding can set in, and to the wider (often 
global) trends that are transforming political processes across many countries. From the 
qualified recognitions of the UK as a stable but not clearly excellent liberal democracy 
covered at the start of Chapter 1.2 we take the lesson that Britain’s patchy achievements 
contain strengths and weaknesses that may translate into opportunities to improve what 
is currently failing, or threaten to initiate wider decay if left un-tackled. And from the 
UK’s highly mixed inheritance of gradual and peaceful democratisation, combined with 
prolonged institutional and political culture deformations from the imperial era (covered 
in Chapter 1.3), we trace why the UK’s unusual constitutional and political arrangements 
have persisted into the 21st century, with many lacunae, gaps and lapses from democratic 
practices that are otherwise hard to explain. ‘Never before has the British political tradition 
been more contested’, according to some critics.
Our analytic approach is a qualitative one, but with the developed criteria for democratic 
practices made explicit, and our key evaluations summarised in our SWOT analyses. Our 
analyses start from the premise that democracy within the UK is far from fully realised:
‘[T]to assume perfection is to cast serious doubt on the conception of 
democracy and the assessment criteria being employed…. An [underlying] 
assumption we have made in our work is of an inertial tendency inherent 
in social and political systems towards oligarchy and inequality, unless it 
is being actively resisted. This means that the work of democratisation is 
never finished and that established democracies are as much in need of 
critical assessment as developing ones’. (Beetham, 1999, pp.568–569).
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What does democracy require for an electoral system?
✦	 It should accurately translate parties’ votes into seats in the legislature (here the 
House of Commons nationally, and councils at local level in England and Wales).
✦	 Votes should be translated into seats in a way that is recognised as legitimate by most 
citizens (ideally almost all of them).
✦	 No substantial part of the population should regard the result as illegitimate, nor suffer 
a consistent bias of the system ‘working against them’.
✦	 If possible, the system should have beneficial effects for the good governance of the 
country.
✦	 If possible, the voting system should enhance the social representativeness of the 
legislature, and encourage high levels of voting across all types of citizens.
The Westminster ‘plurality rule’ 
electoral system
Patrick Dunleavy examines a topic of foundational importance for any liberal democracy 
– how well does the electoral system (in this case the Westminster plurality rule, aka 
‘first-past-the-post’) convert votes into seats? A sudden growth in two-party support in 
2017 allowed the UK’s ancient voting system to work far more proportionately. But is this 
outcome a one-off blip, or the start of a new long-term trend?
2.1
The plurality rule (or ‘first-past-the-post’) voting system
Used for:
✦	 Choosing MPs in the Westminster Parliament.
✦	 Electing local councillors in England and Wales.  
How it works: The national territory is divided into constituencies, each electing one MP. 
Candidates stand for election from parties, and voters cast one vote (by marking an X) for 
their top preference choice only. The party candidate who gets the largest pile of votes in 
each local area is elected. To get elected the winner does not need to gain a majority (50% 
+1 of voters), but just needs more votes than anyone else. The more candidates there are, 
the lower the level needed to win may become.
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Recent developments
Two general elections were held close together – in 2015 (at the end of five years of 
coalition government) and in 2017 (opportunistically called by Theresa May). They brought 
a whole host of dramatic alterations in how the voting system operated, reflecting recent 
large changes in the UK party system. 
In 2015: The biggest upset occurred in Scotland where the Scottish National Party (SNP), 
still buoyed up by its 2014 independence referendum campaign, secured all but three 
of the 59 seats (95%) on the basis of 50% of the vote, a highly disproportional result. 
In England the anti-EU, UK Independence Party (UKIP) piled up over 14% of the votes, 
but won only one seat (that it already held). The initially third-placed Liberal Democrats’ 
vote plunged from 23.5% in 2010 to just 8%, and their seats fell from 57 to just 8 
isolated survivors, spread across as many regions of the country. The party’s coalition 
government with the Conservatives was seen as a betrayal by many of their earlier voters. 
Disproportionality increased markedly in Scotland, and in the south-west region. 
In 2017: Following the 2016 Brexit vote, the UKIP leader Nigel Farage resigned. A year later 
support for UKIP collapsed (partly on a ‘mission accomplished’ basis, and partly because 
of its lack of a recognisable leader). The Liberal Democrats’ vote share dropped a further 
0.5% from its 2015 low. Despite these favourable conditions, the Conservative campaign in 
England backfired badly and they lost seats, despite boosting their UK votes share to over 
42%, almost 6 percentage points higher than in 2015. The Tories did gain seats in Scotland, 
as some of the 2015 SNP surge drained away. Yet overall, the governing party was left 
reliant on a ‘confidence and supply’ deal with the Northern Ireland party, the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), in order to hold on to power. The big gainer from the election was 
Labour under Jeremy Corbyn, whose national vote share grew radically from just over 30% 
in 2015 to 40% in 2017. Much of the growth occurred during the last three weeks of Theresa 
May’s doomed 2017 campaign. The Liberal Democrats’ seats increased slightly from 8 to 12, 
but each was still an isolated bastion, seeming to cling on at the UK’s scattered extremities 
against the revival of the Labour and Conservative votes.
In Scotland, the SNP’s near ‘clean sweep’ in 2015 lasted only two years, and multi-party 
politics were restored there. The SNP’s support dropped sharply from its (probably 
unsustainable) peak of 50% to just below 37%, and the plurality rule system produced a 
radical reduction of its seats from 59 to 35. Labour’s modest bounce-back in Scotland, plus 
a Tory resurgence there under Ruth Davidson, gave both parties more seats at the SNP’s 
expense. 
A mapping of seats by party in Figure 1 also shows the return of what an earlier electoral 
reform commission called ‘electoral deserts’ in England and Wales, where one party wins 
almost all the seats. In 2017, these covered all of southern and eastern England (where 
the Conservatives were very strong); and the north-east, north-west industrial areas, south 
Wales and much of inner London (where Labour predominated). On the other hand, the 
Midlands became more diversified than in the past. 
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Figure 1: Seats won at the 2017 general election by the parties in the UK
Source: Carl Baker et al, General Election 2017: results and analysis
House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper 7979
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Plurality rule is an ancient and hence 
thoroughly familiar system for British voters, 
dating back to medieval times.
Large minorities of voters regard the seats 
awarded to the largest parties, and the lack 
of seats for smaller parties, as illegitimate and 
distorted. Seat shares in the Commons rarely 
match vote shares well.
It is simple for people to cast a vote 
(just mark one X against your top party/
candidate). Votes are easy to count, and 
voters can easily understand how the result 
happened.
Many voters demand an alternative system – 
32% in the 2011 AV referendum, and over two-
fifths consistently favour PR systems in polls. 
In a 2011 national referendum (promoted by 
the then very unpopular Liberal Democrats), 
68% of UK voters supported the status quo 
rather than the reform option on offer, which 
was the alternative vote (AV) system (used 
in Australia).
Plurality rule always advantages the leading 
parties, those that can pile up enough votes to 
create many ‘stronghold’ seats. In the UK, this 
benefits either the Conservatives or Labour 
(depending who’s in the lead locally), and now 
the SNP in Scotland.
Turnout levels this century range from 
59% to 69%, down on earlier levels. But 
30.7 million people still voted in the 2015 
Westminster elections. And this number 
increased sharply to 39.3 million in 2017 – 
more than for any other elected body.
The voting system heavily discriminates 
against parties with dispersed national support 
that only run second or third in many seats – 
especially the Liberal Democrats (plus UKIP in 
2010 and 2015), who secure millions of votes 
but few or no Westminster MPs. (However, in 
2017 UKIP’s support fell to 0.6 million votes.)
In British conditions, plurality rule in the past 
tended to produce ‘artificial’ majorities for 
the leading party. This ‘leader’s bonus’ then 
allowed single-party governments to be 
formed with ‘artificial’ House of Commons 
majorities. Advocates argue that this 
produces ‘strong’ government which is both 
what voters want and an important feature 
of UK democracy as a whole.
However, the system no longer produces strong 
government effect in any reliable way. Recent 
‘exceptions’ include the Conservative–Liberal 
Democrat coalition government of 2010–15 (in 
an otherwise ‘hung’ parliament), and the minority 
Conservative government since 2017 which 
relies on a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement 
with DUP MPs from Northern Ireland in order 
to stay in office. (Earlier examples of minority or 
near minority governments were 1964–66, 1974 
and 1977–79.)
The system creates ‘electoral deserts’ for 
major parties – whole regions where they win 
millions of votes but no or few seats. So there 
are few Tories in northern, industrial cities; and 
few Labour MPs in southern England outside 
London.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The proportion of MPs with local majority 
support has increased across the last three 
general elections, reaching a high of 72% in 
2017.
The proportion of MPs enjoying local majority 
support in their seats fell over the long term 
from 1974 to 2005 (when it touched just 55%). 
The proportion of citizens positively 
supporting the governing Conservatives in 
2017 was 29.2%, an increase on the levels 
shown opposite.
Single-party governments are based on 
small minorities of voters (35–42% from 2001 
to 2017), and even smaller proportions of 
positively supporting citizens (22–24% from 
2001 to 2015).
When Labour won many university town 
and inner-city seats in 2017, helped by 
enthusiastic young supporters, media 
commentators were quick to identify a 
‘youthquake’ in terms of young people 
re-participating in voting. This claim was 
declared a myth by the most orthodox 
political science study (the BES). However, 
their research has been disputed, because 
the BES includes only small numbers of 
young people, from very few constituencies. 
Young people certainly voted more in 2017, 
in line with most social groups.
The proportion of MPs in Westminster holding 
seats not justified by their share of the votes 
was above a fifth between 1997 and 2015. 
However, this level fell sharply in 2017 (see 
below).
Westminster has only tiny proportions 
of people from manual working class 
backgrounds and from black and Asian ethnic 
minorities. Gender representation remains 
overwhelmingly male, with women MPs 
forming 20–29% of the total for the last two 
decades. In 2017, women MPs rose to 32% of 
the Commons, but this is still a long way from 
50/50.  In principle, parties could do better, 
even if plurality rule voting is retained. But 
progress has, in practice, been very slow. (See 
Part 7.)
Future opportunities Future threats
A more proportional voting system is 
demanded by Liberal Democrats, UKIP, 
Greens, the SNP and Plaid Cymru. Many 
people in the Labour ranks also support 
change, but few Conservatives.
If more voters revert to supporting third- 
or fourth-placed parties (as they did 
until 2015, and as they clearly still do in 
Scotland and Wales, and non-Westminster 
elections in England), then the plurality 
system will probably continue to perform 
disproportionately and erratically, as it has in 
the past. 
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Future opportunities Future threats
Change will only come when either Labour 
or the Tories agree to a new system, and 
the party involved forms part of a coalition 
commanding a Commons majority. It will 
probably need a referendum majority as 
well.
However, since the 2017 election UK 
opinion polls consistently show the top two 
parties dominating public support, and this 
is a pattern better suited to plurality rule 
elections – so that reform demands may 
decline (especially within Labour).
Westminster governments are likely to 
continue to be chosen by, and answer to, 
relatively smaller proportions of the population 
– especially older voters in ‘safe’ seats.
Trends evident before 2017, for younger 
people to vote much less and for sections of 
the population to reject election outcomes as 
unrepresentative, may be re-established in 
future, after being reversed in 2017.
An incremental change to adopt the 
supplementary vote (SV) system (used 
in London’s and other mayoral elections) 
could be implemented without a 
referendum, and might secure support from 
one of the top two parties. It would involve 
more voters in being able to choose their 
local MP and give each member a local 
majority of support. But it might well not 
improve proportionality.
Westminster’s legitimacy may continue at a 
low ebb, or decline compared with other UK 
governments and legislatures that are elected 
by more proportional voting systems and 
have stronger links to voters (as in Scotland, 
London and Wales).
How ‘unfair’ or disproportional are Westminster elections?
Political scientists have developed systematic measures of how accurately voting systems 
translate popular votes into seats in the legislature. The simplest and most intuitive measure 
is the ‘deviation from proportionality’ or DV score, which shows what proportion of seats have 
been ‘misallocated’ to parties that do not ‘deserve’ them in terms of their overall vote shares. 
To calculate it, we look at the individual deviations between the vote percentage and the 
seats percentage for all parties, as in this small example table (Figure 2).
Figure 2: A simple example of how to calculate the deviation from proportionality (DV) score
Party % votes % seats Deviations
A 45 65 +20
B 30 22 -8
C 20 12 -8
D 5 1 -4
Total 100    100
Next add up the positive 
and negative numbers in the 
Deviations column, ignoring their 
signs, to get a number called the 
‘modulus’ = 40. 
To eliminate the double-counting 
involved in the modulus, divide by 
two, so DV score = 20. 
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To set any DV score in context, bear in mind that almost any electoral system will end up 
somewhat over-representing larger parties at the expense of very small ones (such as 
those too small to win seats even under proportional representation). The smallest feasibly 
achievable DV score is normally around 5% (and not zero).
In the 2017 election, the big surges in support for Labour and the Conservatives produced 
a very close-fought election with historically very low levels of support for third or fourth 
parties in England (the dominant part of the UK). Yet neither of the top two parties emerged 
with a huge ‘bonus’ swathe of seats (as the winner would have done for most of the late 
20th century). Instead their seats were far more balanced than might have been expected, 
so that the DV score fell to a very unusually low level of just 9.3%. This number is somewhat 
misleading because disproportionalities that favoured the Conservatives in their dominant 
regions are offset by other deviations where Labour did well in its heartlands. If we look 
within each region the disproportionality levels are actually much higher. Nonetheless, the 
improvement from previous elections is a real one. So a critical issue now is whether the 
2017 result is a one-off outcome. Is it likely to repeat in future, and become a new pattern 
– given that support for the top two parties also stayed high in national opinion polls in the 
year after the general election?
To see how exceptional the 2017 result is, consider how Westminster elections have 
performed on the DV measure over a longer period of time. Figure 3 shows the DV score 
(also called the ‘Loosemore-Hanby’ measure after its inventors) as the purple shaded area. 
The relationship between party vote shares and seats shares clearly waggled up and down 
a bit, but also became much more disproportional over time. The 2015 general election DV 
score reached a new high of 24% – so that almost a quarter of MPs in the Commons were not 
entitled to sit there in terms of their party’s share of the national vote.
Figure 3: How the disproportionality of Westminster elections grew over time, up to 2015
Source: Computed from 
data in Renwick
Notes: The DV line here (in 
purple; Loosemore-Hanby) 
shows the % of MPs elected 
to the Commons who are 
not entitled to be there 
from their party’s share of 
the vote – in other words 
how inaccurately votes are 
translated into seats. The 
practical minimum for any 
voting system is around 
5%. For explanations of 
the other two lines, see the 
main text.
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As with every aspect of political science measurement, there are also alternatives to the 
DV score. Figure 3 shows two main contenders, explained in more detail by Alan Renwick. 
Suffice to say here that the ‘Gallagher’ measure (shown light blue) is the most conservative 
index and arguably understates disproportionality by focusing only on the largest deviation. 
In 2015 this did not increase because the Liberal Democrat vote collapsed and UKIP 
(although almost unrepresented in MPs) had a smaller 14% vote share. The third measure, 
the ‘Sainte Laguë’ (shown in pale yellow) is more orientated to the under-representation of 
smaller parties. It has been consistently above the DV score since 1974, and also shows the 
2015 election as a post-war peak of disproportionality.
So far we have looked at national DV only, but in democratic terms what matters a lot also is 
how fairly elections seem to operate to citizens on the ground, in their own local area. When 
people support a particular party, how does their chosen party fare in winning seats in their 
surrounding area? We cannot compute DV for a single seat, of course, but we can look at the 
20 seats nearest to every constituency across Great Britain and calculate the level of local 
DV that voters will experience in the area around them. Figure 4 shows the levels of deviation 
from proportionality that people experienced in the area around their constituency – with low 
scores shown darker, in purple, and high scores yellow. They ranged very high in both 2010 
and 2015, with some local DV scores at or above 40% in the worst cases, often far higher 
than the national DV numbers (which were 23% and 24% in these two years). Some areas 
were of course lower as well.
Figure 4: How much deviation from proportionality do voters experience in the local area 
‘around them’? 2010 general election (left) and 2015 general election (right)
Source: Chris 
Hanretty
Note: The scale 
here shows the 
percent DV score 
in the 20 seats 
closest to each 
constituency in the 
country.
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The side-by-side comparison in Figure 4 also shows how erratically plurality rule elections 
can operate from one year to the next. In 2010 with the Liberal Democrats riding high, south-
west England was one of the most proportional regions (purple). But by 2015, with Liberal 
Democrat support plunging, and Labour’s vote growing but not enough to win seats, it was 
one of the most disproportionate regions (yellow). And in Scotland, the 2010 outcomes were 
disproportionate in the central lowlands with Labour as the key beneficiary, but more so by 
2015 when the SNP was the sole beneficiary. However, there has been consistently bad 
disproportionality in Tory seats across southern and eastern England for decades, and also 
in Labour’s north-east stronghold. But local DV eased off a bit in 2015 in areas around some 
northern Labour cities and former industrial regions.
A third aspect of disproportionality involves recognising that nations differ a great deal in 
how their political parties and party system operate, with big implications for DV scores. So 
perhaps one of the best indicators to look at is how Westminster elections compare with 
other elections held under British political conditions, but using different electoral systems 
(see Chapters 2.2 and 2.3). 
Figure 5 shows that Westminster elections have been far more disproportional than all 
the other major electoral systems now used in the UK. For decades now over a fifth of 
MPs in the House of Commons have been for parties over-represented at other parties’ 
expense. In 2015 the Westminster DV score was a high 24%, only to fall back dramatically 
in 2017 to 9%, less than two-fifths of this number. This is a perfectly respectable showing 
and the lowest Westminster DV score for decades. It reflects the renewed ascendency 
of the Conservatives and Labour, following the Liberal Democrat collapse in 2015 and 
UKIP’s demise in 2017, plus the fall back of SNP support in Scotland from its very high 2015 
levels. With just two parties, plurality rule elections can produce quite proportional results. 
(For example, in the USA DV levels can be as low as 7–8% – because the Democrat and 
Republican parties still dominate all politics there.) 
The Scottish Parliament has consistently achieved DV scores under 11%, half the historic 
Westminster rate. And the London Assembly is not much higher at 12.5%, despite having 
only 25 elected members (which makes fine-grain proportionality impossible to achieve). 
In Wales, the National Assembly’s Labour-designed electoral system has too few ‘top-up’ 
seats to give fully proportional outcomes, so the results there shows higher DV scores, over 
14%, always in Labour’s favour. 
Elections for the European Parliament are also shown in Figure 5, for the period 1999 to 
2014 when they used a regional proportional representation system. Its accuracy was 
restricted by the small number of seats per region, so again this delivered DV scores 
of around 14% – but this was still two-thirds of the ‘normal’ Westminster levels in these 
decades.
In other respects, too, the UK after 2017 seems very far from American patterns, despite the 
Conservatives’ and Labour’s predominance in national opinion polls. In local elections the 
support for the Liberal Democrats has been consistently higher than their general election 
score, and the top two parties combined have commanded only 65 to 70% support in the 
2017 and 2018 local elections, as Figure 6 shows.
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Figure 5: How disproportional have Westminster elections been over the last two decades, 
compared with other British elections?
Source: Patrick Dunleavy, GV311 lecture, LSE, 29 November 2017.
Note: The chart shows the % of MPs or representatives elected who are not entitled to their seats 
from their party’s overall share of the vote – in other words how inaccurately votes are translated into 
seats. The practical minimum for any voting system is around 5%.
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Figure 6: The ‘national equivalent vote shares’ for the main parties in the 2017 and 2018 
local elections
Party Vote share 
(%) in 2017
Vote share 
(%) in 2018
Conservatives 38 35
Labour 27 35
Liberal Democrats 18 16
All others 17 14
Total 100 100
Source: BBC estimates re-balancing local election votes show what the ‘national equivalent’ vote share 
would have been. This controls for local voting taking place in different areas from year to year.
Conclusions
Overall, recent elections suggest that plurality rule has become more erratic in its 
operations. The 2015 election represented a new post-war high in the UK electoral system’s 
disproportionality, but the swing back to two-party pre-dominance in 2017 produced the 
UK’s best DV score for decades. Second, the levels of ‘unfairness’ experienced by voters at 
the local and regional level are much higher than the national figure suggests. For instance, 
in 2015 the SNP nearly won every single seat in Scotland, despite only winning 50% of the 
vote. Third, Westminster elections are historically far more disproportional than other kinds 
of British elections held using different voting systems.
In comparative terms, the historic record of the UK’s Westminster elections up to 2015 
was almost five times more disproportional than the practicable minimum achievable in 
a modern electoral system. Plurality rule in the UK has consistently performed among 
the worst of any liberal democracies worldwide, until 2017’s shock result. And the voting 
system continues to operate in its familiar way in English and Welsh local elections (see 
Chapters 6.4, 6.8 and 6.9), creating frequent large gaps between citizens’ votes and 
the party balance of their representatives. A central issue for the future must be whether 
the next general election will show a re-growth of Britain’s smaller parties and higher DV 
scores, rendering the 2017 result a blip (perhaps attributable to the special conditions 
of the disastrous 2017 Tory campaign)? Or whether instead the 2017 outcome marks a 
fundamental break-point in party politics and electoral behaviours, which might produce 
long-run improvements in how the UK’s main voting system operates.
Patrick Dunleavy is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the LSE and co-
Director of Democratic Audit there. He is also Centenary Professor in the Institute for 
Governance and Policy Analysis (IGPA), University of Canberra. 
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What does democracy require for an electoral system?
✦	 It should accurately translate parties’ votes into seats in the legislature (here, the 
Scottish Parliament, the Senned [or Welsh National Assembly] and the London 
Assembly).
✦	 Votes should be translated into seats in a way that is recognised as legitimate by 
most citizens (ideally almost all of them).
✦	 No substantial part of the population should regard the result as illegitimate, nor 
suffer a consistent bias of the system ‘working against them’.
✦	 When electing a single office-holder (like an executive mayor), the system should 
maximise the number of people who can contribute to the choice between 
candidates, and encourage office-seekers to ‘reach out’ beyond their own party’s 
supporters. Ideally single office holders should enjoy clear majority support, so as to 
enhance their legitimacy.
✦	 If possible, the system should have beneficial effects for the good governance of the 
country.
✦	 If possible, the voting system should enhance the social representativeness of the 
legislature, and encourage high levels of voting across all types of citizens.
The reformed electoral systems used 
in Britain’s devolved governments 
and England’s mayoral elections
Patrick Dunleavy and the Democratic Audit team examine how well citizens are 
represented by the two main reformed electoral systems used in the UK – the ‘additional 
members system’ (AMS) and the ‘supplementary vote’ (SV). How successful have they been 
in showing the way for more modern electoral systems to work well under British political 
conditions?
2.2
Since 1997 voting systems in the UK have diversified. In its early years the first Blair 
government, acting with Liberal Democrat co-operation, created proportional additional 
member systems (AMS) for new devolved government institutions in Scotland, Wales and 
London. These had their fifth round of elections in May 2016. 
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Labour also created a second new electoral system, the ‘supplementary vote’ (SV) 
for choosing the London mayor (approved in a London-wide referendum and used 
successfully five times now). From 2010 to 2016 Conservative ministers in the two Cameron 
governments also encouraged introducing ‘strong mayor’ elections elsewhere, especially 
for new metropolitan/regional mayors (elected first in 2017 and 2018), further expanding 
the use of the SV system. However, in June 2017 the Conservative election manifesto 
proposed to replace all SV elections with plurality rule (first-past-the-post) voting. When the 
Tories failed to get a Commons majority, this proposal seemed to lapse.
Additional member systems in Scotland, Wales and London
Used for: choosing Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs), Assembly Members (AMs) 
in the Welsh National Assembly and members of the London Assembly.
How it works: In ‘classic’ versions of AMS (as used in Germany and New Zealand, and also 
known as a mixed-member proportional system) half of the members of these bodies are 
locally elected in constituencies using plurality rule or first-past-the-post (FPTP) voting. The 
remaining half (the ‘additional’ or ‘top-up’ members) are elected in larger regional areas, 
where a whole set of seats are allocated using a proportional representation system – so 
as to make parties’ overall seat shares match their vote shares as accurately as possible. 
Voters cast two ballots: one for their constituency representative, and one for a party to 
represent them at the top-up region level.
In ‘British AMS’, because constituency representation was seen as historically and culturally 
important in the UK, there are more local constituency seats than top-up seats (Figure 1). In 
Scotland and Wales the top-up areas are sub-regions. For the small London Assembly the 
top-up area is the whole of London. In Wales, the proportion of top-up representatives at 
sub-regional level is just a third of seats. This is sometimes too small to ensure proportional 
outcomes, if one party (so far always Labour) is heavily over-represented in winning 
constituency seats.
Figure 1: The proportion of constituency and top-up seats under AMS in British institutions
Body Local seats ‘Top-up’ area seats Total
Scottish Parliament 73 (57%) 56 (43%) 129
Welsh Assembly 40 (67%) 20 (33%) 60
London Assembly 14 (56%) 11 (44%) 25
Voters get two ballot papers, one for party candidates for their local constituency and one 
for party slates of candidates for the wider regional contest. They mark one X vote on each 
paper. In the local constituencies, whoever gets the largest pile of votes (a plurality) is the 
winner (with no need to get a majority).
In AMS voters also have a second vote for their regional top-up members. To decide who 
gets top-up seats, each party puts forward a slate of candidates (their ‘list’), and voters 
choose one party to support. The election officials look at how many local seats a party 
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already has within region A from the local contests, and what share of the list votes it has 
in the A region. If a given party already has its full share of seats, it gets none of the top-
up members. But if the party does not have enough seats already it is assigned additional 
members, taken from its list of regional candidates, so as to bring each party as closely as 
possible to having equal percentages of seats and votes (for the top-up area stage). The 
order that parties place candidates in their lists is crucial, since it determines who of their 
people are elected at any given level of support.
There’s a formula for calculating the allocation of additional seats that works near perfectly 
given large top-up areas. However, it may over-represent larger parties if a lot of the list 
vote is split across multiple smaller parties, which tends to happen quite a lot in British AMS 
elections.
Recent developments
A key rationale for the three AMS systems is to offer proportional representation for each of 
the bodies involved. In evaluating this claim it is worth bearing in mind as a benchmark the 
Westminster electoral system’s deviation from proportionality, which had averaged 22.5% 
in the two decades up to 2015 – but which fell spectacularly to under 10% in 2017 (see 
Chapter 2.1). Compared with the historic Westminster outcome, Figure 2 shows that the 
Scottish AMS system has performed twice as well in terms of matching party seats shares 
with their vote shares, and the London system has fared almost as well. In Wales DV scores 
are higher, because there have been too few top-up seats, especially in 2007. But still, on 
average, DV scores were routinely two-thirds of historic UK general election scores – until 
2017, when the Westminster result was more than comparable for the first time.
Figure 2: The deviation from proportionality (DV score) of British AMS elections
Scotland/Wales dates Scotland Wales London London dates
2016  8.3 16.8 12.0 2016
2011 11.8 14.7 12.1 2012
2007 10.2 17.7 8.1 2008
2003 12.1 14.1 14.8 2004
1999 10.3 10.6 14.8 2000
Average 10.5 14.8 12.4
Note: The DV score shows the percent of representatives not entitled to their seats in terms of their 
party’s share of the overall vote. Its practical minimum level is around 5%.
Proportional voting systems tend to produce coalition or minority governments, unless a 
single party can command a clear majority of seats on its own. Figure 3 shows that the AMS 
systems have only delivered one single-party government outcome: when the SNP won 
an outright majority in the Edinburgh Parliament in 2011. This was preceded by a period 
when the SNP ran a minority government (2007–11), a situation that returned from May 2016 
onwards. In Wales Labour has been continuously in government since 1999, but has never 
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had an outright majority. In London, mayors have always needed multi-party support in the 
London Assembly, although the mayor’s strong powers mean that they can almost get what 
they want done. In 2016 Labour won the mayor’s role and nearly had a GLA majority, but 
still needed Green support. In all three bodies the arrangements for forming governments 
(and ‘administrations’ in London) have always operated well, without prolonged uncertainty 
and with party divisions generally not being rancorous.
Figure 3: Governing outcomes of the additional member system elections
Scotland/
Wales dates
Scottish 
Parliament  
(129 MSPs)
Welsh Assembly 
(60 AMs)
London 
Assembly  
(25 members)
London 
dates
2016– SNP (63 
seats) minority 
government
Labour (29 
seats) minority 
government
Labour mayor. 
Labour (12 seats) 
largest party, 
and majority with 
Greens
2016–
2011–16 SNP (69 
seats) majority 
government
Labour (30 
seats) minority 
government
Divided 
government, 
Conservative 
mayor.  
Labour (12 seats) 
largest party 
2012–16
2007–11 SNP (47 seats) 
minority 
government
Labour (26 
seats) coalition 
government with 
Plaid Cymru (15 
seats)
Conservative 
mayor. 
Conservatives 
(11 seats) largest 
party 
2008–12
2003–7 Labour (50 
seats) coalition 
with Lib Dems 
(17 seats)
Labour (30 seats) 
government (with 
effective majority 
of 1)
Divided 
government, 
Labour mayor. 
Conservatives 
(9 seats) largest 
party 
2004–8
1999–2003 Labour (56 
seats) coalition 
with Lib Dems 
(17 seats)
1999–2000: 
Labour (28 
seats) minority 
government. 
From 2000: 
Labour (28 seats) 
coalition with Lib 
Dems (6 seats)
Divided 
government, 
Independent 
(previously 
Labour) mayor 
Ken Livingstone. 
Labour and 
Conservatives 
both 9 seats 
2000–4
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The AMS systems were purpose-designed 
for all three bodies. The Edinburgh system 
was defined by a constitutional convention, 
and the GLA system by political scientist 
consultants. The Cardiff arrangements, 
however, were a political ‘fix’ decided by the 
Welsh Labour Party.
We noted above the shortage of top-up seats 
in Wales, which explains higher DV scores 
here, especially in strong Labour years.
In London the Assembly has only 25 
members, so every seat-switch between 
parties reallocates 4% of the total, so this is 
not a ‘fine-grain’ measure of party support.
It is simple for citizens to vote for a local 
representative. Some critics predicted that 
citizens would see constituency voting 
under AMS as more important than top-up 
votes. 
In the first London elections (2000) one in 
six voters did not use their second (‘top-up’ 
list) Assembly vote. However, by 2008, 2012 
and 2016 more people voted in the top-up 
election than in the constituency stage.
Election results for all three bodies have 
historically been more proportional than for 
Westminster elections (see above). 
The London Assembly’s disproportionality 
(DV) score is also raised because by law no 
party can win a top-up seat unless they get 
5% of the London-wide (list) vote.
AMS is easy to count, and it is 
straightforward for voters to understand 
how the overall result happened at both the 
constituency and list elections. All outcomes 
have had high levels of public acceptance 
and legitimacy.
The detailed counting rule used to allocate 
list or ‘top-up’ seats (called the d’Hondt rule) 
somewhat favours the one or two largest 
parties in all three areas. As in any electoral 
system, votes going to very small parties 
(below say 3% of the total) are unlikely to 
secure any representation – and in London 
cannot do so.
Turnout levels have been highest in 
Scotland at 49–59%. Wales has averaged 
43%. London turnout grew from 33% in 
2000 to 45% in 2008 and 46% in 2016.
Critics of the ‘two classes’ of representatives 
under AMS argue that constituency members 
have more contact with people in their 
local area and respond to their problems 
more, whereas the representatives from 
top-up lists focus on party and committee 
work, and on introducing new legislation 
and policies. A 2018 study showed that top-
up area representatives respond less to 
emails from constituents. But the authors 
caution that why people write will likely differ. 
Constituency representatives may get more 
correspondence about constituents’ individual 
problems or issues that need a reply, while 
top-up area representatives may get more 
‘political’ or general policy letters. 
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Under AMS, parties have incentives to 
put equal numbers of men and women on 
their top-up lists. Historically somewhat 
more representatives are women than in 
the Commons, with 35% of the Scottish 
Parliament, 36% of the London Assembly 
and 40% of Welsh National Assembly 
female members. But in 2017 Westminster 
began to catch up.
Outside London, the systems do not seem 
to have improved the representation of 
ethnic minorities or of people from manual 
backgrounds.
Future opportunities Future threats
There are some reform demands to create 
more top-up members in the Welsh National 
Assembly. Such a change is likely to make 
seats results more proportional to votes 
cast.
Both Scotland and Wales are unicameral 
legislatures, so there is no upper house 
to constrain the behaviour of a party that 
becomes dominant there.
Over the 18 years it has been operating, the 
Scottish Parliament has gained far greater 
autonomy over more public spending and 
attracted high levels of public trust. Wales 
and Greater London are also pressing 
Whitehall for an increase in powers, and 
they have broad public support for such a 
change in their areas.
Critics argued in 2015 that the SNP had 
emerged as a ‘dominant party’ in Scotland, 
especially since the 2014 referendum, with 
adverse consequences for government 
responsiveness. There have been complaints 
of overly strong/unchecked executive rule 
by the party. However, 2016 saw a revival in 
the Conservative vote north of the border. 
And in 2017 the SNP’s hegemony over 
Westminster seats in Scotland proved short-
lived. In Scottish Parliament elections there 
are no ‘electoral desert’ areas without multi-
party representation. No democratic electoral 
system can ensure a greater diversity of 
parties than citizens have voted for.
As these bodies become more significant 
and permanent in the eyes of citizens, 
voters’ interest, turnout levels and media 
coverage may all increase, especially in 
Scotland.
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The supplementary vote for electing executive mayors and police 
commissioners
Used for: Choosing the mayor of London; six new metropolitan or regional executive 
mayors in other English regions; executive mayors in 16 English local authorities (see 
Chapter 6.9); and choosing all police and crime commissioners (PCCs) in England and 
Wales. From 2017 onwards SV has also been used to elect ‘regional’ executive mayors in 
six major areas outside London.
How it works: No voting system for a single powerful office (such as a mayor, governor 
or president) can operate in a proportional way, because the position involved cannot be 
divided between several parties. Instead the supplementary vote system tries to involve as 
many voters as possible in deciding who becomes the winner.
Voters have a ballot paper with two columns on it, one for their first choice and one for their 
second choice (see Figure 4). They put an X vote against their chosen candidate in the first 
preference column, and then (if they wish) an X also in the second preference column.
Figure 4: Example ballot paper for a mayoral election using supplementary vote
The key difference between the SV and FPTP systems is what candidates must do to get 
elected, as the system is designed to make leading candidates ‘reach out’ to voters outside 
their own party’s supporters to attract their second preference votes. Initially, only first 
preference votes are counted. If anyone has more than 50% at this stage then they are 
elected straightaway, and counting ends.
However, if no one has overall majority support, then the top two candidates go into a run-
off stage on their own. All other candidates are knocked out of the race at the same time, 
and the second preference ballot papers of their voters are checked. Second choice votes 
for one of the two candidates still in the race are added to their piles. Once all relevant 
second votes are added in, whoever of the two top candidates has the most votes overall 
is the winner.
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This process of knocking out all the low-ranked candidates at once, and redistributing their 
voters’ second choices, ensures that the largest feasible number of votes count in deciding 
who is elected. The person elected can only be one of the initial top two runners (unlike the 
alternative vote system, rejected at the 2011 referendum). And yet in practical terms they 
always have a majority of eligible votes cast. In repeated London elections, the winner has 
gained nearly three-fifths support.
Recent developments
The supplementary vote has been used to elect the London mayor since 2000, in 
numerous contests for other local mayors, for six new metropolitan/regional executive 
mayors outside London in 2017 and 2018, and in the 2012 and 2016 elections of police and 
crime commissioners. The London mayoral election has shown voters (and parties) learning 
how to use the SV system more effectively over time. Figure 5 shows that by 2016 nearly 
nine in ten voters took the opportunity to give both a first and a second preference vote. 
The same proportion of voters played a part in shaping the outcome, so that ‘effective’ 
votes rose from 78% in the first election to around 90% in the last three contexts. The 
number of second choice votes given to the top two candidates has remained steady.
Figure 5: London mayoral elections using the supplementary vote, 2000–16
Millions of votes % of all voters
Date 1st 
choice 
votes
2nd 
choice 
votes for 
top two 
candi-
dates 
All 2nd 
choice 
votes
Casting 
any 2nd 
vote
Directly 
shaping 
final 
outcome
Giving 2 
choices 
for 3rd 
or lower 
candi-
dates
Giving 2 
choices for 
same candi- 
date placed 
3rd or 
lower
Turnout 
(%) 
2016 2.57 0.25 2.30 89.6 88.7 9.7 1.6 45.3
2012 2.21 0.19 1.76 79.8 92.7 5.6 1.3 38.1
2008 2.42 0.26 2.00 82.9 91.0 7.2 1.9 45.3
2004 1.86 0.27 1.59 85.4 80.2 16.1 3.7 37
2000 1.71 0.21 1.42 82.9 78.2 16.4 5.4 34.4
Total 10.77 1.18 14.8 Median 
82.9 
Median 
88.7 
Median 
7.2 
Median 
1.9
Median 
31.0
Source: Computed from Greater London Authority, various dates.
Notes: Votes shaping the final outcome are defined as the combined total of first and second choice 
votes for the top two candidates (those in the run-off stage).
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Nonetheless the share of voters endorsing only a third or lower placed candidate has 
fallen, and Figure 5 shows that most of these people may have good reasons for casting 
an ‘ineffective’ vote – such as signalling two preferences for less popular parties in order 
to boost their future chances. Turnout levels in London also rose over time, from just over a 
third in 2000 to above 45% in 2008 and again in 2016. 
The London mayor system has been very effective in giving unchallenged electoral 
legitimacy to five winners in a row (each of whom has ended up with roughly 60% of 
final counted votes). The model has inspired its imitation elsewhere as a key part of 
English devolution. Following deals negotiated between council leaders in seven areas 
and Conservative ministers to decentralise some Whitehall powers, new ‘metropolitan 
or regional mayor’ SV elections were set up and elected in 2017 in Greater Manchester 
(where the mayor controls health service and infrastructure spending), the West Midlands, 
the Liverpool City Region, Cambridge/Peterborough and the West of England. Another 
followed in Sheffield City Region (which covers Rotherham, Barnsley and Doncaster) in 
2018, attracting interest despite the role of the metro mayor not being finally defined 
by the election date. Further elections may follow if proposals for a whole-of Yorkshire 
regional mayor progress. Figure 6 shows that turnout levels were lower than with other 
SV elections, but this is normal the first time a contest is held, before any institutions have 
started operating or policies have been implemented.
Figure 6 also shows that outside London there has been a limited trend for some major cities 
and some towns to adopt the executive mayor system (like Watford, Bristol, Liverpool and 
Leicester). Elections there have generally operated in far more diverse ways. Figure 6 shows 
that in 16 out of 36 SV contests in conventional local authorities, one candidate won outright 
with clear majorities at the first-preference vote stage, so that second votes did not need to 
be counted. This pattern reflects a strong tendency for SV elections to be adopted in ‘safe’ 
Labour city or town areas, and areas with strong Liberal Democrat or ‘other’ voting (including 
some early support for independent candidates, which has decreased over time). As with the 
new regional/metro mayors, Figure 6 shows that the proportion of voters shaping elections 
(by casting either a first or second vote for one of the top two candidates) has generally been 
high in conventional local mayor contests, even when only a single count has taken place.
Finally, two rounds of police and crime commissioner (PCC) elections have also been held 
using the SV system. In 2012 these were poorly planned. They were held unexpectedly 
in November, at a cold time of year, with little advertising and separate from normal local 
elections – resulting in just a 15% turnout. There was little publicity about what the 40 new 
commissioners would do, or who the candidates were. And, of course, most voters outside 
London were using SV for the first time. Yet, even so, one in seven voters cast a second 
preference, nearly 71% of votes shaped the final outcome, and the results were accepted as a 
sound reflection of the views of those voting.
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In 2016, the PCC elections were held at the same time as conventional local authority 
elections, and consequently turnout improved significantly. However, the number of voters 
casting second preference votes increased slightly to just over one in six. And second time 
around 83% of votes were cast for top two candidates across both rounds of voting. Only 
three areas returned (Labour) PCCs on the first round alone.
Figure 6: Recent major elections in England and Wales using SV, 2009–18
 Date and type of SV elections
First 
choice 
votes 
(millions)
Second 
choice 
votes for 
top two 
candidates 
(millions)
% of all  
voters 
directly 
shaping 
outcome
Median 
turnout %
2017–18: Five new metropolitan/ 
regional executive mayors elected 
with two counts (West Midlands, 
Tees Valley, Cambridgeshire/ 
Peterborough, West of England, 
Sheffield metro area)
1.27 0.89 83.9 27.2
2017: Two new metro-mayor 
elections won on first count (Greater 
Manchester, Liverpool metro)
0.86 N/A 83.1 26.3
20 local authority mayor elections 
with two counts (2009–18)
0.78 0.17 79.4 40.5
16 local authority mayor elections 
won on the first count (2009–18)
1.14 N/A 75.1 36.5
Police and crime commissioners 
(England & Wales) 2016
8.88 1.49 82.8 26.6
Police and crime commissioners 
(E&W) 2012
5.36 0.72 70.8 15.0
Total votes (millions) using the SV 
system
18.29 5.72  Median 
31.0
Source: Computed from House of Commons Library, ‘Local Election Reports’, various dates; and ‘Police 
Commissioner Elections 2016’, and 2012.
Notes: Votes shaping the final outcome are defined as the combined total of first and second choice 
votes for the top two candidates (those in the run-off stage). Where a candidate wins on first choices 
alone, then only the top two candidates’ first choices are counted.  
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The supplementary vote (SV) was a novel 
system when introduced first in London 
in 2000, following recommendations by 
political scientist consultants. The system 
is now well established and has proved 
popular with voters.
Some critics have argued that the person 
chosen may not quite have a majority of all 
the votes cast. This is because some people 
may give both their first and second choice 
votes to smaller party candidates, who 
stand no chance of being in the final top two 
run-off (see Figures 5 and 6). But no other 
voting system for a single office holder can 
guarantee to achieve this elusive ‘majority’ in 
practice either.
The SV system is simple for voters to use. 
Supporters of smaller parties can express 
their real feelings with their first vote, but 
still use their second vote to choose which 
of the top two candidates they prefer to win.
SV is like an ‘instant run-off’ version of 
double-ballot elections (used for example in 
France, where if no one gets a majority on 
the first ballot, voters must come back a week 
later and vote again). Some critics argue that 
it is hard for voters to know in advance who 
the top two candidates are likely to be. But in 
London and most local areas this should be 
reasonably clear.
SV is straightforward to count, even at 
large scale – around two million votes are 
counted overnight in the London-wide 
mayoral contest, using electronic counting. 
Voters can easily understand how the count 
operated and how the result happened.
While the metropolitan/regional executive 
mayors were required by the Cameron 
government before they would devolve 
powers, English local authorities have had the 
free choice to introduce executive mayors or 
not since 2000. Now 23 cities, towns, London 
boroughs and regional/metro mayors use 
this system. In a few areas executive mayors 
were elected for a time but then abandoned 
following local referenda. In a larger number 
of council areas voters in the 2000s turned 
down executive mayors in local referenda.
Election results for the London mayor have 
shown the run-off winners getting nearly 
60% of counted votes. All five results 
have been accepted as accurate, giving 
incumbents of the office very high levels 
of public acceptance and legitimacy, both 
within London and in national (and indeed 
global) politics.
One or two early mayoral elections saw 
victories for unlikely or allegedly ‘joke’ 
candidates with high name recognition. 
This pattern has now died out, with partisan 
candidates prominent in most competitions, 
but with some conventional independents 
also, especially in Labour-dominated areas.
Recent turnout levels for the London 
mayoral elections at 40–45% are quite high 
for local elections.
672.2 The reformed electoral systems used in Britain’s devolved governments and England’s mayoral elections
Future opportunities Future threats
The extension of SV to the new regional 
and metro mayors has worked well, and 
broadened English voters’ experience of the 
system.
The Conservative election manifesto in 
2017 suddenly proposed to scrap SV for all 
mayoral and police commissioner elections 
and revert instead to plurality rule (first-
past-the-post). Following the Conservatives’ 
election set back and a hung parliament, this 
position has been formally reiterated once, 
but no action on it currently seems likely. 
Turnout for police commissioner elections 
improved significantly in 2016, when they 
were run alongside local elections. This 
again may boost public awareness of SV.
Some local authorities with an executive 
mayor may still revert back to a council 
system after a local referendum. But again 
this is normally for wider political reasons, 
and not because of dissatisfaction with SV.
Some local authorities without elected 
executive mayors may adopt them in future.
Is the supplementary vote threatened?
Despite the spread of the SV system, and the fact that more than 27 million English voters 
have used it successfully since 2000, the Conservative election manifesto for the snap 
2017 general election pledged to scrap the supplementary vote for all mayoral and police 
commissioner elections. Drafted by Theresa May’s advisors, and coming somewhat ‘out 
of the blue’, a short clause proposed that standard plurality rule voting (first-past-the-post) 
would be used instead. Following the Conservatives’ failure to win the general election, 
and a hung parliament, this position was reiterated once by Sajid Javid when he had 
responsibility for local government. However, no further proposal to make any change has 
followed. 
It seems unlikely that a change of this overtly partisan kind, made in one party’s interests, 
could progress through both Houses of Parliament before another general election. The 
proposed change might require referenda also, since the London and metro mayors 
(including how they were to be elected) were all approved first by regional referenda. It is 
also unclear why the May government should seek to reverse the Cameron government’s 
stance, or whether the policy is still ‘live’. No rationale was given, except for the claim that 
plurality rule was ‘simpler’ for voters. 
Reverting to plurality-rule elections now, for purely partisan interest reasons, would be a 
highly destructive institutional change. It could dramatically lower the cross-party legitimacy 
of elected mayors, which has been key to their success in framing broadly supported 
policies for their cities. In almost all UK urban settings (except Liverpool) under plurality 
elections the winning mayoral candidate would lack majority support. And in a multi-party 
election, winners might be elected with quite low levels of support (30% or less), as has 
frequently happened in US mayoral elections and elections for the Japanese regional 
governors. 
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Of course, no voting system is perfect. SV obviously works better when voters can 
accurately identify who the top two candidates are in advance, so as to use their second 
preference vote effectively, if they wish to – as in London, the new metro mayor contests 
and in local authorities with previous experience of SV. If a voter does not use either of their 
preferences for one of the top two candidates then their input does not determine who 
wins. But many voters who choose to support two ‘no hope’ candidates may well do so 
deliberately – for example, seeking to signal their strongly held preferences or ideological 
views, rather than to shape the election outcome at the run-off stage. There are no grounds 
on which political scientists can validly class this as ‘ineffective’ voting, since it is a perfectly 
rational choice. The only genuinely ‘irrational’ pattern might be if people vote twice for the 
same ‘no hope’ candidate (who comes third or lower). Figure 5 (above) showed that one in 
20 Londoners did this in 2000 – but that level has now fallen below one in 50.
Conclusions
All three additional member systems have operated effectively and the electoral legitimacy 
of governments in Scotland and Wales has been high. Furthermore, the representativeness 
of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh National Assembly has not been questioned by the 
public or the media. In London, the Assembly elections have been seen as fair, and its 
scrutiny role has secured some public profile in holding to account the powerful executive 
mayor.
The supplementary vote system has also proved successful, working very effectively in 
London in elections so far, and because of that also spreading out to shape the choice of 
more directly elected public officials in England, with a high degree of non-partisan support. 
With more than 29 million votes having been successfully cast in this way, SV is a rare case 
of a reformed electoral system expanding incrementally to new bodies and policy areas, 
under governments of both the main parties. 
Patrick Dunleavy is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the LSE and co-
Director of Democratic Audit there. He is also Centenary Professor in the Institute for 
Governance and Policy Analysis (IGPA), University of Canberra.
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What does democracy require for an electoral system?
✦	 It should accurately translate parties’ votes into seats in the legislature (here, local 
councils in Scotland and Northern Ireland, plus the Northern Ireland Assembly).
✦	 Votes should be translated into seats in a way that is recognised as legitimate by most 
citizens (ideally almost all of them).
✦	 No substantial part of the population should regard the result as illegitimate, nor suffer 
a consistent bias of the system ‘working against them’.
✦	 If possible, the system should have beneficial effects for the good governance of the 
country.
✦	 If possible, the voting system should enhance the social representativeness of the 
legislature, and encourage high levels of voting across all types of citizens.
The UK’s proportional electoral 
system: the single transferable 
vote (STV)
Patrick Dunleavy examines the proportional (PR) electoral system now used for smaller UK 
elections: the Northern Ireland Assembly, and Scottish and Northern Irish local councils. 
How has STV fared in converting votes into seats and fostering political legitimacy, under 
UK political conditions? An Annex also discusses the list PR system used to elect European 
Parliament MEPs from 1999 to 2014, but now discontinued as a result of Brexit.
2.3
Used for: Electing local councillors across Scotland and Northern Ireland; and for choosing 
members of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Elsewhere in the world, single transferable 
vote (STV) is only used to elect parliaments in Ireland and Malta, and for Australian Senate 
elections.
How it works: All representatives are elected in larger constituencies that have 
multiple seats (usually between three and six). STV seeks to allocate seats to parties in 
direct relation to their vote shares, so as to end up with minimum possible differences 
between their seat shares and vote shares (‘high proportionality’). Within each multi-seat 
constituency, parties put up multiple candidates (up to as many as there are seats). Voters 
mark their preferences across parties, and within parties across candidates, using numbers 
(1, 2, 3 etc.). Voters therefore have the option to support candidates from across different 
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parties, so as to match exactly their personal preferences. A complex counting process 
then allocates seats in order to the candidates that have the most votes, to achieve the 
best overall fit possible between party vote shares and their number of legislators. 
The total number of votes cast is divided by the number of seats being contested plus 
one. This gives a ‘quota’, or a vote share that guarantees a party one seat. (For example, if 
100,000 people have voted, and we have 4 seats to elect in a constituency, then the quota 
would be 100,000 divided by [4+1] = 20,000 votes.) Any candidate with more than a quota 
(so 20,001 and upwards) gets a seat straightaway. Every time a seat is allocated, we deduct 
one quota share of votes from the total remaining, and any surplus votes of the elected 
candidate are redistributed to their voters’ second or next choices.
Once this has been fully done, if there are still one or two seats not yet allocated, a different 
method is used to knock out candidates from the bottom. The least popular candidate is 
eliminated from the race, and their voters’ second or next preferences are redistributed 
across the candidates still in the race. This is repeated until one of the parties still in the 
race has enough votes for a quota and so wins the next seat. We then deduct this quota 
from the total votes (as above) and carry on with the ‘knocking out the bottom candidate’ 
process until all the seats are allocated (the final seats can sometimes be filled by 
candidates who do not reach the quota, if they have the highest number of votes after all 
transfers have been made).
Recent developments in Northern Ireland
The single transferable vote was introduced into the UK because of sectarian conflicts 
between the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland during the period 
1968–2008. STV was part of the original arrangements for the Northern Ireland parliament 
after 1921, and when power-sharing was established it was viewed as desirable because 
it had operated successfully for many years in southern Ireland. It is a transparently ‘fair’ 
system – matching parties’ seats in direct relation to their votes, unlike the large distortions 
possible with plurality rule voting (retained in Northern Ireland only for Westminster 
elections).
Because STV also lets voters choose to support candidates they like across party lines, 
British leaders hoped that the system would encourage Northern Ireland voters to endorse 
‘moderate’ people rather than sectarian extremists, and to support newer parties (like 
the Alliance) that were non-sectarian. By and large these earnestly hoped-for effects did 
not materialise. The moderate Protestant party, the Ulster Unionists (UUP), lost ground 
gradually, to be displaced by the initially more vigorously Protestant party, the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP). Sinn Féin, the more radical Catholic-backed party with links to the IRA 
tradition, gained ground, while votes for the more ‘moderate’ Social Democratic and Labour 
Party (SDLP) declined over time. The Alliance and other cross-sectarian parties survived 
under STV, but their vote share remained small, and ‘cross-voting’ across sectarian lines 
has remained rare.
Still the STV elections for the 108 seats Northern Ireland Assembly (reduced to 90 in 2017) 
were successful for a long time in helping to create impetus for a development towards 
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peaceful coexistence between communities (and a degree of co-sovereignty of the UK 
and Irish Republic) in Northern Ireland. The accurate seats shares were also important 
in constituting the power-sharing Northern Ireland executive in a proportional way in the 
period from 1998 to January 2017. When this was operating, the party with most seats got 
the first pick of ministerial positions, the party with the second most seats got the second 
pick, and so on. This system collapsed in January 2017 over a political corruption scandal 
and the Executive and Assembly remain suspended at the time of writing.
STV also applies to all Northern Ireland local elections. It initially operated in 26 districts 
(whose boundaries slightly favoured the DUP). In 2014 the first elections took place on new 
boundaries for the 11 larger and modernised districts, stimulating a flurry of candidacies that 
increased the proportion of votes going to small candidates or parties, and so somewhat 
boosted disproportionality (see Chapter 6.6).
Especially since the transition to power-sharing, and perhaps more since the suspension of 
the Executive, local councils have played an important role in the political life of Northern 
Ireland. STV elections have helped to somewhat moderate previous sectarian elements 
in municipal government over the long term, especially in equalising service provision, 
although controversies over flags and sectarian symbols are still a focal point for tensions.
Recent developments in Scotland
STV elections spread to mainland Great Britain in 2006, when the Labour–Liberal 
Democrat coalition in the Scottish Parliament introduced the reformed voting system for 
the country’s local authorities. The Liberal Democrats have been long-time advocates of 
STV as the most proportional voting system. The SNP accepted the reform, but were not 
that interested at first – ironically for it later proved to be crucial for them in opening up 
entrenched Labour municipal strongholds for their councillors. Even though STV requires 
very much larger council wards (in order to elect multiple councillors), and some of these 
wards in low-population parts of the Highlands proved to be vast areas indeed, the radical 
change went through.
The first Scottish local government elections using STV took place in 2007. Many voters 
were confused then because the AMS elections for the Scottish Parliament and the STV 
elections for councils were held simultaneously (which Labour felt would maximise their 
chances). On a high turnout of 53%, Labour and the SNP were neck and neck in terms of 
votes, with Labour slightly ahead despite losing 4% of its vote share. The seats allocations 
placed the SNP ahead, however, and the party made major advances in its local visibility. 
The second set of Scottish STV elections were held in May 2012, and with no Scottish 
Parliament elections on the same day turnout fell to 40%. The SNP and Labour were 
again close in the lead in popular vote terms, and both gained seats, often from the 
Liberal Democrats (unpopular because of their Westminster coalition with the Tories). The 
results were highly proportional, with the SNP, Independents and Labour somewhat over-
represented at a national level, and the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Greens 
somewhat under-represented. But these effects were very small-scale. 
The two STV results helped to fuel the SNP’s build-up of its party machine, with its many 
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new councillors since 2007 playing leading roles in the party’s 2014 referendum campaign 
on leaving the UK. Labour’s local party machine went into something of decline for a time, 
without large numbers of erstwhile councillor-activists to sustain it, setting the scene for the 
party’s wipe-out losses to the SNP at the 2015 Westminster general election. 
The 2017 STV elections were held a month before the Corbyn surge at the general 
election, with a higher 47% turnout. The SNP votes and seats stayed steady, but there was 
a 12 percentage point surge of Conservative support at Labour’s expense. Labour lost 
another third of its council seats, while the ascendant Conservatives under Ruth Davidson 
gained 146% more seats, moving into second place in terms of councillor numbers. 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
STV is a clearly proportional voting system 
when operating in UK conditions, and mostly 
works very well to match party seats and 
votes.
Even with large multi-member constituencies, 
some smaller constituencies may rather 
randomly not represent all parties (for 
example, a three- or four-seat constituency in 
a five-party system).
In theory it offers voters the chance to choose 
popular candidates as well as their preferred 
party, shaping who gets elected (and not 
choosing unpopular candidates that parties 
have put forward). 
The counting process in STV is complex 
and hard to explain to citizens, potentially 
endangering its legitimacy.
STV does not necessarily promote diversity. 
For example, the proportion of women 
councillors in Scotland was a low 22% in 
2007. It grew only a little to 24% in 2012 and 
29% in 2017.
In Northern Ireland STV has not had as much 
impact as UK elites hoped in encouraging 
voting across sectarian dividing lines.
Future opportunities Future threats
The STV system seems well established, and 
its results are well accepted.
Turnout in the Northern Ireland Assembly 
elections declined from 70% in 1998 to 54% 
in 2011 and 2016. 
In Scotland local election turnout was 40% in 
2012, but rose to 47% in 2017, good for local 
council contests. Questions around whether 
the more complex electoral system deters 
voters that arose in 2007 and 2012 have 
receded. As citizens become more familiar 
with STV there is the potential for it to be 
used more widely for other UK elections.
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How proportional is the single transferable vote in UK conditions?
In almost any voting system it is hard indeed to get the deviation from proportionality (DV) 
score below 5%, so we can regard this as a practicable floor for this measure. We noted in 
Chapter 2.1 that DV scores for FPTP elections at Westminster historically averaged 22.5% 
between 1997 and 2015, until 2017 when they fell radically to 9.3%. Figure 1 below shows 
that both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Scottish system have performed about 
three times as well as Westminster elections. In fact, the Scottish result in 2017 is almost 
as low as it is feasible to get, and other scores are consistently close. The Northern Ireland 
council result in 2014 was considerably less proportional, however, under the new local 
government boundaries. This largely reflected the poor success of a flurry of small parties 
and independents. In that year they garnered nearly one in eight votes in all, but this total 
was fragmented across many candidates and so was often insufficient to win seats. 
Figure 1: The deviation from proportionality (DV) scores in recent STV elections in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland
Date Election National DV  scores %
2017 Scottish local councils 5.9
2017 Northern Ireland Assembly 3.9
2016 Northern Ireland Assembly 4.1
2014 Northern Ireland councils 11.1
2012 Scottish local government 7.5
2011 Northern Ireland Assembly 6.5
2011 Northern Ireland councils 4.5
2007 Scottish local councils 7.5
Conclusions
The adoption of STV in the UK has shown that PR can work effectively under UK political 
conditions, and that it is undoubtedly reliably proportional. That said, it is not without some 
weaknesses, such as tending to favour larger parties in multi-party systems, for example 
at the expense of the Liberal Democrats and Greens in Scotland. And STV elections using 
numbered votes cannot easily be held on the same day as elections using X voting, as 
the first Scottish local government elections showed in 2007. But otherwise Scottish and 
Northern Irish voters seem to have coped well with ranking their choices and accepting 
the fairness of STV’s complicated counting process. The survival (indeed flourishing) of 
independent councillors in Scotland (despite perhaps overly small STV constituencies 
there) also suggests that voters can use their preferences across parties as intended.
The Liberal Democrats have long supported using STV for all UK elections, as has a well-
funded NGO, the Electoral Reform Society, which has propagandised for the system 
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for more than 120 years. However, Conservatives and Labour both resist the system 
(suspecting that it will favour the Liberal Democrats in England). Add in the fact that the 
electorate voted against electoral reform in the 2011 referendum, and the use of STV is 
unlikely to be expanded in the foreseeable future.
Annex: The list proportional representation system for 
electing the UK’s MEPs, used from 1999 to 2014
In addition to STV, the UK operated a PR system for elected Members of the European 
Parliament, from 1999 to 2014, but this sequence came to an end with the 2016 Brexit 
referendum for Leave. The UK will not participate in the July 2019 European Parliament 
elections, nor in any future such elections. However, the experience of these elections is 
still relevant for understanding UK politics and electoral reform.
Was used for: Choosing the 70 British members of the European Parliament (MEPs); the 
three Northern Irish MEPs were elected via STV.
How it worked: The country was divided into 13 regions, ranging in size from the South 
East (ten seats) and London (eight seats) down to the North East and Northern Ireland 
(three seats each). The main parties all selected enough candidates to contest all of a 
region’s seats, while smaller parties could only contest some of the available seats. The 
parties arranged their candidates on their list, so candidates that are placed at the top 
would win seats first if their parties get enough support. The ballot paper showed each 
party’s list and voters chose just one party to support using a single X vote.
All the votes in each region were then counted and each party got seats in proportion 
to the party’s vote share. So, suppose we had a region with ten seats where party A got 
40% of the vote – they should end up with four of the available seats. This system is very 
proportional but it may favour larger parties if votes are heavily fragmented across many 
smaller parties. List PR is also used widely across Europe for electing national parliaments, 
as well as the European Parliament (EP).
Historic developments
The List PR system was first introduced in 1999 as a result of twin pressures – from the 
EU to put in place more standardised PR elections for the European Parliament; and a 
‘constitutional pact’ between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, signed just before the 
1997 general election. The scheme was drawn up by the UK civil service for 86 seats using 
standard regions as multi-seat constituencies.
In 2004, 2009 and 2014 EP elections took place one year before general elections. In 
all these years, support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) surged and that for the 
Conservatives and Labour took a big hit. And because this was a PR system, UKIP’s large 
vote shares converted into seats well, especially in 2014.
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Figure 2: The largest party in the 2014 European Parliament elections, by local authority area
Source: Hawkins, & Miller, V, European Parliament Elections 2014, House of Commons Library 
Research Paper 14/32, p.32. Note: Covers Britain only. 
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This pattern played a significant role in explaining why the Conservatives felt pushed into 
conceding the EU referendum in an attempt to insulate their general election vote from 
UKIP. UKIP, however, were considerably disadvantaged in the Westminster elections by 
the first-past-the-post voting system. Figure 3 shows the alternation of proportional list PR 
EP elections with the historically higher disproportional FPTP general elections – until the 
exceptional 2017 outcome.
Figure 3: The deviation from proportionality (DV) scores (%) of European Parliament and 
general elections
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Strengths and Weaknesses (SW) analysis
Strengths Weaknesses
The system was simple to use. Voters mark 
one X for their first-choice party.
The system was a ‘closed list’ one, where the 
political parties completely control the order 
in which candidates get elected from their list. 
Voters therefore cannot influence this at all.
The system was straightforward to count at 
the large regional scale and it was relatively 
easy for voters to understand how votes 
convert to seats.
Allocating seats followed the d’Hondt method, 
which somewhat favours the larger parties in 
the election over smaller ones.
The system was used for five elections 
and no major public criticisms of its 
representativeness or useability emerged.
The UK’s number of seats in the European 
Parliament fell over time because of EU 
enlargement. The seats were removed from 
UK regions in a rather ad hoc manner (again 
by civil servants), in only rough relation to their 
population.
From 1999 to 2014 MEPs in the UK were very 
little known by citizens. Critics argued that 
the large regional constituencies used with 
list PR contributed to this ‘isolation’. But it 
seems more likely that the UK’s very inwardly 
focused political elites and media dynamics 
were chiefly to blame, since neither ever 
effectively engaged with the EU. The 2016 
vote to leave the EU could also be interpreted 
as a challenge to MEPs’ legitimacy, if not 
necessarily the system used to elect them.
With only three seats each, the two smallest 
regions could only give seats to the top three 
parties. The North East of England could have 
been merged into one of its neighbouring 
regions, but Northern Ireland was an 
intractable case.
Patrick Dunleavy is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the LSE and co-
Director of Democratic Audit there. He is also Centenary Professor in the Institute for 
Governance and Policy Analysis (IGPA), University of Canberra.
What does democracy require for the conduct of elections? And 
how are voting, candidacies and fair competition facilitated?
✦	 Governmental and legislative offices are open to popular competitive elections. All 
citizens have the right to take part in the electoral process. All parties, interests and 
groups assign great importance to maintaining universal and equal voting rights and 
to encouraging electoral participation.
✦	 All votes count equally. So constituencies for all legislatures are (broadly) equal 
in size; and seats are (broadly) distributed in proportion to population numbers. 
Some variations in the population sizes of seats in order to facilitate more effective 
‘community’ representation are allowable.
✦	 The registration of voters is impartially organised in timely, speedy, convenient and 
effective ways. It maximises the ability of all citizens to take part in voting. Resources 
are available to help hard-to-register groups to be enrolled on the register.
✦	 Voting in all elections is easy to do and the administrative costs for the citizen are 
minimised. Polling stations are local and convenient to access, there are no long 
queues for voting, and voters can also cast votes conveniently by mail or online. 
Arrangements for proxy voting are available. All modes of voting are free from 
intimidation, fraud-proof and robust.
✦	 All citizens can stand for election as candidates, and they face no onerous regulatory 
or other barriers in doing so. Some requirements for signatures or deposits are 
allowable in order to obviate frivolous candidacies, but they must be kept low and 
proportional to the seriousness of the offices being contested. All parties and groups 
Are UK elections conducted with 
integrity, with sufficient turnout?
Across the world, there are many countries where elections take place but are rigged by 
governments or unfairly conducted. And even in core liberal democracies (like the United 
States) political parties have now become deeply involved in gerrymandering constituencies 
and partisan efforts at ‘voter suppression’. Toby S James looks at how well elections are 
run in the UK, and whether the systems for registering voters and encouraging turnout are 
operating effectively and fairly.
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assign top importance to maintaining candidacy rights and facilitating effective 
electoral competition and maximum choice for voters.
✦	 Political party names and identifying symbols can also be registered to prevent 
‘passing off’ strategies designed only or mainly to confuse voters. (Registering party 
names is also essential in most PR systems where candidates are elected off party 
lists.) But otherwise party or candidacy names may be freely chosen, and candidates 
can describe themselves in any legal way.
✦	 All aspects of the electoral process are run impartially by trained, professional staffs 
in secure ways that minimise any opportunity for fraud. Election administrators have 
the legal ability to curb electoral abuses and to ensure that all candidates campaign 
legally and within both the electoral rules and the normal legal requirements to show 
respect for other citizens. Police and prosecution services impartially investigate 
and pursue all allegations of electoral misconduct or corruption and prosecute when 
necessary in a timely manner.
✦	 Incumbent governments at the national level and sitting MPs or members of 
legislatures at constituency level must compete at elections on fully equal terms with 
all other parties and candidates. They enjoy no special advantages.
✦	 Elections are welcoming and safe opportunities for voters and candidates to express 
their views, whatever their political affiliations or social background. They are never 
occasions for intimidation or the worsening of social tensions.
✦	 Election conduct and counting processes should be transparent and subject to 
inspection by parties and candidates, and by external observers. Election processes 
and results should be accepted by all domestic political forces as fully free and fair, 
and rated in the same way by foreign observers.
✦	 The media system should be a pluralistic one, handling the reporting of elections 
and campaigns in a reasonably fair and diverse way. There should be no direct state 
interference in the reporting of elections or campaigns designed to secure partisan 
advantages for the incumbents or for powerful parties.
Free and fair elections are essential for the democratic process, and the UK implemented 
many of the requirements for them (including limits on local campaign spending) by the 
1880s, although the franchise was not fully extended until 1928. The effectiveness of long-
unchanged ‘legacy’ rules, and the administration and practice of elections, often decays 
over time, however. As society changes, the effectiveness of old rules can drift and new 
problems can emerge. The UK does not have electoral irregularities on the scale commonly 
seen in electoral autocracies (authoritarian states or where voting takes place but under 
rigged arrangements) or the almost unrestricted corporate funding of elections in the USA. 
However, there are many pressures on electoral integrity in the UK.
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Recent developments: elections, referenda and external 
interference
The robustness and timeliness of the regulation of campaigns was brought into question 
after the 2016 Brexit vote. As with any referendum, parties were not the vehicles 
leading the campaign. Instead, special, one-off ‘referendum fighting organisations’ were 
established and regulated. An official campaign for Leave (Vote Leave) and another 
for Remain (Stronger In) were recognised by the government and Election Commission 
and each was assigned a relatively restrictive limit on their total spending. In addition, 
‘allied’ organisations could register and be assigned smaller spending limits. After many 
allegations of malpractice by the Leave campaign, an Election Commission report found 
in June 2018 (two years after the vote) that Vote Leave had overspent its limit of £7.6m by 
passing a payment of £650,000 to a one-person associated ‘campaign’ (Be Leave, run 
by a graduate student). The main staffer of this organisation was on loan from Vote Leave 
and they used the money to hire a firm to do its social media analytics. Vote Leave claimed 
that the Commission had approved this at the time. Concerns were raised about how rules 
seemed to be easily circumvented by the campaigners and that an investigation from the 
Electoral Commission was only undertaken very belatedly and after a lot of prodding by 
media investigations.
A second closely related area has been a surge of concerns that external countries or 
agents can too easily influence UK elections. Suggestions have been made that units close 
to the Kremlin intervened in the Brexit campaign by establishing multiple robot sites to re-
send Leave-favouring messages on Facebook and Twitter, so as to artificially magnify their 
apparent salience and influence. UK investigations are only slowly proceeding, however. 
Concerns had been raised before, at the 2017 general election, after Russian sites were 
boosting Labour-favouring social media messages, according to one study. The evidence 
base for these worries remains very minimal, but the claims have gained currency because of 
better-attested evidence of Russian interventions in the Donald Trump election campaign and 
the threat that they would pose to electoral democracy and the international order, if true.
‘Dark money’ and social media
These two developments illustrate a basic concern about ‘dark money’ and social media. 
As election campaigning increasingly shifts to the internet and social media new concerns 
have also been raised about how undisclosed ‘dark money’ can influence elections and 
undermine political equality. Political parties are reportedly increasingly making use 
of data analytics to track voter behaviour on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. 
This information can then be used to target advertisements in marginal constituencies. 
This involves a substantial investment of work and money in data analytics which does 
not necessarily fall within the UK’s short official campaign period. Nor does this kind of 
expenditure clearly fit within campaign spending categories that are regulated by law. 
Campaign advertising laws cover TV and radio, but not social media. The playing field at 
electoral contests may become increasingly uneven as a result, and there is a clear need 
for election finance arrangements to be updated for the digital era. 
812.4 Are UK elections conducted with integrity, with sufficient turnout?
A 2018 Electoral Commission report claimed that the UK’s regulatory framework governing 
elections in the social media age was radically inadequate. It proposed an extensive 
modernisation of its powers to catch up by:
✦	 requiring all online materials by candidates, parties and campaigners to state who 
created them;
✦	 make all campaigners declare in detail what they spent on digital activities in campaigns;
✦	 require social media companies to label all election and referendum adverts with their 
sources and create online databases of all such materials;
✦	 give the Commission itself more investigatory powers, and the ability to levy bigger 
sanctions for breaches.
The government and opposition parties have not yet taken a stance on these proposals, so 
speedy remedial action seems unlikely.
The ‘age gap’ in voting
A third well publicised (and completely factual) development has been positive, namely 
the reversal of the long decline in turnout in UK general elections. Figure 1 shows that 
from the nadir of 2001, turnout rose by nearly 10 percentage points to 68.5% in the 2017 
general election. Moreover, it grew substantially amongst one of those groups who were 
increasingly not exercising their democratic right – young people. In 2005 the UK had the 
largest ‘age gap’ of any liberal democracy in the gulf between voters over 55 and under 
34. However, Figure 1 shows that turnout amongst the 18–24 and 25–34 age categories 
substantially rebounded in June 2017. The age gap from 2005 and 2015 was effectively 
halved.
Figure 1: The estimated turnout of different age groups at general elections from 1964 to 
2017
Source: Computed by author using data from the British Election Study, IPSOS Mori and BBC.
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Yet turnout remains a cause for concern. Differentials between age (and other) groups 
have not disappeared. The method for calculating turnout in the UK (as a percentage of 
registered voters) makes it look higher than it really is. The 2017 surge reflected somewhat 
unusual conditions and turnout remains chronically low for other electoral contests. Up to 
2015 a new political cleavage had arguably opened-up based on age, education and social 
values rather than social class. Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party has successfully focused on 
gathering support from a new electoral bloc – with the newly re-energised youth a key part 
of this. But whether this engagement can be sustained remains uncertain.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Elections are generally very peaceful, and 
intimidation or electoral fraud rarely occur, 
although there are isolated problems. 
Election results are well respected by 
parties and citizens. International observers  
have regularly expressed ‘a high level of 
confidence in the electoral process.’
One of the biggest problems is incomplete 
electoral registers, owing to a system 
where it is an individual and not a state 
responsibility to ensure names are on the 
electoral roll. Many citizens fail to re-register 
because they misunderstand the electoral 
registration process. Estimates suggest that 
up to eight million citizens may be missing 
from registers in recent contests, around 16% 
of the adult population (see below).
No evidence has emerged that either 
flaws in campaign spending or foreign 
interference in either the 2016 Brexit vote or 
the 2017 general election changed or even 
significantly influenced the outcomes.
We noted above, there were apparent major 
flaws in the conduct and regulation of the 
2016 Brexit referendum, plus the alleged 
vulnerability of UK elections to social media 
distortions of public debate and rigging of 
‘fake news’. Both raise acute new issues 
about whether current safeguards are 
adequate or adapted for modern digital 
conditions.
It is very straightforward to register a party 
or to stand as a candidate at UK elections, 
with very few regulatory impediments. An 
election deposit of £500 is required to stand 
as an MP for Westminster, returnable if the 
candidate gets 5% of the votes. Higher 
deposits apply for police commissioner 
elections (£2000). Candidates also need 
relatively few registered voters to sponsor 
their standing (10 for Westminster).
At £500 per seat, the deposit cost of 
contesting every seat in Britain at a general 
election is £314,000. This still favours the 
most established parties over newcomers. In 
2017 candidacies for UKIP fell sharply by 346 
compared to 2015; and those for the Green 
party by 106. This partly reflected lack of 
finance, and less time to raise finance since 
the 2015 general election.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Procedures in polling stations are simple 
and liberal. Currently voters do not need to 
show ID but just give a name and address. 
This makes voting very speedy to do and 
facilitates maximum turnout. Polling stations 
are also very locally situated (mainly in 
primary schools or community centres), and 
around 75% of locations stay the same from 
one election to another, so becoming familiar 
to citizens.
There is an archaic, antiquated and illogical 
system for determining who is allowed to 
vote (see below). For instance, in Scotland 
(and soon Wales) teenagers of 16 and 17 
can vote in elections for the Edinburgh 
Parliament and local councils, but not for 
Westminster MPs. In England and Northern 
Ireland they cannot vote at all. In addition, 
there remains little or no citizenship 
education in UK schools and available funds 
for this are tiny.
The UK’s boundary review process 
responds to statute and its implementation 
timing is often politically delayed and 
influenced. However, the process of 
defining constituencies is independent from 
politicians, which prevents gerrymandering.
The robustness of the local and constituency 
regulation of electoral spending is 
problematic at the margins (see below). 
Constituency spending limits are set 
restrictively, but national spending levels by 
parties are completely unrestricted.
Electoral administration is chiefly run by 
professional officials in local government, 
who are independent from government and 
local politicians. The Electoral Commission 
is a national quasi-government body that 
regulates electoral finance and advises on 
election procedures in an independent way. 
It has been willing to criticise the government 
when necessary and recently called for its 
powers to be extended (see above).
The legislative framework is ‘complex, 
voluminous and fragmented’ and in need 
of consultation. Isolated cases of electoral 
fraud remain. Some vulnerabilities in electoral 
registration remain. The system for securing 
electoral justice is archaic and slow. 
Critics argue that the regulation of 
campaigns requires modernisation – notably 
citing the 2016 Brexit referendum (see 
above). They also say that the there is a need 
to update the communication of election 
and candidate information to citizens for the 
social and digital media age. 
A modernised online electoral registration 
system implemented by local authorities has 
enabled many last-minute voter registration 
applications. Timely registration for 
upcoming contests is much better developed 
than in the past.
Locating electoral administrators in local 
governments means that many are operating 
under financial restraints, following many 
years of austerity cutbacks. Systems for 
registration are often dated. Arrangements 
for the effective online communication of 
results back to voters are problematic. The 
apparatus for communicating with voters was 
basically defined in the 1880s and though 
candidates addresses are listed on websites 
the approach has otherwise been little 
updated for the social media era. Cutbacks 
have especially restricted voter outreach 
work by local authorities.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Civil society groups and NGOs (such as 
‘Bite the Ballot’) have organised to register 
and engage voters. They helped to set 
out policy ideas through a parliamentary 
group. Voter advice applications also seek 
to reach people at general elections who are 
not normally politically engaged. And sites 
such as Democracy Club and Democratic 
Dashboard contribute to the provision of 
information to citizens.
Further deficiencies in UK elections lie 
outside the area of ‘electoral integrity’ 
itself. The Westminster electoral plurality 
voting system (also used in English and 
Welsh council elections) often produces 
highly disproportional results (see Chapter 
2.1). In the media system the newspaper 
coverage of candidates and parties remains 
systematically unbalanced.
Future opportunities Future threats
The Scottish government may bring 
legislation forward to reform Scottish 
electoral law and Welsh government is 
reviewing local elections in Wales (see 
Chapter 6.4). This could also provide 
opportunities for innovation and learning 
across the UK.
Pilots to make voters show ID have been 
introduced in five local authorities at 
England’s May 2018 local elections. Early 
academic studies showed that the pilots 
were ‘unnecessary and ineffective.’ Future 
pilots and the permanent compulsory 
requirement to introduce voter ID may 
follow, which could reduce turnout. 
The Brexit negotiations offer an opportunity 
for the concept of citizenship to be redefined 
and electoral rights to be realigned.
The Brexit process may still end up leaving 
many EU citizens resident in the UK with 
fewer electoral rights than they have had up 
to now.
UK-wide pilots of automatic registration 
could lead to cost efficiency savings, but may 
also strengthen levels of voter registration. 
The Missing Millions report from the All Party 
Group on Democratic Participation provides a 
roadmap for voter registration reform.
Under the new Individual Registration 
systems electoral turnout and registration 
levels have so far held up. But they may drift 
downwards at subsequent elections without 
the transitional efforts to boost registration 
rates or high profile electoral events such as 
the Brexit referendum.
A debate has opened up about the funding 
of electoral services with the Scottish 
Local Government and Communities Select 
Committee reviewing arrangements.
Political advertising, external boosting 
of particular campaigns, and other 
interventions via social media are currently 
very little regulated (see above). (See also 
Chapter 3.4.)
The Law Commission’s proposals to 
consolidate the UK’s ‘complex, voluminous, 
and fragmented’ sets of electoral law were 
published in February 2016 – and provides a 
blueprint for reforming electoral law.
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Who is eligible to vote?
The electoral franchise, which defines who has the right to vote, is an essential part of 
what it means to be a citizen within a polity. Excluding people from it immediately builds 
in political inequality, and can lend itself to partisan ‘voter suppression’ effort, as in many 
American states now. 
The UK’s electoral franchise is an antiquated patchwork of historical legacies that lacks 
any underlying principles. Citizens from qualifying Commonwealth countries and Ireland 
can move to the UK and have full electoral rights immediately. Yet a citizen from the 
European Union, who has lived and worked in the UK for most of their life, has rights for 
local and European elections (while they last) but not for parliamentary elections, nor for 
major electoral events like the EU referendum. Recent electoral events have affected them 
more than any other group of people. 
We noted in the SWOT analysis that 16- and 17-year-olds can vote in all Scottish elections, 
and that this is planned for Wales, whereas these young people cannot vote in Westminster 
elections, or in any other part of the UK. Theresa May has since restated opposition 
to extending voting rights to 16-year-olds. During the Brexit referendum lead-up, Lords 
amendments to grant 16- and 17-year-olds the right to vote were rejected by the government, 
a decision that probably affected the result. Where Conservative governments have been 
proactive in expanding the franchise is for British overseas electors. The Overseas Electors 
Bill will give them votes for life, if passed (compared with the current system where expats 
retain the franchise only for the first 15 years that they live overseas). 
Many recent electoral contests with profound consequences for public policy may have 
had entirely different electoral outcomes if UK franchise arrangements were different. 
Current provisions are largely unjustified, unbalanced and unequal. Meanwhile, the UK 
continues to breach the European Convention of Human Rights in denying prisoners 
(other than those on remand or serving sentences for contempt of court) any vote while 
serving their sentence.
Fraud and malpractices
The government ran pilots in five local authorities to require voters in England to present 
voter ID in the May 2018 local elections. But before those trials could be organised and 
the results analysed, the Conservatives rushed to make a manifesto commitment at the 
2017 election to make this a permanent and compulsory reform. Critics argued that it 
could lead to many people being denied their right to vote because they do not have 
sufficient paperwork to hand on election day – or that voters would refuse to provide it on 
ideological grounds. 
There is very little evidence that there is any significant voting fraud problem to justify 
the reform. Figure 2 shows data from a study of the 2018 English local elections which 
identifies the frequency of problems in polling stations. Suspicions of electoral fraud in 
polling stations was a tiny problem, and dwarfed by other problems. The overall number of 
fraud cases under the current ‘high trust’ system is exceptionally low. 
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Figure 2: Problems experienced by poll workers at the English local elections 2018
Potential problem % of respondents 
reporting problem
People asking to vote but not on register 52
Disabled voters having problems completing ballot papers 14
Members of parties being where they shouldn’t be 9
Disabled voters having problems with access to the polling station 9
People taking photos of ballot/ polling station 8
Members of parties intimidating public 8
People asking to vote whose identity I was unsure of 5
Suspected cases of electoral fraud 1
Source: Clark and James, 2018. Note: % exceeds 100 as workers can report more than one problem.
The ‘missing millions’ of unregistered citizens
Figure 2 also shows that the more significant problem was citizens turning up to vote 
only to find themselves not on the electoral register (although problems with accessibility 
for disabled voters are also common). Research shows that many citizens think they are 
registered because they access other government services and pay their council tax, when 
they often are not. Figure 3 below shows the number of people missing from the electoral 
register has gradually risen. If everyone was registered, the number of people on the 
electoral register should be roughly in line with the annual mid-year population estimates. 
But there has been a growing gap. And if there are duplicate register entries, which there 
are, many more people may be missing. One assessment suggests the overall number 
missed off could be up to eight million people.
Figure 3: The growing gap between the eligible number of citizens/inhabitants and total 
electors
Source: Author compiled from ONS Population Estimates and Electoral Statistics from 1 December each 
year. The local electoral register is used because it has the higher franchise.
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Under-registration is not equally distributed across the whole population, fuelling 
further political inequality. Evidence shows the register is less complete in urban areas 
(especially within London, where three out of ten people under 30 move borough every 
year). This chiefly affects recent movers and private renters, Commonwealth and EU 
nationals, non-white ethnicities, lower socioeconomic groups, citizens with learning 
disabilities and young people. 
The most worrying trend is with attainers – those citizens who will shortly reach the voting 
age during the currency of the forthcoming register. Historically this was just 16- and 
17-year-olds, as only 18-year-olds can vote. But in Scotland and Wales attainers for devolved 
and local elections can now be 14 or 15. And Figure 4 shows that from 2009 there has been 
a decline in the number of attainer electors on the register (the grey line) compared with 
mid-year estimates of 16- and 17-year-olds in the UK (and including 14- and 15-year-olds in 
Scotland after 2015). Most of the next generation of voters already seem to be missing from 
the register.
Figure 4: The gap between eligible attainers (people nearing voting age, who should be on 
the electoral register) and registered attainers
Source: Author compiled from ONS Population Estimates and Electoral Statistics. The local electoral 
register is used because it has the higher franchise.
Two effects are at work here. The move from household to individual electoral registration 
was predicted to hit young people the hardest since their parents often previously 
registered them, despite some counter-mobilisation efforts from civil society which 
helped to avert this in the short-term. Second, electoral registration efforts in Scotland 
may not have caught up with the new franchise. Simple solutions include the automatic 
registration of young people at other government ‘touch points’, for example, when they 
receive their national insurance card (needed for paid employment), or perhaps register for 
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post-16 education. Legislation was recently passed to require universities to play a role 
in registering their students, one of the most under-registered groups. This may have a 
positive effect in the longer-run. 
Controlling election expenses at constituency level
Despite efforts to monitor and regulate electoral campaign spending locally, 2015 saw 
allegations of significant breaching of electoral laws by 22 Conservative MPs and their 
agents not declaring ‘national’ spending in fact carried out in their local area. The Tories 
claimed that they had abided by the rules as set out, and never intended to breach 
requirements. The Electoral Commission found significant breaches and that the Tory party 
nationally showed an ‘unreasonable’ lack of co-operation with the Commission. Cases from 
14 police forces were referred to the Crown Prosecution Service, which eventually only 
decided to press charges in one case.
Yet charges were not pressed in many cases, not because the affair was trivial but because 
of ‘insufficient evidence to prove to the criminal standard that any candidate or agent was 
dishonest.’ Critics question whether current legislation requires such a high (or impossible) 
threshold of evidence, that it is difficult to prevent loose interpretations from parties. 
In addition, there was a worrying effort by the governing Conservatives and the MPs 
involved to criticise and discredit the neutrality of the Electoral Commission in unwarranted 
ways, rather than to accept or respect the result of investigations. Such partisanship can 
only undermine confidence in the electoral process in the longer term. An additional 
new concern is that different requirements in Northern Ireland provide a backdoor for 
influencing election contests the UK.
Reviewing Westminster constituency boundaries
The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government agreed that the size of the 
House of Commons should be reduced from 650 to 600 MPs, with the populations of 
constituencies to be equalised exactly. This would remove the previous tolerance for 
seats being only broadly similar in size because of community and other factors, which 
meant that the smallest constituencies were often in inner-city areas held by Labour, 
while the largest constituencies were in fast-growing outer urban areas. A boundary 
review was set in motion by the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies 
Act 2011. However, the Liberal Democrats subsequently withdrew co-operation on 
implementing the review, in response to Tory backbenchers wrecking House of Lords 
reform, and nothing further happened.
After the Tories gained a majority in 2015 fully equalised constituencies were revived and the 
Boundary Commission published proposals in 2017, redone after the 2017 election, with final 
details published in autumn 2018. Most estimates suggest that the Conservatives would make 
perhaps 20 seat gains from 600 equal sized constituencies, with Labour the chiefly loser. 
Yet some individual Tory MPs also risk seeing their established seats disappear, and may not 
be keen to see that happen. Some press reports in autumn 2017 suggested that the May 
government would drop the proposals (which would require re-legislating) altogether, since 
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they are hard to get through a hung parliament. At the least, many observers expect that no 
new boundaries may come into effect by the next general election. 
This might be a positive development for electoral integrity. One notable feature of the 
new boundaries was that they used the December 2015 electoral register to estimate 
populations – a snapshot of the electorate where millions were missing from the roll. Those 
geographic areas or groups who are under-represented on the register would therefore be 
under-represented in a new parliament.
Conclusions
Elections are an indispensable way for citizens to have popular control of government, 
and they are a fundamental foundation of political equality. At a time when democracy is 
thought to be under threat, achieving these objectives has never been more important. 
UK elections largely do this, but there are some underlying problems and new emerging 
threats which require reform in many areas.
Arguably, the paralysis caused by Brexit and the difficulties in legislating without a 
government majority, might excuse a government for not having the capacity to undertake 
the important changes. Nonetheless, some reforms, notably extending the franchise for 
overseas electors and introducing voter ID requirements, seem to be forthcoming. The 
problem, however, is that these do not speak in any way to the heart of the core electoral 
integrity challenges faced in the UK and to some extent worsen them.
Toby S. James is Head of Politics and Senior Lecturer at the University of East Anglia. 
He is Lead Fellow on Electoral Modernisation for the All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Democratic Participation and co-convenor of the Electoral Management Network.
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What does democracy require for political parties and a party 
system?
Parties (and now other forms of ‘election fighting organisation’, like referendum 
campaigns) are diverse, so four kinds of democratic evaluation criteria are needed:
(i) Structuring competition and engagement
✦	 The party system should provide citizens with a framework for simplifying and 
organising political ideas and discourses, providing coherent packages of policy 
proposals, so as to sustain vigorous and effective electoral competition between 
rival teams.
✦	 Parties should provide enduring brands, able to sustain the engagement and trust of 
most citizens over long periods. Because they endure through time, parties should 
behave responsibly, knowing that citizens can hold them effectively to account in 
future.
✦	 Main parties should help to recruit, socialise, select and promote talented individuals 
into elected public office, ranging from local council to national government levels.
✦	 Party groups inside elected legislatures (such as MPs or councillors), and elites and 
members in the party’s extra-parliamentary organisation, should help to sustain 
viable and accountable leadership teams. They should also be important channels 
for the scrutiny of public policies and the elected leadership’s conduct in office and 
behaviour in the public interest.
The political parties and party system
Patrick Dunleavy and Sean Kippin examine how democratic the UK’s party system and 
political parties are. Parties often attract criticism from those outside their ranks, but they 
have multiple, complex roles to play in any liberal democratic society. The UK’s system has 
many strengths, but also key weaknesses, where meaningful reform could realistically take 
place.
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(ii) Representing civil society
✦	 The party system should be reasonably inclusive, covering a broad range of 
interests and views in civil society. Parties should not exclude or discriminate against 
people on the basis of gender, ethnicity or other characteristics.
✦	 Citizens should be able to form and grow new political parties easily, without 
encountering onerous or artificial official barriers privileging existing, established or 
incumbent parties.
✦	 Party activities should be regulated independently by impartial officials and 
agencies, so as to prevent self-serving protection of existing incumbents.
(iii) Internal party democracy and transparency
✦	 Long-established parties inevitably accumulate discretionary political power in the 
exercise of their functions. This creates some citizen dependencies upon them and 
always has ‘oligopolistic’ effects in restricting political competition (for example, 
concentrating funding and advertising/campaign capabilities in main parties). To 
compensate, the internal leadership of parties and their processes for setting policies 
should be responsive to a wide membership, one that is open and easy to join.
✦	 Leadership selection and the setting of main policies should operate democratically 
and transparently to members and other groupings inside the party (such as party 
MPs or members of legislatures). Independent regulation should ensure that parties 
stick both to their rule books and to public interest practices.
 (iv) Political finance
✦	 Parties should be able to raise substantial political funding of their own, but subject 
to independent regulation to ensure that effective electoral competition is not 
undermined by inequities of funding.
✦	 Individuals, organisations or interests providing large donations to parties or other 
‘election fighting organisations’ (such as referendum campaigns) must not gain 
enhanced or differential influence over public policies, or the allocation of social 
prestige (such as honours). 
✦	 All donations must be fully transparent, and without payments from ‘front’ 
organisations or foreign sources. The size of individual contributions should be 
capped where they raise doubts of undue influence.
Recent developments: the party system 
Political parties in the UK are normally stable organisations. Their vote shares and party 
membership levels typically alter only moderately from one period to the next. But since 
2014, party fortunes have changed radically in the UK, particularly in England and Scotland. 
In 2017 the top two parties secured more than four-fifths of votes in the UK (Figure 2), 
whereas in England (their ‘home ground’) their share was 73% only two years earlier (Figure 
1). With the Brexit referendum won for ‘Leave’ in 2016 and its party leadership in chaos 
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without its former leader Nigel Farage, the UK Independence Party’s (UKIP’s) support in 
England in 2017 plummeted to 2% – whereas two years earlier they commanded one in 
seven English votes at the general election (and their opinion poll ratings were higher). 
Already in 2015, the Liberal Democrats’ vote share had fallen sharply to just 8% in England 
(and lower elsewhere), around a third of its 2010 level – as the electors punished them 
for their 2010–15 ‘austerity’ coalition government with the Tories. In 2017 their support still 
languished, although in local council elections in 2017 and 2018 they secured around one 
in six votes. 
Yet the most fundamental difference in the UK party systems between the elections arose 
from the Brexit referendum in June 2016. Figure 1 below shows that in 2015 the competition 
space of British politics was still essentially one-dimensional – so that parties could still be 
organised on a classical left-right dimension, with the left standing for more public-sector 
spending and egalitarian policies, and the right standing for free-market solutions, less 
welfare spending and stronger policies on restricting immigration. There was a pro- and 
anti-European Union dimension in British politics in 2015 but only UKIP, with their advocacy 
of EU withdrawal, placed it centre stage. For the rest the issue was sublimated, with the 
Cameron-led Conservatives and Miliband-led Labour both offering very similar and quite 
consensual-seeming ‘European’ policy positions. Inside the Tories, although strong currents 
of Euroscepticism were beginning to predominate again behind the scenes, this issue 
hardly featured in Cameron’s 2015 campaign. 
Figure 1: The party system in England, in the May 2015 general election
Source: P. Dunleavy, 2017 Lecture.
Notes: The positions of party ‘circles’ show their approximate left/right position; the size of the circles 
shows indicates their vote shares in England. Parties with names underlined won seats.
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By 2017, Figure 2 shows that a year after the shock June 2016 referendum vote for ‘Leave’ 
the space of party competition was clearly two-dimensional, with the left-right ideological 
spectrum now cross-cut slantwise by a three-fold cleavage between:
✦	 Strong Eurosceptics committed to implementing the ‘Leave’ vote, whatever the 
consequences, perhaps even walking away from the EU with a ‘no deal’ outcome – 
shown in the purple-shaded area.
Figure 2: The UK’s changed party system at the 2017 general election and the subsequent 
Brexit negotiations phase
Source: P. Dunleavy, 2017 Lecture. 
Notes: The positions of party circles show their approximate left/right position; the size shows their 
vote shares at the 2017 general election. The dotted line around the Liberal Democrats indicates their 
approximate level of support in 2017 and 2018 local elections (16%, calculated using the BBC’s national 
equivalent votes share measure).
973.1 The political parties and party system
✦	 Strong ‘Remainers’ committed to retaining the closest possible relationship with or full 
customs union and single market access to the EU, and perhaps to holding a second 
referendum for the public to approve the detailed outcome of withdrawal negotiations 
– shown in the green shaded area. Significant sections of public and elite opinion here 
were also willing to see the 2016 vote reversed if possible.
✦	 In between, in the unshaded area, lie the largest blocs of elite and public opinion, 
committed to implementing the ‘Leave’ vote so that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ as May 
insisted, but also seeking the best possible compromise outcome for the UK in retaining 
links to the EU while yet not having to accept ‘freedom of movement’ of EU citizens into 
the UK, or any EU policies, or jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice.
These pro- and anti-Brexit lines of cleavage affect both the main parties. There are more 
Conservative ultra-Leavers and more Labour strong Remainers, but both the top two 
parties are internally divided into the three groups above. Only the Liberal Democrats, 
Scottish National Party (SNP), and the Greens came out fully for remaining in the EU or as 
close as possible, while the now-diminished UKIP was equally clearly for leaving ‘come 
what may’. The divisions within the main parties meant that although Theresa May called 
the snap 2017 election supposedly to strengthen her bargaining hand in negotiations with 
Brussels, in fact the EU withdrawal issue was again handled in a ‘sub voce’ manner by both 
Conservatives and especially Labour – whose policy position concentrated on domestic 
issues and remained deliberately very vague on European issues.
A succession of parliamentary votes on Brexit legislation in 2017 and 2018 has so far only 
confirmed the picture in Figure 2, with Labour’s position varying quite markedly depending 
on the detailed wording of each vote. Significant numbers of Conservatives have voted 
against the May government’s ‘shaky compromise’ strategies at various stages, while many 
Labour MPs in strong Leave-voting constituencies have supported the government against 
their party line on occasion (while others, particularly London MPs, have rebelled for pro-EU 
amendments). Jeremy Corbyn has especially kept Labour’s policy line so subtly modulated 
as to be almost invisible outside Parliament itself.
So British party politics has never in recent history been so complex, and party labels 
have rarely been so little use in predicting how people stand on the dominant issue facing 
the UK. At the same time the successive ‘suicide’ decisions of the Liberal Democrats (in 
2010–15, by backing the Cameron-Clegg coalition government and implementing austerity 
policies for five years) and of UKIP (by losing Nigel Farage as leader at the height of the 
party’s Brexit success, and being unable to replace him in any coherent way) have boosted 
the Conservative–Labour dominance of the political process. The apparent two-party 
predominance broadly endured in opinion polls into mid-2018 raising questions about 
whether the UK (or at least England) has decisively shifted back in love with ‘two-party’ 
competition? Or will multi-partism survive (as it clearly has at local level) and grow back 
once the stress of Brexit decisions eases?
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Recent developments: inside the parties
Labour: In the extended 2017 election campaign Jeremy Corbyn reversed a 20 percentage 
point deficit in the opinion polls at the outset, thanks to a growth in younger supporters 
and sophisticated online campaigning. Aided by May’s campaign misfiring, his leadership 
produced an unprecedented 10 percentage point growth in Labour’s vote share over six 
weeks. 
This performance cemented Corbyn’s leadership and the policy changes that he had 
implemented, shifting the Labour Party decisively leftwards in opposition to austerity 
cuts; and contemplating re-extending public ownership again for the railways, water and 
perhaps other industries. He maintained support for implementing the 2016 Brexit vote, 
while successfully masking or finessing this stance with pro-Remain supporters (not least 
amongst the young). His triumph came after two torpid years. In summer 2015 Corbyn was 
only just allowed to stand for the leadership at all by the naïve generosity of some centrist 
MPs in getting him 15% of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) signatures. His runaway 
victory, with over three-fifths support amongst the party’s newly enlarged membership, was 
greeted with horror by the PLP’s centre-right, but showed how astonishingly out of touch 
most Labour MPs had got from their activists. In summer 2016 Corbyn’s perceived failure to 
campaign overtly enough for Remain was the trigger for four-fifths of his Shadow Cabinet 
to resign, triggering another leadership election. Yet the attempted coup was almost 
farcically mis-handled. No viable alternative candidate had been identified in advance, and 
an attempt to make Corbyn re-gather nominations from 15% of MPs before he could stand 
again also failed. He subsequently romped home with 62% support from members, against 
a lacklustre and previously unknown centrist candidate, Owen Smith. 
At long last the PLP had to accept his leadership, and Corbyn and his MPs held their nerve 
when May called a snap election. They gave her the two-thirds consent of the Commons 
that she needed under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, despite Labour lagging badly in the 
polls. The process for defining a Labour manifesto then worked well, producing a popular 
document with few hostages to fortune. And in the aftermath of the narrow 2017 defeat, 
Corbyn steered a rule change through the party’s National Executive lowering the PLP 
nominations bar to 10% of MPs, so ensuring that a future left candidacy for the leadership 
should be feasible. Most of the new MPs in 2017 are Corbynites, the Shadow Cabinet 
has worked well (despite Labour’s evasiveness on Brexit), and Labour’s poll ratings have 
broadly tied with the government’s into summer 2018. The alleged influence of Momentum, 
a parallel movement of Labour supporters, has not so far produced clear evidence of far-
left ‘entryism’, and threats to sitting MPs from the left have been relatively few.
On another front Corbyn has faced strong and vocal criticism by UK Jewish organisations 
that Labour has failed to crack down on anti-semitism within its ranks. An official Labour 
report found that the problem was small scale. And the NEC subsequently took actions 
to strengthen disciplinary penalties for members breaching the party’s code of conduct 
– whose most prominent casualty included former London mayor Ken Livingstone, who 
resigned from the party in spring 2018 over the issue. The party’s vulnerability to attack 
here reflects three factors: the re-growth of the Labour left (who condemn the illegal 
permanent Israeli occupation of territories seized after the 1967 war); Corbyn’s identification 
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with this position, and Labour’s remodelling itself as a multi-ethnic urban party. The PLP 
has demanded a stronger definition of anti-semitism in the code of conduct – eventually 
enacted (see Chapter 7.3). However, the party’s defenders argue that the pro-Israel lobby 
in the UK systematically categorises every criticism of that state as anti-semitism – in order 
to close down criticism of Israeli repressive actions against Palestinians. 
Conservatives: The party under Theresa May also increased their 2017 vote share, reaping 
a dividend from UKIP’s collapse. Yet this was not enough to retain a Commons majority 
against the Labour surge, nor to save May’s legitimacy with her party for ‘wasting’ David 
Cameron’s (small) 2015 majority. May became a party leader and Prime Minister on notice, 
with an expectation that at some point she would be superseded, either by resigning or by 
a leadership contest being triggered. Her original accession in 2016 (with only an aborted 
election, from which all other candidate fell away) turned into a liability when May proved 
an uncharismatic (allegedly ‘robotic’) performer on the campaign trail. And her two top 
aides were widely blamed for mishandling a 2017 manifesto pledge on taxing the elderly to 
fund social care, resulting in the advisors’ subsequent speedy departure. 
May also faced a difficult task of party management over its Brexit strategy, which 
constantly plagued her during her first two years in office. She ensured that Brexiteers 
formed a third of her Cabinet, gave them some key negotiating roles (notably David 
Davis, supposedly in charge of negotiations) and brought her main erstwhile rival for the 
leadership, Boris Johnson, into the Cabinet in the (deliberately?) inappropriate role of 
Foreign Secretary. In July 2018, she forced a long-delayed confrontation over the UK’s 
Brexit negotiating position with the Brexiteers in the Cabinet at a Chequers awayday, 
only to see Johnson and Davis both resign two days later and a guerrilla war escalate in 
Parliament with her large group of Brexiteer MPs.
The Conservative’s key problem is that both wings of the party have suffered cataclysmic 
defeats in intra-party battles in living memory, which were so fundamental for both sides 
that maintaining the Tories’ famous capacity to coalesce under pressure has become 
very difficult. For the right, the 1990 ejection of Margaret Thatcher from the leadership 
by the pro-European centre-left created a ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth that fuelled a bitter 
Euroscepticism that grew and became more intense over nearly three decades. For the 
centre-left, the Brexit Leave vote became a symmetrical disaster, causing the consequent 
ejection of David Cameron (and his Chancellor/heir apparent George Osborne) from 
Downing Street. The Tory right’s role here was one Remainers find equally hard to forgive – 
reversing as it does 43 years of centre-left policies on the EU.
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Britain’s party system is stable, and the 
main parties generally provide coherent 
platforms consistent with their ‘brand’ 
and ‘image’, despite the party cleavages 
caused by the Brexit issue (see above).
Party membership in the UK has increased from 
a low base in 2010, but it is still low. Around 
950,000 people are party members, out of 
a population of 65.6 million, with Labour and 
the SNP both showing strong recent growth. 
Conservative membership is now perhaps the 
most elderly of all the parties and remains small 
relative to Labour’s renewed mass membership.
Britain’s political parties continue to 
attract competent and talented individuals 
to run for office.
Plurality rule elections (see Chapter 2.1) 
privilege established major parties with strong 
‘safe seat’ bastions of support, at the expense 
of new entrants. The most active political 
competition thus tends to be focused on a 
minority of around 120 marginal seats, with 
policies tailored to appeal to the voters therein.
Entry conditions vary somewhat by party, 
but it is not difficult or arduous to join and 
influence the UK’s political parties. Labour 
initially opened up the choice of their 
top two leadership positions to a wider 
electorate using their existing trade union 
networks and a £3 ‘supporter’ scheme (in 
2015), but later reverted to full members 
only voting, after tensions with the party’s 
MPs. 
It is fairly simple to form new political parties 
in the UK, but funding nomination fees for 
Westminster elections is still costly. And in 
plurality rule elections new parties with millions 
of votes may still win no seats, as happened 
to UKIP in 2015. At local level, some one-party 
dominant areas also produce councils with no 
opposition councillors at all.
All the main parties (except perhaps UKIP) 
have recruited across ethnic boundaries, 
helping to foster the integration of black 
and ethnic minority groups into the 
mainstream of UK politics.
Labour has had long-running difficulties with 
allegations of anti-semitism amongst some party 
members in recent years (see above). Some 
critics argue that the Conservatives have failed 
to tackle Islamophobia within their ranks.
Labour has involved a wider set of 
‘supporters’ in its affairs and used digital 
campaigning more. And the separate 
group Momentum has helped channel 
back disillusioned, left-leaning people 
who had left the party under Blair and 
Brown, and younger people into ‘parallel’ 
Labour involvements through both 
‘clicktivist’ and more ‘old school’ activism.
Most mechanisms of internal democracy 
have accorded little influence to their party 
memberships beyond choosing the winner in 
leadership elections. Jeremy Corbyn claims to 
be counteracting this and listening more to his 
members. However, in consequence, Labour 
struggled to delineate the relationship between 
MPs in the parliamentary party and the enlarged 
membership (who may not reflect Labour voters’ 
views well). 
1013.1 The political parties and party system
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The UK’s main political parties are not over-
reliant on state subsidies and can generally 
finance themselves either through private 
membership fees, individual donation and 
corporate donations, or (in Labour’s case) 
trade unions funding.
There are large inequities in political finance 
available to parties, with some key aspects left 
unregulated. These may distort political (if not) 
electoral competition. Majority governments can 
alter party funding rules in directly partisan and 
adversarial ways (see below).
In the restricted areas where it can 
regulate the parties, the Electoral 
Commission is independent from day-to-
day partisan interference.
The ‘professionalisation of politics’ is widely 
seen as having ‘squeezed out’ other people 
with a developed background outside of politics 
(but see below).
Future opportunities Future threats
Before the 2016 Brexit vote the UK 
seemed to be historically evolving 
towards multi-party politics, a trend 
that also found expression in elections 
beyond Westminster and English local 
government. New and ‘outsider’ parties 
strengthened anti-oligopoly tendencies. 
Since then, however, public opinion 
showed a renewed emphasis upon top 
two party competition.
Critics argue that the cross-cutting of both the 
top two parties by Brexit positions shown in 
Figure 2 means that party labels and identities 
are no longer effectively structuring (but instead 
obscuring) the dominant issues in UK politics.
Some strong ‘new party’ trends 
have emerged towards broadening 
involvements using digital means and 
extended outreach/lowered barriers to 
membership within Labour and the SNP. 
These developments could strengthen 
party ties with civil society, reversing years 
of weakening. Alternatively these effects 
may ebb away again (see below).
In multi-party conditions, plurality rule elections 
for Westminster may operate in ever more 
eccentric or dramatic ways, as with the SNP’s 
2015 landslide in Scotland almost obliterating 
all other parties’ MPs there. The SNP’s strong 
support in 2014–16 threatened to create a 
‘dominant party system’ in Scotland, where 
party alternation in government ceases for 
a long period. However, this prospect soon 
receded with both Tory and Labour revivals 
north of the border.
Digital changes also open up new ways in 
which parties can connect to supporters 
beyond their formal memberships and 
increase their links to and engagement 
with a wider range of voters. Parties 
now generally conduct their leadership 
elections using an online system which 
makes it easier to register a preference. 
Other matters of internal party business 
and campaigns could soon be affected, 
potentially including setting policy.
The growth of political populism and identity 
divisions post-EU referendum has ‘hollowed 
out’ the centre ground of British politics, with 
the Liberal Democrats unable to regain their 
earlier momentum.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The advent of far greater ‘citizen vigilance’ 
operating via the web and social media 
like Twitter and Facebook creates a 
new and far more intensive ‘public gaze’ 
scrutinising parties’ internal operations. 
Tools such as ‘voting advice’ application 
apps or the Democratic Dashboard also 
allow voters to access reliable information 
about elections and democracy in 
their area – information that neither 
government nor the top parties has so far 
either been able or willing to provide.
Moves by governing political parties to alter 
laws, rules and regulations so as to skew 
future political competition and disadvantage 
their rivals can set dangerous precedents 
that degrade the quality of democracy. 
The Conservative government’s changes 
to electoral registration and redrawing of 
constituency boundaries may all have such 
effects, even if implemented in non-partisan 
ways.
All the UK’s different legislatures 
(Westminster, and the devolved assemblies/
parliaments in Scotland, Wales, Northern 
Ireland, and London) have now sustained 
coalition governments of different political 
stripes and at different periods, and each 
has operated stably. Therefore, the UK’s 
adversarial political culture does not rule 
out cross-party cooperation where electoral 
outcomes make it necessary.
Changes in the Scottish party system
By contrast to England, and to a large extent Wales also, in Scotland politics has long 
operated across two ideological dimensions, with left/right cleavages cross-cut by another 
issue of equal (sometimes greater) salience: should Scotland stay in the UK, or not? 
And how much power should be devolved to Edinburgh? Following the extraordinary 
mobilisation around the 2014 independence referendum (which was narrowly lost by 55% 
to 45%) this line of cleavage greatly benefited the SNP (and the Scottish Greens in a much 
smaller way). It tended to undermine and push together the other four parties, all of which 
campaigned to keep the union with the UK. 
Despite their ’Indy’ referendum defeat, the SNP’s enhanced membership and morale meant 
that by the time of the 2015 general election they gained a pre-eminence as the ‘voice 
for Scotland’ against the prospect of a clear majority Tory UK government, as shown in 
Figure 3a. Gaining half of all Scottish votes in 2015, they won all but three of the country’s 
59 seats, leaving Labour’s traditional dominance of Scottish representation in the UK 
Parliament shattered with just one MP, the same number gained by the Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats. For a time, it looked as if the SNP would exert a hard-to-challenge 
dominance in Scottish politics, controlling as they did both the Scottish government in 
Edinburgh, a majority of all MSPs and almost all Scottish representation at Westminster, 
against a multiply-divided opposition.
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Figure 3: The Scottish party system at the 2015 and 2017 general elections
Source: Dunleavy, LSE Lecture Notes for course Gv311.
Notes: The size of each party circle indicates its rough size and salience in the party system, and its 
approximate position in two-dimensional space. The numbers in each circle show that party’s vote 
share percentage in Scotland. Parties with names underlined won seats.
In the 2016 Scottish Parliament elections, however, the SNP as incumbents lost a little 
ground in votes (down to 42%, and 63 of 129 seats), while the Tories jumped nearly 11% 
to become the main opposition on 23% support, and Labour fell back badly to third. The 
Liberal Democrats were unchanged, but the Greens moved from 2 to 6 seats, becoming 
critical for the SNP staying in power. Nicola Sturgeon looked to have four more years as 
First Minister, and when Scotland voted by 62% to 38% not to leave the European Union, 
her allies quickly raised the prospect of holding a second referendum on independence far 
more speedily than anyone had previously envisaged – not least to resist a Westminster 
‘land grab’ for EU powers that the SNP argued could permanently reset the devolution 
settlement in the UK’s favour.
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By 2017, however, public support for any second independence referendum amongst 
Scottish voters was clearly a minority view. The new Scottish Conservative leader, Ruth 
Davidson, moved her party’s position decisively towards the political centre, endorsed 
more devolution of powers to Scotland, and sharpened criticisms of the SNP’s government 
at Holyrood. The Tories perhaps attracted more support from pro-union Labour and Liberal 
Democrat voters as the most viable unionist opposition. 
In addition, during the June 2017 election campaign Jeremy Corbyn’s UK national 
leadership also shifted Labour’s image leftwards, and brought the party back in line with 
the Scotland’s left-leaning political spectrum. The party also backed more powers for 
Scotland and slightly blurred its rejection of independence (for instance, no longer making 
support for independence inconsistent with Labour membership). These changes caused 
a significant swing back to a multi-party system, shown in Figure 3b above. The later 
easy victory of Corbynite Richard Leonard as Scottish Labour leader consolidated these 
changes, although he has yet make much of a mark with voters at large. 
The SNP could not sustain its 2015 majority vote share, losing a quarter of its support. Its 
seats were slashed back from 56 to 35, just under three-fifths of the total of Scotland’s 59 
MPs. The scale and speed of these seat reversals was damaging. It was not until spring 
2018 that the SNP dared to publicly re-launch the idea of an Indy 2 referendum, at some 
point after Brexit had occurred, perhaps in 2020 or 2021. The danger of Scotland becoming 
a ‘dominant party system’ – where the same party is a serial winner against a fragmented 
opposition incapable of co-operating to defeat it – clearly had receded after 2016. 
Structuring competition and party ‘brands’
We noted above that the main alternative dimension in England has been the pro- and anti-
EU one, increasingly overlapping in UKIP’s campaigning with anti-immigrant sentiments. 
The right-wing press have also explicitly played to anti-immigrant views, notably in their 
Brexit coverage, but officially the Tories have not played along. However, Theresa May’s 
insistence on maintaining the net immigration target of below 100,000 people a year, which 
was set under the Cameron government when she was Home Secretary, and which has 
never been even vaguely approached by actual, much higher migration levels, undoubtedly 
reflects a sub voce Conservative appeal on the same lines. Attitudes towards immigration 
are far more aligned with existing left-right cleavages, especially as Labour has developed 
towards being more of an urban/multicultural party, less dominated by its working class/
trade union lineage.
Both the top two British parties have had chronic difficulties in organising around the EU/
immigration aspect of politics, maintaining an agreed strategy of not vocally campaigning 
on immigration, lest it stir up ethnic tensions. As we saw above, Labour has become 
progressively more pro-EU since Brexit (echoing more the strongly European stances under 
previous leaders) and the Conservative MPs (if not their leadership) have become more 
anti-EU and pro-Brexit. 
The enduring quality of parties’ appeals is borne out by recent research showing that 
strong party supporters place themselves ideologically at the same place as the parties 
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they identify with. Supporters tend to accurately perceive their own party’s position, but 
to see opposing parties as more ‘extreme’ than they are. On the centre-left in 2017 there 
were multiple overlaps of party supporters’ views amongst Labour, the Greens and Liberal 
Democrats, while on the right the Conservatives and UKIP overlapped in some anti-EU 
positions. Yet in mid-terms, between general elections, around two-fifths of those backing 
major parties told IPSOS-MORI they did not know what they stood for. 
So are main parties failing to communicate their brands in a sustained and consistent 
manner? A potential explanation may lie with the various processes of party ‘modernisation’ 
that took place over recent years, with each of the three main parties attempting to ‘move 
to the centre’. The shifts to a more ‘managerialist’ politics of detail that occurred before 
Corbyn, the EU referendum and May’s realignment of the Tories may have left many voters 
less clear what each party advocates. But the reconfiguration of British party politics since 
2016 now suggests that a realignment of the party system may be in train, with UKIP 
potentially eliminated altogether, to the Tories’ great benefit.
Electing party leaders, or not
For a brief period in the 2010s, all the parties enacted protracted processes in which their 
mass memberships would elect the party leaders, albeit from fields of contenders that were 
initially defined by MPs. Yet some of these arrangements now look as if they are likely to 
change or fall into abeyance. Jeremy Corbyn’s two commanding party leadership election 
wins in 2015 and 2016 set him up to almost succeed as a campaigner in the 2017 general 
election, and the changes lowering the share of MPs needed for nomination (noted above) 
may guarantee that Labour’s internal elections remain critical for the party in future. 
However, in the other two leading parties, the members’ voice has recently been de-
activated and leadership competition denied. In June 2016, following Cameron’s shock 
resignation, complex politicking amongst Tory MPs meant that Boris Johnson did not 
even make the nomination stage and Michael Gove was ignominiously eliminated at the 
‘winnowing out’ second ballot of Tory MPs. The clear frontrunner Theresa May was left 
facing only the relatively unknown Brexiteer Andrea Leadsom in a run-off vote by party 
members that would in theory take all summer long. Leadsom withdrew, making May the 
unelected but initially unquestioned leader. Effectively the Tory MPs’ fix denied their party 
members any chance to vote.
However, May’s subsequent huge problems as party leader, and her lack of success 
as a campaigner at the 2017 general election, may mean that the next Tory leadership 
contest will have to run by the book and involve members after all. The complex politics of 
precipitating a new contest without seeming to be ‘disloyal’ put many alternative leaders off 
in 2017–18, especially while May could be left to bear the burden of the Brexit negotiations. 
But as time wears on, the pressure for a resolution of her perceived ‘caretaker only’ 
leadership tenure will intensify. 
The second party where members effectively lost a vote was the Liberal Democrats. When 
they came to elect a new leader after their 2015 general election losses their party had 
only eight MPs left in the Commons to choose from. Tim Farron took the helm in 2015 but 
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made little impact. In 2017 he stood down and the elderly returning MP Vince Cable was 
the only candidate to replace him. By mid-2018 he had largely failed to improve the party’s 
lowly opinion poll ratings, perhaps reflecting Cable’s own close involvement in the 2010–15 
coalition government. The party’s deputy leader, Jo Swinson, may be the party’s best hope 
of remaking its image in time for a 2022 general election, by passing the leadership baton 
to a new gender and generation.
Internal democracy for policy-making
All the parties have moved to greater transparency and openness in their affairs, and have 
different arrangements for intra-party democracy to periodically set aspects of party policy. 
Labour’s widening of membership and election of the party’s National Executive Committee 
by members is the most radical innovation, and has created a left majority under Corbyn.
The remaining parties still operate more orthodox arrangements. In theory, Liberal 
Democrats have the most internally democratic party, with the federal party and party 
conference enjoying a pre-eminent role in policy formation. Yet in the coalition period 
the exigencies of the party being in government seemed to easily negate this nominal 
influence (as has long been argued to be the case in the top two parties). Conservative 
Party members have relatively little formal influence over party policy, with key decisions 
made largely in Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet, and to a lesser degree by the national party 
machine. At local level, members have more influence, but they rarely challenge sitting 
MPs. UKIP’s members are not empowered by their party’s constitution, which declares that 
motions at conference will only be considered as ‘advisory’, rather than binding. The Green 
Party probably allows its membership the greatest degree of influence over internal policy, 
but in local government has had to tighten up in the few areas where it has exercised 
power (such as in Brighton).
Recruiting political elites
The main political parties regularly sustain a steady stream of individuals to run for political 
office, who can be socialised, selected and promoted into their structures. However, the 
impression has gained ground that increasingly only candidates with professional, back-
office backgrounds are being chosen. In fact, such ‘politics professionals’ make up less 
than one in six MPs, far lower than popular accounts envisage. However, it is true that: 
‘MPs who worked full-time in politics before being elected dominate the top frontbench 
positions, whilst colleagues whose political experience consisted of being a local councillor 
tended to remain backbenchers’. So politics professionals within the top parties do tend to 
dominate media and policy debates.
In terms of wider social diversity, the 2017 parliament is in some ways (notably gender and 
ethnicity) the most diverse and representative ever. Yet as Hudson and Campbell noted 
in 2015 (when the same claim was made): ‘To put the progress made in perspective, the 
UK would need to elect 130 more women and double the current number of black and 
ethnic minority MPs to make its parliament descriptively representative of the population 
it serves.’ Just 2% more MPs were women in 2017. The problem is that research continues 
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to show that all the main parties’ membership is disproportionally white, male, middle aged 
and middle class, with the problem being most severe for the Conservatives. Against this 
background achieving sustained and rapid improvements in the recruitment of diverse 
prospective candidates is tricky.
Representing civil society
The standard theme of now dated textbook discussions is that the major political parties 
are declining in their ability to recruit members, and thereby becoming ‘cartel parties’ 
dependent for their lifeblood upon large donors (such as very rich individuals for all parties, 
or trade unions with large membership blocs for Labour), or upon state subsidies to parties. 
Yet Figure 4 shows that this narrative of continuous decline has not been accurate for 
British parties as a whole in the 21st century.
Figure 4: The membership levels of UK political parties, 2002–18
Membership of UK Political Parties 8 
R c t trends: 2002 – 2018 
Figure 2 shows party membership figures from annual accounts 
submitted to the Electoral Commission, data from parties’ Head Offices 
and, in the case of the Conservatives, media estimates. Where available, 
figure 2 shows latest available figures for 2017 and 2018 based on 
information from party head offices and media. 
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Note: Labour party membership figures for 2015 and 2016 include party members and 
affiliated supporters, but exclude registered supporters.  
Sources: Prior to 2016 (All parties excluding Con) figures derived from party annual accounts 
submitted to the Electoral Commission year ending 31 December; 2016 figures, for all parties 
except Conservative, are based on information provided by Parties’ head offices and recent 
estimates in news articles as of 2018; Conservative membership figures derive from 2002-2006 
Daily Telegraph; 2008 News of the World estimate; 2010 -2011 estimates reported by the 
Independent and Daily Mail 2013- 2014; May Bulman, Labour - James Tapsfield, Has Corbyn 
peaked? Labour membership falls by more than 4,200 in a WEEK - but still stands at 552,000, 
Daily Mail, 30 January 2018. 
2. PARTY MEMBERSHIP BY PARTY 2002-2018
Thousands (as at December each year, latest data: August 2017 and March-April 2018) 
 
Source: Lukas Audickas, Noel Dempsey, Richard Keen, Membership of Political Parties, House of 
Co mons Library Briefing Paper SN05 25, 1 May 18, p.8 
Notes: The vertical xis here shows thousands of members, from annual accounts submitted to the 
electoral commission, data from parties’ head offices and, in the case of the Conservatives, media 
estimates. The Labour Party membership numbers of 2015 and 2016 include full party members and 
affiliated supporters, but not ‘registered supporters’ (who paid only £3). Dotted lines show estimates 
based on media reports.
108 3. How democratic are the channels for political participation?
The last four years in Figure 4 show soaring numbers of members for the SNP since the 
independence referendum and of the Labour Party since easier membership rules, low 
cost fees, and the post-general election changes. Some observers point out that now with 
522,000 individual members, a Corbyn-led Labour has gained perhaps £8m in annual 
fees and so may be able to reduce its dependence on affiliated trade unions’ block fee 
payments – a goal that eluded all previous Labour leaders. The Conservatives also moved 
against the unions again. The Trade Union Act 2016 introduced an ‘opt-in’ requirement for 
political levies for new members of trade unions, replacing the previous opt-out provision. 
This may (gradually) hit Labour’s union income in future years, or it may be mitigated by 
improvements in union communication practices. 
All these changes mean that parties now draw very different proportions of their income 
from membership subscriptions. Figure 5 shows that the Greens and SNP are the parties 
for whom membership fees count most as a source of income, with the Conservatives 
bottom, and the Liberal Democrats next. Labour, Plaid Cymru and UKIP are in the 
intermediate group.
Figure 5: Income from membership revenues as a percentage of total income
Source: Party annual accounts submitted to the Electoral Commission
In some European countries, a recent rejuvenation of party politics has taken two 
contrasting forms. Some new left parties committed to a different kind of ‘close to civil 
society’ politics emerged on the left (like Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece). More 
often though populist, anti-EU/anti-immigration parties grew markedly on the radical right. 
Some observers even discern the ‘death of representative politics’ in such changes. But 
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in the UK the highly insulating plurality rule voting system (see Chapter 2.1) at Westminster 
has asymmetrically protected the top two UK parties, with the UKIP wave artificially 
excluded from Parliament on the right in 2015. And left-of-centre movements have 
happened not in new parties but within the ranks of Labour (in England) and the SNP (in 
Scotland). These latter changes have proved resilient so far, but they may still not endure if 
either party experiences setbacks in future.
Political finance
The core foundations of the UK’s party funding system lie in electoral law. Two key 
provisions are: (i) the imposition of very restrictive local campaign finance limits on parties 
and candidates; and (ii) the outlawing of any paid-for broadcast advertising by parties in 
favour of state-funded and strictly regulated party election broadcasts (set by votes won 
last time). Opposition parties also have the benefit of a degree of state funding (called 
‘Short money’ and again related to votes received) but this is only available to those parties 
with at least one MP (see Chapter 4.1). The bulk of the funds so far has gone to fund the 
leaders’ offices of Labour, the SNP and Liberal Democrats.
Political finance nonetheless still matters immensely in UK politics because two types of 
spending are completely uncontrolled, namely: (iii) supra-local campaigning and advertising 
in the press, billboards, social media and other generic formats; and (iv) general campaign 
and organisational spending by parties, which is crucial to parties’ abilities to set agendas 
and create media coverage ‘opportunities’, especially outside the narrowly defined and 
more media-regulated election periods themselves. 
Figure 5: Donations to political parties, 2013–17
Party £ millions % of all 
donations2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
2013–17
Conservatives 15.9 29.2 33.2 17.5 37.1 132.9 50.5
Labour 13.3 18.7 21.5 13.9 16.1 83.5 32
Lib Dems 3.9 8.3 6.7 6.4 6.30 31.6 12
UKIP 0.67 1.2 3.3 1.6 0.65 7.4 2.8
SNP 0.04 3.8 1.2 0.14 0.87 6.5 2.5
Green 0.19 0.66 0.43 0.18 0.28 1.8 0.7
Total 34 62 66 40 61.3 263.3 100
Source: Electoral Commission
Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
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In terms of private donations Figure 5 shows that the Conservative Party gained just 
over half of the total across the 2013–17 period, mostly from very rich people. Labour, 
meanwhile, received a smaller 32%, partly from mass membership and trade union fees, 
with some large individual donations also. The Liberal Democrats, in government until 2015, 
also gained some large gifts – as did UKIP.
Donating to parties is supposedly transparent. All gifts must be declared and sources 
made clear, and funding is regulated by the Electoral Commission. But unlike many liberal 
democracies, there are no maximum size limits on UK donations, although donations from 
overseas have been clamped down on. Critics argue that ‘the fact that political parties 
are sustained by just a handful of individuals makes unfair influence a very real possibility 
even if the reality is a system that is more corruptible than corrupt.’ Close analysis also 
shows a strong link between donations to political parties and membership of the House 
of Lords, now almost entirely in the gift of party leaders, despite supposedly stronger rules 
applying to ‘good conduct’ in public life (following scandals around 2009). In the past 
Conservative and Labour leaders have both been very reluctant to give up the lubricating 
role of the honours system in sustaining their funding hegemony and easing internal party 
management. The Tories (and Liberal Democrats in a lesser way) continue to take full 
advantage of this. However, Corbyn has made few Lords appointments, and the SNP will 
take no seats there. Meanwhile the Liberal Democrats have far and away the highest ratio 
of peerages and knighthoods amongst their past MPs of any UK political party.
Although party finance regulation is impartially implemented in a day-to-day manner, there 
is little to stop a government with a majority from legislating radically to change party 
finance rules in ‘sectarian’ ways that maximise their own individual party interests and 
directly damage opponents. In the UK’s ‘unfixed’ constitution, only elite self-restraint, Tory 
party misgivings or perhaps House of Lords changes (which made a difference to the anti-
union law in 2016) can prevent directly partisan manipulation of the opposition’s finances.
Conclusions
The conventional wisdom of ‘parties in decline’ does not now fit the recent history of the 
UK well, with some membership levels growing, and others fairly stable. Some ‘new party’ 
trends emerged (for a while) within Labour and the SNP, utilising different, more digital ways 
of mobilising and stronger links to parts of civil society. Internal party elections of most key 
candidates (not leaders) are generally stronger now than in earlier decades (except within 
UKIP). So parties are not yet just the self-serving ‘cartels’ that critics often allege.
Yet many problems remain. The Brexit divide cuts across party lines in an acute way, 
producing deliberate vagueness in what each of the two top parties say to voters on this 
crucial issue. The provisions for party members to elect leaders were left unused in the 
Conservative Party in 2016, and for a time created almost insupportable strains within 
Labour under Corbyn. The problem of a ‘club ethos’ uniting MPs in the main parties was 
evident in the over-protection that the Westminster election system grants Conservatives, 
Labour and now the SNP; in the very partial regulation of political financing and the (only 
weakly regulated) effective ‘sale’ of honours; in the ability of governments to legislate in 
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sectarian ways to weaken their opposition parties; in weak internal democracy controls 
or influence over parties’ policy stances and manifestos; and in the sheer scale of 
parliamentary party remoteness from membership views that can arise.
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How should the interest group process operate in a liberal 
democracy?
✦	 Elected representatives and politicians should recognise a need for continuous 
consultation and dialogue with different sections of the public over detailed policy 
choices. Procedures for involving interest groups in decisions affecting them should 
cover the full range of stakeholders.
✦	 The resources for organising collective voices and political action in pressure 
groups, trade unions, trade associations, non-governmental organisations, charities, 
community groups and other forms should be readily available. In particular, 
decision-makers should recognise the legitimacy of autonomous collective actions 
and mobilisations by different groups of citizens.
✦	 The costs of organising effectively should be low and within reach of any social 
group or interest. State or philanthropic assistance should be available to ensure 
that a balanced representation of all affected interests can be achieved in the policy 
process.
✦	 Decision-makers should recognise inequalities in resources across interest groups, 
and discount for different levels of ‘organisability’ and resources.
✦	 Policy-makers should also re-weight the inputs they receive so as to distinguish 
between shallow or even ‘fake’ harms being claimed by well-organised groups, and 
deeper harms potentially being suffered by hard-to-organise groups.
The interest group process 
Between elections, the interest group process (along with media and social media 
coverage) is a key way in which citizens can seek to communicate with their MPs and other 
representatives, and to influence government policy-makers. Patrick Dunleavy considers 
how far different social groups can gain access and influence decision-makers. How 
democratically does this key form of input politics operate? And how effectively are all UK 
citizens’ interests considered? 
3.2
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✦	 Other aspects of liberal democratic processes, such as the ‘manifesto doctrine’ 
that elected governments should implement all components of their election 
programmes, do not over-ride the need to consult and listen in detail to affected 
groups, and to choose policy options that minimise harms and maximise public 
legitimacy and consensus support.
✦	 Since policy-makers must sometimes make changes that impose new risks and 
costs across society, they should in general seek to allocate risks to those groups 
most easily or able to insure against them.
Between elections, the interest groups process generates a great deal of useful and 
perhaps relatively reliable information for policy-makers about preference intensities. 
By undertaking different levels of collective action along a continuum of participation 
opportunities, and incurring costs in doing so, ordinary citizens can accurately indicate how 
strongly they feel about issues to decision-makers.
Actions like sending back a pre-devised public feedback form, writing to an MP, supporting 
an online petition to the government, or tweeting support for something, are cheap to do 
and so only indicate a low level of commitment. Joining (and paying membership fees 
to) an interest group or going to meetings shows more commitment, and gives the group 
legitimacy and weight with politicians. Going on strike or marching in a demonstration 
indicates a higher level of commitments still. A well-organised interest group process will 
allow for a huge variety of ways in which citizens can indicate their views.
From a somewhat elderly 2006 study, we know that in the UK there were over 7,800 
interest groups registered by group directories for the field. Jordan and Greenan  
demonstrate that business trade associations (many very small) were by far the greatest 
number, followed in numerical terms by professional groups and learned societies. 
Campaigning and pressure groups ranked only fifth of their category types. Some individual 
groups have grown very large memberships in the millions or hundreds of thousands – 
such as the UK’s few trade unions, which have coalesced into a few very large membership 
bodies, or the National Trust or Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.
As Figure 1 shows, four out of five interest groups recruited individual members, and three 
out of five only recruited individuals – so their significance for elected politicians was based 
quite heavily on their size. Those that can engage the participation of almost all the people 
in a given occupation or role will carry especial weight, as with the well-organised medical 
professions. Over time the numbers of non-business groups (with individual memberships) 
grew substantially from 1970 to 2006, as the table part of Figure 1 shows. Campaigning 
groups grew slightly more in numbers than the general trend.
The remaining fifth of interest groups (all of them business or trade associations) only 
recruited firms as members, and a further fifth recruited both firms and individual members. 
Here legitimacy may be based on what proportion of a given industry or type of business 
are engaged with bodies claiming to represent them. Often rather divergent voices 
have claimed to represent business interests – as in the long-run rivalry between the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI; which represents big firms and operates in a
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Figure 1: The distribution of UK interest groups in 2006
Type of non-
trade group
1970 2006 % change
Professional 606 1,167 93
General interest 259 565 118
Campaigning 191 414 117
Total 1,056 2,146 103
Firm members only  
22%
Both firm members and  
individual members  
19%
Individual members only  
59%
Source: Jordan et al, 2012, Table 7.2, p. 151, & Jordan & Greenan, 2012 Figure 4.1 p.82 & p.92.
politically neutral, corporatist way) and the Institute of Directors (which is more eclectic 
and more right wing). Some industries are dominated by a single interest group, like the 
National Farmers’ Union, which in the past achieved enormous insider influence with the 
relevant Whitehall department. Other looser coalitions of different interests (like the ‘roads 
lobby’ of transport operators, construction companies and motorist organisations) can 
achieve a similar dominance, however.
At any given time, an ‘ecology’ of interest groups operates, with different organisations 
competing for attention, and encouraging their members to commit more resources or 
time to the group. Trade unions have been the biggest and most continuous losers since 
the 1980s. Their membership numbers radically reduced with the decline of manufacturing 
industry and large firms. Numbers and unionisation rates held up better in the public sector, 
but even there, members became markedly less willing to go on strike in recent years. 
Meanwhile environmentally aligned groups and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) 
have flourished. Some big groups that shifted away from restrictive ‘legacy’ modes of 
recruiting members and adopted digital approaches have increased their size radically, 
notably the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. But in the interest group world at large, 
such effects have generally been smaller.
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Recent developments
This area of policy-making has been stable for many years, with occasional fringe scandals 
– a succession of which lead to the 2014 Lobbying Act. This introduced an official register 
of paid lobbyists contacting MPs in Westminster and in touch with Whitehall departments, 
affecting commercial lobbying firms most, together with some groups with developed 
governmental or parliamentary liaison operations. The lobbying industry in the UK is 
estimated by some sources to be worth £2bn a year, but still remains mostly self-regulated, 
especially perhaps in the new ‘digital influencing’ areas. 
The large data analysis and lobbyist firm Cambridge Analytica became a focus of 
controversy in 2018 in the USA and Britain, after it emerged that it had extracted a large 
amount of users’ personal data from Facebook without their knowledge, and used the 
information to construct sophisticated psychological profiles to target voters in the Trump 
campaign, and used by a closely allied company to help the Brexit Leave campaign. The 
firm fought a rearguard action against its critics, but it had to close down when its UK chair 
was caught on video in a ‘sting’ by a UK TV programme, boasting of using illicit influence 
techniques to ruin the reputations of rivals to its clients. With business clients drying up 
the firm shut its doors within a few days. The chief executive attended two grillings by a 
House of Commons select committee, and official investigations continued at the time of 
writing. Critics argued that the incident shone a light on lax regulation of new influence 
technologies, a conclusion that a Commons select committee shared in a critical mid-2018 
report on fake news and social media.
Digital technologies could also play a role in allowing decision-makers to elicit and cheaply 
incorporate mass public views. The UK government re-established an official online 
petitions site in 2015, where citizens can lodge proposals for issues to be reviewed by 
Parliament. Any petition gaining 100,000 verified electronic signatures goes to the House 
of Commons and supposedly gets a debate, followed by a response. Very large numbers 
of petitions are started, but most quickly fail to attract public attention. Only those that 
can generate around 10,000 supporters in the first couple of days have any effective 
chance of reaching the 100,000 target in the time allowed. In 2016 thousands of petitions 
were started but only 10 reached the 100,000 threshold, and four of these were denied a 
parliamentary debate.
However, these initiatives can be influential. In spring 2017 Theresa May invited newly 
elected US President Donald Trump on a state visit to the UK. A petition to ban him quickly 
attracted 1.86 million supporters. Although ministers said that they would ignore this, the 
idea of a visit receded into the long grass until the summer of 2018. And when it did take 
place it was carefully organised to keep the famously touchy US President completely away 
from London and other UK cities where mass protests occurred. 
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
British government ministers, MPs, 
politicians and civil servants recognise 
the importance and legitimacy of a 
vigorous interest group process. An open 
consultation process operates for all new 
legislation and government policy White 
Papers, and sometimes for statutory 
instruments.
Where interest groups are battling against party 
A’s manifesto commitments, and especially where 
they are aligned with a rival party B, they will 
face an uphill struggle to make any changes in 
the incumbent government’s policies. Governing 
parties in the UK have a strong record of pushing 
through partisan commitments, and over-riding 
the opposition of groups who do not support 
them. The UK has no equivalent of the European 
Union’s formal reporting back of consultation 
outcomes. Ministers and civil servants commonly 
‘talk up’ any support their proposals secure, while 
ignoring or belittling unfavourable feedback.
Parliamentary processes, including the 
consideration of legislation, questions to 
ministers, and select committee hearings, 
connect strongly with the interest group 
process. Most legitimate or established 
groups can find MPs to represent their 
interests or cause, or to help from their 
position in the legislature. However, 
select committee inquiries access 
quite a restricted and biased range of 
‘recognised’ interests. Public involvement 
processes in the devolved Scottish, 
Welsh, Northern Ireland and London 
legislatures/assemblies are generally far 
more systematic and inclusive.
There are sharp inequalities in the capabilities 
of different social groups to monitor policy 
proposals and to get effectively involved in official 
consultation and legislative processes. The 
poorest and least socially resourced groups in 
British society rely chiefly on NGOs, charities and 
altruistic philanthropists to secure any research 
or campaigning on issues that concern them. By 
contrast, business interests have well-developed 
government and parliamentary liaison units, and 
ready access to professional lobbyists, public 
relations consultants, marketers and media 
experts – giving corporations and well-off elites 
inherent advantages that are hard to counteract.
UK decision-makers are alert to the 
potentially excessive power of lobbyists 
and of well-resourced groups best able to 
afford lobbyists and other organised and 
commoditised means of influence. Most (if 
not all) politicians discount heavily for the 
‘industrialised’ lobby power of business 
and other wealthy groups. Lobbying is 
regulated and any excesses in attempting 
to secure influence are frowned upon and 
quickly stamped out – as the Cambridge 
Analytica case demonstrates.
Lobbying in the UK has historically focused 
most attention on creating private links with civil 
servants and ministers, exercised at early stages 
of the policy process, and often carried out 
without transparency. Concertation of ministerial 
decisions and business interests have been 
fuelled by incidents like the hundreds of emails 
between News International and the private office 
of the responsible minister, Jeremy Hunt, during a 
take-over battle he had to adjudicate in 2010–12. 
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
As the powers of the House of Commons 
committees have slowly grown, and coalition 
governments operated in hung parliaments in 
2010–15 and 2017–present, so more lobbying 
has focused on the legislature. Because MPs 
and peers can work for outside jobs and take 
money from well-funded interests, there have 
been a succession of scandals around MPs, 
peers and even ministers not declaring interests.
For elected politicians, what matters most 
is the vote-power of groups, which is a 
function of their size (large membership 
groups are more influential than small 
ones), the intensity of their preferences 
(groups that care a lot outweigh apathetic 
ones), and their pivotality (giving more 
importance to potential ‘swing’ groups 
who might shift support between parties, 
shaping who wins). There are inherent 
influence inequalities between groups, 
but because they derive essentially from 
their role in the electoral process, they 
are generally democratically defensible.
For politicians the realpolitik of the interest 
group process is that they appease groups 
whose support they rely on. But they will 
cheerfully impose costs on groups normally 
opposed to them, or too small or poorly 
organised to do them electoral damage. 
Both ministers and civil servants also routinely 
extract a ‘good behaviour’ price for conceding 
influence to any ‘insider’ group. To remain 
influential the group must only express critical 
views ‘moderately’ and privately, at early stages 
of policy development before proposals go 
public. They must normally mute any public 
criticisms altogether, or tone them down to be 
non-confrontational or expressed ‘responsibly’.
Saturation media coverage, and now 
social media coverage as well, means 
that the risks for politicians in lightly or 
overtly deferring to powerfully organised 
interests have increased. Modern policy-
making has shifted more into cognitive 
modes of competition between rival 
coalitions of interests. Here the quality 
of evidence you can produce to back a 
case, and sustain effective participation 
in policy debates, counts for more than 
simple voting power or financial might. A 
more deliberative interest group process 
has emerged, which has evened up 
access to the policy terrain.
Cognitive competition remains heavily 
influenced by resources and money. Wealthy 
interests can better afford to fund research and 
information gathering than groups representing 
the poor and powerless. Wealthy interests can 
also trigger more law cases in areas favourable 
to them and thus ensure that legal knowledge 
differentially develops in helpful ways.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The growth of social media and internet-based 
modes of organising has radically lowered the 
information and transaction costs of organising 
collective actions in the last two decades, and 
promises to continue doing so. In particular, 
large-scale citizen mobilisations by spatially 
dispersed or ‘functional’ groups (for example, 
patients affected by a particular disease, or 
citizens with a shared specialist interest) have 
become far more feasible and influential.
Lobbying and public relations professionals 
have extended the techniques and services 
they use for commercial and other well-
funded interests so as to increasingly 
manipulate social media in expert ways. A 
new and powerful ‘data-industrial complex’ 
has recently emerged, as the Leave 
campaign for the Brexit referendum aptly 
demonstrated.
The mass emergence of ‘clicktivism’ allows 
individuals to spontaneously signal their 
position on public issues on Twitter, Facebook 
and other social media. These ‘micro-
donations’ of time and support mean that 
people get instant feedback on the popularity 
of their views and potentially linkages to 
like-minded people. This radically enhances 
the speed and granularity of the public’s 
collective vigilance over policy-making in 
liberal democracies. However, more critical 
citizen activist campaigners like Alberto 
Alemmano stress that clicktivism cannot be 
an end in itself, but must be part of a wide 
armoury of modernised citizen engagement 
leading to ‘real world’ engagement.
By increasingly ‘delegating’ the job of 
representing diverse relatively powerless 
societal interests to NGOs and charities, 
and restricting their own participation to 
digital means, well-educated and altruistic 
middle-class people have created another 
spiral in the further ‘professionalisation’ 
of democratic politics. Groups that slip 
between the gaps of NGOs’ concerns (for 
example, perhaps ‘Fathers for Justice’) 
can lose out badly from this system. Their 
inexpert autonomous efforts to organise 
become ever more marginalised in the 
political world.
Crowdfunding via the internet has increasingly 
emerged as a way that large and dispersed 
groups can fund previously difficult 
mobilisations. The anti-Brexit lobbyist Gina 
Miller used this technique to back anti-Brexit 
candidates in the 2017 general election, as did 
other satellite campaigns. (However, her more 
famous Supreme Court legal case against the 
government was privately funded.) Similarly, 
‘open source’ techniques of organising can 
often help otherwise disadvantaged groups to 
operate more effectively in competition with 
business hierarchies.
The virulent tone of the Brexit referendum 
campaign upset many charities. The 
chief executive of the National Council of 
Voluntary Organisations said he regretted 
they had not spoken out enough because 
of fear of running foul of the 2014 lobbying 
regulations, plus being pilloried in the 
media. In Brexit policy development up 
to summer 2018, ministers and Whitehall 
have seemed reluctant to bring in outside 
voices, and groups have felt excluded, 
despite their EU expertise, according to 
Jeremy Richardson.
Interest groups were keen to get involved 
in the Brexit negotiations, not least because 
they know a lot about the EU policy process 
– but pro-Remain industry interventions were 
fiercely attacked by Brexiteer politicians.
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‘Managing’ decision-making consultations
Elections inherently give policy-makers only a crude and infrequent idea of public opinion. 
Parties must aggregate issues together into programmes and manifestos. Citizens can only 
cast a single vote, with no capacity to indicate which issues or policy commitment counts 
most with them. Nor can they express the different strength of their preferences on multiple 
issues. So even politicians with a clear manifesto commitment to implement have just a 
direction of travel, not a detailed route map for getting anywhere that works.
Public consultation processes (some linked to legislation or executive orders) generate huge 
volumes of very specific information about how and why different interests are affected by 
proposed policy changes, which will bear costs and which see benefits in them. Often the 
detailed information needed for effective policy implementation rests with trade associations, 
firms, trade unions, professions, NGOs, sub-national governments, or academia rather than 
in Whitehall. Hence in any policy area there will either be a ‘policy community’ that is strongly 
networked, regularly influential and perhaps closed to outsider groups. Alternatively there 
may be a looser ‘policy network’, linking the main groups that regularly comment on policy 
issues, but with more weakly tied or changeable sets of participants.
A well-organised civil society may seem to leave Whitehall and ministers in a weak position, 
and in the past some political scientists rather fancifully described a ‘hollow crown’ that 
has resulted in the UK. However, ministers and civil servants do not assign equal weight to 
all actors in networks, but instead demand ‘responsible’ behaviours from those to whom 
they will listen, such as think tanks, business lobbies, professions or expert academics. 
‘Insider’ groups have the ear of policy-makers, while more strident, public and ‘extreme’ 
voices are routinely discounted. 
Finally, sophisticated opinion polling now allows both politicians and the public to regularly 
learn how different types of citizen feel about issues – so the policy influence of public 
opinion as a whole has improved and magnified. A lot of media and social media coverage 
and commentary also ensures that policy-makers continuously ‘get the message’ about 
which bits of their proposals are popular and with whom.
Corporate power in the interest group process
Yet is the apparent diversity and pluralism of the consultation process just a misleading 
façade? Vladimir Lenin famously argued that the liberal democratic state was ‘tied by a 
thousand threads’ into doing things that owners of capital want. And a concern about the 
‘privileged position of business’ in dealing with government extends widely amongst 
liberal authors too, such as Charles Lindblom. Since businesses generate economic growth 
and taxes, they have special salience in making demands on politicians and officials. And 
as the journalist Robert Peston argued:
‘The wealthy will [always] find a way to buy political power – whether through 
the direct sponsorship of politicians and parties, or through the acquisition of 
media businesses, or through the financing of think tanks. The voices of the 
super-wealthy are heard by politicians well above the babble of the crowd…. 
We are more vulnerable than perhaps we have been since the nineteenth 
century to the advent of rule by an unelected oligarchy’ (p.346).
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In a discussion for Democratic Audit, David Beetham drew attention to how dominant 
financial corporate sectors in the UK economy first caused the 2008 economic crash 
by forcing through rash financial deregulation. But these same interests were then 
differentially rescued by unprecedented state bailouts by the biggest banks. And to 
stop a wider decline, ‘quantitative easing’ by the Bank of England propped up the asset 
values of the wealthiest groups in society. Via transfer pricing, debt loading and shifting 
domicile the largest global companies have also effectively evaded corporation taxes and 
undermined the UK fiscal regime. Public disquiet and ‘tax-shaming’ mobilisations by online 
activists have dented this regime (for example, a consumer boycott forced Starbucks 
into ‘voluntarily’ paying nominal amounts of UK corporation tax), and forced a rethink of 
previous pro-multinational tax policies across the OECD.
Competition between ‘advocacy coalitions’
A more benign view of changes in the interest group process is given by the ‘advocacy 
coalition framework’ (ACF). This modern pluralist view argues that the key influences 
on public policies now are cognitive ones, turning on empirical evidence, research and 
cognitions. Old-style, ‘big battalion’ groups – like big corporations, media barons and mass 
ranks of trade unions – sought influence on the basis that they could mobilise adverse 
votes at the ballot box or unfavourable coverage by media commentators. But most policy-
level influence now comes from a different process of cognitive competition where rational 
arguments and evidence chiefly sway policy-makers, not political self-interest alone.
Nor are the battles that matter fought any longer by single interest groups, but rather by 
competing ‘advocacy coalitions’ that bring together diverse clusters or networks of groups 
aligned on each side of the policy debate. For example, on tobacco policy a succession 
of nudge interventions by government followed up periodically by regulatory restrictions 
and new legislation have progressively strengthened the disincentives for smoking and 
curtailed ‘passive smoking’ in the UK – and Figure 2 shows impacts in terms of falls in 
the number of smokers. The apparently ascendant coalition here includes anti-smoking 
charities, the medical professions, NHS authorities, the health department in Whitehall, 
progressive local authorities who forced the pace of implementation, many non-smokers 
(especially those adversely affected by ‘passive smoking’), and so on. 
The coalition fighting a rearguard action against smoking regulation includes of course the 
tobacco corporations front and centre, plus some other aligned businesses, pro-‘freedom’ 
or libertarian think tanks, Tories opposing a ‘nanny state’, and a diminishing minority of still-
enthusiastic smokers. 
Yet has the progress achieved in reducing smoking incidence over recent decades been 
fast and furious (as defenders of the UK’s policy apparatus might say), or slow and often 
stalled? How you assess the scale and speed of these changes will shape how effectively 
you think cognitive competition changes the dynamics of group competition.
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Figure 2: The proportion of men and women smoking in Great Britain, 2000–17
Source: Office of National Statistics Dataset, 2018.
Conclusions
Nobody now claims that the UK’s interest group process is an equitable one (a position 
wrongly attributed to pluralists by their critics). Even common sense requires that we 
recognise there are big and powerful lobbies, medium influence groups and ‘no hopers’ 
battling against a hostile consensus. Democracy requires that each interest be able to 
effectively voice their case, and have it heard by policy-makers on its merits, so that the 
group can in some way shape the things that matter most to them. On the whole, the 
first (voice) criterion is now easily met in Britain. But achieving any form of balanced, 
deliberative consideration of interests by policy-makers remains an uphill struggle. 
Business dominance is perhaps reduced by restrictions on lobbying and extra transparency 
from social media. But it is still strong, despite some shifts towards cognitive competition 
over policy solutions and towards more deliberative and evidence-based policy-making.
Patrick Dunleavy is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the LSE and co-
Director of Democratic Audit there. He is also Centenary Professor in the Institute for 
Governance and Policy Analysis (IGPA), University of Canberra.
What does liberal democracy require of a media system?
✦	 The media system should be diverse and pluralistic, including different media types, 
operating under varied systems of regulation, designed to foster free competition for 
audiences and attention, and a strong accountability of media producers to citizens 
and public opinion.
✦	 Taken as a whole, the regulatory set-up should guard against the distortions 
of competition introduced by media monopolies or oligopolies (dominance of 
information/content ‘markets’ by two or three owners or firms), and against any state 
direction of the media.
✦	 A free press is a key part of media pluralism – that is, privately owned newspapers, 
with free entry by competitors and only normal forms of business regulation (those 
common to any industry) by government and the law.
✦	 Because of network effects, state control of bandwidth, and the salience of TV/radio 
for citizens’ political information, a degree of ‘special’ regulation of broadcasters to 
ensure bipartisan or neutral coverage and balance is desirable, especially in election 
campaign periods. However, regulation of broadcasters must always be handled at 
arm’s length from control by politicians or state officials, by an impartial quasi-non-
governmental organisation (quango) with a diverse board and professional staffs.
✦	 Where government funds a state broadcaster (like the BBC), this should also be 
set up at arm’s length, and with a quango governance structure. Government 
ministers and top civil servants should avoid forms of intervention that might seem 
The media system 
The growth of ‘semi-democracies’ across the world, where elections are held but are rigged 
by state power-holders, has brought into ever-sharper focus how much a country’s media 
system conditions the quality of its democracy. Free elections without some form of media 
diversity and balance clearly cannot hope to deliver effective liberal democracy. Ros Taylor 
and the Democratic Audit team look at how well the UK’s media system operates to 
support or damage democratic politics, and to ensure a full and effective representation of 
citizens’ political views and interests.
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to compromise the state broadcaster’s independence in generating political, public 
policy or other news and commentary.
✦	 Journalistic professionalism is an important component of a healthy media 
system, and the internalisation of respect for the public interest and operation of a 
‘reputational economy’ within the profession provide important safeguards against 
excesses, and an incentive for innovation. Systems that strengthen occupational 
self-regulation within the press are valuable.
✦	 The overall media system should provide citizens with political information, evidence 
and commentary about public policy choices that are easy to access, at no or low 
cost. The system should operate as transparently as possible, so that truthful/factual 
content predominates, it quickly ‘drives out’ incorrect content and ‘fake news’, and 
that ‘passing off’ and other lapses are minimised and rapidly counteracted.
✦	 People are entitled to published corrections and effective redress against any 
reporting that is unfair, incorrect or invades personal and family privacy. Citizens are 
entitled to expect that media organisations will respect all laws applying to them, 
and will not be able to exploit their power to deter investigations or prosecutions by 
the police or prosecutors.
✦	 Public interest defences should be available to journalists commenting on possible 
political, state and corporate wrongdoing, and media organisations should enjoy 
some legal and judicial protection against attempts to harass, intimidate or penalise 
them by large and powerful corporations, or by the state.
✦	 At election times especially, the media system should inform the electorate 
accurately about the competing party manifestos and campaigns, and encourage 
citizens’ democratic participation.
The UK has long maintained one of the best developed systems for media pluralism 
amongst liberal democracies, centring on five components:
(i)  A free press, one that is privately owned and regulated only by normal business 
regulations and civil and criminal law provisions. The biggest UK newspapers are highly 
national in their readership and coverage. They characteristically adopt strong political 
alignments to one party or another. A voluntary self-regulation scheme has provided 
only a weak code of conduct and system of redress in the event of mistakes in reporting 
or commentary.
(ii)  A publicly owned broadcaster (the BBC), operated by a quasi-non-governmental 
agency (quango), at arm’s length from any political control by the state or politicians. It is 
regulated by another arm’s length quango, Ofcom, so as to be politically impartial in its 
coverage, according space to different parties and viewpoints.
(iii) A few private sector broadcasters whose political coverage is regulated by the same 
set of rules to be politically impartial – which are also set and enforced by Ofcom, 
insulated from control by politicians, the state and from the broadcasters themselves.
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(iv) Strongly developed journalistic professionalism, with common standards of reporting 
accuracy, and much looser agreement on fairness in commentary and respect for 
privacy, shared across (almost) the whole occupational group. But breaches are 
enforced only informally by weak social sanctions, such as disapproval or reputational 
damage for offenders within the profession. 
(v)  Social media, which are an increasingly salient aspect of the media system, and 
resemble the free press in being unregulated beyond normal legal provisions. The 
biggest online sites and associated social media are journalistically produced by 
newspapers, and generally operate on the same lines, although with less political 
colouration of news priorities. However, much politically relevant content is also 
generated by a wide range of non-government organisations (NGOs), pressure groups 
and individuals, many of whom are strongly politically aligned and may not feel bound 
by journalistic standards. (See Chapter 3.4 for a detailed discussion of social media.)
Recent developments
In recent years, the UK’s media landscape has undergone enormous transformation. 
Not only has news consumption shifted online, but the growth in digital social media 
has enabled people to originate, find and share information in ways that challenge the 
traditional hegemony of state-funded broadcasters and the national press.
The biggest source of concern about the democratic qualities of the UK’s media system 
has been that most of the press perennially back the Conservative Party (in very forceful 
ways in most cases). Far fewer papers normally back Labour, and the Liberal Democrats 
receive only episodic support from smaller papers. Once predicted to become just another 
depoliticised operation of conglomerate corporations, in fact newspapers are still run in 
a hands-on, ‘press baron’ fashion by powerful companies or media magnates (like Rupert 
Murdoch and the Barclay brothers). Figure 1 shows that the fiercely anti-Labour and pro-
Brexit Sun is by far the biggest newspaper, and Rupert Murdoch also owns the Times/
Sunday Times. The Daily Mail, Daily Express and Daily Telegraph complete the Tory press 
hegemony. The Labour-backing Trinity Group newspapers (owning the Daily Mirror, Daily 
Record, and The People) have smaller readerships, as does the Guardian. Some papers 
also take a neutral or more varied political line.
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Figure 1: The percentage of UK respondents who used different TV, radio and print news 
sources in 2017 – and the political affiliations of these sources
Source Political stance
% used 
in last 3 
days
% used 
in last 
week
BBC News (TV & radio) Regulated non-partisan 53 64
ITV News Regulated non-partisan 20 33
Sky News Regulated non-partisan 14 21
Sun (& Sunday Sun) Conservative, Brexiteer 7 15
Daily Mail (& Sunday) Conservative, Brexiteer* 8 13
Metro (free) Non-political 6 11
Regional or local newspapers Varied 4 11
Daily Mirror (SM, Daily Record) Labour, EU pragmatic 6 10
Channel 4 News Regulated non-partisan 4 10
Commercial radio news Regulated non-partisan 7 10
Times/Sunday Times Conservative, EU pragmatic 3 7
Guardian/ Observer Labour, Remainer 2 5
London Evening Standard (free) Conservative, Remainer 2 4
Daily Telegraph (& Sunday) Conservative, Brexiteer 2 4
‘I’ (newspaper) Independent, Remainer 2 4
CNN Regulated non-partisan 1 4
Daily Express (& Sunday) Conservative, Brexiteer 1 2
Political orientation of source
 
 
Regulated non-partisan 99 142
Conservative 24 47
Labour 8 15
Independent, non-political press 8 15
Brexit orientation of source
 
Brexiteer 18 34
Neutral or EU pragmatic 105 153
Remainer 4 9
Source: Data from Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018 (Express from full survey data supplied). 
Classifications of political orientations by the authors.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100% because people use multiple media sources. *The Daily Mail 
was strongly pro-Brexit, but the Mail on Sunday supported Remain.
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However, Figure 1 also shows that in terms of media exposure the non-partisan broadcast 
news media have maintained far more reach and regular use than print newspapers. In 
modern times a trio of TV news outlets (BBC, ITV and Sky News) plus radio have provided 
much of people’s political information. All broadcasters operate under political neutrality 
rules that apply with special force during election campaigns. They must achieve a 
bipartisan balancing of Conservative and Labour issues and viewpoints (given their historic 
dominance in shaping general election voting) plus the broadly proportional representation 
of other parties – for example, giving the SNP in Scotland equal prominence. Optimists 
about the media system would point out that in Figure 1 four times as many people have 
used non-partisan media than have read Conservative-aligned newspapers. Similarly, more 
than five times as many people have used sources that take a neutral or pragmatic view 
of Brexit than have used strongly pro-Brexit sources. Figure 1 also shows that most people 
use multiple media sources and thus are exposed to a mix of partisan and non-partisan 
coverage of issues and politics.
However, newspaper-run websites now provide major sources of revenue for the press, 
and they compete for online attention with the broadcasters’ websites and online-only 
publications. Figure 2 shows that the papers’ online readership produces a greater 
balancing of political alignments in the digital world. During the 2015 and 2017 election 
campaigns Labour enjoyed the backing of the Guardian website, which has a much bigger 
reach than its print version. The Daily Mirror is also prominent. On the Tory side the Daily 
Mail is the leading online title, along with the Telegraph.
Figure 2: The online monthly readership of UK newspaper websites (in 2017)
Source: UK Press 
Gazette
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These modifying factors perhaps have begun to blunt the ‘power of the press’ compared 
with (say) the 1992 general election, when Murdoch’s leading title boasted ‘It was the 
Sun wot won it’ for John Major. In 2017, the Sun’s election day ‘Cor-Bin’ front page was 
no less strident in denouncing Jeremy Corbyn. On the day before polling, the Daily Mail 
devoted 13 pages to anti-Corbyn and anti-Labour stories and commentary, with the cover 
headline ‘Apologists for Terror’). The levels of political bias exhibited can also be strikingly 
unconstrained, verging into ‘fake news’ generation, with, for example, the front pages of 
the Sun and Daily Mail both explicitly linking top opposition politicians to terrorist threats.
Yet optimists about the media system point out that Corbyn’s Labour surged in popularity 
during the campaign, and forced a hung parliament, despite facing a wall of Tory press 
criticism. Perhaps, then, media diversity is working after all, allowing voters to form their 
own opinions from a range of different sources?
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that the UK’s 
media system remains essentially pluralistic 
when taken as a whole, especially in the 
complementary nature of a free press offset 
by bipartisan regulated broadcasting.
The print versions of the leading national 
newspapers remain wedded to highly 
partisan approaches to covering UK politics 
and elections. Cross-ownership of titles and 
broadcasting by powerful and committed 
corporate leaders actively trying to sway 
elections and policy decisions (like Rupert 
Murdoch) perennially distorts political power 
away from political equality. Traditional forms 
of joint agenda-setting by journalists (‘wolf 
pack’ questioning on top issues) and new 
developments (for example, press preview 
programmes on 24-hour TV and press front 
pages on broadcaster websites) mean that 
press distortions can drag public service 
broadcasters into line with a press-led 
agenda.
The growth of satellite and online TV 
channels, and rapid increases in the numbers 
of specialised or paid-for TV channels (many 
catering for niche interests) has reduced 
the ways in which TV presents a common 
news agenda to all citizens. Yet the BBC, ITV, 
Channel 4 and Sky News still compete very 
effectively for news and politics audiences 
(Figure 1). Although its audience is ageing 
somewhat, the BBC’s broadcast news 
coverage continues to reach two-thirds of 
the public each week.
Press coverage of the 2016 EU referendum 
campaign was frequently hyper-partisan, 
disingenuous or actively misleading (as in 
claims that Turkey was poised to join the EU). 
If and when such claims were ever corrected 
at a media regulator’s request, this happened 
only after readers had voted.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The mainstream press has experimented 
with subscription models that offer an 
alternative to paywalls, such as voluntary 
subscriptions or one-off donations and 
crowd-funded journalism.
The public’s reluctance to pay for news, 
both online and offline, as well as declining 
advertising revenues and insurgent start-ups, 
represent an existential threat to established 
press brands and perhaps other media. The 
local press is also in decline, with far fewer 
reporters. Those who remain are sometimes 
based outside their ‘beat’ and discouraged 
from original reporting for reasons of time 
and cost.
Several new versions of self-regulation have 
emerged, with Impress and Ipso offering 
different models (see below). The closure of 
the News of the World over its toxic phone-
hacking culture still looms large in editors’ 
and journalists’ consciousness.
The newspaper industry has failed to 
reach consensus on press regulation after 
the hacking scandal and Leveson report, 
including on the chilling effect of section 
40 of Crime and Courts Act (see below). 
Complaints mechanisms are often weak and 
unclear, especially among new entrants.
The Freedom of Information Act, a key right 
for citizens that is also a valuable tool for 
journalists, has survived repeated threats 
due to Whitehall cost-cutting and politicians’ 
hostility to it.
Court injunctions to force the press to 
respect people’s privacy are the preserve of 
the very wealthy, though are now declining 
in numbers. Ordinary citizens typically find 
it hard to achieve redress or corrections for 
mistakes from newspapers.
Parliamentary reporting has adapted to 
the live blog format, arguably providing 
a more detailed and real-time account of 
proceedings than the legacy print media did.
Coverage of Welsh politics is especially 
inadequate. The nation lacks a powerful 
home-grown media and the Welsh Assembly 
has considered appointing its own team 
of journalists to report proceedings. Like 
local authority-run newspapers, this is a 
problematic development.
Current opportunities Current threats
Libel cases have fallen since the Defamation 
Act 2013 simplified the public interest 
defence. If the trend is maintained, this may 
enable more adventurous investigatory 
reporting in future.
Mainstream media and journalists are 
increasingly distrusted by the public, 
particularly on the left, for their perceived 
biases and remoteness from ‘ordinary 
people’.
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Current opportunities Current threats
Citizens have mobilised on social media 
to counteract newspaper partisan or 
commentary excesses – for example, Stop 
Funding Hate’s campaign to shame big 
advertisers into boycotting newspapers 
accused of anti-Islam coverage and stirring 
up racial hatred. As online sources grow 
more salient, so a somewhat less partisan 
style of political journalism may take root. 
Crowd-funded initiatives like WikiTribune 
may have the potential to make the 
ownership and administration of media 
outlets more transparent and accountable to 
their readers.
Both ‘alt-left’ and ‘alt-right’ media outlets, run 
directly by political interest groups seeking 
to manipulate public debates, have already 
penetrated the UK market. They have often 
used ‘data-industrial complex’ methods to 
target sets of swing citizens, and paid-for 
Facebook and Twitter ‘news’ generation to 
evade journalistic controls or scrutiny. The 
alt-left (for example, the Canary and Evolve 
Politics) claimed extensive influence in the 
2017 general election, while the alt-right (and 
possibly Russian intelligence) seems to have 
helped sway the EU referendum campaign 
towards ‘Leave’.
Recognising the dearth of local news 
reporting, some efforts are being made to 
fund and train reporters (see below).
Official proposals for a modernised 
Espionage Act could threaten whistleblowers 
and introduce a further chilling effect to 
journalists’ ability to pursue stories relating to 
the ‘secret state’.
Hyperlocal news models continue to 
evolve, with the ease of making micro-
payments offering the possibility of an (albeit 
unpredictable) revenue stream (see Chapter 
3.4 on social media).
The declining sales of local newspapers, and 
the closure of many titles, plus the relative 
weakness of regional and local broadcasting 
within the BBC and ITV, have all meant that 
journalistic coverage of local politics has 
drastically fallen away. Court reporting is also 
in steep decline.
The BBC and Sky
The regulated TV broadcasters (and in the BBC’s case, state-funded too) have been a key 
part of the UK’s media system since the BBC was set up in the 1920s. Their role enjoys 
a wide amount of cross-party consensus, but the Tory press has constantly accused the 
BBC of having a ‘left-wing’ and liberal causes bias. Conversely, in 2015–17, when Jeremy 
Corbyn’s Labour leadership was controversial, some ‘alt-left’ outlets attacked the BBC 
(and in particular its political editor, Laura Kuenssberg) for bias against him. The BBC is 
now externally regulated by Ofcom, putting it on a par with other regulated broadcasters, 
instead of the previous exceptional situation where the BBC Trust was both ‘judge and 
jury’ on major complaints. The BBC’s once very extensive online web presence has also 
been greatly cut back to focus on news and programme-specific sites, chiefly as a result 
of commercial rivals complaining to Ofcom that it was ‘crowding out’ their own web 
operations.
A Conservative government green paper in 2015 raised the possibility of cutting or 
reforming the BBC’s licence fee (a disliked tax on TVs) and cutting back the corporation’s 
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remit to focus on news. However, the charter renewal of January 2017 guaranteed the 
licence fee’s survival for at least 11 years, with inflation-linked increases until early 2022. A 
new BBC Board – no more than half of whose members are government appointees – was 
put in place to manage the Corporation. The National Audit Office will now play a role in 
scrutinising BBC spending.
The BBC also undertook to serve ethnic minority and regional audiences better. The 
BBC Trust previously found that audiences in the devolved regions felt the corporation 
needed to do more to hold their politicians to account, particularly in Wales, where Cardiff 
University’s 2016 Welsh Election Study identified a ‘democratic deficit’ in media. In Scotland 
SNP supporters have regularly argued that the BBC is pro-union and called for a separate 
Scottish Broadcasting Corporation to be set up. Across the UK, the reach of BBC services is 
falling as its radio and TV audience ages.
The Brexit referendum campaign represented a major challenge for all the UK media, but 
particularly so for the BBC’s public service remit and due impartiality. The subject matter 
was complex and the public was poorly informed about the history and functions of the EU. 
The BBC’s referendum guidelines sought to give ‘due weight’ and prominence to all the 
main strands of argument and to all the main parties, rather than being an overly simplistic 
‘seesaw’ approach to impartiality – the latter critiqued by Jay Rosen as ‘views from 
nowhere’. Despite these efforts, the BBC was criticised for inadequate scrutiny of campaign 
claims on both sides and faced particular opprobrium from Leave-supporting politicians and 
newspapers. After the vote criticism continued from both Leavers and Remainers.
At the height of the News of the World phone hacking scandal, the Murdoch-run 21st 
Century Fox (the ultimate owner of the Sun and the News of the World) withdrew a bid 
to assume full control of Sky that had previously seemed likely to succeed. After an 
interregnum, the bid was renewed and Ofcom was lobbied to block it on the grounds that 
Murdoch’s companies failed a ‘fit and proper’ persons test. Ofcom did not agree and let 
it continue, but the issue was referred by the minister to the Competition and Mergers 
Authority. Their initial findings in January 2018 said that the merger was not in the public 
interest because of media plurality concerns. In July 2018, 21st Century Fox successfully bid 
for Sky, on condition that Sky News was divested to a buyer that will fund it for a decade 
and guarantee its independence.
This bidding war also reflected a new and salient challenge to the established broadcasters 
(and Hollywood film studios) posed by new media players Amazon, Netflix and some similar 
competitors focusing on paid-for, on-demand streaming of drama and entertainment only, 
paralleling the earlier growth of sports and specialist channels. As millions of consumers 
migrate to these services, so the audiences for regular bipartisan TV news may be eroded 
– because fewer people are following TV services offering a mix of services with regular 
slots for news.
Newspaper closures and online paywalls
For the ‘free press’ across the UK, the viability of newspaper titles is crucial. With sales 
and advertising revenue falling, the Independent newspaper ceased all print editions to 
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become online only, and subsequently reported a return to profit. The Times and Financial 
Times continued to maintain online paywalls to fund their journalism, with the Telegraph 
also erecting a partial paywall. The London Evening Standard became a free paper 
in 2009, maintaining its circulation. However, only 3% of Britons have an online news 
subscription, one of the lowest percentages across the European Union. At Murdoch’s 
insistence, The Sun experimented with a paywall in 2013, but abandoned it two years later 
as its online readership numbers fell. A majority of readers seem unwilling to pay for online 
news when it is freely available elsewhere. However, the Guardian reports 500,000 regular 
paying supporters and a further 300,000 one-off contributors.
Regional papers in big cities outside London, and local publications across the country, 
also experienced a drop of 12% in digital and print revenues in 2015–16. Across the UK 198 
local papers closed in 2005–16, plus 40 more in 2017. Falling advertising revenues have 
been the principal driver of local journalism’s decline, but not the only one. More people 
have been renting privately and moving between local areas. The sociologist Anthony 
Giddens argued that social life has become ‘dis-embedded’ from the local level, so that ‘we 
cannot take the existence of local journalism for granted’. The decline in local reporting 
was exemplified in tragic fashion by the failure of west London’s press to pick up on the 
repeatedly expressed concerns of the Grenfell Tower residents on the Grenfell Action 
Group blog about the safety of their building, before it burnt down, killing 72 people in 
June 2017.
Some efforts are being made to reinvigorate the sector. The BBC has earmarked £8m for 
‘local democracy reporters’ from selected news services, giving them training and access 
to BBC video and audio. In addition, the local press decline has been a key catalyst for a 
growth of citizen-driven hyperlocal sites (see Chapter 3.4).
Media ownership, partisanship and transparency
A diversity of media ownership has historically been seen as important because of 
the strong political orientation of the national newspaper titles. But in addition, owning 
newspapers has often helped different capitalist interests to advance their own interests 
in regulatory matters and other public policy concerns, especially where press titles and 
broadcast channels are owned by the same mogul or firm. Elected politicians may want 
to keep powerful media owners onside and so give them the benefit of the doubt in 
regulatory decisions.
Ownership of the major newspapers has long been divided among a few large companies, 
with the American-owned News Corp, publisher of the Sun and the Times/Sunday Times, 
as the dominant player. These, along with the Daily Mail (DMG Media), the Daily Express 
(bought by Trinity Mirror in 2018) and the Telegraph Media Group, continue to dominate 
right-leaning coverage, while the Mirror, the Guardian and the Independent occupy the 
left or centre. Pearson sold the Financial Times to the Japanese company Nikkei in 2015. 
A Saudi investor, Sultan Muhammad Abuljadayel, took a stake of between 25% and 50% in 
the Independent’s holding company in 2017, causing concern among some of its journalists, 
although they were assured its editorial independence would remain intact.
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However, online media has inflicted considerable disruption on the newspaper-dominated 
press model. Digital entrants have used social media to disseminate free news and opinion. 
Some originate in the US (BuzzFeed, the Huffington Post, Vice), others are funded by the 
Russian state (Russia Today and the Edinburgh-based Sputnik). A number of hyper-partisan 
low-cost start-ups – such as Evolve Politics and the Canary, a free-to-access site funded by 
advertising and voluntary subscriptions – have generated their traffic via Facebook. These 
last, which backed the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn unreservedly, enjoyed particular 
success during the 2017 general election campaign. Their online reach among younger 
voters during that campaign may have exceeded that of the established mainstream press.
New entrants are overwhelmingly digital, but in print media the free Metro and small-scale 
print publications such as the anti-Brexit weekly the New European (owned by Archant 
Media) – have also meant that UK media are more pluralistic than ever before. Some 
new players are not transparent about their ownership and do not always choose to 
join a regulator. Neither Sputnik nor Breitbart provide any channel for readers to make a 
complaint about their reporting, apart from an online contact form on the Sputnik page, and 
neither are members of a press regulation body. Social media also presents a new set of 
challenges to democratic debate (see Chapter 3.4).
Journalists have been gloomy about the decline of paid-for news contents and its 
adverse implications for the health of media outlets and the ability of the press to report 
freely. Freedom House identified ‘varied ways in which pressure can be placed on the 
flow of objective information and the ability of platforms to operate freely and without 
fear of repercussions’. They rated the UK’s media environment as ‘free’ in 2017, giving it 
an overall score of 25 (where 0 denotes the most free and 100 the least). This represents 
a four-point worsening in the UK’s score since 2013. Although Freedom House considers 
the UK’s press ‘largely open’, significant concerns about regulation and government 
surveillance are unresolved.
Press regulation and the Crime and Courts Act
Poor or inaccurate media reporting (especially by the press) may generate a great deal 
of misery for the people involved. UK newspapers maintained for many years a very 
weak apparatus of ‘self-regulation’, which collapsed in the wake of a major scandal about 
reporters at the News of the World, Daily Mirror and other tabloid titles ‘hacking’ the 
phones of celebrities and politicians so as to uncover aspects of their private lives. This was 
always a criminal activity, but Scotland Yard proved strangely reluctant to act until long after 
the large scale of scandal became apparent. In 2014, the BBC’s sensationalist live reporting 
of the search of singer Cliff Richard’s home as part of an investigation into allegations of 
sexual offences, featuring helicopter shots of a police raid, was apparently based on police 
leaks. With the case later dismissed, it proved controversial, and the Corporation eventually 
had sizeable damages and legal costs awarded against it for invading Richard’s privacy, in 
a court judgment that some critics argued would constrain future press freedom.
The phone-hacking scandal produced a long-delayed Inquiry into the Culture, Practices 
and Ethics of the Press chaired by Lord Leveson. It deemed the previous Press 
Complaints Commission ‘not fit for purpose’ and it was dissolved. But Leveson’s call for 
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an independent, self-regulatory body to create and uphold a new standards code for the 
media failed to get press cooperation. The only government-created (but independently 
appointed) Press Recognition Panel (PRP) is Impress, which regulates over 100 small, 
chiefly local and digital publications. Most national newspapers have joined the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation (Ipso). However, the Financial Times and the 
Guardian chose to set up their own internal mechanisms for handling complaints, citing 
worries about Ipso’s independence and the royal charter model that underpins it. The 
charter is not a statute but is drafted and approved by the Privy Council, which its critics 
argue amounts to ‘unacceptable political involvement’ in press regulation.
To try and make publishers join a PRP-approved regulator, section 40 of the coalition 
government’s Crime and Courts Act 2013 gave those that have done so the opportunity to 
settle libel action through a low-cost arbitration scheme. If they did not, they may be liable 
for the claimant’s costs in libel, privacy or harassment cases. The vast majority of the press 
have vociferously opposed the implementation of section 40, with the Financial Times 
opening its objections by claiming that the press landscape had been ‘utterly transformed’ 
since the publication of the Leveson report. Index on Censorship warned that section 
40 ‘protects the rich and powerful and is a gift to the corrupt and conniving to silence 
investigative journalists – particularly media outfits that don’t have very deep pockets’. 
In March 2018 the responsible minister announced that section 40 would be repealed, 
and the previously proposed second part of the Levenson inquiry scrapped – leaving the 
shape, let alone the effectiveness, of any future press regulation or self-regulation unclear.
Libel law and ‘gag’ orders
For decades the English law of libel has provided for potentially large damages against 
anyone publishing statements likely to lower the reputation of the claimant in the eyes 
of reasonable people, even if the statements were true. Papers also had to prove that 
‘defamatory’ statements were not maliciously motivated. The Defamation Act 2013  
simplified the so-called ‘Reynolds defence’ against libel by codifying it more simply: if a 
statement is in the public interest and the writer reasonably believes it to be so, it enjoys 
protection. In addition, a libel claimant must prove the statement caused ‘serious’ harm. 
English PEN and Index on Censorship both welcomed the overhaul: ‘England’s notorious 
libel laws [have been] changed in favour of free speech’, said the latter. The number of 
defamation cases fell to around 60 in the three years 2014–16. A growing proportion of 
these related to social media postings by private individuals.
English law also allows for ‘gag’ injunctions preventing publication of details (like names) if 
the subject can claim their privacy would be damaged. In recent years these have declined 
greatly, because such information can easily be published by third parties online, and court 
proceedings made public, thus undermining the very purpose of the action. The privacy 
injunction remains a tool of the rich: ‘With average legal fees of £400 an hour, the first court 
hearing would cost up to £100,000,’ reported the Guardian in 2016. For almost all citizens, 
pre-emptive action against breaches of privacy is out of the question, and post-hoc privacy 
actions are likewise impossible. Self-regulation and effective means of redress therefore 
take on an even greater importance. 
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Leaking of government secrets and a proposed Espionage Act
The UK government operates a system (called D notices) where the responsible minister 
can exceptionally bar papers or broadcasters from running items that would endanger a 
clear national interest (for example, publishing the names of UK espionage agents). UK 
journalists have been vigilant in keeping such cases to an absolute minimum. However, 
other developments have changed the picture a lot.
In 2013, the American IT contractor Edward Snowden passed large amounts of classified 
material from the US National Security Agency (NSA) to the Guardian and Washington Post 
which revealed details of government surveillance programmes, also involving GCHQ (the 
UK’s electronic surveillance agency). GCHQ requested the Guardian to handover its copy 
of the material. Instead, warned that the security services were considering taking legal 
action to halt its reporting, the paper destroyed the hard drives and memory chips with 
cutting tools at their offices. This was ‘a largely symbolic act’ the paper said, because the 
same files were stored in other jurisdictions.
As a result, the Law Commission, a normally neutral, expert legal body, undertook a 
review of the Official Secrets Act, and recommended its replacement with a modernised 
Espionage Act in 2016. The proposals immediately created fears that they would 
criminalise receiving and handling any data that the government deems damaging to 
national security, even if editors and journalists were merely examining leaked material. 
The influential Open Rights Group described the new provisions as a ‘full-frontal attack on 
journalism…. The intention is to stop the public from ever knowing that any secret agency 
has ever broken the law.’ However, the Commission’s ‘public consultation’ was badly 
mishandled, and its publicity was even worse. The proposals were sent back for more work, 
initially planned for autumn 2017 and then postponed to September 2018. The Commission 
insists on its website that under its proposals:
‘An offence is only committed if the defendant “knew or had reasonable 
grounds to believe his or her conduct was capable of benefitting a foreign 
power and intended or was reckless as to whether his or her conduct 
would prejudice the safety or interests of the state”. Currently someone 
can commit an offence under the Official Secrets Act 1911 even if he or she 
thought their conduct was in the interests of the UK.’
Re-establishing trust
While trust in the BBC’s ability to deliver accurate and reliable news remains high (70%), 
trust in journalists in the UK overall remains much lower than in most of the EU and USA. 
It is lower still among under-35s and those who describe themselves as left-wing. Among 
journalists themselves, most say owners, advertising and profit considerations have little 
influence over their work. A quarter of them believe that it is sometimes justifiable to 
publish unverified information.
However, fact-checking has become an increasingly common practice online, pioneered 
by the charity FullFact, and later adopted by the BBC, Channel 4 and Guardian. Google’s 
1353.3 The media system 
Digital News Initiative is currently looking at ways to automate parts of the process. 
Mindful of how Donald Trump’s presidency came about and has developed, the media 
industry is beginning to grapple with the question of how to report untrue or contested 
statements made by top politicians.
Conclusions
The media system is changing fast, and it is often easy to lament all change as a decline 
from a past golden age, and to resent ‘new goods’ that are having disruptive effects. 
Optimists, on the other hand, argue that the choice and variety of news information 
available to Britons have never been greater and that press and broadcasters are free from 
censorship or direct government interference.
Pessimists see a largely unreconstructed national press, wedded to truth-bending, 
high intensity partisanship, with unregulated power concentrated in the hands of a few 
press barons (often pushing their corporate agendas as well business interest), and a 
wider profession resistant to any meaningful professionalism or effective self-policing of 
journalistic practices. In the wings, UK government and official sources have proposed 
restrictive laws that would greatly inhibit journalistic enterprise and ability to investigate – 
especially where the UK’s still-large ‘secret state’ operates, largely immune to any public or 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
Ros Taylor (@rosamundmtaylor) is Research Manager at the LSE Truth, Trust and 
Technology Commission and co-editor of LSE Brexit. She is a former Guardian journalist 
and has also worked for the BBC.
How should the social media system operate in a liberal 
democracy?
✦	 Social media should enhance the pluralism and diversity of the overall media system, 
lowering the costs for citizens in securing political information, commentary and 
evidence, and improving their opportunities to understand how democracy works. 
✦	 Social media should be easily accessible for ordinary citizens, encouraging them 
to become politically involved by taking individual actions to express their views 
in responsible ways, and enabling them to take collective actions to promote a 
shared viewpoint.
✦	 The overall media system should operate as transparently as possible, so that 
truthful/factual content predominates, it quickly drives out misinformation, and ‘fake 
news’, ‘passing off’ and other lapses are minimised and rapidly counteracted.
✦	 The growth of social media should contribute to greater political equality by re-
weighting communication towards members of the public and non-government 
organisations, reducing the communication and organisational advantages of 
corporate actors, professional lobbyists or ‘industrialised’ content promoters.
✦	 By providing more direct, less ‘mediated’ communications with large publics, social 
media should enhance the capacity of politicians and parties to create and maintain 
direct links with citizens, enhancing their understanding of public opinion and 
responsiveness to it.
Social media and citizen vigilance  
Social media technologies (such as Facebook, Twitter, Google, YouTube, Snapchat and 
Instagram) have brought about radical changes in how the media systems of liberal 
democracies operate. The platform providers have become powerful actors in the operation 
of the media system, and in how it connects to political processes. At the same time, these 
companies claim political neutrality, because most of their content is created by their 
millions of users – perhaps creating far greater citizen vigilance over government and 
politicians. Ros Taylor and the Democratic Audit team examine how far the UK’s social 
media system operates to support or damage democratic politics. Does it help to ensure a 
full and effective representation of citizens’ political views and interests?
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✦	 Social media should unambiguously enhance citizen vigilance over state policies 
and public choices, increasing the ‘granularity’ of public scrutiny, speeding up 
the recognition of policy problems or scandals, and reaching the widest relevant 
audiences for critiques and commentary of government actions.
✦	 Platform providers argue that they do not generate the content posted on millions 
of Twitter sites or Facebook pages, but only provide an online facility that allows 
citizens, NGOs and enterprises to build their own content. However, these large 
companies also reap important network and oligopoly effects that increase 
their discretionary power, and their platforms have become increasingly salient 
factors in democratic politics. Therefore, regulation of their activities should be 
considered if they create monopolies or oligopolies, suppress rival competitors, 
unfairly undermine the viability of established media, fail to deal with extremism 
and hate speech, or damage the integrity of elections or other political participation 
processes.
✦	 Platform providers must take their legal responsibilities to ‘do no harm’ seriously, and 
respond quickly to mitigate new social problems enabled by social media that are 
identified by public opinion or elected politicians.
✦	 In assessing (and potentially regulating) social media effects, evidence-based 
knowledge of the actual, empirical behaviours of users and platform providers is key, 
rather than relying on a priori expectations. 
✦	 The development of regulations and law around fast-changing ‘new goods’ like 
social media often lags behind social practice. Legislators and government need 
to be agile in responding to emergent problems created by social media, or to 
existing problems that are re-scaled or change character because of them. Where 
existing controls or actions to mitigate effects are already feasible in law, their 
implementation needs to be prioritised and taken seriously by police forces and 
regulators.
✦	 As with conventional media, citizens should be able to gain published corrections 
and other effective forms of redress (including appropriate damages) against 
reporting or commentary that is illegal, unfair, incorrect or invades personal and 
family privacy. Citizens are entitled to expect that platform companies will respect 
all laws applying to them in speedily taking down offensive content, and will not be 
able to exploit their power to deter investigations or prosecutions by the police or 
prosecutors.
✦	 Adverse by-product effects of social media use on established or paid-for journalism 
and media diversity needs to be taken into account. Social media companies 
argue that their activities are similar to ‘disintermediation’ (‘cutting out the middle 
man’) processes in other industries, allowing citizens more choice in how they gain 
information or services. Yet losses of advertising revenue to platform corporations 
that critically threaten the viability of existing media (like broadcasting and print/paid-
for newspapers) may have net negative effects on the overall media system.
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✦	 Facebook and Google provide a cheap way for any political campaigner with money 
or large numbers of supporters to reach voters, often in a highly targeted way. 
Policy-makers need to consider how the new capabilities here affect the autonomy 
of citizens’ voting decisions, and whether electoral law – which imposes obligations 
and restrictions on broadcasters – should be extended and adapted to encompass 
political advertising on social media platforms.
The growth of social media – and its wider consequences for the web – have been seen 
in rather different ways. On the one hand, easy-to-produce content and low-cost internet 
communication helps citizens in myriad ways to organise, campaign, form new political 
movements, influence policy-makers and hold the government accountable. Social media 
can also ‘disintermediate’ the conventional journalist-run and corporate-owned media. 
In 2008, Clay Shirky’s Here Comes Everybody set out a vision in which self-publishing 
meant ‘anyone can be a journalist’. Yascha Mounk points out that social media ‘favours the 
outsider over the insider, and the forces of instability over the status quo’.
A populist discourse rationalising such changes argues that the mainstream media (‘MSM’) 
has stifled debate on issues that matter to ‘ordinary’ citizens. This pattern was observable 
in the EU referendum campaign (when the Leave campaign derided ‘expert’ opinions 
and urged people to ‘take back control’) and in the United States (where Donald Trump 
sought to bypass most media outlets in favour of direct communication at rallies and on 
social media). Some left critics also share the sentiment. Citing the LSE’s study of negative 
representations of Jeremy Corbyn in the British press, Kadira Pethiyagoda describes a 
‘chasm between the masses and the elites, represented by the out-of-touch MSM, [that] 
threatens not only democracy and justice, but also stability’.
On the other side of the debate, new social goods, especially those that disrupt the 
established ways in which powerful interests and social groups operate, often attract 
exaggerated predictions (or even ‘folk panics’) about their adverse implications for society. 
Social media inherently present a double aspect, because they are run by powerful 
platform provider corporations (Facebook/WhatsApp/Instagram, Twitter, Google/You Tube 
and Apple). 
Many providers seek to ‘wall-in’ millions of users within their proprietary domains. At the 
same time, almost all the content they carry is generated by individuals, firms or NGOs 
using free speech rights to communicate about the issues that matter to them. So, while 
the platform providers might seem oligopolistic in the way that they carve up the social 
media market, and in the enormous corporate power they have acquired relative to other 
companies, especially conventional media corporations, they can still claim to be politically 
neutral and competing for customers – and hence standing outside conventional media 
regulation provisions.
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Recent developments
In the realm of news and current affairs, the growth of social media in the UK has shrunk 
the audience for free TV news bulletins. For the BBC, the change means UK viewers 
can watch and consume news on PCs or smartphones, often playing clips rather than 
full bulletins. The readerships of most paid-for/print daily and Sunday newspapers has 
also fallen, although some Sunday titles and the free Metro are exceptions. Newspaper 
publishers that want to reach users on social media must either rely on existing readers 
recommending their content, or pay to advertise – even as papers’ digital advertising 
revenues fail to live up to publishers’ hopes and are scooped up instead by Google or 
Facebook. In addition, Facebook has reduced the amount of news in its newsfeed and 
announced that ‘trusted’ publishers – to be determined by public poll – will be given 
prominence. Thus social media are widely seen by journalists and others as posing an 
existential challenge for legacy publishers. (See Chapter 3.3.)
For a growing proportion of people, particularly among the 18–34-year-old demographic, 
online news reports represent their chief source of news. While many people use apps 
to follow the news, a growing number rely on stories shared via Twitter, Snapchat and, in 
particular, Facebook.
Figure 2 also shows that people value the ability to directly monitor what their political 
representatives and candidates are doing, and social media offers an easy way to do so. 
Currently 18% of all UK citizens follow a politician. In the case of councillors or even MPs, 
social media commentary is often the first thing to draw politicians’ attention to causes 
and public concerns that do not reach them via constituency surgeries, council meetings 
or emails. The ability for people to click and comment in their own terms instantly helps to 
indicate the breadth and depth of public feeling on a particular issue.
Figure 1: Most used social media platforms for news consumption by people in the UK, 2018 
Source: Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018
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Figure 2: Why people in six countries (including the UK) follow politicians on social media
Source: Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017
Notes: Question was: ‘You say you follow a politician or political party via social media, what are some 
of the reasons for this? Base: All who follow a politician or political party on social media, USA, UK, 
Germany, Spain, Ireland, and Australia. n = 2671.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Voters can follow their elected 
representatives on social media, and 
candidates who are competing against 
them. By replying and commenting, people 
have low-cost opportunities to contact and 
influence them at a national or local level.
Platform providers give people the ability 
to customise the news they receive on 
social media. Most people use this facility 
as they use conventional media, paying 
most attention to viewpoints and sources 
with which they already agree. On tailored 
social media responding closely to citizen 
preferences, this behaviour can create a 
‘filter bubble’ in which opposing or even 
unaligned voices go unheard. Only 4% 
of social media users follow politicians 
from both the political left and right. Some 
politicians – not just in the US – use Twitter 
as a channel for angry and often inaccurate 
polemic, and corrections are rare and often 
go unnoticed.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Even citizens unaffiliated with an 
organisation, can quickly disseminate their 
message to a very wide audience via social 
media and have some chance of evoking 
wider agreement from like-minded people – 
a dynamic that drives retweeting, Facebook 
‘likes’ and even now officially recognised 
online petitions to the UK government. 
The popularity of social media among 
young people provides a helpful means of 
encouraging them to get on the electoral 
roll, after the relative success of the online 
National Voter Registration Drives.
Most ‘retweeters’ and ‘likers’ are not 
professional journalists writing for fact-
checked publications, but ordinary citizens 
with lower levels of information. So critics 
argue that inaccurate and misleading 
information (‘fake news’) can spread more 
quickly. For example, after the Grenfell 
Tower disaster online reports spread quickly 
that the government had issued a D-Notice 
restricting media reporting on the issue, 
which (of course) it had not.
Digital-only publication and dissemination 
via social media have lowered the start-up 
costs for many alternative media outlets, 
broadening the range of professionally 
produced news and commentary available 
to citizens. Snapchat Discover has enabled 
mainstream publications like Le Monde and 
CNN to reach the 18–24 year-old audience 
more easily (10% reach in the UK) as legacy 
broadcast and printed press consumption 
declines.
Digital-only publishing by highly committed 
or partisan publishers has also enabled them 
to flood online platform systems with multiple 
biased or untrue messages in ways that are 
completely non-transparent. The ongoing US 
inquiries into the Trump administration’s links 
with Russia have revealed the ability of foreign 
powers to use ‘fake news’ disseminated on 
social media to sway the political process, 
and allegations of similar influence in the 2016 
Brexit referendum and 2017 election have 
been made. (See Chapter 2.4.)
Social media apps are nominally free to 
set up and use. Quite sophisticated media 
(like blogs, video streams and photo sites) 
are now also very cheap to run, and need 
no special training. Hence the growth of 
social media expands the foundations for a 
pluralistic and diverse media system.
There is evidence that online abuse and 
harassment, particularly of women, children, 
ethnic minorities, and socially unpopular 
groups, can be more extensive in social 
media than in society outside. Moving online 
increases the audiences for abuse, lets it 
occur in real time and more often, escalating 
faster, and often involving extreme language. 
Online ‘hate speech’ is illegal in the UK but 
police and prosecutors have been slow 
to engage. Some cases of legal redress 
for defamation on Twitter have been 
successful, but this is a very costly process 
to accomplish. Many people complain that 
platform providers have been too slow to 
take down offensive, harassing or illegal 
content. So a lack of online ‘civility’, and 
harassment of vulnerable people, remain a 
serious problem.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The EU’s new General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) began operating in 
late May 2018. It imposes more stringent 
requirements on social media companies 
operating in the EU (including the UK still) to 
better explain privacy rules to users and to get 
their active consent to their information being 
collected via cookies. Users can also more 
easily get redress if their information is leaked 
inappropriately or their privacy compromised.
The platform providers (especially Facebook) 
launched big damage-limitation exercises in 
mid-2018, using the GDPR to claim advances 
in users’ control. However, most users have 
no choice but to accept the complex ‘terms 
of service’ that companies enforce, or else 
lose the functionality, services and networks 
that the major platforms provide. 
The scandal around Cambridge Analytica’s 
political operations (see Chapter 2.4) 
prompted major investigations of how 
millions of Facebook users’ data leaked to 
them without users’ authorisation. These 
developments triggered the questioning of 
Mark Zuckerberg by the US Congress and 
European Parliament. 
The European Commission (EC) has the 
population scale and legal resources to 
move vigorously against misuse of monopoly 
power by Microsoft (after it bundled its 
Explorer browser and stifled competition) 
and later by Google (over unfairly 
advantaging its own search engine hits). In 
mid-2017 the EC fined Google €2.4bn and a 
further €4.3bn for antitrust practices in 2018, 
a substantial disincentive to monopolistic 
practices. 
However, after Britain leaves the EU, it is 
unclear whether any UK government would 
have the motivation, legal resources or scale 
to act as vigorously. Even if stronger rulings 
were made, the UK is a much smaller and 
less salient market for these firms than the 
EU as a whole. In spring 2018 Zuckerberg 
declined a request to appear before a House 
of Commons select committee, going instead 
to the European Parliament.
The growth of fact-checking tools and 
websites, including automated fact-checking, 
enables rapid rebuttal of falsehoods – 
especially if platform provider firms assist in 
the process. This ability improves with time.
The media landscape risks atomisation 
as citizens turn to news sources that 
are specialised to their political view, 
interests or local area (but see below), with 
a corresponding decline in the political 
salience (‘valence’) of top media issues.
1433.4 Social media and citizen vigilance
Future opportunities Future threats
Social media enables rapid and 
unprecedented scrutiny of policy-making 
and politicians’ pronouncements, with 
stakeholders’ and experts’ opinions freely 
available on Twitter. Some liveblogs have 
tried to curate them, but this body of 
knowledge and inputs remains diffuse. 
It can be linked to formal mechanisms, 
such as select committees of the House of 
Commons.
Armed with huge cash reserves (often 
gained from setting up complex tax-
avoidance schemes), the giant platform 
corporations have diversified into social 
media conglomerates. Facebook (which 
owns Instagram and WhatsApp), Google 
(which owns YouTube) and to a lesser 
extent Twitter, now dominate social media 
platforms. These corporations’ power 
to shape how democratic discourse 
happens online is considerable, and almost 
unregulated at nation state level.
Outside the UK and US, growth in some key 
social media (like Facebook) appears to be 
levelling off in favour of the more closed 
environment of messaging applications. This 
poses its own challenges, given the difficulty 
of monitoring activity in private channels.
How social media users behave
Many critics of social media claim that they change the behavioural dynamics of information 
markets in adverse ways. The ability to ‘like’ and ‘follow’ like-minded individuals on social 
media, together with Facebook’s use of algorithms that present news and posts based on 
a user’s existing preferences, has led to fears that people increasingly obtain their news 
from a self-reinforcing ‘filter bubble’ of similar opinion – concerns famously expressed by 
Cass Sunstein. Evidence for filter bubbles is mixed, with one study suggesting social media 
users are exposed to more viewpoints than they would otherwise be. People are more 
likely to read news their friends and family recommend. Increasingly, however, research 
suggests that the roots of political polarisation lie in wider societal changes rather than 
social media behaviour.
In the social media world, the key metric of successful content is its ability to generate 
retweets or Facebook ‘likes’. Chasing the advertising revenue that a ‘viral’ piece or video 
can generate has led some media publishers to produce ‘clickbait’ – sensationalist 
headlines that tempt the readers to click through to that story in preference to others 
on the page. While a great deal of clickbait content is celebrity or lifestyle journalism, 
some of it relies on distorted and sensationalised news stories. Ofcom research on how 
news is consumed through social media suggests that users are less engaged and rarely 
remember the source of a story.
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Fake news 
The term ‘fake news’ is inevitably subjective and contentious. In some instances it is 
difficult to draw a clear line between fabricated stories online and the hyper-partisan 
coverage of several British tabloids. Ulises Mejias argues that to insist on a clear distinction 
between ‘real’ and ‘fake’ news ‘bypasses any kind of analysis of the economics that makes 
disinformation possible and indeed desirable’ in Western democracies. One notable 
development in the UK has been the ability of far-right groups such as Britain First to 
disseminate their message on social media under the guise of entertainment – and one 
of their false tweets fostering anti-Islamic sentiment was retweeted by the US President, 
Donald Trump (with no later apology). Britain First was banned from Facebook in early 2018.
As with traditional media (see Chapter 3.3), increasingly globalised media ownership has 
opened up opportunities for powerful actors and state-funded operations to influence 
democratic debate abroad. Leaked US intelligence, which claims Russia used online fake 
news to influence voters in the 2016 election, suggest that the phenomenon is a growing 
threat to the legitimacy of elections in the West. In his analysis of electoral manipulation 
across the world, Ferran Martinez i Coma notes a move away from ballot-stuffing and 
towards media manipulation. 
Threats to female politicians and activists
Misogyny on social media remains a problem, despite the introduction of stricter rules by 
Twitter. Social media harassment has been the subject of numerous other complaints by 
female politicians and activists, especially at the 2017 general election. A 2016 Demos 
study suggests that women users are just as responsible as men for originating misogynist 
threats. Police action against hatred and threats online seemed to take a long time to get 
started, but a man and a woman were given prison sentences in 2014 for posting threats on 
Twitter against the feminist campaigner Caroline Criado-Perez. 
‘Trolling’ of women politicians or those from ethnic minorities clearly inhibits their freedom 
to develop and express opinions and debate on Twitter and other social media, and so 
represents a threat to democratic discourse online. Other forms of misuse of social media 
– such as the bullying of vulnerable school students by others – can easily have tragic 
consequences in terms of mental harm and even suicides. There have been repeated 
criticisms of platform providers (many of whose founders espoused socially libertarian 
ideas) for being reluctant to take down hate speech content and self-regulate their content 
effectively. The sheer volume of content posted on networks makes the task of policing 
hate speech difficult. In Germany, enforcing the NetzDG law – which makes platforms 
liable for certain forms of hate speech – has proved costly for Facebook. The social 
media companies tend to only help state authorities with clearly illegal material, such as 
encouraging terrorism or promoting suicides. While Facebook has significantly revised 
its content moderation rules, they are not always enforced. Critics argue that the major 
platform providers could enhance their automated checks (for example, by developing 
better ‘artificial intelligence’ systems), but have been dragging their feet so as not to lose 
the clicks (and ad revenues) that sensationalist ‘fake news’ attracts.
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Hyper-local social media
A more positive trend has been the development of hyper-local news, with half of sites 
run by people with some form of mainstream journalistic experience. Good quality sites 
may be able to partly offset the rapid decline of paid-for local newspapers across the 
UK by attracting crowdfunding and subscriptions. Micro-payments are another possible 
revenue stream, though they have developed much more slowly than anticipated. Hyper-
local news strengthens the voices of community groups and members of the public, 
whereas the traditional local press ‘are very authority-oriented in their sourcing strategies’. 
But, Andy Williams explains, most outlets depend heavily on volunteers: ‘Despite the 
impressive social and democratic value of hyper-local news content, community news in 
the UK is generally not a field rich in economic value’. So he concludes that for all their 
valuable efforts, unpaid and part-time news producers ‘can only very partially plug growing 
local news deficits’. A Cardiff University initiative has sought to support hyper-local and 
community journalism by offering online training and funding advice, chiefly in Wales, which 
has a particular democratic deficit in coverage of regional/local news. 
Conclusions
Social media clearly offers unprecedented opportunities for voters to debate and scrutinise 
public policy, albeit on terms heavily conditioned by the platform providers. As a tool for 
influencing and holding the political class accountable for their actions, it may ultimately 
prove as powerful as the press itself, which increasingly relies upon social media channels 
to reach younger people. Yet there is also a constant ‘arms race’ between citizens finding 
their online voices and the countervailing development of industrialised/professionalised 
social media campaigning by companies, large vested interests, political parties and some 
government actors. For good or ill – as the Trump presidency vividly demonstrates – social 
media allow politicians to communicate directly with citizens, enthusing the electorate and 
reinforcing their bond with supporters. 
The blooming of multiple voices enables those who have traditionally been on the 
fringes of debate to make their voices heard, such as citizens with disabilities, However, 
it also opens a channel for extremists and news outlets with motives going far beyond 
conventional partisanship to embrace attempts to skew and undermine democratic debate 
itself. Because users choose whom they follow and can exclude unwanted or dissenting 
voices, critics argue that social media can foster and sustain conspiracy theories and 
fake news. And because social media make strongly held (sometimes abusive) opinions 
so visible, they risk stoking social polarisation and alienating other people from the 
‘normal’ political processes. Political advertising on platforms, meanwhile, poses an urgent 
challenge for electoral law – one that the Electoral Commission has recently highlighted. 
Are the current main platforms fit for purpose in liberal democratic societies, either in 
being transparent about their user-monitoring policies, or the extent to which they co-
operate with governments for security purposes, or their ability to foster democratic 
deliberation and thoughtful social learning? Fears that the hegemony and ubiquity of these 
platforms could be nudging people towards extreme political behaviour have already 
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triggered criticism of the social media model that ‘moves fast and break things’. Some form 
of regulation looks increasingly likely – or at the very least policies designed to moderate 
platform power and safeguard elections.
Ros Taylor (@rosamundmtaylor) is Research Manager at the LSE Truth, Trust and 
Technology Commission and co-editor of LSE Brexit. She is a former Guardian journalist 
and has also worked for the BBC.
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What does democracy require for the legislature?
(i) Focusing national debate, and scrutinising and controlling major decisions by the 
executive
✦	 The elected legislature should normally maintain full public control of government 
services and state operations, ensuring public and parliamentary accountability 
through conditionally supporting the government, and articulating reasoned 
opposition, via its proceedings.
✦	 The House of Commons’ floor debates and question times should be a critically 
important focus of national political debate, articulating ‘public opinion’ in ways that 
provide useful guidance to the government in making complex policy choices.
✦	 Legislators should regularly and influentially scrutinise the current implementation 
of policies, and the efficiency and effectiveness of government services and policy 
delivery.
✦	 Individually and collectively legislators should seek to uncover and publicise issues 
of public concern and citizens’ grievances, giving effective representation both to 
majority and minority views, and showing a consensus regard for serving the public 
interest.
The House of Commons: control 
of government and citizen 
representation
How well does the House of Commons work via floor debates, questions to ministers 
and as a general means of scrutinising and passing legislation, and monitoring policy 
implementation? Has the return of a hung parliament since 2017 changed how the House  
of Commons functions as a legislature? Artemis Photiadou and Patrick Dunleavy consider 
if the traditional model of Parliament as primarily supporting a showcase political clash  
of government and opposition has changed to make the Commons a more effective focus of 
national debate or to create stronger control of the executive.
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(ii) Passing laws and controlling the executive’s detailed policies
✦	 In the preparation of new laws, the legislature should supervise government 
consultations and help ensure effective pre-legislative scrutiny.
✦	 In considering legislation, Parliament should undertake close scrutiny in a climate 
of effective deliberation, seeking to identify and maximise a national consensus 
where feasible.
✦	 Ideally pre-legislative scrutiny will ensure that the consequences of new laws are 
fully anticipated, changes are made to avert ‘policy disasters’ and risks are assigned 
to those societal interests which can most easily insure against them.
Recent developments
If the parliament elected in June 2017 endures for five years, as by law it could and should, 
then by June 2022 the UK will have experienced ten years of hung parliaments out of the 
last 12. The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government of 2010–15 would be 
joined by up to five years of a Tory minority government sustained in office by a ‘confidence 
and supply’ agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). One year of minority 
government has already passed as we write. In between these supposedly ‘unusual’ 
peacetime conditions, there would be only a single year’s inter-regnum (2015–16) when the 
Cameron government had a small but clear overall majority and operated on the traditional 
patter. There was also a further year of Tory majority government under May, but it was 
marked by a good deal of post-Brexit Leaver–Remain conflicts that made her parliamentary 
situation very weak. 
All of this might make the ‘Westminster system’ of disproportional elections producing 
‘strong’ majority governments, and the associated ‘British political tradition’ look more 
suspect than ever before. But how far has it affected how the House of Commons 
operates? In particular, has it transferred power over policy-making from the executive 
to Westminster, or from ministers to MPs acting as a body, or to the opposition, or to 
backbenchers in the governing party?
In the Conservative and Liberal Democrats coalition (2010–15) – the first in peacetime 
since 1945 – David Cameron as Prime Minister was uniquely exposed to right-wing Tory 
backbenchers and centre-left Liberal Democrats dissenting from government policies. 
Philip Cowley showed that, not surprisingly, some level of backbench dissent affected 
35% of Commons divisions in 2010–15, a post-war record (with the Labour government of 
2005–10 as the nearest parallel). Yet how much did any of this matter? A listing of explicit 
government defeats in the Commons shows only six for the Cameron coalition, of which 
two were minor ambushes by the opposition and one a private members’ bill. In 2015–16 
there were two substantial votes against government policy supported by Tory MPs, but 
none between June 2016 and the 2017 general election under May.
Since Theresa May lost her majority, the government has been defeated on 13 Commons 
votes, of which the most serious was an amendment to a Brexit bill to give Parliament a 
vote on the final Brexit deal. Ministers have also had several narrow escapes (for example, 
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a win by three votes in July 2018). Two other defeats are Brexit-related, three concerned 
the Universal Credit reform of social security (which was running into many problems that 
ministers seemed to be in denial about) and two others reflected the 2017 electorate’s 
message to the government that pay austerity in the public sector had gone on for too 
long. Suggestions that Tory MPs in particular had now got the habit of dissenting were 
also buttressed in the Queen’s Speech debate in June 2017, when Labour backbencher 
Stella Creasy tabled a relevant amendment to fund abortion operations in mainland UK for 
women from Northern Ireland – and the government was forced to agree the change in 
order to avoid a defeat.
This example shows the familiar limits of only looking at explicit defeats that follow from the 
‘rule of anticipated reactions’. This says that if B always does what A says, this may be due 
to A being so powerful that B must always comply; or to B being so powerful that A never 
proposes anything they will vote down; or to some mix of the two. Much of MPs’ influence 
over public policies undoubtedly takes the form of ministers amending or abandoning 
proposals to forestall defeats – as May did in July 2018 by accepting four Brexiteer 
amendments to avoid a defeat over the government’s Brexit strategy. 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The House of Commons’ long history, 
and its key position cross-nationally as an 
exemplar of sound parliamentary practice, 
give MPs a strong sense of corporate 
identity. This clearly motivates some public 
interest behaviours that blur otherwise 
rancorous partisanship.
The Commons is executive-dominated, with 
MPs most often voting on ‘whipped’ partisan 
lines. Party cohesion has weakened, but 
is still exceptionally high by cross-national 
standards.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The collaboration of government and 
opposition to manage the Commons 
also contributes to a certain degree 
of elite self-restraint and avoidance of 
unconstrained partisanship that is essential 
to the operations of the UK’s ‘unfixed’ 
constitution.
The top two parties are not only normally 
over-represented in terms of MPs vis-à-vis 
their vote share, but also collude to run 
Westminster business in a ‘club way’ (for 
example, via whips’ cooperation, and archaic 
bodies like the Privy Council). These practices 
maximise their joint power but exclude from 
influence all small parties. A disastrous 
combination of these two biases produced a 
Commons walkout by SNP MPs in June 2018, 
when all the devolution aspects of the main 
Brexit bill – the European Union (Withdrawal) 
Bill – were allocated a derisory 15 minutes’ 
debating time.
In 2015, the Tory government unilaterally 
made 19% cuts in the state funding given 
to opposition parties in Parliament (known 
as short money). The move inhibited their 
ability to conduct parliamentary business and 
critique ministers effectively, without making 
any worthwhile savings. In 2017–19 nearly 
80% of the money will go to Labour, with the 
SNP next.
Some parliamentary institutions operate 
effectively, engaging the attention of MPs, 
media and the public – especially Prime 
Minister’s Question Time (and to a lesser 
degree, ministers’ question times), and 
the operation of select committees (see 
Chapter 4.2).
Only a few component parts of the 
legislature’s activities work well. Much time 
and energy is consumed in behaviours that 
are ritualistic, point-scoring and unproductive 
in terms of achieving policy improvements – 
as when a Tory MP shouted ‘object’ to block a 
2018 private members’ bill against ‘upskirting’ 
that enjoyed almost universal support. 
Anachronistic and time-wasting division voting 
procedures are also used in a digital era. Most 
attempted modernisations remain stalled on 
traditionalist MPs’ objections.
The post hoc scrutiny of policy 
implementation via select committees has 
greatly improved the Commons’ role since 
1979, adding to previous strengths in post 
hoc financial scrutiny (see Chapter 4.2).
The Commons’ ex ante budget control is 
non-existent. Finance debates on the floor of 
the House are simply general political talk-
fests for the government and opposition. 
Parliamentary ‘estimates’ are odd, specially 
constructed and out-of-date numbers, 
of declining value in relation to the real 
dynamics of public spending.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Moves to make the Commons more family-
friendly and its culture more diverse are 
having some success.
The Commons meets in a museum building, 
surrounded by a Victorian empire grandeur 
that helps perpetuate a culture amongst MPs 
that is always male-orientated, white, club-like, 
and obsessed with the ‘privileges’ of MPs. 
Debates and other sessions are often ‘shouty’ 
and visibly anti-deliberative. Much more could 
be done at zero cost to make the Commons 
more women- and family-friendly, and to 
normalise its now odd culture.
MPs’ small constituencies have fuelled their 
role as grievance-handlers for constituents 
having trouble with public services, which 
has expanded in recent years. 
On matters affecting their own welfare, 
MPs are self-governing, self-interested and 
routinely dismissive of ordinary citizens’ 
concerns (c.f. repeated MPs’ expenses 
scandals and recent austerity-busting pay 
rises). Some 30% of MPs have second jobs. 
MPs also run their own offices as small 
businesses, employing whom they like. So, 
some do a good job and others perform 
poorly.
The Liaison Committee’s generalist 
sessions with the Prime Minister (ranging 
across a wide set of policy areas) are a 
useful if modest innovation.
At 650 MPs, the House of Commons is an 
exceptionally large legislature. Most MPs 
don’t have enough useful things to do 
(hence the second jobs held by three in ten, 
and a plethora of ethically dubious ‘outside 
interests’). 
The government has created a huge ‘payroll 
vote’ of ministers and unpaid pseudo-
ministers on the first rung of a promotion 
ladder, simply to help maintain control of these 
excess numbers by dangling a chance for 
preferment.
The Backbench Business Committee 
enables backbenchers to raise topics for 
debate in a more effective way, adding to 
the Commons’ overall steering capabilities.
Fuelled by the coalition period, and the 
post-2017 hung parliament, the amount of 
secondary legislation is growing. Primary 
legislation is increasingly drafted in ways that 
leave its consequences obscure, to be filled 
in later via statutory instruments or regulation. 
Commons scrutiny of such ‘delegated 
legislation’ is very weak and ineffective.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
MPs can raise issues with the government 
though Early Day Motions (EDMs), very 
few of which are ever debated. Many 
topics tend to be trivial. The Procedure 
Committee in 2013 nonetheless found that 
there should be no changes. EDMs have 
generally declined.
Future opportunities Future threats
E-petitions started via Parliament in 2015. 
They give the public a new opportunity 
to raise issues with the government by 
triggering a parliamentary debate if 100,000 
signatures are obtained. By June 2017, over 
31,730 petitions had been launched, two-
thirds of which were rejected, but nearly 
11,000 accepted. Only 65 were debated 
in Parliament. In these two years 31 million 
signatures were added to petitions, and 
14 million discrete email addresses used. 
So far this popular option has proved 
inconsequential in changing policies, 
though it is an effective way for groups 
to raise public awareness or show public 
discontent (nearly 1.8 million people signed 
a petition to ban President Trump visiting 
the UK – he still did, but he did not come to 
Westminster).
Enacting the English votes for English laws 
(EVEL) change via changing Commons’ 
standing orders sets a thoroughly dangerous 
constitutional precedent, outside all judicial 
review. If a Commons majority alone can 
tell MPs in one part of the country that they 
cannot vote in a newly created but decisive 
Westminster procedure, what is to stop 
another majority imposing the same exclusion 
on MPs of a given party?
The Parliament website is very large but 
poorly structured and hard to use. 
Large distortions in the regional representation 
of parties (for example, the almost elimination 
of non-SNP parties in Scotland 2015–17) further 
reduces the legislature’s already tattered 
representativeness under first-past-the post 
voting.
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Future opportunities Future threats
If and when a Brexit agreement is reached, 
current EU law in force in the UK will need 
to be converted into domestic law (and in 
certain cases be ‘corrected’ before being 
converted). Such changes, as instituted by 
the EU Withdrawal Act, will be made by 
ministers and not be subject to the usual 
parliamentary scrutiny. The Lords Constitution 
Committee called this prospect a ‘massive 
transfer of legislative competence’ into the 
Government’s hands. It raises major questions 
about the right balance between executive 
and legislature power, especially in the period 
2017–20.
Many MPs and select committees have only 
made limited steps to connect with voters via 
social media.
Parliamentary consideration of treaties and military actions
The royal prerogative consists of those powers of the medieval absolute monarchs that are 
not yet regulated by statute law. They are exercised on the Crown’s behalf by ministers, 
especially the Prime Minister. Historically the Prime Minister and government have retained 
the prerogative ability to go to war and to ratify treaties. The Commons has only been able to 
vote on these decisions after the fact and in restrictive ways – for example, via moving a no 
confidence motion in the government. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 
curtailed the treaty-ratifying power and put it on a statutory basis. Its provisions will be very 
important if the withdrawal agreement from the EU will be in the form of a treaty, as this would 
require the approval of the UK Parliament (and of the EU Parliament) before it became binding.
The ability to commit UK armed forces to war appears to have been replaced through a 
new convention that MPs should vote on major actions before they are undertaken. But 
earlier promises made by Gordon Brown and William Hague that formal changes would 
be made have not been acted on, so that a Prime Minister can still do things without 
explicit parliamentary authorisation. The complex history of UK involvement in Syria is 
an example. In August 2013, MPs defeated a proposal by the coalition government to take 
military action against the Assad government in Syria. A year later a diametrically opposite 
motion for air strikes against IS (Islamic State) in Iraq (but not in Syria) was approved by 
the Commons. In December 2015, the Tory government won a vote with a majority of 174 
to extend anti-IS airstrikes to Syria. In April 2018 May approved air strikes in Syria without 
consulting the Commons, and in July despatched 440 more UK troops to Afghanistan. The 
early parts of this sequence would seem to suggest that the power to go to war is now 
subject to approval by the Commons, but the later ones would not. Similarly, in mid-2016 
it emerged that some UK ground forces were being secretly deployed in anti-IS actions in 
Libya, without even any notification to Parliament.
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What do fixed-term parliaments mean?
Almost the only major constitutional changes to survive from the 2010–15 coalition 
government period is the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. This requires that general 
elections are held every five years, unless either: 
(i) the government loses a vote of confidence, the Prime Minister resigns and no other 
government can be formed; or 
(ii) two-thirds of MPs vote for an earlier dissolution, which would normally require that 
(most) MPs from both the government and the main opposition parties support the 
motion. 
Nick Clegg saw fixed terms as a key safeguard against Cameron calling an election early 
and terminating the coalition with the Liberal Democrats at a time when they might suffer 
– but his party’s support fell by two-thirds anyway at the end of the government. The Act 
initially made the Tories look like a strong beneficiary, with a five-year term apparently 
securely guaranteed to Cameron in 2015. 
Yet May’s decision in April 2017 to ‘call’ an early election for June changed all that. It 
produced a defiant ‘bring it on’ reaction from Jeremy Corbyn and Labour MPs, despite 
their party being 20 percentage points behind in the early opinion polls. A supermajority 
of 522 to 13 MPs backed the government’s motion for a new election, at which voters 
subsequently went on to deny the Conservatives a majority. Where does this leave the 
FTP law? Clearly it could be another piece of completely dud legislation, if every future 
opposition always feels compelled by bravado to say yes to any dissolution. On the 
other hand, May’s disastrous choice in 2017 confirmed UK voters’ dislike of unnecessary 
elections, and so is likely to deter any future Prime Minister with a majority from going back 
to voters before at least a four-year gap from the last election – which was already the 
historical status quo ante.
Another area of ambiguity exists. If the Prime Minister of a majority party resigns, as 
David Cameron did in June 2016, and the governing party chooses a new leader, 
she is automatically asked by the Queen to form a government. However, should the 
Prime Minister lose a no-confidence vote instead, the process to be followed under 
FTP is still unclear. Some commentators on FTP claim that the monarch’s role here has 
been completely excluded, and so a robo-law transition to a new election must follow 
immediately from a no-confidence vote in a Prime Minister. However, within a 14-day period 
under the Act, could the monarch ask another member of the largest party to try to form a 
government without any immediate dissolution (since no party leadership election could 
easily be organised in that time)? Or does she then ask the Leader of the Opposition to 
perhaps form a minority government? 
Scrutiny of the executive
The Prime Minister’s active participation in parliamentary proceedings is a key mechanism 
for ensuring the accountability of the executive, but they have been less and less present in 
the Commons since the time of Thatcher and Blair. The Prime Minister’s attendances are now 
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limited to a single 30-minute question time (PMQs) once a week when Parliament is sitting, 
occasional speeches in major debates, and periodic public meetings with the chairs of select 
committees in the Liaison Committee. More encouraging is recent research showing that 
backbenchers used PMQs in 1997–2008 as a key public venue, with backbenchers often 
leading the agenda and breaking new issues that later grew to prominence. As Leader of the 
Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn has experimented with using PMQs to ask questions sent in on 
email by the public, somewhat changing the tone of the session.
The ‘payroll vote’
Parliament’s independence vis-à-vis the executive has long been qualified by strong 
partisan loyalties amongst almost all MPs, who (after all) have spent many years working 
within parties before getting into the Commons. The members of the government’s 
frontbench are expected to always vote with the executive, as are parliamentary private 
secretaries (who are unpaid pseudo-ministers). The last official data of the payroll vote in 
2010 showed that approximately 140 MPs are affected. Unofficial estimates of the size of 
the payroll vote suggest that by 2013 it was equivalent to well over a third of government 
MPs. Given the small number of Conservative MPs in the 2015 and 2017 parliaments, the 
ratio will still be high. If the Commons seats ever do fall to 600, then the prominence of the 
payroll vote would increase, unless government roles for MPs were cut back.
EVEL: English votes for English laws
In the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, Labour and the Liberal Democrats joined 
with the Tories to solemnly pledge major new powers for the Scottish Parliament. The 
morning after the result Cameron announced a previously hidden codicil to this deal, that 
English and Welsh MPs would vote alone in the Commons on laws just affecting them.
This potentially substantial constitutional change was then bounced through by the 2015 
Tory majority amending the House of Commons’ standing orders – with no real public 
consultation, no House of Lords approval needed, no Supreme Court decision on the 
scheme and no judicial review. A new ‘England-only’ committee stage came in for laws 
affecting only England (and including Welsh MPs for English and Welsh laws) with a ping-
pong process between the committee and full House (including Scottish and Northern 
Ireland MPs) possible at report stage. At the close of the Commons’ consideration, a 
Legislative Grand Committee of only England MPs would then vote to accept or reject 
the final bill as a whole. The House of Lords process for these laws was not changed, but 
a Commons Grand Committee composed of only English MPs now considers any Lords 
amendments, as well as full the Commons. The Speaker is also repeatedly involved in 
determining which laws or provisions within laws must be subject to this process. The 
Public Administration and Constitution Committee’s 2016 report on EVEL was highly 
critical. 
Academic research into EVEL’s first year of operation found that the process is too 
complex; that English and Welsh MPs have the power to veto laws passed by the entire 
House; that the process undermines the coherence of UK-wide government; and that it 
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fails to facilitate a meaningful expression of England’s voice. Whether the scheme will be 
much used, and if it can survive a non-Tory majority, both seem unclear at present. The 
Conservatives anticipated being the great beneficiaries of the EVEL change, but they 
now depend on the votes from Northern Ireland MPs in the DUP in order to pass any UK 
legislation.
Conclusions
Public confidence in Parliament was badly damaged by the expenses scandals of 2009, 
and trust in the House of Commons remains at a low ebb, despite some worthwhile but 
modest reforms in the interim, which made select committees more effective in scrutinising 
government (see Chapter 4.2). The Commons remains a potent focus for national debate 
– but that would be true of any legislature in most mature liberal democracies. There is no 
evidence that the UK legislature is especially effective or well-regarded, as its advocates 
often claim. Structural reforms to make the Commons a more effective legislature, and to 
modernise ritualistic behaviours and processes, are still urgently needed.
Five years of coalition government between 2010 and 2015 and a return to a hung 
parliament since 2017 have both somewhat reduced executive predominance over 
Parliament – as they were almost bound to do. In addition, the effect of Brexit in cross-
cutting party lines (see Chapter 3.1) produced a highly complex set of votes in the 
Commons on relevant laws. At several points, legislative progress seemed almost 
deadlocked in 2018. Perhaps any more powerful legislature may operate like this – as 
often getting grid-locked as it provides a clear, independent lead on policy choices. Critics 
of Parliament have easily interpreted this experience as MPs trying to ‘frustrate’ the 2016 
referendum verdict.
Yet even such major developments as these may not break the tradition of strong executive 
control over the Commons. After the 2017 general election there were some signs of an 
amelioration of party discipline and more cross-party working in the public interest being 
possible (for example, in MPs insisting that the Universal Credit reorganisation of welfare 
payments be improved). Yet these proved to be temporary. 
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What does democracy require for how the national legislature 
monitors, understands, publicises and questions the policies that 
national government develops?
✦ The elected legislature should normally maintain full public control of government 
services and state operations, ensuring public and parliamentary accountability 
through conditionally supporting the government, and articulating reasoned 
opposition, via its proceedings.
✦ The House of Commons should be a critically important focus of national political 
debate, articulating ‘public opinion’ in ways that provide useful guidance to the 
government in making specific and often complex policy choices.
✦ Individually and collectively legislators should seek to uncover and publicise issues 
of public concern and citizens’ grievances, giving effective representation both to 
majority and minority views, and showing a consensus regard for the public interest.
✦ In the preparation of new laws, the legislature should supervise government 
consultations and help to ensure effective pre-legislative scrutiny.
✦ In considering legislation, Parliament should undertake close scrutiny in a climate of 
effective deliberation, seeking to identify and maximise a national consensus where 
feasible.
✦ Legislators should regularly and influentially scrutinise the current implementation 
of policies, and audit the efficiency and effectiveness of government services and 
policy delivery.
The Commons’ two committee 
systems and scrutiny of government 
policy-making
In addition to their floor debates, a crucial role of legislatures is to scrutinise government 
law-making and policy implementation. The House of Commons looks at legislation via bill 
committees, and its select committees cover each of the Whitehall departments to scrutinise 
implementation. Patrick Dunleavy and the Democratic Audit team consider how well 
current processes maintain parliamentary knowledge and scrutiny of the central state in 
the UK and England.
4.2
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The House of Commons is one of the oldest and foremost legislatures in the world – yet 
in the past it was also a byword amongst political scientists for weak legislative control of 
government. Some recent political science work has painted a more active picture of MPs’ 
influence. Beyond the floor debates in the main Commons chamber (see Chapter 4.1) – and 
the rowdy weekly showcase of Prime Minister’s Question Time – the House of Commons 
also does a lot of detailed work in committees holding the government to account. (The 
Lords have their own, smaller and much less influential group of select committees, but 
our focus in this chapter is solely on the work of the democratically elected Commons.)
Recent developments
The House of Commons’ select committee system shadows the work of every civil service 
department and has grown in influence over time. In the past, the issue of reconstituting 
committees after a general election has sometimes been delayed, and until 2010 the party 
whips in the Commons ‘fixed’ who would chair which committee. Following the ‘Wright’ 
reforms made after 2009, however, committee chairs can be elected by MPs, if there are 
multiple candidates. Figure 1 shows that only nine contests were held for the 26 chair 
positions in July 2017. However, this low number reflects the fact that many influential and 
well-liked chairs continued unchallenged from the 2015–17 parliament.
Figure 1: Key characteristics of the 26 select committee chairs in July 2017
Party No. Experience No. Type of committee No.
Competition 
for post No.
Conservative 14 Backbench 10 Departmental 18 One candidate 17
Labour 10 Cabinet/ 
Shadow 
Cabinet
9 Parliamentary 5 Election held 9
Liberal 
Democrat
1 Minister 4 Cross-cutting 3
Scottish 
National Party
1 Junior 
minister
3
Source: From data in HC Speaker, 2017
Figure 1 also shows that half of the chairs have ministerial experience, with nine having 
earlier been Cabinet ministers or Shadow Cabinet spokespersons – showing the increasing 
salience of these chairing roles (which also attract a salary addition for the MPs involved). 
There are 18 single-department committees, five that handle internal parliamentary issues, 
and three cross-cutting committees, of which the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is best 
known. The distribution of chairs broadly follows the proportion of MPs belonging to each 
party. After the 2016 EU referendum the Department for Exiting the EU Committee, chaired 
by Labour’s Hilary Benn, was set up to scrutinise the work of the new DExEU, and similarly 
the International Trade Committee supervises the new Whitehall department DIT.
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The select committee system now provides 
one committee scrutinising each Whitehall 
department’s executive actions and 
implementation processes in detail. Select 
committee members build up worthwhile 
expertise in that area and a more 
effective ‘corporate’ spirit than in the past. 
Attendance at committee sessions has 
increased and there is more of a premium 
on effective engagement by members.
Select committees only work effectively when 
they operate in a bipartisan manner, with 
MPs from different sides of the committee 
endorsing the same report. Creating this 
‘corporate’ spirit is difficult and biases the 
topics that committee chairs investigate, 
because they are anxious to secure wide 
agreement. As a result, critical issues dividing 
the parties may not be examined as being ‘too 
difficult’. Sometimes committees will take on 
an issue wanted by party A, but only so long 
party B also gets its favourite issue tackled. 
These cases rarely work well.
Select committee chairs are now paid 
a worthwhile salary increment and 
attract a good deal of media attention. 
So this role has grown in salience. It 
increasingly attracts serious ex-ministers 
and genuinely expert and less-partisan 
backbenchers, who can command 
regular engagement from their committee 
members.
Both departmental and bill committees 
mostly operate by calling ‘witnesses’ to give 
evidence, and taking written evidence from 
relevant or involved bodies. This is a weak and 
old-fashioned form of information gathering. It 
produces a lot of claim and counter-claim that 
committees do not have the staff or expertise 
to critically or objectively assess – except in a 
vague, judgement-of-plausibility manner.
Since mid-2007 select committees 
have had the capability to review major 
ministerial appointments of people to 
head quasi-government agencies. These 
pre-appointment hearings now help 
shape how ministers and top officials 
make these appointments. Out of a set of 
59 hearings to 2017, appointments have 
divided committees or been rejected 13 
times. Some very serious government 
jobs have been involved. MPs on the 
Education Committee initially rejected the 
government’s proposed head of Ofsted 
(which monitors schools’ quality) after a 
lacklustre performance at their hearing. 
And a candidate for Bank of England 
Deputy Governor resigned in 2017 after 
the Treasury Select Committee criticised 
incomplete answers that she had given 
them.
There is strong evidence of a past lack of 
diversity in who is invited to give evidence 
(see below), partly reflecting biases in who 
sits on committees. Women MPs have 
been severely under-represented on some 
committees, especially Defence and Foreign 
Affairs whose members were 93% male from 
1979 to 2017. Women MPs are most prominent 
on the health and education committees. 
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The support staff for chairs and committee 
members has increased somewhat. And in 
response to criticisms of a lack of witness 
diversity, select committees staff and chairs 
have recently been more proactive about 
soliciting evidence from people who might 
not normally volunteer as witnesses.
Select committees’ powers to compel 
witnesses to appear and to tell the truth seem 
weak and undefined. Senior civil servants 
have to appear before select committees, but 
ministers may refuse. The committees can 
invite outsiders to appear, and they might be 
in contempt of Parliament if they fail to show 
up. Witnesses have to answer questions but 
can claim not to know or have information with 
impunity. Some corporate sector witnesses 
have made plain their unwillingness to be 
frank, without much come-back.
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
benefits from research by the National 
Audit Office’s 800 professional staff in 60 
‘value for money’ (VFM) reports per year. 
(NAO is the leading parliamentary agency 
providing an independent check for MPs 
that monies voted to the government were 
spent for the correct purposes and in an 
effective manner.) PAC hearings and final 
reports regularly attract media attention in 
addition to the NAO reports themselves.
Many PAC reports currently concern only 
single-department subjects, and could more 
helpfully be processed by the relevant 
departmental select committees. These 
other committees could also benefit greatly 
from gaining access to the NAO staff and 
expertise to boost their information-generating 
capabilities. But at present PAC ‘exclusivism’ 
has prevented most select committees from 
gaining any NAO assistance, except for a few 
cases.
The PAC Chair is always a senior opposition 
figure, and plays a significant role in giving 
some ‘parliamentary’ overview of secret 
spending and defence areas, signing off on 
some key mega-projects for instance.
Funnelling all the post hoc financial scrutiny of 
public spending through only one committee 
(PAC) wastes much of the work of the National 
Audit Office (NAO) in scrutinising the civil 
service. PAC’s agenda is a crammed one, 
so that time devoted to cross-Whitehall 
issues is regularly squeezed by the pressure 
of single department reports, sometimes 
quite minor in scale. PAC members are 
necessarily generalists in terms of processing 
a random stream of reports across different 
departments, although they do develop 
experience of Whitehall spending and control 
processes. The NAO also produces around 
10–15 VFM reports per year that are never 
reviewed by any parliamentary committee 
because of capacity limits in the PAC.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Some political scientists (like Louise 
Thompson) have called for a re-evaluation 
of the dominant views of bill committees 
(also called legislative committees). 
She found that around three-fifths of 
bill committee members have relevant 
specialist expertise and she argues 
that some committee sessions achieve 
impressive levels of deliberative quality. 
Many critics see scrutiny of legislation via 
partisan whipped bill committees (with many 
inexpert MPs just voting a party line) as always 
ritualistic, ineffective and normally of very 
little value. Government whips can completely 
dominate proceedings, with the committee 
majority accepting only government 
amendments. Many (two or more out of 
five) members are still just ‘cannon fodder’ 
attendees, primed to vote the party line, 
whatever problems emerge in discussion.
The separation of bill committees from 
select committees is unhelpful and reduces 
the ability to have legislation reviewed by 
genuinely expert MPs. The deliberative quality 
of legislative committee sessions has also 
been seen as low, reaching a nadir when the 
timetabling for bills gets under pressure (as it 
often does).
‘Revisionists’ have also defended bill 
committees as showing up the ‘viscosity’ 
of different measures – they alert ministers 
about where changes are needed, even 
if the changes involved are always those 
proposed by ministers.
Bill committees have been widely seen as 
ineffective in securing effective scrutiny. 
Only half of 1% of accepted amendments in 
and after the committee stage are from the 
opposition. Even Thompson finds that the 
vast bulk (84%) of changes made are still 
government ones. (11% are also changes to 
regulations or guidance for bills made by 
departments.)
Parliament has no separate procedures for 
considering major government projects 
in technical or expert consideration 
ways before money is spent on them – 
contributing to what critics see as the 
prevalence of ‘policy disasters’ in the UK.
All NAO and PAC scrutiny activities occur ‘after 
the fact’, and so are limited to a post hoc audit 
role. The NAO claims to save £9 for every £1 
that it spends, but PAC plays no prospective 
or policy-warning role on decisions. Small 
amounts of NAO advice go to other select 
committees, for example, checking the 
economic growth estimates included in 
the Chancellor’s annual public spending 
statements.
164 4. How democratic is the Westminster Parliament?
Future opportunities Future threats
The return of a hung parliament in June 
2017, just two years after the earlier 2010–15 
period, may once more encourage MPs to 
be more assertive towards the executive 
on more issues – especially those that 
can command cross-party agreement on 
improving specific policies – as occurred 
in 2017–18 over a troubled social welfare 
reform, Universal Credit. 
The Brexit process is likely to involve 
extensive use of statutory instruments, 
over which parliamentary surveillance has 
generally been weak.
Proposals for incremental reforms, such as 
allowing the NAO to advise departmental 
select committees more, and for MPs there 
to discuss more single department VFM 
studies in their area, could bring worthwhile 
improvements quickly, increasing the 
expertise available to select committees.
Reports on single department and smaller 
spending issues could be run through other 
select committees. The PAC could then focus 
more effectively on cross-departmental, inter-
governmental and major spending areas. 
However, radical proposals such as these, 
or even their more moderate versions (see 
opposite), seem unlikely to be adopted, 
with select committees still locked into 
obsolescent and high cost ways of calling 
‘witnesses’.
Bill committees
During the legislative process, most bills are sent to a committee stage when a group of at 
least 11 MPs consider the proposed Act, clause-by-clause in detail. Of course, the ministers 
attending come from the department involved and are matched by the Shadow Cabinet 
frontbenchers that parallel them, and this brings a certain degree of different expertise to 
each discussion. But many of the remaining MPs are just those deputed by the party whips 
to serve on each committee. Each committee handles a varied stream of legislation in 
which the ‘ordinary’ members may have little expertise. There are generally six legislative 
committees operating in tandem.
Critics have historically argued that the committees have no real purpose beyond being 
a kind of ‘mini-me’ image of the Commons as whole, always dominated by a government 
majority and chair. Over 99% of ministerial amendments moved at the committee or report 
stages succeed, while the success rate for non-government amendments is below 1%. 
Opposition amendments almost never succeed, despite the fuss made by some authors 
about the greater incidence of backbench rebellions. Most MPs vote with the party line 
almost all the time, in committee as much as on the House floor. Partisan timetabling 
considerations also shape how ‘line by line’ any scrutiny is, with guillotines often invoked. 
And Berry notes that ‘sometimes whole sections of bills pass through committees without 
scrutiny’.
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Some recent authors have argued for a more optimistic picture. Russell and Cowley 
reported on a systematic examination of over 4,360 amendments on six bills, which at one 
level replicated the picture above. However:
‘closer examination found that nearly three-quarters of government 
amendments had little policy substance – being purely technical, 
clarificatory, or “consequential” on other amendments. Of those government 
amendments with substance that actually changed any of the bills, over 
60% – 117 in total – were traceable to influence from nongovernment 
parliamentarians, usually through prior amendments withdrawn when 
ministers promised to reconsider. In most cases, there was no [government] 
defeat involved, but some changes were substantial’.
Similarly Thompson’s 2015 study argued that:
‘bill committees are the perfect conduit for changes to government bills. 
They enable ministers to effectively be lobbied by MPs. They are both 
the breeding ground for amendments to legislation and a platform for 
allowing policy issues which have already been aired by MPs through other 
parliamentary tools to be tagged on to a bill, making policy change more 
likely.’ (p.89).
These arguments suggest that the committee and report stages of legislation can increase 
the ‘viscosity’ of different measures, pointing ministers and officials towards fixing the most 
egregiously damaging of their initial provisions. However, this remains an exceptionally 
modest role, and one that falls well below the rationale of careful deliberative debate and 
consideration that other legislatures in Europe can claim.
The increasing salience of select committees
Much of government uses executive capabilities and administrative discretion to deliver 
services, make regulations or undertake interventions in particular ways. From its 
foundation in 1979, the select committee system has provided an ever more influential 
mechanism for ‘shadowing’ each department and bringing legislators’ views to bear. 
Having MPs elect committee chairs, and paying them extra salary, has especially helped 
them to evolve into better independent forces for policy scrutiny. Their records of 
influential hearings and reports have grown their media and public profiles. Especially 
under the coalition government (2010–15), select committees became important venues 
for discussing controversial issues. Figure 2 show that press mentions of Commons 
committees in the UK press broadly tripled from 2008 to 2012 in terms of both total press 
mentions and the average (mean) for committee mentions.
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Figure 2: Increase in press coverage of House of Commons Committees, 2008–12 
Source: Dunleavy and Muir, 2013. Analysis of Lexis-Nexis press database.
Figure 3 provides a detailed view of which committees became more salient in this period, 
and which did not. The pink rows show that much of the total increase in mentions in this 
period took place in four exceptionally prominent committees:
✦	 The Public Accounts Committee (see the SWOT analysis above). At this time it had a 
dynamic new chair in Margaret Hodge MP.
✦	 The Home Affairs Select Committee, already the second-most important committee in 
2008. Its press mentions increased sharply in 2011 and 2013, following the summer riots 
in London and the Committee’s inquiries into them.
✦	 The Treasury Select Committee was another already important committee in 2008 
under the Conservative chair Andrew Tyrie. In 2017, the former Tory Cabinet minister 
Nicky Morgan won election as chair, quickly assuming a pro-active approach. 
✦	 The Culture, Media and Sport committee. Its prominence at this period grew greatly 
during the phone-hacking scandal over media behaviour. Both Rupert and James 
Murdoch were called to give evidence on the scandal in 2011, attracting global media 
coverage. This interest continued during the subsequent Leveson Inquiry process. 
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Figure 3: Trends in the UK press mentions of Commons’ select committees, 2008–12
Committee 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Home Affairs 295 405 302 989 2033
Public Accounts 557 644 639 813 1956
Treasury 213 418 277 308 530
Culture, Media and Sport 49 85 102 573 476
Transport 135 113 90 186 229
Public Administration 58 90 80 81 200
Energy and Climate Change 55 58 86 101 148
International Development 27 15 13 42 112
Standards and Privileges 143 333 181 98 94
Scottish Affairs 17 48 24 37 73
Health 30 36 42 54 70
Environmental Audit 83 54 50 79 62
European Scrutiny 16 15 40 68 58
Defence 81 94 73 108 56
Education 10 7 20 39 55
Business, Innovation & Skills 0 10 49 46 54
Work and Pensions 17 27 18 58 42
Backbench Business 0 3 28 121 41
Foreign Affairs 44 65 40 42 36
Commons Liaison 13 44 28 17 34
Justice 25 30 32 31 32
Procedure 9 18 24 30 28
Communities & Local Government 25 33 16 18 24
Political & Constitutional Reform 2 20 27 21
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs 13 11 9 8 18
Northern Ireland Affairs 14 9 22 12 9
Welsh Affairs 5 1 4 5 4
Finance and Services 0 1 1 0 2
Administration 0 0 0 1 1
Members’ Expenses 0 0 0 3 1
Armed Forces Bill 0 0 0 3 0
Commons Privileges 1 0 4 0 0
Regulatory Reform 18 5 0 2 0
Source: Dunleavy and Muir, 2013. Analysis of Lexis-Nexis press database. 
Notes: We searched across years in a standard grid, so committees may not exist in all years covered.
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The green rows in Figure 3 also show that seven other Commons committees enjoyed 
a consistent growth of press coverage in this period. Overall, 14 committees more than 
doubled their press mentions between 2008 and 2012. A further four saw smaller 
increases, while seven committees received less coverage.
More recently select committees have moved into other controversial areas, with the Work 
and Pensions and the Business committees both summoning Sir Philip Green to attend 
a hearing in June 2016 to answer questions over the collapse of BHS with hundreds of 
millions of pounds apparently missing from the pensions fund. 
Yet were select committees just more attractive ‘talking shops’ for the media? Or have 
their deliberations and especially their recommendations had substantial effects on policy? 
The grounds for thinking they have start with their selection of issues to cover, which has 
tended to become topical and substantial over time.
One innovative study collated many thousands of recommendations to government made 
by seven select committees over a long period, and then set out to chart how many of these 
were recommended, and how many were subsequently acted upon. Figure 4 shows the 
key results for implementation of a large set of over 1,330 recommendations that could be 
tracked. The authors concluded with a strikingly benign assessment: ‘Numerous committee 
recommendations are implemented by government, including many for major policy change’.
Figure 4: How recommendations from seven select committees were implemented by the 
government, or not (1997– 2010)
Scale of change in 
recommendation
% of total recommendations implemented
Fully Partially Limited attempts
Unclear if 
acted on 
or not
Clearly 
not 
acted 
upon
Row 
totals
No or small change 15 8 6 5 3 39
Medium change 8 10 10 13 12 52
Large change 1 1 1 1 3 6
Scale unclear 1 0 0 0 1 2
All recommendations 25  19 18 19 18 100% 
(n=1334)
Source: Computed from Benton and Russell, 2013, Table 1. The committees covered were those for BIS, 
Defence, Foreign Affairs, Health, Home Affairs, Public Administration (PAC) and Treasury. The period 
covered was the Blair and Brown governments. 
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However, Figure 4 shows that this is a highly ‘stretched’ interpretation of the actual 
findings. The numbers in orange cells show that one in five (20%) of the trackable 
committee recommendations were both ‘medium’ or ‘large scale’ in their impacts, and 
also implemented by government. But one in six recommendations (15%) (in the green 
shaded cells) were at the same scale and were clearly rejected by government (while in a 
further one in seven cases implementation was unclear). Large-scale changes accepted by 
minister in fact formed only 2% of recommendations (the dark orange cells), whereas those 
rejected at this scale were 3%.
Of course, our interpretation here excludes the top row in Figure 4 covering ‘no change’ or 
small change recommendations from committees. MPs and Commons officials will freely 
admit that there is an accepted art of writing ‘chaff’ committee recommendations, which 
suggest to ministers or officials that they should do something small that they already want 
to do anyway. This tactic allows the committee to look friendly and ‘on the same page’ 
as the executive. And it fosters government MPs supporting reports that make criticisms 
elsewhere, since ministers can agree to the easy bits. So although the top row in Figure 4 
shows another 23 to 29% of minor recommendations being implemented (versus only 3% 
not acted on), these cases probably are ‘chaff’, and so ought to be set aside.
Nevertheless, although committees’ hit rate for acceptance and implementation of 
recommendation is perhaps far less than some over-enthusiastic accounts suggest, it is 
still a pretty creditable record. Select committees remain one of only two areas where the 
Commons is clearly contributing to detailed policy-making.
Who does Parliament ask for their views?
Because Westminster relies so heavily on calling witnesses as a way of bring in outside 
knowledge to the scrutiny of legislation and of policy implementation it matters a lot who 
submits evidence. Academic research shown in Figure 5 found that most submissions 
came from interest groups, individuals and private companies – and that surprisingly only 
one in 16 submissions came from ‘experts’ and slightly less from think tanks.
However, witnesses who give oral evidence in person before committees, and hence can 
be questioned by committee members, are generally those judged more important or more 
knowledgeable by chairs (and their clerks). A study of all witnesses who gave evidence 
to select committees only in the 2013–14 session of parliament showed that civil servants 
and public-sector agencies were the biggest group (see Figure 6). A further one in eight 
witnesses were ministers or parliamentarians, so that almost half of those appearing were 
from Whitehall and surrounds, as one might expect. The civil society sources for witnesses 
were NGOs, think tanks and interest groups, and then private sector companies and trade 
associations, with academics from higher education third.
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Source: Helboe et al (2015), Table 2.
Notes: Data on oral and written evidence collected from the UK Parliament’s website, August 1, 2010 to 
July 31, 2011. Percentages of N = 8431. 
Figure 6: The organisational affiliations of oral witnesses to all select committees,  
2013–14 session
Source: Re-calculated from Geddes, 2018
Notes: We have moved trade associations 
into the ‘private sector’ category here, and 
out of the ‘NGOs and think tanks’ category. 
Figure 5: The main actors who gave evidence to Westminster legislative and select 
committee in the period 2010–11
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A broadly similar picture is also given by a Democratic Audit study of nearly 600 witnesses 
who appeared before 153 hearings in autumn 2013. That analysis also looked in depth at 
the make-up of 120 ‘expert’ witnesses, whose role may be especially helpful for MPs in 
uncovering well-founded (rather than partisan) evidence. Figure 7 shows that academics 
were exceptionally prominent (accounting for nearly half of all expert witnesses in person), 
plus think tanks and trade associations. 
A more disturbing finding of both the 2013–14 studies was that in this period around 75% of 
witnesses going to committees were men. Some committees like PAC heard from nine men 
for every woman appearing. Following on from their research in 2014, the Democratic Audit 
staff involved met with committee clerks, and Parliament later took some remedial actions 
to seek greater diversity amongst witnesses.
Legislative supervision of UK government spending
In international terms the UK has a strong system of post hoc scrutiny of government 
spending achieved by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), acting on the reports of 
the independent National Audit Office, the UK’s ‘supreme audit institution’ (or SAI). The 
NAO is perhaps the second most powerful SAI in the liberal democratic world (after the 
Government Accountability Office in the USA). With a constant flow of high-quality reports 
to consider, the PAC is a powerful committee, and is always chaired by a leading opposition 
MP, usually with past ministerial experience. For permanent secretaries attending PAC 
hearings is a stressful experience requiring a lot of preparation.
Yet it is easy to exaggerate the PAC/NAO influence. In a recent five-year period NAO 
staff accounted for one-third of witnesses to the PAC, and HM Treasury personnel for 
Figure 7: The organisational affiliations of 120 expert witnesses to select committees,  
in two months, autumn 2013 
Source: Berry and Kippin, 2014, Figure 4.
Notes: Data covers 120 expert witnesses 
giving oral evidence to select committees in 
October–November 2013.  
Percentages of N = 541. 
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another 30%. Only seven ministerial departments or major agencies had more than four 
witnesses a year (Health, Defence, Defra, HMRC, Education, the Home Office and DWP), 
and another six had over one. Eight departments had one or none per year. In this period, 
the NAO issued 40 VFM studies that tackled cross-government issues (like digital change 
in government services, or environmental issues). But the PAC held hearings on only half 
of these (see Figure 13 in this source). MPs preferred to devote their time to the more easily 
media-understandable (and more frequently scandalous) reports on single departments. 
Just officially detailing already well-known cost over-runs and obvious mistakes made 
by Whitehall (known by senior civil servants as ‘bayoneting the wounded’) has typically 
earned the PAC chair more headlines than engaging with more difficult task of fostering 
sustainable improvements in policy delivery systems.
More generally MPs’ stress on ex post scrutiny reflects the fact that they have almost no 
ex ante influence over budgeting in the UK. Very strong party discipline explains some of 
this, but a lot stems from restrictions in the House of Commons standing orders. These 
prohibit any ordinary MP from proposing any amendment to adding even £1 extra on to 
public spending, unless they can provide the Commons clerks with a certificate signed by 
a minister – which of course, is never supplied. This blanket ban has spread from the UK 
to other Westminster system countries and to France and Ireland. It largely explains why 
Joachim Wehner’s comparative index assigns the UK fifth to bottom place in a league 
table of legislatures’ influence over public spending across 30 liberal democracies.
Conclusions
Where once Parliament lurked almost completely impotently on the sidelines of policy-
making, recent research has ‘talked up’ MPs’ collective influence, with some justification 
in recent hung parliaments. Yet the Commons is still far from having the ‘full spectrum’ 
policy influence, genuine deliberation or decisive voice that democratic criteria suggest 
are needed. Party loyalties greatly inhibit public criticisms and undermine evidence-based 
reasoning about policies. Consideration of budgets before money gets spent is largely 
a joke. And legacy procedural practices, plus MPs’ traditionalist attachment to inefficient 
and ineffective ways of working (like the witness system for select committees, instead of 
developing proper investigative staffs), have limited the legislature’s role, despite some 
positive recent developments.
Patrick Dunleavy is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the LSE and co-
Director of Democratic Audit there. He is also Centenary Professor in the Institute for 
Governance and Policy Analysis (IGPA), University of Canberra.
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What does democracy require for the accountability of security 
and intelligence services?
✦	 Under normal circumstances, elected legislators usually must control all government 
services and state operations, either directly or indirectly (that is, via ministers), 
normally through full public and parliamentary accountability.
✦	 At the same time, the state must also maintain a national security, intelligence and 
defence apparatus sufficient to protect citizens from terrorism and other harms, and 
to secure national defence – and for much of such activities maintaining secrecy is 
essential.
✦	 Institutional arrangements must balance these contradictory requirements, ideally 
securing a degree of accountability while preserving essential secrecy.
✦	 Given limited public accountability, it is of the first importance that legislative, 
ministerial and judicial controls are sufficient to ensure that the security and 
intelligence services respect civil liberties and human rights, and operate within the 
law – for example, with rigorous complaints and investigation processes that engage 
high levels of public trust.
Accountability of the security and 
intelligence services
Sean Kippin and the Democratic Audit team assess the ways in which the UK’s four main 
security services are scrutinised, to ensure that they are operating legally and in the public 
interest. For matters that must be kept secret, ‘compromise’ forms of scrutiny have now 
been developed in Parliament. But how effectively or independently do they work? 
4.3
In the nature of secret intelligence and espionage matters, there are limits on how far 
legislative scrutiny can operate via the normal parliamentary channels. Every liberal 
democracy in the world consequently provides some special machinery of control that is 
designed to manage the incompatibility between maintaining these vital specials services 
and ensuring public accountability.
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Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)
This is the main vehicle used in the UK. It is formally a joint committee of the Houses of 
Parliament. In practice it is Commons-dominated and is the major way in which MPs in 
the Westminster Parliament (plus a few peers) exercise a degree of control over the UK’s 
intelligence and security services. These consist of:
✦	 MI5 (internal security),
✦	 SIS or MI6 (overseas intelligence),
✦	 GCHQ (electronic and other surveillance),
✦	 the Defence Intelligence Staffs (military intelligence), and
✦	 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the Cabinet Office, which coordinates and 
sanctions major operations, reporting to the Prime Minister.
The ISC operates in a quite dissimilar way to the Commons select committees. Its members 
are drawn from both Houses of Parliament (currently seven MPs and two Lords). They are 
nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with opposition party leaders, before being 
approved by Parliament and they are security-vetted. The Committee generally meets 
in private (although it has held occasional public sessions). It almost always questions 
security and intelligence witnesses in private, and issues only heavily vetted summary 
public reports, designed not to reveal any secret information. The chair of the Committee 
comes from the government party, is appointed by the Prime Minister, and is very influential 
in settling its workflow and being the public face of its investigations and reports. They 
(and committee members) have often (but not always) had a background of supervising 
security agencies as ministers (see Figure 1). Some people on the ISC are also members 
of the Privy Council, an appointed executive body sometimes used for handling secret 
issues and briefings. The publication of ISC reports is also ‘negotiated’ with the government 
beforehand, in the past quite speedily, but more recently with longer delays, and even pre-
emptive leaking by Whitehall in 2018. 
The ISC is a kind of ‘compromise’ solution of a type that is quite common in liberal 
democracies. However, a 2014 report of the Commons’ Home Affairs Committee identified 
three shortcomings in this approach across many countries surveyed:
✦	 ‘the potential for political deference [to ministers and the intelligence services top brass];
✦	 the over-identification of the [committee] members with the security and intelligence 
services; and
✦	 the danger confidential information provided to the committee might be leaked’.
Recent developments: up to 2015
The 2010–15 ISC was criticised as a group of elderly ‘trusties’, all heavily committed to 
defending intelligence operations from criticism. Their average age was 63, they were 
overwhelmingly male, and the ISC chair was Malcolm Rifkind (aged 67 when he finished, 
a former foreign and defence secretary), who also had extensive business interests in a 
number of related areas.
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Serious allegations surfaced in the mid-2000s of UK agencies having colluded with the 
illegal ‘rendition’ of suspects by the CIA and US agencies; and of SIS agents knowing of 
and being complicit in the torturing of suspects by US or foreign intelligence services. 
The UK government made large payments to British citizens imprisoned in Guantanamo 
Bay and released without any charges (one of whom later died as a jihadist fighter in 
Syria). Links between UK services and the Gaddafi regime in Libya have also provoked 
controversy, and damages have been paid for a rendition of one person. The Committee 
investigated all the claims against the UK services in 2007 (in some fashion, undisclosed) 
and pronounced that the fears expressed about them were all unfounded. Later a judge-
lead inquiry was put in place, but that was wound up in 2013.
In 2013, the scale of surveillance work carried out by Western governments was revealed 
by Edward Snowden, a US security contractor, who released a great mass of documents to 
the Guardian and Washington Post newspapers. They showed the existence of a series of 
programmes pertaining to the mining of phone, internet and other personal communication 
data, and agreements to share said data between governments, without – in most cases 
– the knowledge or consent of citizen populations. Essentially GCHQ appeared to be 
running a ‘swapsie’ information deal with the US National Security Agency, whereby GCHQ 
bulk-spied on US citizens for its American counterpart (for whom this would be illegal), 
in exchange for the NSA bulk-spying on British and European citizens (for which GCHQ 
would normally need a warrant or ministerial clearance). According to the well-placed 
observer Ian Brown the scale and reach of these activities ‘appeared to be a surprise to 
members of Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), let alone the National 
Security Council, other parliamentarians, and the broader public.’ Under Rifkind’s lead, the 
Intelligence and Security Committee rather promptly cleared GCHQ of any wrongdoing 
at all, which a former chair of the ISC and Conservative Defence Secretary Lord King 
described as ‘unfortunate’ and ‘pretty quick’.
In February 2015 Rifkind was involved in a press ‘sting’ operation (along with former Labour 
Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw), where Daily Telegraph journalists claimed both men offered 
to trade lobbying influence for advisor fees. Cleared by a limited Commons investigation, 
both men’s public credibility was none the less impaired. In September 2015 Rifkind stood 
down as ISC chair.
The post-2015 ISC
The new ISC chair appointed in 2015 was the Conservative MP Dominic Grieve, a 
former Solicitor General (government law officer), who has been a prominent defender 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and someone with a strong civil liberties 
reputation. He has attracted press coverage over recent years for his stances on issues 
such as enforced removal of UK passports from citizens, the stalled Gibson Inquiry which 
looked into the treatment of detainees, and the potential implications of repealing the 
Human Rights Act. Since Grieve’s appointment in September 2015, the ISC has produced 
five special reports.
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One dramatic report was on drone strikes in Syria in which civilians were killed, at least 
three of whom were British citizens. David Cameron explained in 2015 that the deaths 
were the first time a UK drone had been used to kill someone in a country with which 
Britain was not at war. The report was rushed out in April 2017, with substantial redactions 
that the ISC had no time to challenge before the general election. In it, the Committee 
expressed frustration that the government had deemed the strikes a military issue and 
therefore outside the ISC’s remit:
‘Oversight and scrutiny depend on primary evidence: without sight of the 
actual documents provided to Ministers we cannot ourselves be sure – nor 
offer an assurance to Parliament or the public – that we have indeed been 
given the full facts surrounding the authorisation process for the lethal strike 
against [one citizen] Reyaad Khan.’
The ISC reports on the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) was released in 2016, also known as 
the ‘snoopers’ charter’, which the Conservative government argued was urgently needed. 
The Committee was sceptical of the need for bulk hacking powers and said that the bill 
should include privacy protections. The Act was slightly modified to allay these concerns, 
with a clause inserted to the effect that mass surveillance powers were not to be used if 
less intrusive means were available. The civil liberties group Liberty continues to call for 
a judicial review of the wide-reaching bulk surveillance powers available to government 
departments and the security services under the IPA.
In June 2018, the ISC released new reports on the treatment of detainees and on rendition, 
one covering the periods 2001–10 and another covering more recent material. They made 
a considerable stir. A recent summary (by Blakely and Raphael) argued:
‘The two ISC reports are hard-hitting. The first, documenting British 
involvement in torture in the early ‘war on terror’, makes previous UK 
governments’ denials of involvement completely untenable. Although Jack 
Straw famously asserted that only conspiracy theorists should believe 
the UK played any role in rendition or torture, we now know that British 
intelligence knew about, suggested, planned, agreed to, or paid for others 
to conduct rendition operations in more than 70 cases. In hundreds of 
others, UK officials knew that their allies were subjecting prisoners to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CIDT), and yet continued to supply 
questions to, and receive intelligence from, those who were tortured.
The second report is no less important. It catalogues a series of failures 
in government policy, as well as in training and guidance provided to UK 
security services. The implications are serious: there is every possibility 
British collusion in torture is being, or could be, repeated.’
Despite this recent activism and evidence of greater ISC independence, demands for 
further reform remain on the agenda. Lord MacDonald, a former Director of Public 
Prosecutions, has argued that the Committee ought to become a select committee like 
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any other, and criticised the ‘partial’ nature of the reforms enacted by the 2013 Justice and 
Security Act. He argued that the reforms:
‘unwittingly or not, actually weakened democratic oversight of the security 
and intelligence agencies through the introduction of closed hearings into 
our civil justice system in national security cases, while simultaneously 
failing to strengthen the structures of direct parliamentary oversight in any 
meaningful way.’
And currently only one of nine ISC members is a woman, so greater diversity is clearly 
needed there.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The ISC follows the pattern of a common, 
minimum or compromise solution used in 
several liberal democracies.
The Committee has a modest staff, no 
investigatory powers and can only conduct 
very limited private hearings with the heads 
of agencies.
It creates some appearance of an 
independent parliamentary capacity to 
investigate – one that is separate from 
ministers.
The ISC is in principle able to consider any 
operational matter, but only if it is a matter 
of significant national interest and does not 
form part of an ongoing operation. Since 
security operations often take place over a 
long period, this is a significant restriction.
For the first time, the heads of the security 
services were questioned in front of the 
ISC in public, and the Director of MI5 has 
in addition been interviewed on the Today 
programme, suggesting a new willingness to 
engage with the public via the media.
Despite the ability to request information 
from the security services and other 
governmental bodies engaged in intelligence 
work, sensitive material is subject to veto at 
Secretary of State level on grounds that are 
not limited to national security.
ISC members are able to require the security 
agencies to produce information pertaining 
to their activities, a stronger power than 
is granted to standard select committees 
which only have the power to ‘request’ 
departmental information.
Inherently the Committee is not normally 
able to publish much of the evidence that 
it has taken, but can only pronounce its 
conclusions.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Under Dominic Grieve’s chairmanship, the 
ISC has shown a willingness to defend 
privacy concerns in the face of bulk 
surveillance. The two 2018 reports on 
rendition and torture of detainees show 
a (lagged) movement towards greater 
openness.
The ISC remains to a considerable degree 
in hoc to the government, with the Prime 
Minister and Leader of the Opposition 
nominating ISC members. Additionally, the 
Prime Minister continues to receive ISC 
reports ahead of publication, and retains 
the right to choose the timing of publication, 
and even to veto the publication of certain 
elements of the report. (This scrutiny 
power is probably mostly delegated to the 
Permanent Secretary who chairs the Cabinet 
Office’s Joint Intelligence Committee.)
The Committee has also reported on UK 
drone strikes, although that report was 
heavily redacted.
The Committee has no legal obligation 
to investigate and make public the kinds 
of intelligence service work that may 
create controversy because of invasions 
of civil liberties or human rights. Nor does 
it have any duty to educate or to explain 
the intricacies of intelligence work to both 
parliamentarians and members of the public.
The ISC remains a one-off and heavily 
‘siloed’ body with little transfer of knowledge 
or expertise from a core group of 
representatives to the wider Parliament.
Future opportunities Future threats
The current ISC chair (Grieve) has a good 
reputation for taking rights issues seriously, 
and legal knowledge.
With the growth of violent extremism, 
and other threats, externally, and the 
increasing scale of homeland security 
interventions, the absence of more credible 
parliamentary safeguards for UK citizens 
may fuel problems. Similarly, issues around 
foreign powers potentially intervening in 
UK elections and referenda have not been 
speedily addressed by the ISC, unlike in the 
USA.
The Justice and Security Act (2013) ended the 
anomalous situation by which the secretariat 
to a parliamentary committee was provided 
by Cabinet Office civil servants (itself a 
government department with intelligence 
responsibilities). The ISC now has its own, 
dedicated staff – which may help it to take a 
more independent attitude over time.
The provisions of the RIPA 2000 (Regulatory 
and Investigatory Powers Act) are being 
greatly extended by current legislation – 
giving security services greater powers to 
hoover up the electronic communications 
of all citizens without warrants. ISC has no 
apparent resources for effectively monitoring 
the use of such powers.
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Future opportunities Future threats
One of the least well-covered and most 
secretive areas of UK state activity concerns 
the operations of the large and well-funded 
UK ‘special forces’, including the SAS. Here 
blanket secrecy has been maintained, but 
the ISC chair (Dominic Grieve) observed in 
2017 that: ‘in a modern democracy, having 
areas of state activity that are not subject 
to scrutiny at all by parliament is not a very 
good place to be.’ Critics argue that either 
the ISC’s remit should be extended from 
intelligence to also cover special forces 
operations, or that the Defence Select 
Committee should have oversight.
If the government deems an issue a military 
one then it falls outside the ISC’s remit. 
Changing methods of warfare (for example, 
towards digital weapons and drones) make 
this an increasingly likely occurrence.
Some observers detect signs of Whitehall 
mobilising against a more combative ISC 
– for example, in the pre-emptive leaking 
of misleading details of the 2018 rendition 
reports.
Security issues are supposed to be 
safeguarded in the UK’s exit from the 
European Union, but uncertainty clouds 
many issues here. It is not clear that the 
ISC can match the level of vigilance and 
speedy scrutiny that other commons select 
committees have demonstrated on the 
implementation of Brexit. 
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Chairs of the Intelligence and Security Committee
This key role has tended to be given to former ministers, with a preference for those who 
have served in governmental positions in which security clearance is required. Figure 1 
below shows that only Ann Taylor had served in ministerial positions that did not pertain to 
security matters prior to her appointment.
Figure 1: Chairs of the Joint Intelligence and Security Committee since its creation in 1994
Chair Time position held
Former government positions 
(prior to JISC) Party
Dominic Grieve 2015– Attorney General* Conservative
Sir Malcolm 
Rifkind
2010–15 Foreign Secretary* 
Defence Secretary* 
Transport Secretary 
Scottish Secretary
Conservative
Kim Howells 2008–10 Minister for Foreign Affairs* 
Higher Education Minister 
Transport Minister
Labour
Margaret Beckett Jan–Oct 2008 Foreign Secretary* 
Environment Secretary 
Leader of the Commons 
President of the Board of Trade
Labour
Paul Murphy 2005–8 Welsh Secretary 
Northern Ireland Secretary*
Labour
Ann Taylor 2001–5 Government Chief Whip 
Leader of the Commons
Labour
Tom King 1994–2001 Defence Secretary* 
Northern Ireland Secretary* 
Employment Secretary 
Transport Secretary
Conservative
 * Position involves supervising security services
Reporting by the Committee
The Intelligence and Security Committee is now required to release an annual report on 
‘the discharge of its functions’ and 2013 legislation ‘enables it to make any other reports 
as it considers appropriate concerning any aspects of its functions’. This differs from the 
situation before the 2013 Act was implemented, which required the ISC to make its reports 
to the Prime Minister alone. However, the Prime Minister still enjoys foresight of reports and 
can delay their publication or veto the release of certain information.
The committee may also make other reports on issues and topics that it views as important. 
For example, in November 2014, it produced a report on the murder of an off-duty soldier 
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Lee Rigby in a London street by two jihadist terrorists. The range and frequency of reports 
increased with ‘Women in the Intelligence Community’ in March 2015, and a follow-up one 
on diversity and inclusion in 2018. In 2015 it also published ‘Privacy and Security: a modern 
and transparent legal framework’. After Donald Trump claimed that President Barack Obama 
had asked the UK to wiretap him while he was candidate for the presidency, Dominic Grieve 
said in a statement that it was ‘inconceivable’ that GCHQ could have done so.
Political neutrality, transparency and openness
Before 1994 the UK’s official attitude to the security services was not to even acknowledge 
their existence. A more open approach has also now lead some of the main UK security 
agencies recently to engage more actively in public debate, partly because they use 
public appearances to lobby for increased surveillance powers in battling terrorism, 
cyberattacks and major crime. The Director of MI5 Andrew Parker agreed to be interviewed 
by the BBC’s Today programme in September 2015 – but then did not reveal anything by 
way of new information. Instead Parker used the interview to justify the passage of the 
draft Investigatory Powers Act. Robert Harrington, the normally reclusive head of GCHQ, 
wrote an opinion piece for the Financial Times in which he made the case for a new 
understanding between the security services, social media companies and the public.
The first ever evidence session at which ISC members publicly questioned the agency 
heads was held in late 2013. An academic expert on the ISC, Andrew Defty, noted that:
‘Some of the questions were clearly designed to allow the agency heads 
to make prepared statements dispelling popular myths about their work. 
It is hardly tenable, for example, that [the then-ISC chair] Sir Malcolm 
Rifkind really believes that GCHQ collects information on “the majority of 
the public”. But his suggestion that they did, allowed the head of GCHQ to 
refute the notion.’
Conclusions
The Intelligence and Select Committee remains an imperfect and very limited body for 
the regulation of the large, powerful, and secretive intelligence services. Despite recent 
reforms which have seen the body become a committee of Parliament, and with influence 
over its membership extended to Parliament, it is still a body over which the government 
and Prime Minister exercise an enormous amount of influence. Choreographed evidence 
sessions between the committee and the Service heads suggest an over-co-operative, 
too close relationship. So too does the past willingness of the committee to very promptly 
exonerate the GCHQ in regard to the Snowden revelations and the charges of data 
collection and surveillance exceeding the agency’s remit – a clearance that occurred 
while the revelations were still emerging. Although the ICS criticised the lack of privacy 
safeguards in the Investigatory Powers Bill, it did not secure major changes in the final Act.
Sean Kippin is a PhD candidate and Associate Lecturer at the University of the West of 
Scotland and a former editor of Democratic Audit.
What does democracy require for second chambers in 
legislatures?
✦	 All legislators with a capacity to approve, amend or reject legislation should:
• either (and preferably) be directly elected by voters, or
• be elected/appointed indirectly by the elected chamber, or by a government 
fully accountable to the elected chamber.
✦	 In a liberal democracy no legislator should sit in a second chamber (or upper house) 
simply by virtue of their birth, wealth or as a result of donating money or services to 
party politicians.
✦	 Serving in the second chamber may confer distinction, but no part of the legislature 
should form an integral part of an aristocratic or societal honours system.
✦	 Any appointment of legislators to a second chamber should be vetted by a 
genuinely independent regulatory body. Mechanisms should be in place to remove 
legislators who breach legal or ethical standards and to ensure the social and 
partisan representativeness of all groups.
How undemocratic is 
the House of Lords? 
Sonali Campion, Sean Kippin and the Democratic Audit team examine how the UK’s 
deeply controversial current second chamber, the House of Lords, matches up to the 
criteria for liberal democracies with bicameral legislatures. Now an almost-all appointed 
Chamber, the Lords has achieved recent prominence on Brexit and tax credits by exerting 
some bipartisan influence moderating Commons proposals. However, its members remain 
creatures of patronage, and wholly unaccountable to the UK’s citizens. All parties except 
the Tories now support its replacement by an elected Senate. Increasingly only the Tories 
and Liberal Democrats are still appointing any peers – although there are also a fifth of 
peers who are ‘crossbenchers’, not taking a party whip.
4.4
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✦	 In any bicameral legislature, an upper house should be designed to realise a 
combination of specific constitutional and political advantages. A second house 
should:
• Act as a constitutional and policy check on the majority in the elected house, 
especially by offering a safeguard against legislative changes that breach 
democratic principles, impair rights or are otherwise ill-advised.
• Facilitate the technical operation of legislative drafting, scrutiny and 
amendment. Improve the accountability of the executive as a whole to the 
legislature and to public opinion.
• Increase the number or range of access channels from civil society to the 
executive, in equitable and accountable ways.
• Re-balance the geographical representation of different parts of the country 
compared with the lower house – for instance, to secure more equal or 
greater influence for all component regions/provinces/states within a country.
• Improve the social representativeness of legislators.
• Widen the range of expertise amongst legislators as a whole.
• Provide a mechanism to encourage the continued engagement of ‘emeritus’ 
politicians in public life.
• Offer a measure of policy continuity, especially on issues where civil society 
actors must make decisions with some long-run predictability.
Recent developments
The UK’s House of Lords is an almost all-appointed upper chamber, whose members are 
nominated by some (but not all) main parties. Once appointed they effectively sit for life and 
attend more or less when they wish, never facing re-appointment, nor of course any form 
of re-election. The Lords’ powers in law-making are limited to amending or delaying non-
financial bills, and its members have generally followed a convention acknowledging the 
‘primacy’ of the Commons. In addition, the ‘Salisbury convention’ means that the House will 
give a second reading to bills for which an elected government in the House of Commons 
has a majority and a manifesto commitment. 
In the flurry of Brexit legislation tabled in parliament’s 2017–18 session most observers 
did not expect that the House of Lords would play a very consequential role, given that 
both the Conservative government and the Labour Party had campaigned at the 2017 
election on a platform of implementing the UK’s exit from the EU. However, by the end 
of the process, the government had been defeated 15 times in some fairly significant 
Lords votes, which some observers felt had the effect of forcing MPs to face up to some 
vital constitutional choices. On some of these generally ‘pro-Remainer’ changes the 
government accepted a need for change and introduced their own versions of them. 
Others were more or less reversed in the Commons, but not without difficulty and with 
additional concessions extracted from Theresa May and ministers by both right-wing 
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Brexiteers and liberal Remainers in the Tory party. As a result, the Lords earned some new 
critics in the right-wing Brexiteer press (previously amongst its great defenders).
Clearly then the House of Lords still matters in UK legislative politics, but on what basis? 
The pro-Remain majorities in the Lords essentially reflected the feelings of UK elites at 
the historic periods when members were appointed, with most of them occurring in the 
43 years 1973–2016 when the UK seemed a secure member of the EU. As well as pro-EU 
Liberal Democrats (now massively over-represented in the Lords relative to their current 
popular support), most long-established Tory and Labour peers are pro-Remain.
Meanwhile the third largest party in the House of Commons since 2015, the SNP, refuses 
to nominate anyone for appointment to the Lords, and because UKIP has never secured 
any significant MPs at elections (despite gaining 13% of votes in Britain in 2015) it too 
is represented there only by two or three Tory defectors. The SNP stance has been 
followed (almost) by Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader since 2015. He has made only four 
appointments on specific grounds, promised to scrap the Lords as currently constituted, 
and required all new appointees to vote for creating an elected House in future. A prospect 
thus opens up of the Lords becoming just a two-party (Conservative/Liberal Democrat) 
House, representing only England, mitigated for the moment only by the ‘legacy’ group of 
‘cross-bencher’ peers and past Labour nominees.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
In recent years, while observing the 
primacy of the Commons, and the ‘Salisbury 
convention’ to respect government’s clear 
general election mandates, the House of 
Lords has proved willing to defeat ministers, 
even on flagship and other significant 
pieces of legislation. This change has led 
to somewhat greater checks and balances 
constitutionally and a little more scrutiny in 
the policy-making process, especially on 
matters not presaged in a winning party’s 
manifesto.
The House of Lords remains completely 
unelected. All peers can hold their seats 
until they die (if they want to) and thus are 
not accountable to or removable by citizens 
in any way. However, peers can now ‘retire’ 
if they wish to from the Lords (but still use 
its facilities as a London ‘club’) and some 
members have taken this course. 
There have been some highly questionable 
appointments of peers over time, even in 
recent years. Still a substantial part of the 
public, many MPs and elites, and the Lords 
members themselves (almost universally) 
believe that peers bring valuable additional 
expertise into public life.
The value of patronage power for Prime 
Ministers and party leaders means that 
the Lords has increased hugely in size 
(see below). Costs are also substantial – 
the average peer claims over £25,800 in 
expenses and allowances per year. One 
recent investigation also revealed that 15 
peers had claimed an average of £11,090 
each, despite not speaking in the main 
chamber during the 2016–17 session.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The social diversity of membership in the 
House of Lords has slightly improved in this 
century. In 2018 there are now 204 female 
peers (26% of the total). In 2017 there were 
51 black or minority ethnic peers (6% at that 
date).
Although outside peerage appointments are 
scrutinised by a weak regulator (the House 
of Lords Appointments Commission), party 
nominations of peers seem to be only lightly 
and inadequately appraised, and HOLAC’s 
remit is very constrained. Many citizens 
and commentators believe that major party 
donors can still effectively ‘buy’ peerages.
Corruption and misbehaviour allegations 
against peers highlight the openness to 
abuse that inevitably follows when legislators 
are accountable to no one and lack any 
effective oversight.
Ministers from the Lords are not held 
accountable to the same degree as their 
counterparts in the Commons.
In all 91 hereditary peers still sit in the Lords, 
with vacancies supposedly being ‘elected’ 
from a wider pool of hereditaries who cannot 
sit. In effect this is just a self-perpetuating 
oligarchy selecting new members from 
among the aristocracy with a tiny ‘electorate’.
Uniquely amongst UK religions, 26 Church of 
England bishops still have seats in the Lords.
Future opportunities Future threats
All parties in the centre and on the left of UK 
politics are now committed to scrapping the 
Lords in favour of a wholly elected Senate.
The Conservatives remain resistant to any 
substantial reform of the Lords of any kind, 
but especially to introduce elections.
Systems of election using PR systems, and 
detailed possible rules and conventions 
for regulating a Senate’s relations with the 
Commons and roles in policy-making, have 
now been worked out. This weakens many 
of the traditional arguments put forward 
by Lords’ defenders (pointing to small 
advantages of existing bicameralism as if they 
would be lost altogether, or suggesting that 
reform must create new tensions between the 
chambers).
Most existing peers will undoubtedly seek 
to wreck any serious reform of the chamber, 
resisting to the last ditch (as illustrated by the 
survival of 91 hereditaries).
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Future opportunities Future threats
After the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum, and the ad hoc EVEL (English 
votes for English laws) changes of 2015, the 
urgent need to reach a proper devolution 
settlement for all parts of the UK opens up 
a potentially key new constitutional role for 
an elected Senate. Greater devolution of 
Whitehall powers to English city-regions may 
also help in this area.
It seems likely that any substantial reform 
will need to be put to a referendum, at which 
only a coherent and low-cost scheme could 
succeed – and for which there is not yet 
consensus agreement between the parties or 
in public opinion.
Lord Grocott has made persistent efforts to 
abolish the hereditary by-elections system, 
introducing a private member’s bill in the 
2015–16 session (which was blocked at 
committee stage). Grocott tried again in the 
2017–18 session. Some critics argue that the 
move is not a reform, but just designed to 
make the status quo seem more palatable.
Vague threats to ‘stuff’ the Lords with more 
Brexiteer peers have been made by Tory 
critics of its pro-Remain majority. But there is 
no apparent way this could be done, since the 
(divided) Tory party as a whole is now the only 
large-scale nominator of peers now.
The unelected and swollen House of Lords
In 2012, the coalition government introduced the House of Lords Reform Bill to the House 
of Commons. The Bill would have created a smaller House of Lords in which a large 
majority of representatives would be elected by a system of proportional representation, 
but where a substantial minority of peers would be appointed more or less as they are 
now. Additionally, space would be reserved for appointed ‘ministerial members’ and 
Church of England bishops. The reforms were essentially wrecked by the opposition of 
Conservative backbench MPs, combined with the refusal of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
to facilitate debate (citing opposition to the proposed timetable rather than the substance 
of the reforms). Some minor reforms were introduced in 2014 to enable peers’ voluntary 
retirement, to exclude those given a prison sentence of more than a year, and to allow 
peers to be excluded if they did not attend the House for an entire session.
Calls for reform have persisted, particularly since the deputy speaker Lord Sewel was 
forced to resign, following revelations that he had been filmed taking drugs with sex 
workers and commenting in derogatory terms on the Lords’ expenses system. Widespread 
public and media outrage over a string of misconduct incidents, and unease over the 
role of party political donations in securing peerages for governing party supporters 
especially, have been backed up by continued demands for a major reform of the House 
of Lords. The Liberal Democrats are firm in wanting a democratically elected chamber (but 
nonetheless have a full quota of members themselves). The Scottish National Party refuses 
point blank to make any party nominations. Their deliberate and long-term absence makes 
the Lords even more grossly unrepresentative and south-east England-centric than ever. 
Figure 1 shows the current party make-up of the House.
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Figure 1: The Lords by party or group in 2018
Source: Parliament.uk
For Prime Ministers and opposition leaders alike, the ability to appoint peers (without any 
limit) has been politically convenient. David Cameron created new peers faster than any 
of his predecessors, following a policy that the membership of the House of Lords should 
be roughly in proportion to the party voting totals at House of Commons elections. In 2018 
there were 793 peers – the only other countries in the world with second chambers larger 
than the first are the People’s Republic of China, Kazakhstan and Burkina Faso – none of 
them liberal democracies. Figure 2 shows the size of the Lords in between 1992 and 2016; 
the vertical line indicates most hereditary members were removed in 2000. By 2016 the 
total possible peers attending increased by 27% and amongst actual eligible members the 
increase was 27%. (Absolute members include those who have retired, or taken leave of 
absence – it can be seen that in recent years the orange line has again risen above the 
grey line of actual membership.) There is a constant tendency for potential members to 
decrease, as elderly peers die, offset by bouts of Prime Ministers creating new peers for 
their party (and pro rata-ing for other parties making nominations). Public criticism of rising 
numbers has led to a small decline in recent years.
During the 2010–15 coalition, both Tory and Liberal Democrat peers tended to support 
their government’s legislative proposals, so that with limited crossbench backing most laws 
could pass unscathed. However, after the 2015 general election, Cameron’s Conservative 
majority government and later Theresa May’s minority Tory government have had the 
support of less than a third of peers. Both faced Labour and Liberal Democrat peers in 
opposition (nearly two-fifths of the House). 
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Figure 2: House of Lords membership and attendance from 1992 to 2016
Source: Russell, Taylor, Size of the House of Lords, House of Lords Library note, 2016
Notes: The dotted line here marks the 2000 exclusion of most hereditary peers from the House.
To cope with this, Cameron appointed 40 more peers (of whom 26 were Conservatives) in 
the 2015 dissolution honours and a further 16 (13 of them Conservative) in his resignation 
honours. This final list attracted particular criticism for its alleged ‘cronyism’, with a number 
of key Conservative aides and donors awarded peerages. The only Labour nominee, 
Shami Chakrabarti, had chaired an inquiry that largely cleared the party of charges of 
anti-semitism three months earlier. In total, Cameron appointed 190 peers during his 
premiership, a faster rate than any Prime Minister before him. May has slowed the rate, but 
in early 2018 appointed nine new peers, three of them former Tory ministers.
These efforts to increase Tory representation did not prevent ministers being defeated 98 
times in the Lords between May 2015 and June 2017, compared to 99 times in the previous 
five years of coalition. Yet in August 2015 Cameron dismissed the question of Lords reform 
and reiterated his ad hoc scheme for the numbers of peers to ‘reflect the situation in the 
House of Commons’. In 2016 the Lords speaker, Lord Fowler, argued that the increase in 
the Lords’ size was ‘hard to justify’, and called on ministers to stop ‘faffing around’ with the 
House’s oversized condition. After 2016 May’s Brexit legislation also created some large 
defeats in the Lords of major government plans, often backed by Conservative Remainer 
peers (see above). 
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Issues around membership
Analysis by the SNP showed that nearly three-quarters of the 62 peers appointed in the 
second half of 2015 were former MPs, special advisors or party aides. Only four academics 
and two NGO or third-sector figures entered the Lords in this time, suggesting that 
little diversity or expertise is being brought into play by the current House. Just over a 
quarter of eligible peers are women and only 6.4% are black or minority ethnic. Territorial 
representation is particularly poor, with limited representation of those outside the south-
east of England. After a flurry of appointments during the 2000s, the House of Lords 
Appointments Commission – which has only appointed crossbenchers – has been told 
to recommend only two new appointments each year; in 2016 there were none. The only 
other parliamentary chamber in the world to include representatives from the state religion 
is the Islamic Republic of Iran.
By 2020 more than a quarter (211) of peers will be over 80, and Lord Steel has suggested 
introducing a retirement age. However, Meg Russell has pointed out that this measure 
if adopted alone would lead to an uneven party balance, and would not prevent Prime 
Ministers from appointing large numbers of new peers to replace them. Even simply 
imposing a cap on numbers would reduce the proportion of crossbenchers, since Prime 
Ministers tend to appoint overwhelmingly from their own party.
The only other parliamentary chambers in the world to still include hereditary members of 
the aristocracy are in the tiny polities of Tonga and the Kingdom of Lesotho. An attempt 
to end the hereditary peerage by-elections, in which some or all of the House picks 
replacements to top up the remaining 91 hereditary peers after one dies, also failed in late 
2016 after not receiving government support. It was revived in 2017–18 and, if successful, 
would mean that the number of hereditary peers would gradually dwindle as their current 
eligible members die off.
Ministers in the House of Lords
At present, around one in five ministers, 20 in all, sit in the Lords and are accountable only 
to other peers, providing no direct link between them and voters to create legitimacy and 
accountability. Currently no Secretaries of State sit in the House of Lords, but in the recent 
past important figures were there – for example, Peter Mandelson was virtually Deputy PM 
there in 2009–10, and Business Secretary before that in 2008–9. However, the only form 
of scrutiny of peer ministers by MPs is currently through the Commons committees, which 
very infrequently ask them to give evidence. A possible reform would be to allow ministers 
from the Lords to answer MPs’ questions in the House of Commons or in Westminster Hall.
Independence of the House of Lords
Defenders of the chamber argue that it continues to act with a reasonable degree 
of independence from the government, as shown by the difficult ride given to the 
controversial Health and Social Care Bill in 2012 (in contrast to its easy passage through 
the House of Commons), when peers mauled ministers’ proposals, which contributed to 
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a ‘pause’, re-consultation and some redesign of the legislation, as well as the tax credits 
defeat in autumn 2015 (discussed below). In 2016, the Lords rebelled over the right of EU 
citizens to stay in the UK after Brexit, which were followed by extensive Brexit legislation 
defeats for the government in the 2017–18 session. This development towards a more 
even-handed scrutiny has come as something of a shock the Conservatives, who always 
dominated the Lords under the hereditary system and so were therefore used to suffering 
far fewer defeats when in power than Labour governments did. 
Furthermore, Lords defeats since 2010 have frequently been on significant pieces of 
legislation including some relating to immigration, pensions, anti-lobbying, financial 
services, children and families, welfare reform and legal aid. In some of these cases the 
amendments passed by the Lords, or the amended government proposals responding 
to Lords defeats, were accepted by the Commons, often bringing about better policy-
making. The pattern of defeats and amendments suggest that the Lords continues to play 
a significant legislative role on issues where the heavily whipped MPs in the Commons at 
times seem incapable or unwilling to act.
The 2015 revolt on tax credits and ‘Strathclyde review’
Most of the time amendments moved in the Lords are reversed in the Commons under 
governments with a majority, of which 2015–17 is the only recent example. However, in 
October 2015 peers very unusually voted to delay changes to tax credits until certain 
conditions were met – in the process verging into budgetary matters where normally 
they have no competence. This move sparked outrage from Conservative ministers, who 
argued that peers were overstepping their constitutional powers by meddling with a 
budgetary matter (albeit intended to be implemented via delegated legislation). Opposition 
peers countered that the legislation was not a money bill but a statutory instrument, a 
method seemingly chosen by the government so as to avoid debate and amendment in 
the Commons, while the cuts themselves were in violation of election pledges given by 
leading Tories that tax credits would not be changed. Therefore, they argued, it was within 
their rights to ask the government to rethink. The former chancellor, George Osborne, 
subsequently made a virtue out of dropping the tax credit cuts in his Autumn Statement. 
Nonetheless Cameron set up an inquiry led by the former Tory peers’ leader Lord 
Strathclyde ‘to conduct a review of statutory instruments and to consider how more 
certainty and clarity could be brought to their passage through Parliament’ as a result of 
the dispute. The resulting Strathclyde Review report in December 2015 recommended 
that the Lords’ (very rarely used) ability to veto statutory instruments should be scrapped, 
bringing these powers into line with the House’s powers over primary legislation, where 
peers can only delay action for a year. These contentious recommendations were received 
with scepticism by the opposition, and were widely criticised for threatening to undermine 
parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation. Theresa May’s government dropped the 
recommendations a year later, but with the proviso that they might be revived if peers 
failed to show ‘discipline and self-regulation’ and continued to veto statutory instruments.
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Expenses abuse in the House of Lords
The House of Lords periodically hits the headlines due to expenses scandals which 
highlight the on-going openness of the Upper House to financial misuse. In 2014 Lord 
Hanningfield was suspended for a year after being convicted of abusing expenses for a 
second time (he served time in prison for his first offence in 2011). Worryingly, Hanningfield 
offered to reveal another 50 peers who were also claiming allowances for days when they 
undertook no work in the Lords, although he did not actually name anyone when pressed. 
He also claimed: ‘I was unaware that what I was doing was wrong’. In 2015, alongside the 
allegations that Lord Sewel had spent public money on drugs and sex workers (see above), 
the Lord Speaker, Baroness D’Souza, also came under fire for her ‘downright frivolous‘ 
attitude to public money. An FOI request revealed she had fuelled substantial ‘unnecessary’ 
spending on ministerial cars and international travel. 
Proposals for Lords reform
In its 2017 manifesto, Labour called for a democratically elected second chamber and, in 
the interim, the removal of the last hereditary peers (mostly Tories) and a ‘wider package 
of constitutional reform’ that would reduce the size of the House. Subsequently Corbyn 
insisted that any new Labour appointees must pledge to vote for a wholly elected second 
chamber in future.
The Liberal Democrats previously reiterated a commitment to reform based on proposals in 
the failed 2012 Bill, but their 2017 manifesto was clearer in calling for an elected chamber, 
a call joined by the Greens. The SNP and UKIP manifestos in 2017 supported scrapping the 
Lords altogether. 
However, in their 2015 manifesto the Conservatives recognised only the case for 
‘introducing an elected element’, but emphasised this would not be a priority. Cameron 
flatly refused to discuss reform on the scale demanded by the opposition parties. Some 
commentators, including Lord Tebbit and Meg Russell, have even suggested Cameron 
might have deliberately undermined the Lords through his numerous appointments. 
In their 2017 manifesto the Tories declared that ‘comprehensive reform’ of the House 
of Lords is ‘not a priority’. How long the Tories can go on defending an unreformed 
House when essentially all the other parties have withdrawn most legitimacy from Lords 
remains one of the great questions of British politics. All the other parties’ stances seem 
to recognise the past attempts at ‘tweaking the Lords’ have not addressed the chamber’s 
systemic problems, and it is likely that only a fresh, elected Senate can really bring about 
the changes that are needed.
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Conclusions
New Labour’s compromise changes to keep only a self-perpetuating oligarchy of hereditary 
peers in the House of Lords and to move it to being an overwhelmingly appointed-for-life 
body appear to have perhaps increased its role and significance. However, the case for 
reform is also now impossible to ignore. The growth in Lords membership and costs is 
unsustainable, its territorial representation is lamentable, the UK’s fourth-largest party is 
boycotting it, and the current members lack all democratic accountability and legitimacy. 
The Lords are now sustained only by Conservative party support, its convenience as a 
source of Prime Ministerial patronage and the still-significant barriers to meaningful reform. 
If current government quiescence and the self-interested opposition of peers themselves 
are to be overcome, opposition parties favouring major reform need to crystallise (and 
coordinate) their proposals for replacing the Lords with an elected Senate, potentially 
through a constitutional convention.
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What would a democratic basic constitutional law look like?
A democratic basic constitutional law should meet a number of formal and substantive 
requirements.
Formal democratic requirements
✦	 The rules of the constitution need to be – so far as possible – clear, accessible to 
and understandable for citizens, politicians and officials.
✦	 Some ambiguities or disputes about these rules are inevitable. Some generally 
accepted processes (both legal and political) are needed through which issues can 
be settled in inclusive and transparent ways.
✦	 There must be a genuine possibility of the rules changing to enhance the democratic 
quality of the constitutional system. Processes for constitutional change should be 
transparent and underpinned by the democratic agreement of citizens.
Substantive democratic requirements
✦	 The actors allocated governmental power must be democratically chosen 
and removable, with effective processes of accountability for the exercise of 
constitutional authority – both political, to ensure responsibility for official action, and 
legal, to ensure the legality of official action.
✦	 A variety of institutions will exercise a range of overlapping functions – including 
those of a legislative, executive and judicial nature. But institutions with democratic 
legitimacy must be allocated the ultimate responsibility for crucial decisions.
The basic constitutional law
The foundations of any liberal democracy lie with its constitutional arrangements, the key 
means by which the powers of the state are specified, distributed across different institutions 
and regulated. Constitutions set out how the state is structured, what its major institutions 
are, and what basic principles govern their relations with each other and with citizens. In the 
UK these provisions are famously diverse and uncodified, with no single written ‘constitution’ 
document. Michael Gordon looks at how to assess the democratic basis of constitutional law, 
and how well recent experience suggests that the UK has been performing.
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✦	 Opportunities for citizens to engage with and influence those in power must exist. A 
range of channels should be established. And civil liberties, which allow people to 
engage in individual and collective political activity, must be ensured.
✦	 There must be recognition and accommodation of different democratic desires 
in different parts of the state, with devolution or decentralisation of power so that 
decisions can be taken at the most appropriate levels of government. 
Recent developments
The basic constitutional law of the UK is in the midst of a period of fundamental change. 
Perhaps this has been the case for over 20 years, since the election of the New Labour 
government in May 1997, which began an unprecedented era of constitutional reform. 
But the electorate’s decision to exit the European Union at the June 2016 referendum, 
rejecting the pro-Remain position adopted by the largest groups inside the UK’s three main 
political parties, will see a further transformation of constitutional law in the UK.
For 43 years the UK constitution adapted to accommodate membership of the EU, and the 
obligations which that imposes. Now Brexit will see domestic constitutional law reshaped to 
reverse many of these changes. The future supremacy of EU law over domestic law will be 
removed on exit day by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. And we will very likely 
see the return of law-making competence from the European Union institutions to the UK 
Parliament, and (subject to some controversial centralising by Westminster) to the devolved 
legislatures in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Depending on the nature of any 
future relationship agreed with the EU, and the obligations that may flow from a possible 
free trade agreement, this may include the reacquisition of authority in areas including 
agriculture, fisheries, consumer rights, workers’ rights, product standards, competition, 
public procurement, immigration and trade.
This will be a significant change to the constitutional authority of the domestic institutions, 
which had previously opted to combine their decision-making power with that of other 
member states in a process of EU-wide cooperative law-making. But it will also represent a 
major challenge for the UK constitution, as the institutions of government attempt to deal 
with this unprecedented shift, across multiple strands of activity. There is the legislative 
challenge of preparing the UK for the withdrawal of EU law; the diplomatic challenge of 
negotiating exit and potentially a new relationship; the policy challenge of making effective 
decisions in areas of reacquired competence; and the scrutiny challenge for Parliament and 
the courts in ensuring that all of this is done in a legitimate manner.
Yet Brexit is just one of a number of high-profile constitutional developments in recent years 
with potentially far-reaching implications. These include an independence referendum 
in Scotland in 2014, a national general election in 2015, the EU referendum in 2016, and 
a further general election in 2017. The UK constitution is facilitating repeated high-level 
democratic exercises – some easily anticipated, like the 2015 election, others less so, like 
Theresa May’s snap 2017 election. In different ways, the two referenda might perhaps be 
viewed as inevitable, given the political environments cultivated by successive UK and 
Scottish governments, both from positions of weakness and strength.
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This political turmoil has also left the UK constitution exposed to very rapid change. 
While Scotland voted to stay within the UK, the 2014 referendum did prompt further far-
reaching devolution of powers to Edinburgh. It also raised expectations in other devolved 
governments, leading to further devolution for Wales and Northern Ireland (although the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive both remain suspended through most of 2017 
and 2018, which left a major constitutional and democratic vacuum at a significant time). 
The 2015 election created the conditions for the 2016 referendum, which led to the end 
of one government, the formation of another, and in less than a year a further general 
election. The major changes that will flow from Brexit have also therefore been complicated 
further by the hung parliament which resulted from the 2017 election, and the uncertain 
authority of Theresa May as Prime Minister.
We might therefore have reached (or passed) the point of constitutional fatigue – with 
radical change occurring at an intense pace both to the rules of the constitution, and to 
the position and authority of those allocated constitutional powers. And while fatigue 
may be setting in, the pace of change is only likely to accelerate, with new constitutional 
challenges resulting from the reshaping of the UK which is underway. For example, 
Brexit has great potential to trigger further change to the union, as calls are made for a 
second independence referendum in Scotland, or a border poll on the reunification of 
Northern Ireland with the Republic. The confidence and supply deal negotiated by the 
Conservatives with the DUP to sustain the minority Tory government in office has the 
potential to destabilise efforts to restore devolved government in Northern Ireland, with a 
return to direct rule from Westminster for a considerable period a serious prospect. Given 
the instability of the present government, a further election before 2022 (the legally due 
date) also looks more likely than not.
The Supreme Court 
While the UK’s constitutional politics have reached a level of almost peak unpredictability, 
there has been a less obvious, gradual shift in the position of the courts. The expansion 
of judicial powers made necessary by EU membership were supplemented considerably 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 – which gave the judiciary new powers and duties to 
assess the compatibility of official acts with human rights. In the 21st century this has been 
accompanied by the development of a striking constitutional self-confidence amongst 
judges. The most senior judges were relocated from the archaic Appellate Committee of 
the House of Lords to a new Supreme Court, by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. On 
the face of it, this did little to change the pre-existing substantive independence of the 
judges. But this significant ‘rebranding’ exercise has profoundly reinforced the judges’ 
willingness to engage with constitutional questions in bolder ways.
The Supreme Court has recently begun exploring common law constitutional frameworks in 
novel ways (HS2), challenging the otherwise clear language of statutory provisions (Evans), 
and gesturing at the possibility of exceptional limitations on the UK Parliament’s sovereign 
law-making power (Moohan). The peak of the judges’ new prominence was the Miller case, 
on the constitutional requirements for commencing withdrawal from the EU. There was a 
furious academic and public debate about how this could be done, as these legal issues 
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were considered in the High Courts of England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, before 
progressing to the Supreme Court. By a majority of eight Justices to three, the Supreme 
Court held that a new Act of Parliament was required to authorise the Prime Minister giving 
notice of the UK’s intention to leave the European Union. This was an affirmation of the 
decision of the High Court of England and Wales, albeit on somewhat different grounds, 
based ultimately on the premise that Brexit would cause a change to the legal sources of 
the constitution of such magnitude that it could not be commenced by the government 
using its royal prerogative powers to conduct international affairs. The majority decision 
by the Court might be criticised as being high on constitutional principle, but lacking in 
rigorous interpretation of the relevant statute establishing the status of EU law within 
the UK, or sensitivity to the broader political framework allocating different institutional 
responsibilities. Yet even aside from the major results of these cases, the shift in judicial 
power is both a complex and important phenomenon. It raises fundamental questions 
about the changing role of non-democratic actors in the UK’s constitutional system, 
especially within a period of extraordinary realignment.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The ‘manner and form’ theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty holds that the UK 
Parliament possesses a legislative authority 
that is not legally limited. It can pass laws 
with any content that it chooses. And it can 
also change its own legislative procedures in 
any way it chooses.
This provides a secure basis for a strong 
executive government, founded on a 
democratic responsiveness to the wishes of 
a majority of voters, and subject to political 
accountability in the UK Parliament. It also 
ensures there are few formal barriers to 
radical (democratic) constitutional reform.
Alternative accounts of how the UK’s basic 
constitutional set-up now works allocate 
a larger role to the Supreme Court and 
judges in regulating how the core institutions 
of the state operate. On the ‘common 
law constitutionalist’ theory, ‘the UK’s 
constitution is higher law made by the 
conscious decisions of a legislature to create 
principles of fundamental significance’. This 
view may lie behind the Supreme Court’s 
January 2017 decision that because Brexit 
entails changes in legal sources and rights, it 
requires an explicit Act of Parliament to start 
that process – and could not be done under 
the executive powers to make and unmake 
treaties, as initially claimed by the May 
government. 
Yet this may be part of a shift from the 
UK’s ‘political constitution’, in which the 
constitutional constraints on a UK executive 
with a Commons majority primarily flow from 
politics. Such limits are less formal, more 
fluid, and their effectiveness is hotly disputed 
– but it is far from clear whether a move 
to greater constitutional limitation through 
legalism will produce better democratic 
government.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The era of reform to the UK’s constitutional 
law started by New Labour in 1997 has had 
generally positive results. Those changes 
have either been extended, as is the case 
with the further devolution of powers to 
democratic institutions in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, or proved resilient to 
retrenchment, for example, the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000.
Despite the era of reform, non-democratic 
institutions remain, and wield considerable 
power. The House of Lords is only 
partially reformed and still unelected, yet 
it is increasingly relied on as a check on 
government and the House of Commons. 
Public debate about the monarchy is absent, 
even though the Queen has been ever 
more insulated from key political decisions 
– such as that relating to the formation of 
a government in a hung parliament by the 
codification of rules in the Cabinet Manual.
Frequent opportunities exist for the 
electorate to freely express their will, both in 
parliamentary elections and referenda, and 
for citizens to shape the policy agenda, such 
as via the parliamentary petitions website.
The rapid extension of devolution has also 
posed challenges – notably the pace of 
change in Scotland; difficulties achieving 
consensus in Wales over the new reserved 
powers Act of 2017; continuing problems 
in establishing a government in Northern 
Ireland; and some inconsistencies in the 
Combined Authority deals in England. There 
has been a lack of transparency or citizen 
engagement in the process.
Moreover, establishing English votes for 
English laws in the Westminster Parliament 
may initially have seem an underwhelming 
change, but it could yet have consequences 
for the equality of MPs. And a failure to 
obtain the consent of the Scottish Parliament 
for the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
2018 raises concerns about the authority of 
the democratic principles and conventions 
underpinning the structures of devolution.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Only limited critical or considered debate 
has taken place about the recent increasing 
prominence of the courts, especially given 
longstanding concerns about the total lack 
of ethnic diversity and dramatic under-
representation of women among the senior 
judiciary. Also important are the increasing 
powers over moral-political issues that 
judges now exercise as a result of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, without being 
subject themselves to regular accountability 
processes. Human rights litigation has also 
produced some frustrating, fragmented, and 
inaccessible judgments on major issues, for 
example on assisted dying (Nicklinson) and 
abortion rights (NIHRC).
Future opportunities Future threats
Further strengthening and broadening 
of devolution across the UK may be 
achievable. Continuing decentralisation of 
aspects of decision-making can create and 
reinforce new sites of democratic activity to 
challenge and compete with the Westminster 
institutions. (However, there are also real 
concerns about the democratic engagement 
of citizens in the process of deciding what to 
devolve.)
The scale of the Brexit process will test 
the capacity of the UK’s political institutions 
to the limit. There will be a strong need 
to ensure the Westminster government is 
held to account for the array of decisions it 
will take as it becomes paramount. The all-
encompassing nature of withdrawal from 
the EU will leave little time for any other 
democratic reform. Yet it may also represent 
a complacency about the superiority of 
UK’s exceptional constitution that should be 
challenged and dispelled.
2015.1 The basic constitutional law
Future opportunities Future threats
The inadequacy of the first-past-the-post 
voting system for elections to the Commons 
is increasingly clear. It has difficulties in 
accommodating an increasingly plural 
approach to politics, and recently has also 
failed to achieve its supposed purpose of 
delivering decisive election results. The 
return to a hung parliament after the 2017 
election may present a further opportunity 
for critics to press the case for reform to 
the voting system, to establish a system of 
proportional representation.
The result of the Brexit referendum, and its 
potentially damaging consequences, may 
have a chilling effect on the use of direct 
democratic decision-making, or engagement 
with other kinds of democratic innovation in 
future. If Brexit has poor consequences, the 
lesson drawn may be to stick to conventional 
representative government only. 
Rather than reverting to such pure 
representative democratic systems, ways 
of deepening the electorate’s involvement 
in democratic methods of reform should be 
further explored, such as via a constitutional 
convention or citizens’ assemblies.
The lack of social diversity amongst judges 
has gone beyond the point of being 
indefensible. The appointment of a new 
Lord Chief Justice in 2017 offered little hope 
in this regard. However, Lady Hale is now 
the President of the Supreme Court, and 
she has been joined by two further female 
Justices. Yet formal quotas would still be 
required to alter substantially the dynamics 
of judicial appointments, and accelerate 
current glacial progress.
Any debate about codification of the UK 
constitution, or establishing a formal legal 
federal order in the aftermath of Brexit, 
is likely to be a distraction. Its democratic 
salience is also disputable. A legalised 
constitution is not necessarily democratically 
superior to an (‘unwritten’) political 
constitution, especially when there is much 
to seek to reform, rather than to entrench, in 
the UK’s present arrangements.
Brexit
Brexit will dominate constitutional discussions during (and well beyond) the process of 
exiting the EU, running to 29 March, 2019. Parliament needs to ensure that democratic 
scrutiny and accountability is as effective as possible during this period of unprecedented 
change. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (albeit necessarily) delegates a great 
deal of subordinate law-making authority to the government. But this delegation needs to 
be subject to strict and appropriate limits on the use of the powers. Thorough and detailed 
parliamentary scrutiny will be needed to ensure their exercise does not instigate major 
changes in legal regulation for which a democratic mandate has not been obtained. A 
new parliamentary review process has been designed to sift through the estimated 800–
1,000 subordinate laws which may need to be enacted. A Commons European Statutory 
Instruments Committee will examine all proposed secondary legislation in preparation 
for Brexit, and flag those that ought to be subject to debate and the positive approval of 
Parliament. 
The 2016 referendum result may provide the government with a mandate to deliver 
the UK’s exit from the EU. However, if the process and its results are to be regarded as 
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legitimate, then the nature of that exit, and the means by which it is achieved, will have 
to be negotiated in a constructive, transparent way in a much more complex democratic 
landscape. As a matter of political principle and constitutional convention, if not by law, the 
interactions between the UK institutions and the devolved legislatures and governments 
are crucial to this. The consent of the Scottish Parliament, Northern Ireland Assembly and 
National Assembly for Wales should have been required to make legislative changes to 
the devolution statutes and competences. Yet only the Welsh Assembly gave its approval 
to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The UK government pressed ahead without 
consent from the Scottish Parliament, raising serious concerns about the extent to which 
democratic principles underpinning devolution are being respected, and bolstering calls for 
a second independence referendum in Scotland. Political and statutory commitments have 
been made to ensure the UK Parliament gets a ‘meaningful vote’ to approve a Withdrawal 
Agreement negotiated by the government, and any deal will be for Parliament to implement 
through new primary legislation. Parliament has also legislated to require the government 
to report on progress if ‘no deal’ becomes a likely outcome, providing an avenue for this to 
be challenged in the legislature.
The nature, extent and process of constitutional change
Away from the immediate challenge of Brexit, the impact of the dramatic programme of 
constitutional reform commenced by New Labour in 1997, but continued by the 2010–2015 
coalition government, and the Cameron government after the 2015 election, is still to 
be assessed. The pace and scale of change has been rapid, and hard to keep up with – 
suggesting that we must also try to take stock to establish future priorities.
It is not a straightforward question to answer ‘where is the UK constitution now?’ 
because the constitution is still changing, and further change is to come. Nevertheless, 
there remain particularly important questions to consider concerning the manner in which 
we have changed the law of the constitution. New Labour believed in ‘constitutional 
modernisation’, but had no overarching vision of what that meant in order to structure the 
reform programme it actually carried out. This may explain why a systematic approach 
has subsequently proved elusive. What New Labour produced is a constitution that we 
can think about holistically and explicitly, and be prepared to change in a proactive way. 
But if the goal of ‘modernisation’ simply becomes an end in itself, rather than directed 
to achieving other values, we can end up (and perhaps, to some extent, have ended up) 
lacking the ability to work out exactly what has been successful, and where further efforts 
must be targeted. A structured, value-oriented approach is important to constitutional 
reform – that may be the key lesson to emerge from the changes of the last two decades. 
We must at least attempt to sketch some kind of coherent vision of the overall constitution 
that we ultimately want for the UK. In so doing, we can try to develop a clearer sense of 
how we can make the constitutional law of the UK more democratic, both in substance and 
in its processes.
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A vision for a democratic UK constitution?
The UK constitution is at a crossroads – partially reformed, but with further change 
imminent. The process of reform – through the abundance of new statute law, and written 
constitutional documents – has made the constitution more formalised. Yet the UK’s 
arrangements are still fluid, and stand far apart from a traditional codified constitution. 
For some observers this may be a democratic deficiency. As the UK political system 
has become more overtly ‘constitutionalised’, calls have increased for a codified, written 
constitution to be established. This could more clearly define, and also limit, the powers 
of Parliament and the government. Such a model could more firmly federalise the powers 
of the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The increased 
accessibility of such a constitution may appear attractive. Yet a decisive shift from a political 
to a legalised constitution would also have many costs. It would likely entrench inadequate 
existing arrangements, create potential barriers to further reform, along with accomplishing 
the (further and greater) empowerment of the judiciary, who would be tasked with enforcing 
its rules in increasingly contentious political circumstances.
The crucial (and enduring) idea of parliamentary sovereignty at the heart of the UK 
constitution can (rightly) attract criticism if it is used as a rhetorical device signalling the 
centrality of Westminster politics, or the international superiority of the UK. Yet it is a 
fundamentally democratic foundational principle of UK constitutional law, in allocating 
ultimate law-making power to the elected and accountable actors in the UK’s system of 
government. Rather than displacing parliamentary sovereignty by pursuing the distraction 
of codifying the UK constitution, a better vision for democratic constitutional change 
involves exploiting that unlimited legislative authority to complete substantive institutional 
reform: to the House of Lords, the voting system, the monarchy and the royal prerogative 
powers, the funding and election spending of political parties, voter registration and age 
limits, the ownership of the media, among others.
Such an orientation would be accompanied by consideration of the process and 
methodology of constitutional reform, and its democratic components. How can we 
use democratic instruments more effectively and constructively, and deepen levels of 
citizen engagement and deliberation? Can we regularise and enhance the use of direct 
democracy (like referenda), which is at present irregular and under-informed, so therefore 
potentially erratic? Being aware of the limits of ‘the constitutional’ means recognising that 
effective citizen engagement is a function of political culture and education, as much as it is 
a product of any particular legal institutional arrangements.
Yet the engagement of the people in reshaping the basic constitutional law of the UK 
is something of intrinsic democratic importance, while also crucial in the present age of 
political distrust and citizen alienation. Further democratising the constitutional law of the 
UK – both in substance and in terms of the process of reform – is no doubt a goal that 
poses great difficulties, both in general and especially in the age of Brexit. Yet greater 
difficulties would be caused by allowing this era of democratic change to stall at a point 
where much more remains to be done.
Michael Gordon is Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Liverpool.
What does democracy require of the core executive, along with 
wider central government?
✦	 The core executive should provide clear unification of public policies across 
government, so that the UK state operates as an effective whole, and citizens and 
civil society can better understand decision-making.
✦	 The core executive especially, and central government more widely, should 
continuously protect the welfare and security of UK citizens and organisations. 
Government should provide a stable and predictable context in which citizens can 
plan their lives and enterprises, and civil society can conduct their activities with 
reasonable assurance about future government policies.
✦	 Both strategic decision-making within the core executive, and more routine policy-
making across Whitehall, should foster careful deliberation to establish the most 
inclusive possible view of the ‘public interest’. Effective policy should maximise 
benefits and minimise costs and risks for UK citizens and stakeholders. 
✦	 Checks and balances are needed within the core executive to guard against the 
formulation of ill-advised policies through ‘groupthink’ or the abuse of power by one 
or a few powerful decision-makers. Where ‘policy fiascos’ occur the core executive 
must demonstrate a concern for lesson-drawing and future improvement.
✦	 The core executive and government should operate fully within the law, and 
ministers should be effectively scrutinised by and politically accountable to 
Parliament. Ministers and departments/agencies must also be legally accountable to 
the courts for their conduct and policy decisions.
The core executive 
and government
Patrick Dunleavy looks at how well the dominant centre of power in the British state 
operates – spanning the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Cabinet committees, ministers and critical 
central departments. How accountable and responsive to Parliament and the public is this 
‘core executive’? And how effective are these key centres of decision-making and the rest of 
Whitehall government, in making policy? Do they consistently serve UK citizens’ interests? 
5.2
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✦	 Policy-making and implementation should be as transparent as possible, while 
recognising that some special core executive matters may need to be kept secret, 
for a time. Parliament should always be truthfully informed of decisions and policy 
plans as early as possible, and House of Commons debates and scrutiny should 
influence what gets done.
✦	 Policy development should ideally distribute risks to those social interests best 
able to insure against them (that is, at lowest cost). Consultation arrangements 
should ensure that a full range of stakeholders can be and are easily and effectively 
involved. Freedom of information provisions should be extensive and implemented 
in committed ways.
The executive is the part of the state that makes policies and gets things done, with 
ministers answering in public directly to Parliament, and via elections to voters. At UK 
national level, and across all of England, the executive consists of ministerial departments 
and big agencies headquartered in Whitehall, each making policy predominantly in a single 
policy area. This centre also funds and guides other implementing parts of the state – 
such as the NHS, local authorities, police services and a wide range of quasi-government 
agencies and ‘non-departmental public bodies’ (NDPBs).
Within the centre, the ‘core executive’ is the functional apex (or the brains/heart) of state 
decision-making. In any country it is the set of institutions that unifies the polity and 
determines the most important or strategic policies. In the UK the ‘core executive’ includes 
the Prime Minister, who appoints the Cabinet, plus Cabinet committees, key ministers in 
central Whitehall departments, and some top officials in the same departments – especially 
the Treasury, Cabinet Office, 10 Downing Street staffs, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of 
Defence, the intelligence services and the Bank of England. The core executive especially 
makes ‘war and peace’ decisions, shaping the UK’s external relations and commitments, 
homeland security and immigration, strategic economic policies (like austerity, national debt 
and deficit financing), and the direction of broad policy agendas from the top (like Brexit). 
Parts of the core executive’s activities are shrouded in secrecy, and much that gets done 
remains confidential at the time.
Recent developments
In July 2018 Theresa May summoned her Cabinet to the Prime Minister’s country home 
at Chequers and briefed them on the negotiating position for UK withdrawal from the EU. 
After months of wrangling and disagreements between Leave and Remainer ministers, and 
between Whitehall departments, the White Paper she required them to vote to accept had 
been drawn up by staff in the Cabinet Office under her direction (chiefly by Oliver Robbins) 
and discarded a quite different paper that the Department for Exiting the EU (DExEU) had 
been working on for months. Faced with an ultimatum the Cabinet voted to agree, but two 
days later Boris Johnson (the Foreign Secretary) and David Davis (the DExEU Secretary 
of State) and a strongly Brexiteer junior minister at DExEU resigned. Five other Leave 
Cabinet ministers, who had concerted positions with Johnson and Davis the night before 
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the Chequers showdown, decided to stay on. A few days later, the government took the 
Chequers deal to the hung Commons, but had to back down and accept four amendments 
proposed by Tory Brexiteer MPs from the European Research Group. The amended 
proposals passed the Commons by margins as low as three votes, as Conservative 
Remainers defied their party’s whip.
This incident marked one climactic peak (there will likely be others) in the conflictual 
executive politics between Leaver, pragmatists and Remainers that marked the May 
government from the outset, and intensified as the UK’s withdrawal negotiations with 
the EU neared critical decision points. Previous UK core executive conflicts were mainly 
‘dyadic’, two-way struggles between a Prime Minister and a rival or successor in one of the 
top four Cabinet roles – Chancellor, Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary and sometimes 
Defence Minister (see ‘weaknesses’ in the SWOT analysis below). The transition to triadic or 
three-way conflicts reflects the strong divisions within the Conservative Party (see Chapter 
3.1). It was made worse by May’s ‘closed decision-making’ style, and her habit of briefing 
symmetrically against her leading colleagues in 2016–17 – for example, in the run-up to the 
mishandled 2017 election May’s staff clearly signalled the press and her MPs that Philip 
Hammond (Chancellor) and Johnson would be dumped in her new government. 
In a weakened position after losing her majority, May was unable to act on either of these 
ambitions. Even her new appointments, like the not-very-well-known Gavin Williamson as 
Defence Secretary, began using resignation threats overtly in the press to seek bigger 
budgets. The government abandoned practically all the controversial components of 
the damaging Tory manifesto, and May called for inter-party co-operation. But the Prime 
Minister was living on borrowed time and her administration could not seem to get a 
modus operandi for liaising more constructively on Brexit with Labour or the devolved 
governments in Scotland and Wales, whose legislative consent will probably be needed.
However, one root of May’s collapsing authority can be traced back to David Cameron’s 
position after winning a narrow Conservative majority in the 2015 general election. The 
result seemed to signal the resumption of ‘normal service’ for peacetime government 
in Britain. The apparatus of the five-year Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition 
government was swept into the dustbin. The post of Deputy PM, which had been held by 
Nick Clegg, returned to the cupboard of history. And the inner co-ordination committee 
of four (Cameron, George Osborne at the Treasury, Clegg and Danny Alexander, Chief 
Secretary at the Treasury) that had kept the coalition operating smoothly for so long, was 
scrapped. Cameron kept Whitehall’s department structure largely unchanged, as he had 
under the coalition, and ruled mainly with Osborne. Boris Johnson (a possible leadership 
succession contender) was brought into the Cabinet in a minor role.
Cameron had alighted on the pledge of an in/out referendum in early 2013 as a tool to 
keep the dissidence of the Tory right’s MPs under control in the short term. But as the 
pledge hardened and UKIP boomed in 2014, Cameron began to make a drip-drip of extra 
concessions to his far-right ministers and MPs. Jockeying between the relatively few 
Cabinet Eurosceptics and the strongly pro-EU ‘Cameroons’ became more vigorous as 
the Prime Minister moved to deliver on his election pledge to hold an in/out referendum 
on the European Union. Buoyed up by their experience of (narrowly) winning the Scottish 
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independence referendum with a ‘big fear’ campaign warning of disastrous consequences, 
Cameron and Osborne re-ran almost the same playbook and for a long time seemed to be 
winning. Yet Eurosceptic ministers were allowed to campaign for Leave, and a significant 
minority did so (while May and some others were ‘apathetic Remainers’). This suspension of 
collective Cabinet responsibility during the referendum campaign meant that Eurosceptic 
ministers need not resign their posts, despite publicly contradicting everything that the 
Prime Minister and Chancellor were saying. In the end it was the committed Eurosceptic 
Michael Gove and the initially more diffident late-convert Johnson whose campaigning 
caused the ‘doom and gloom’ Brexit campaign to be lost on 23 June, 2016. Cameron 
resigned the next morning.
From the ensuing chaos of an aborted Tory leadership contest (in which Gove and 
Johnson both imploded early on), Theresa May emerged as winner, becoming Prime 
Minister after a two-week interregnum. She initially signalled a pattern of strong central 
control from Downing Street by keeping only three out of 24 Cabinet ministers in the same 
roles as before, promoting Johnson to the Foreign Office, and exiling Gove (for a year) and 
Osborne (for good). She created two new Whitehall departments for the major Eurosceptics 
David Davis (DExEU) and Liam Fox (International Trade) to run key Brexit functions. A very 
centralist 10 Downing Street operation was headed by two powerful staffers who had 
followed May from the Home Office (Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill). In a speech at Lancaster 
House, May outlined a ‘hard Brexit’ stance, which toughened up the referendum vote 
decision into a commitment to re-control all immigration and exit fairly completely from all 
EU institutions and arrangements.
This regime collapsed within a year, after May reversed her previous public pledges and 
called a general election (which Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour agreed to under the terms of the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act). What seemed like a smart move for May, and a suicidal one 
by Corbyn, turned out to be exactly the opposite, with May losing her majority of MPs in 
June 2017. The government clung to power only by negotiating a ‘confidence and supply’ 
agreement with the ten MPs from the Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), at 
a reputed minimum cost of a £1bn ‘bung’ for public spending there. May’s closest advisors, 
Timothy and Hill, were blamed for the disastrous Tory manifesto and hounded from office 
by Tory newspapers and MPs. A more outwardly ‘consensual’ regime for running the 
Conservative parliamentary party was put in place, with a quasi-Deputy PM the more 
accommodating Damian Green, but he lasted only a year before resigning over a porn 
scandal.
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
British government before 2010 was 
normally strongly unified, with clear 
Prime Ministerial and Cabinet control, 
strong ministerial roles within Whitehall 
departments, single-party governments, and 
relatively clear and distinct strategic policy 
stances. All of these features were briefly 
visible again in 2015–16, and some were 
present in 2016–17 – but not in the other six 
years since 2010 under hung parliaments.
The Prime Minister’s ‘three As’ powers are 
extensive. She appoints Cabinet ministers, 
allocates their portfolios and assigns policy 
issues across departments. Theoretically she 
can so arrange ministers’ policy trade-offs that 
they will perfectly implement the premier’s 
preferences. In ‘normal’ times, most ministers 
are highly dependent on the Prime Minister’s 
patronage and access for influence.
Cabinet government and the extended 
Cabinet committee system provide key 
checks on the power of Prime Ministers 
and their 10 Downing Street office. They 
foster greater deliberation before policy 
commitments are made, and a balanced 
approach, with the different departments 
ideally representing diverse stakeholders’ 
interests and wider public reactions.
In pursuit of purely political advantages, Prime 
Ministers have often re-jigged ministerial roles 
by pushing through reorganisations ‘making 
and breaking Whitehall departments’ (see 
below). This administrative churning is costly, 
short-termist and disruptive, reaching a peak 
under the Blair and Brown governments. A 
near-moratorium on reorganisations followed 
under Cameron’s premiership (2010–16), only 
to be succeeded by drastic changes and a 
wholesale reshuffle of ministers under May in 
June 2016.
Decisions within the core executive are 
normally made on far more than a simple 
majority rule (51% agreement). Instead 
an initial search looks for a high level of 
consensus across ministers/ departments. 
This may give way to deciding on a lesser 
but still ‘large majority’ (for example, 60% 
agreement) basis, especially in crises 
or situations where the status quo is 
worsening.
Cabinet decision-making no longer operates 
in any effectively collegial manner. Prime 
Ministers control the routing of issues 
through committees and can bypass them 
via ‘bilaterals’ and ‘sofa government’. For 
example, even the weakened Theresa May 
was able to re-centralise power from her 
DExEU Secretary, creating a Cabinet Office 
unit that in the end wrote a completely 
different White Paper by summer 2018 from 
the one the department had been working 
on. In ‘normal times’ strong integration of 
government communications also enforces 
complete solidarity across all ministers, 
without any guarantee of participation in 
decisions. Ministers mainly fight back by 
‘adversarial leaking’, which is in turn routinely 
denied.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Because of these processes, the principle 
of ‘collective responsibility’ binds Cabinet 
ministers to publicly back every agreed 
government policy, and not to talk ‘off 
their brief’. Wider ministerial solidarity also 
requires all junior ministers to follow the 
government line (for example, resigning 
if they do not vote the government line in 
the Commons). This convention held even 
over the July 2018 three-way Chequers 
agreement battle.
The UK still has a ‘fastest law in the West’ 
syndrome, with the fewest checks and 
balances of any liberal democracy on the 
Prime Minister or the core executive – 
especially in one-party governments with 
secure Commons majorities. But even May 
made her own EU negotiating position far 
weaker by triggering Article 50 to leave with 
only a two-year period to go. Decisions can 
be (and often are) made ‘lightly or inadvisedly’. 
Ministers can simply escape any unfavourable 
consequences of bad policies through party 
loyalties making them invulnerable in the 
legislature.
Policy-making can take place swiftly when 
needed. Whitehall’s resilience in crisis-
handling and its capacity to respond to 
demanding contingencies are generally 
high.
Recurring ‘groupthink’ episodes have 
produced major ‘policy disasters’ – most 
recently the UK’s involvement on false 
grounds in the 2003 invasion of Iraq; the 
disastrous 2011 armed intervention with 
France in Libya; and Theresa May’s calling of 
an early general election in 2017. Arguably the 
UK is more prone to major ‘policy disasters’ 
than other liberal democracies (see below).
UK institutions are long-lived and can draw 
on a strong tradition of relatively effective 
government, confident and immediate 
administrative implementation of ministerial 
decisions (when they are clear), and 
(normally) high levels of public acceptance 
and legitimacy
There is little evidence of much substantial 
policy-learning capacity within the core 
executive. All British Prime Ministers back to 
Stanley Baldwin (in 1935) have been forced to 
retire by election defeats, coups against them 
within their own parties, or illness. None has 
retired to acclaim as a successful leader.
It is expected that the government will 
consult (most) affected interests on major 
policy changes.
‘Policy fiascos’ occur when Prime Ministers 
and governments choose to ignore credible 
warnings of foreseeable policy disasters. Even 
on relatively mundane legislation, ministers 
and departments often choose to ignore or 
override the feedback received.
All ministers sit in Parliament and are 
directly and individually accountable 
there for their actions. The Freedom 
of Information (FOI) Act secures public 
transparency. Modern media, interest group 
and social media scrutiny is intense, rapid 
and fine-grained.
Ministerial decision-making operates in a 
climate of pervasive secrecy (still enforced 
by the Official Secrets Act). Ministers often 
withhold information from Parliament, reject 
FOI requests on questionable grounds, and 
manipulate the flows of information to their 
own advantage. They incur only small costs 
when found out, unless a scandal takes root.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Long-running dyadic power conflicts have 
occurred between Prime Ministers and 
key ministerial colleagues (especially the 
Chancellor or Foreign Secretary). These have 
been the main exceptions to Prime Ministerial 
dominance. Here a powerful minister (often 
an alternate leadership contender) can amass 
enough influence with colleagues to exercise 
a ‘blocking veto’ on what the Prime Minister 
wants to happen in key policy areas, usually 
those related to their brief. Under large 
majority rules this frustrates implementation 
of the Prime Minister’s preferred policy. 
It either results in inaction, or on extra 
time being spent to achieve a bargained 
compromise between the Prime Minister and 
the vetoing minister. Notable cases include 
Thatcher-Lawson/Howe conflicts on EU policy 
(1985–90), the Blair-Brown public spending 
conflicts (1997–2007), Cameron-Clegg 
tussles (2010–15), and post-Brexit referendum 
disagreements within the May governments 
(2016–17).
Future opportunities Future threats
Over the 43 years of the UK’s membership 
of the EU, Westminster ministers lost power 
to Brussels. Perhaps unconsciously British 
elites compensated by focusing more and 
more attention on ‘micro-managing’ the 
public services still within their control in the 
UK and in England and being implemented 
by regional or local bodies. This strong 
centralisation dynamic was checked only by 
some ‘organic’ devolution (see Chapter 5.6). 
Now that the UK is leaving the EU, many lost 
central government competences need to 
be re-built to ‘take back control’ of trade and 
economic policy. A post-Brexit re-focusing 
may encourage ministers and Whitehall 
to ease up on trying to fine-control public 
services that are best run at regional or local 
levels. At the least the burden of Brexit-
related laws will squeeze opportunities for 
other kinds of domestic legislation.
The Brexit process will remove a whole set of 
checks and balances on UK decision-making 
that have operated for 43 years at EU level 
in Brussels. These mainly enhanced stability 
and a long-run perspective in policy-making. 
As a result, the organisational culture of 
more short-termist and failure-prone modes 
of decision-making (that prevail in defence, 
foreign policy and welfare state management) 
may reinvade key parts of UK policy, 
especially in economic regulation, innovation 
and environmental policies.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The government accepted motions backed 
by a majority of MPs requiring a Commons 
sifting committee to scrutinise the Brexit-
related statutory instruments. The efficacy 
of this arrangement versus the information 
advantages of ministers and Whitehall 
remains to be established.
Working through the Brexit process will take 
many years and entail one of the largest and 
most demanding shifts in public policy-making 
of the last three decades. Many observers 
doubt that ministers and Whitehall will be able 
to respond well to this challenge.
As originally drafted, the May government 
relied heavily on ‘Henry VIII’ clauses in Brexit 
legislation, which would allow ministers to 
vary inherited EU laws using some 900 hard-
to-scrutinise statutory instruments instead 
of new legislation in Parliament. This is now 
altered but there remain concerns that new 
‘sifting’ measures remain too weak.
In the 2016–17 period there were disturbing 
signs of another eminently foreseeable 
policy fiasco emerging through Conservative 
ministers’ partisan stress on following a ‘hard 
Brexit’ strategy, whose economic costs could 
be high.
Making and breaking Whitehall departments
One of a Prime Minister’s most potent uses of Crown prerogative powers involves their 
unilateral control over the structure of Whitehall departments. Prime Ministers can scrap, 
merge, de-merge and reorganise ministries at will, often creating new ones to reflect 
their priorities or to respond to external changes. Figure 1 below shows that in the post-
war period there were two periods of rapid reorganisation, in the late 1960s/early 1970s, 
and under the modernising Blair and Brown ‘New Labour’ governments. Most redesigns 
occur in the first two years of each premiership. Research shows that political priorities in 
Cabinet-making dominated administrative ones in most of the reorganisations – many of 
which were done by Prime Ministers in a great rush and with little or no planning. The past 
level of churn in Whitehall structures made the UK exceptional amongst OECD countries, 
and stood out even when compared with other ‘Westminster system’ countries.
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Figure 1: Major reorganisations of Whitehall departments by Prime Ministers, 1950 to 2018
Source: Up to 2010: White and Dunleavy, 2010, Figure 8, p. 20. From mid-2010 on: Institute for 
Government, Whitehall Monitor series.
In 2010, David Cameron decided not to reorganise Whitehall, a course which he saw as a 
costly distraction when the UK’s priority was cutting public sector deficits. He contented 
himself with abolishing a recent Labour-created department (called DIUS). (His Tory 
Secretary of State for Health, however, pushed through a costly and pointless ‘reform’ 
of NHS governance’.) Throughout Cameron’s five years running a coalition government 
he could not act alone, since ministerial appointments formed key parts of the coalition 
agreement, although he reshuffled Tory ministers a little. In 2016, he continued this 
stance, so that the UK seemed to be acting more like a standard OECD country with stable 
department structures.
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All this changed under Theresa May, who created two new ministries: DExEU, to manage 
the Europe Union withdrawal process; and DIT, the Department for International Trade, to 
resume the trade deals role previously assigned to Brussels, and in which the UK lacked 
all expertise. May also reconfigured two existing departments in major ways, abolishing the 
previous Department for Energy and Climate Change and transferring most of its functions 
to BEIS, the department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. In line with previous 
yo-yo changes over the decades, the responsibilities for skills plus universities and 
research moved back to the Education Department. Figure 2 shows that these changes 
plus the Brexit preparations created some substantial boosts to many policy departments’ 
staff; but the biggest employers (HMRC, DWP and MoD) remained stable. DExEU is almost 
designed to not last too long, although DIT look as if it may endure. Instead of DExEU, 
an alternative strategy would have been to create a neutral Cabinet Office unit under 
Prime Ministerial authority to run Brexit negotiations. Effectively May belatedly followed 
this course from autumn 2017, sucking much of the momentum out of DExEU and helping 
trigger David Davis’ resignation nine months later.
Figure 2: Changes in Whitehall departments’ staffing levels, 2016–18
Source: Institute for Government, Whitehall Monitor 2018, Figure 2.3. 
Notes: Some DExEU staff are on loan from FCO and other departments, and so may be counted twice.
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The Cabinet committee system
Below the large, 23-member Cabinet, the Westminster system has traditionally operated 
one of the most elaborate committee systems of any liberal democracy. All relevant Cabinet 
departments sit on related committees, but in the past there were many more committees, 
arranged in a complex hierarchy. ‘Prime Ministers decide how to organise [committees], 
who to appoint to them, and how actively they are involved in them’. However, Nicholas 
Allen and Nora Siklodi demonstrated that:
‘May has streamlined the committee system she inherited from David 
Cameron. Instead of ten committees, ten subcommittees and eleven 
“implementation taskforces” (bodies introduced in 2015 to drive forward 
the government’s “most important crosscutting priorities”) [31 major bodies 
in all], there are now just five committees, nine subcommittees handling 
regular business, and seven taskforces [21 major bodies]’. [Our emphasis.] 
By November 2017, May’s tuning of the government machine to yield her kind of 
administration, plus the huge load increasingly associated with the Brexit negotiations 
(which shut down a lot of legislation and activity on other issues), produced the Cabinet 
committee structure shown in Figure 3, perhaps the smallest in living memory – with just 
16 policy committees and sub-committees and only five taskforces. Almost half of these 
new bodies were chaired by the Prime Minister herself (as shown), including all the main 
substantive committees, a historically unusual level of centralisation. 
Critics argue that May favours a ‘closed decision-making’ style, with power concentrated 
in her hands, plus 10 Downing Street and a few favoured delegates. The Leader of the 
Commons chaired the only other full committee, scheduling legislative business. The 
Chancellor and Home Secretary chaired two sub-committees each, and the Business 
Secretary and Party Chairman chaired one. Three other ministers chaired one or two 
taskforces, which on past form may meet irregularly or infrequently. Running the committee 
system and keeping track of what departments have committed to do, and of their progress 
in meeting targets, is the Cabinet Office secretariat. It provides a strong administrative core, 
ensuring that decisions and commitments are carefully recorded and then chased up.
Using a counting and weighting system applied to committees in all UK governments since 
1992, we can calculate the ‘positional power’ of ministers in terms of their places, and their 
share of the total. Figure 4 shows that in summer 2016 the new bigger committees and 
some sub-committees gave a place to almost everyone on almost everything, so that the 
Prime Minister’s share of positional power was less than 11%. Comparing earlier research 
shows that May’s number was greater than John Major’s 7.6% score in 2001, but down on 
Tony Blair’s score of 14.9% in 1997.
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Figure 3: Theresa May’s Cabinet committee structure in November 2017
Source: Institute for Government, 2018, redrawn from Figure 1.7
Note: Prime Minister chairs committees marked (PM)
Of course, positional power is not the only kind of power that ministers have, as shown 
by the low rank at this time for David Davis (in the early days of Brexit one of the most 
powerful ministers under May). Allen showed that in the 2010–15 coalition government 
the Liberal Democrats had more positional power in the committee system than they did 
Cabinet posts (where they had five out of 23). But this positional power was effectively 
invisible to the public. Voters saw the government as almost exclusively dominated by the 
Conservatives, because Nick Clegg had naively allowed them to hold the top (‘secretary of 
state’) ministerial portfolios in all but one of the major policy departments.
Amongst the several other power bases that matter, ministers control the substantial 
administrative power of their own department fiefdoms, where they set policy priorities, 
control key policy-making processes, and shape how a lot of public money is spent. 
Informal alliances of ministers may have ‘blocking power’ to delay or frustrate decisions 
under the ‘large majority’ rules that prevail in executive decision-making. Other ministers 
may be politically powerful because they have the Prime Minister’s ear. And some Cabinet 
top ministers can become credible leadership succession candidates, with their own 
followings in the government party’s MPs and perhaps amongst other ministers looking to 
the future.
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Figure 4: The positional power of Cabinet members in the Cabinet committee system, 
summer 2016
Source: Allen and Siklodi, 2016
Note: Ministers in pink are prominent Brexiteers.
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Budgetary control within government
The other core co-ordination mechanism is tight Treasury control of public spending, which 
reached a peak under the Cameron-Clegg governments’ austerity programme, maintained 
for a further year by Cameron after 2015. The budgets for the NHS and overseas aid were 
maintained in real terms between 2010–16 (although NHS spending fell below the amounts 
needed for a real standstill budget). But this just meant that the burdens elsewhere, on 
other domestic, welfare and defence spending, were intensified. An Expenditure Review 
Group formed from the Treasury and Cabinet Office did a reasonable job, at first, of 
damage limitation in implementing cutbacks, using a ‘do more for less’ strategy. David 
Cameron commented complacently in 2014: ‘It must be said, at the time, all manner of 
horror show predictions were made about what would happen to our country. But what 
actually happened?’ 
However, by this time in fact real cuts in programmes, crude ‘do less for less’ strategies had 
almost completely taken over, with Whitehall simply passing the need for huge cost cuts 
down to local authorities, police forces, the armed forces and NHS bodies which could cope 
only by cutting out services. The costs of such policies only became apparent after lags – for 
example, big increases in some categories of serious crime followed in 2017–18 after police 
cutbacks. And in the 2017 general election many voters sent a clear message to Conservative 
MPs and ministers that public sector pay restraint had to end. A 2018 Theresa May pledge 
to guarantee long-term NHS real-terms budget increases, and her difficulties with defence 
spending, both reflected ‘incubated’ problems resonating with the public. The strategy of 
‘cutting back until the shoe pinches’ by this stage had clearly rising political costs.
The apparatus of Treasury control makes it one of the world’s most powerful ‘finance 
ministries’. It ‘focuses on managing a number of interrelated systems that taken together 
provide the basis for spending control in the context of substantial delegation to other 
actors’, according to one study. In preparing three-year spending reviews the Treasury 
conducts detailed ‘bi-lateral’ negotiations with spending ministries. It also has a set of 
macro-controls over budget sectors, which it uses to hold departments to spending totals 
between reviews, but with some departmental autonomy within agreed totals.
Yet micro budget controls (such as limits on viring unspent monies from one heading to 
another, and ‘clawing back’ unspent funding at the year end) also remain. And staff and 
expertise cuts within the Treasury itself have drastically reduced its understanding of 
where spending occurs, or why. For example, many government ‘blunders’ have revolved 
around IT schemes and big capital investments, for which there are several different but 
inadequate major project evaluation systems. And UK central government has never yet 
had any coherent programme for improving government sector productivity.
The ‘secret state’ within Whitehall
The UK’s still substantial secret state is the last surviving remnant of the British empire’s 
worldwide reach. The main intelligence and security services are:
✦	 MI5 (internal security),
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✦	 SIS or MI6 (overseas intelligence),
✦	 GCHQ (electronic and other tech surveillance),
✦	 the Defence Intelligence Staffs (military intelligence).
Their activities are supervised by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the Cabinet Office, 
which coordinates and sanctions major operations, reporting to the Prime Minister. Following 
the ‘dodgy dossier’ episode where intelligence was manipulated by the Prime Minister’s aides 
in the lead up to the Iraq war, Whitehall confidence in the quality of information from the four 
agencies and the Joint Intelligence Committee took several years to rebuild.
The UK is bound into close working relationships with the US intelligence agencies, with 
SIS linked to the CIA, and GCHQ working hand-in-glove with the US National Security 
Agency. Less important strong links are to agencies in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 
and also to those in a few major European states and EU agencies.
A single Cabinet Office intelligence expenditure vote of £3.1bn (including £470m of capital 
spending) is declared to Parliament but not further explained in public. Around £85m 
to £100m of undeclared intelligence spending is still padded around the Cabinet Office 
budget, with further amounts in defence. The only parliamentary control over any of this 
comes from the Intelligence and Security Committee, hand-picked by the Prime Minister 
from the Commons and Lords. Committee members were previously criticised as ‘trusties’ 
but there is now more parliamentary input into their selection (see Chapter 4.3).
The UK also has developed inter-departmental homeland security arrangements which 
focus on the COBRA meeting (an impressive acronym that actually stands for the mundane 
‘Cabinet Office, Briefing Room A’, where its meetings take place). In principle, the resilience 
system is also supposed to also cover civil contingencies (such as foot and mouth disease 
and flooding in the past). But COBRA never met over the 2017 Grenfell Tower disaster, and 
government co-ordination in the aftermath was very poor.
These highly non-transparent arrangements have fuelled persistent controversy about 
the existence of an ‘inner state’, one that controls the drone killings of terror suspects in 
military action zones overseas, and some extra-legal actions of homeland security or army 
special forces (which for certain included extra-judicial assassinations in Northern Ireland 
and perhaps in Afghanistan in earlier periods). The Snowden revelations suggested that 
GCHQ had done a ‘buddy deal’ for many years with the NSA to bulk spy on US citizens 
(which the US agency cannot legally do), in return for the NSA trading back the same 
information for UK and European citizens (which GCHQ cannot legally do). SIS has been 
accused of colluding in US renditions and torture of terror suspects implemented by US 
agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2002–08, using information gained from a rendition 
programme where prisoners were sent for interrogation to torture-using US-allied states.
Routinely denounced by elite insiders as ‘conspiracy theories’, these allegations have 
generally been proved reasonably well-founded. For example, in summer 2018 a report by 
Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee found that UK intelligence agencies had 
tolerated US renditions and derived benefit from CIA tortures of prisoners (for example, 
submitting questions to people whom they knew were being water-boarded). Arguments for 
a pattern of ‘deep state’ cover-ups followed by belated admissions have also gained added 
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contextual credence from evidence of policy fiascos perpetrated elsewhere by the UK state – 
such as the police cover-up over mass deaths in 1989 at the Hillsborough football stadium; 
and the Department of Health’s actions over the poisoning of NHS patients over many years 
with hepatitis B from blood for transfusions imported from the USA.
Policy fiascos and disasters 
Critics have long argued that the UK is unusual in the extent to which it suffers from 
acute policy disasters and policy fiascos (perfectly foreseeable disasters) – and that 
the key sources of these problems are the lack of checks and balances in the UK core 
executive. Majoritarian government, strong Whitehall traditions and a pronounced lack of 
accountability to the legislature all interact badly with the ‘legacy’ hangovers of an over-
strong executive government tradition using Crown prerogative powers, plus the malign 
influence of ‘new public management’ thinking on core civil service competencies (see 
Chapter 5.3). 
Other observers see the UK ministerial elite as being too powerful vis-à-vis their ‘generalist’ 
civil servants, able to order that ill-advised policy is implemented. Neither politicians nor 
their Whitehall advisors are masters of specialist subjects, compounding a long succession 
of smaller-scale ‘blunders’. However, this is arguably an implausibly politically focused 
analysis, which over-locates responsibility with particular minister and party advisors, 
neglecting the role of the civil service (see Chapter 5.3) and the specificities of major 
projects like large-scale IT investments. Ministers may be unrealistic in how they approve 
schemes like the Universal Credit changes in social welfare, and then may deny and 
bluster about problems when implementation starts going wrong. Yet all politicians in liberal 
democracies are policy amateurs, and yet the UK scale of problems is rarely matched in 
other long-established European democracies. 
The risks of unconstrained executive action are especially severe where a Prime Minister and 
close advisors fall prey to ‘groupthink’, as May and advisors clearly did in triggering the 2017 
early general election. In overseas and defence policy many of the factors above are further 
compounded by a lingering British empire tradition of foreign and defence policy-making 
that is elite-dominated, insulated from public opinion and Parliament, and (arguably) lacking 
in realism. In the spring and early summer of 2018, Theresa May and her Defence Secretary 
Gavin Williamson were involved in a bitter wrangle over defence budgets. During it the Prime 
Minister created shock in the ‘defence establishment’ by questioning whether Britain could 
any long afford to retain its long-prized goal of being a ‘Tier 1’ defence power – an ‘article of 
faith’ for the defence and foreign policy establishment.
Overseas policy disasters
In strategic policy-making the most recent policy fiasco was the UK’s joint military 
intervention with France into the civil war in Libya in 2011, aiding the anti-Gaddafi rebels 
with frequent air strikes, SAS ‘advisors’ and plentiful arms supplies. Both the intervening 
countries ran out of bombs and missiles within weeks of the conflict starting, and had to be 
re-supplied covertly by the USA which nominally was not involved. A lot of Gaddafi regime 
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infrastructure was destroyed, and plentiful arms supplies sent to assorted rebel militias. 
The regime was duly toppled, but Libya descended into near-permanent lower intensity 
civil war and ‘failed state’ status. A Commons committee concluded that planning for the 
aftermath of intervention was minimal and ham-fisted.
As a result, greatly increased flows of refugees began crossing the Mediterranean to reach 
EU countries, fuelling part of the anti-immigrant momentum that fed into the anxieties of the 
UK’s Brexit voters five years later. And Islamic jihadist forces (such as Isis and al-Qaeda) soon 
secured toeholds in the Libyan stalemate chaos. The arms initially sent into Libya also spread 
into all neighbouring countries, reaching Islamic jihadists as far south as Nigeria and Chad. 
The Libya commitment reflected an over-homogenisation of views by the Prime Minister and 
colleagues, and an over-confidence (bordering on delusional) about the UK’s state capacities 
in the modern world. Little wonder that Barack Obama publicly described the episode as the 
‘worst mistake’ during his presidency, and in private reputedly called it ‘a shit show’. 
Amidst these travails, the 2016 official post mortem report into the UK’s 2003 joining of 
the Iraq invasion by Sir John Chilcot’s commission (five years in the making and running 
to 15-million words) was soon lost to view. It painted a bleak picture of how the UK’s core 
executive operated at that time. Blair as Prime Minister and his communication chief 
(Alastair Campbell) clearly steamrollered military action through the Cabinet and Parliament 
with false information – a ‘dodgy dossier’ alleging that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had 
‘weapons of mass destruction’, which in fact did not exist.
Domestic policy disasters
In terms of domestic policy disasters, the onset of the Brexit referendum in 2016 (discussed 
above) is perhaps the leading case of the key requirement for the core executive to provide 
unified control, albeit with checks and balances. The vacuum of leadership that opened 
up for two weeks or more after Cameron’s resignation spoke to this collapse of the core 
executive’s role – as did the Tories’ subsequent aborting of the leadership campaign, with 
all of Theresa May’s rivals knocked out or withdrawing.
Two other recent policy crises illuminate different aspects of the limitations on UK core 
executive operations. First, the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, and the forced 
renationalisation of most UK banks that followed, imposed a decade of acute austerity on 
UK government, and a considerable burden on taxpayers. These difficulties were made far 
worse than they might have been by an almost unacknowledged change whereby under 
Tory and Labour governments the UK state allowed bank liabilities – for which taxpayers 
were the ultimate guarantor – to expand from early post-war modest levels around half of 
GDP to a peak just before the crash. 
Figure 5 shows that the liabilities of UK financial corporations were almost four times 
nominal GDP in 1987, and then rose past ten times GDP by 2006, peaking at 11 times GDP 
just before the GFC broke. Throughout this period, the Treasury, Bank of England and 
enthusiastic key ministers like Nigel Lawson, Margaret Thatcher and Gordon Brown all 
fuelled the massive expansion of the UK’s finance sector, without imposing any form of 
‘macro-prudential’ regulation of the scale of liabilities the UK state was taking on. Instead 
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financial de-regulation and ‘light touch’ regulation were repeatedly pushed by ministers – 
creating an almost completely ineffective apparatus which collapsed precipitately once the 
crisis struck. In the subsequent recession, financial corporations’ liabilities kept on rising, 
briefly touching levels 15 times GDP in 2009–10 and only plateaued out at 11 times GDP 
again from around 2014 onwards.
A second example concerns the Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017, when a London tower 
block was completely devastated by fire in a couple of hours, killing 72 people and injuring 
hundreds more. The May government ran into immediate trouble, failing to trigger the 
COBRA emergency committee to manage the disaster, and providing only a woefully 
inadequate initial state response to the catastrophe. It rapidly emerged that the fire spread 
so quickly because the block was clad all over in inflammable materials in a disastrously 
cheapskate refurbishment carried out by the Tory Kensington and Chelsea borough under 
austerity pressures. 
However, by the time that a public inquiry started it became clear that the conditions for 
the fire had been created by two core executive failures. A long-run campaign to de-
regulate building safety and foster ‘technical innovation’ had begun under the Blair and 
Brown Labour governments and been sustained by the coalition government and Tory 
Figure 5: The financial liabilities of financial corporations in the UK, as a percentage of 
the country’s nominal GDP, from 1987 to 2015
Source: Computed from Office of National Statistics, 2016, Figure 1.
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administrations since 2010. Fire service roles in safety were pared back, regulations were 
written in incredibly vague and ineffective ways, and building contractors allowed to self-
certify materials and designs. Second, the relevant department (DCLG; Communities and 
Local Government) was repeatedly warned of cladding fire dangers from 2011 onwards 
from a succession of incidents, and lobbied by an all-party group of MPs to urgently review 
regulations. But whereas the Scottish government acted on the same evidence to ban 
flammable materials in all its high rises, several Tory ministers (plus one Liberal Democrat) 
at Westminster repeatedly deferred taking any corrective action at all. Add in the incidence 
of ‘public service delivery disasters’ (see Chapter 5.3) and the contemporary diversity and 
significance of UK public policy mistakes is clearly considerable.
Conclusions
The UK’s core executive once worked smoothly. It has clearly degenerated fast in the 21st 
century. Westminster and Whitehall retain some core strengths, especially a weight of 
tradition that regularly produces better performance under pressure, reasonably integrated 
action on homeland security for citizens, and some ability to securely ride out crises. Yet 
elite conventional wisdoms, which dwelt on a supposed ‘Rolls-Royce’ machine, are never 
heard now – after eight years of unprecedented cutbacks in running costs across Whitehall; 
political mistakes and poor planning over Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq; and the unexpected 
loss of the Brexit referendum. Now this tarnished record may be capped by the looming 
threats of either leaving the EU on poor economic terms under a ‘hard Brexit’ strategy, or of 
being trapped in an unsatisfactory ‘soft’ Brexit, where the ‘dirty’ component of a ‘quick and 
dirty’ exit turns into enduring disadvantages.
The clouds in the form of recurring ‘policy disasters’ and ‘fiascos’ have also gathered. Both 
the Conservative and Labour party elites and leaderships, and Whitehall elites themselves, 
have seemed disinclined to learn the right lessons from past mistakes, or to take steps to 
foster more transparent, deliberative and well-considered decision-making at the heart of 
government. Like the Bourbon monarchs, the fear might be that they have ‘learnt nothing 
and forgotten nothing’.
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What does democracy require for how Whitehall and the 
national civil service operates, along with wider public service 
delivery systems?
✦	 Services provision and implementation, and the regulation of social and economic 
activities, should be controlled by democratically elected officials so far as possible. 
Policy-making at this level should be deliberative, carefully considering all the 
interests of all relevant actors. 
✦	 Before significant policy or implementation changes are made, fair and equal 
consultation arrangements should allow service recipients and other stakeholders to 
make inputs into decisions, especially where services are being withdrawn or rights 
are being constrained.
✦	 The management of all public services management at all levels of government 
(within national, regional, local and micro-local agencies) should be impartially 
conducted within administrators’ legally available powers. All citizens should have 
full and equal access to government and to the beneficial services and goods to 
which they are entitled, without discriminatory provisions applying to any group. The 
human rights of all citizens should be carefully protected in decision-making, and 
‘due process’ rules followed in adjudicating their cases or entitlements.
✦	 Wherever ‘para-state’ organisations deliver services on behalf of or subsidised 
by government (for example, non-government organisations [NGOs] or private 
The civil service and public services 
management systems
Citizens and civil society have most contact with the administrative apparatus of the 
UK state, whose operations can powerfully condition life chances and experiences. 
Patrick Dunleavy considers the responsiveness of traditionally dominant civil service 
headquartered in Whitehall, and the wider administration of key public services, notably 
the NHS, policing and other administrations in England. Are public managers at all 
levels of the UK and England accountable enough to citizens, public opinion and elected 
representatives and legislatures? And how representative of, and in touch with, modern 
Britain are public bureaucracies?
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contractors), these public value standards (action within the law, equal treatment and 
access, respect for human rights, and freedom from corruption) should all apply in 
exactly the same way. 
✦	 The importance of ‘public value’ considerations is especially heightened in 
government legal and regulatory activities, cases of compulsory consumption, where 
service-users face any form of ‘coerced exchange’ choices, or where consumers 
depend heavily on professional expertise or are subject to the exercise of state or 
professional power.
✦	 Public services, contracting and regulation should be completely free from 
corruption, with swift action taken against evidence of possible offences.
✦	 The civil service and public services organisations should recruit and promote staff 
on merit, having due regard for the need to combat wider societal discrimination that 
may exist on grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, disability or other factors.
✦	 Ideally, public administrations will be ‘representative bureaucracies’ whose social 
make-up reflects (as far as possible) that of the populations they are serving. Where 
differences in the social make-up of the people delivering and receiving public 
service has significant implications for the understanding, legitimacy and perceived 
quality of services, the delivery organisation must demonstrate committed efforts to 
overcome recruitment biases.
✦	 Government-organised and -subsidised services should be efficient and deliver 
‘value for money’. Costs should be reasonable and competitive, and the activities 
and outputs should be produced using technologies that are modern, and 
kept under review, using best practice methods. Over time the productivity of 
government-organised and state-subsidised services should grow, ideally at or 
above the societal average level.
✦	 The efficacy of government interventions and regulations should be carefully 
assessed in a balanced and evidence-based way, allowing for consultation not just 
with organised stakeholders but also with unorganised sets of people affected, or 
interest groups active on their behalf.
✦	 Regulation and de-regulation should both be implemented in balanced, up-to-date 
and precautionary ways that safeguard public safety and the public interest, but 
keep the economic and transaction costs of regulation to the minimum needed.
✦	 Point of service standards in the public services should keep pace with and be 
comparable to those in other modern sectors. Procedures for complaints and citizen 
redress should be easy to access and use, and public service delivery agencies 
should operate them in transparent and responsive ways, fulfilling ‘freedom of 
information’ requirements.
✦	 Where mistakes happen, and especially where public service delivery disasters 
occur (at implementation levels) that seriously harm one or a few persons, or that 
affect large number of people in highly adverse ways, public service organisations 
should show a committed approach to recognising and rectifying problems, and to 
rapid organisational learning to prevent them from recurring.
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In liberal democracies, citizens and politicians expect that the civil service and other public 
service organisations will meet all of the multiple requirements listed above, simultaneously. 
If lapses occur in any aspect, public trust in these bodies can be severely impaired, usually 
increasing their costs appreciably and reducing their abilities to get things done.
Yet the different expectations clearly crosscut each other. For instance, carefully consulting 
and respecting human rights adds expense and time to government agencies’ processes, 
so it may curtail their ability to reform, and impair efficiency-seeking and cost containment. 
Similarly, treating people equally means that agencies cannot do what firms do, and focus 
just on those customers who are easy or profitable to serve, turning their backs on difficult 
cases. Yet agencies are also expected to match firms in terms of productivity growth. 
Public management involves handling these dilemmas so as to (somehow) steer a course 
between them that maximises public value.
Recent developments
The recent history of public services has been dominated by the austerity programme 
of the 2010–15 Conservative–Liberal Democrat government, which sought to restore a 
balance between public spending and government revenues, primarily by cutting back 
welfare payments and the running costs of public services. Figure 1 shows that their plan 
sought a rarely achieved balance of current spending and receipts, initially by 2020 but 
now postponed past 2023. Public spending would (in theory) stabilise at around 37% of 
GDP – pretty much above the level it has been since the late 1980s.
Figure 1: Tax receipts, public spending and UK deficits as a proportion of gross domestic 
product from 1995 to 2016, and projected to 2023
Source: Institute for Government, Whitehall Monitor 2018, Figure 3.3.
Notes: A dark pink gap between the spending and revenue lines shows a public sector deficit, and a 
grey gap shows a (rare) surplus. The government in power is shown by the background shading: pale 
pink Labour; blue Conservative; hashed Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition. Dotted lines are 
projections under autumn 2017 government plans.
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The NHS was exempted from austerity with spending maintained in real terms, but the 
higher costs of health inflation were not covered. Most spending cuts focused on welfare 
benefits, policing, prisons, and devolved and local government services, with the civil 
service exporting many cutbacks to other agencies to accomplish. Nonetheless Whitehall 
running costs were also targeted and Figure 2 shows that for a year in 2016 the number of 
civil servants fell below 385,000 – its lowest level since 1940 (when the UK’s population 
was also far smaller). By 2017, though, this total was rising again as Whitehall geared up for 
the 500-plus projects involved in leaving the European Union.
Much of the apparent fall in Figure 2 may also be rather deceptive, because of the growth 
of a para-state of contractors (and a few NGOs). These organisations now carry out many 
functions previously done by Whitehall but do not count in the personnel numbers. In 
2017 the UK government as a whole spent as much on contracting with firms for goods 
and services as it did on paying public sector salaries. There are no grounds for believing 
that this has in any way saved money, and it also carries large risks because just a few 
oligopolistic firms dominate public services work. In January 2018 one of these contractors, 
Carillion with 65,000 employees, went bankrupt, imposing costs of up to £148m on UK 
government in finding and paying alternative providers to take over their work at short 
notice. Other firms, including Capita, were on a watch list for similar problems in mid-2018.
In its 2017 general election campaign, Labour called for an end to austerity and ending 
the multi-year public sector pay quasi-freeze (with rises limited to 1% for all public sector 
workers, cutting their real pay by around 2% a year). This theme apparently chimed with 
the public, especially when three terrorist attacks occurred near or during the campaign, 
drawing attention to reductions of 20,000 in police numbers. Shortly afterwards the 
Grenfell Tower fire catastrophe dramatised the radical erosion of building and fire safety 
regulation (see below). Contrary to David Cameron’s sanguine 2014 assessment that 
spending cuts had done little damage, voters clearly felt that NHS waiting list backlogs, an 
Figure 2: The size of the UK civil service, 2009 to first quarter of 2018
Source: Institute for Government, Whitehall Monitor 2018, Figure S7, and updated for Q1 2018.
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epidemic of badly potholed roads, ‘banana republic’ safety regulations, and disappearing 
police and fire personnel mattered a lot. Tory MPs returned from the 2017 campaign to 
press ministers to end the pay freeze for government sector workers. 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The UK civil service model has a long 
tradition of being very politically controllable 
and accountable. Its culture is generalist and 
non-partisan, able to work with governments 
of different partisanship and to tackle new 
issues with some competence. Departmental 
viewpoints are strongly held in Whitehall, but 
less so than in many other liberal democratic 
countries thanks to cross-departmental 
movements of personnel over their careers.
The lessened but still-dominant ascendency 
of the generalist ‘policy profession’ within 
Whitehall feeds into and encourages an 
‘amateurish’ pattern of policy-making. It 
overvalues short-run administrative and 
organisational changes as keys for increasing 
public policy effectiveness. This undervalues 
the importance of long-run and substantive 
changes, which rely on managers having 
greater professional expertise specific 
to each policy area (and requiring more 
advanced higher education than most UK 
policy profession staff actually have).
Officials are individually and collectively 
responsive to public opinion, keen to avoid 
criticisms, and committed to equal treatment 
of citizens at the point of service. These 
qualities are (generally) replicated in other 
public services.
There is no statutory protection of civil 
servant independence. The ‘Armstrong 
Doctrine’ holds that ‘the civil service has no 
constitutional personality separate from that 
of the government of the day’. So, UK senior 
civil servants have only a weak capacity 
to ‘speak truth to power’. They especially 
have not been able to curtail ministerial 
hyper-activism (for example, changes made 
solely for the sake of demonstrating a new 
minister’s control), pointless party political 
policy churn, and legislation that was little 
used after its passage into law.
Public administration in the UK is generally 
effective and reasonably modern. The 
civil service has a well-developed pattern 
of continuously or regularly undertaking 
reforms and looking for best practices 
elsewhere to adopt. The UK’s record in 
digitally transforming public services is a 
reasonable if not outstanding one, especially 
in the heyday of the Government Digital 
Service (2011–15), but less so now (see 
below).
The NPM organisational culture means 
that senior UK civil service officials may be 
party-politically neutral, but show a chronic 
bias towards ‘new public management’ 
(NPM) approaches. NPM greatly over-
values the importance of ‘managerialism’, 
‘leaderism’ (exaggerated faith in strong 
leadership) and public/private ownership for 
substantive service development. It greatly 
under-values the salience of digital change, 
evidence-based policy-making, workforce 
expertise commitment, and the incremental 
improvement of services in continuously 
growing productivity.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Whitehall has a strong tradition of 
contingency planning and rallying around 
in resilient ways in crises, plus an ability to 
see issues through despite resources being 
scarce.
The same over-orientation towards 
managerial reorganisations and strong 
leadership has been spread strongly into 
policing, local government and the NHS by 
Whitehall interventions.
Corruption and fraud in the civil service 
is rare and through central government 
vigilance this norm has been extended 
into devolved governments and other sub-
national agencies.
The ‘revolving door’ denotes a set-up 
where senior mandarins can retire or leave 
their posts, but then move into private 
consultancy jobs or posts in public service 
contractor firms. Critics argue that it also 
creates a pro-outsourcing NPM bias. Rules 
supposedly safeguarding the public interest 
by limiting moves to beneficial jobs are only 
weakly enforced, as a 2017 NAO report 
noted.
The increased financial involvement of 
private sector firms in delivering critical 
public services (via privatisation, the 
private finance initiative and public-private 
partnerships) has sometimes worked. But 
at other times it has weakened the stability 
of public service, importing new sources 
of financial instability and risk (as with the 
Carillion bankruptcy, see above) and poor 
productivity change (see below).
There have been some notable and 
recurrent lapses in the equal treatment of 
some black and ethnic minority citizens, 
women and people with physical or mental 
disabilities within the police, prisons 
service, NHS and local government, with 
a succession of adverse scandals. The 
Windrush saga exposed a systematic race-
biased Whitehall policy stance enforced over 
many years (see below).
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Citizen redress processes have always 
been weak in conventional public services 
(see below). They have been made far 
more complex and often impenetrable 
by the contracting and commissioning by 
private sector firms in services areas, and 
by NGOs in many welfare state and social 
services. Legal and administrative provision 
for complaints and redress in these areas 
lags many years behind organisational best 
practice.
A few corruption blackspots remain, 
especially in areas like overseas sales of 
defence equipment, and private contractors 
taking over government-run services on a 
payment-by-results basis.
Future opportunities Future threats
The Brexit move to ‘take back control’ (and 
its many associated difficulties) may create 
an ‘overload’ at the centre that impels both 
ministers and Whitehall and the civil service 
to cease blocking the delegation of more 
powers and freedoms to devolved and local 
governments.
The burden of new legislation and statutory 
instruments imposed by any abrupt 
Brexit transition could overload Whitehall 
capacities, but might be handled better 
given an extended transition period. An early 
Deloitte consultants’ report argued that 
Whitehall really needed 30,000 more civil 
servants to process over 500 Brexit-related 
projects, sparking angry denunciations by 
the May government. Nothing like this level 
of extra resource has so far been made 
available.
Even though post-Brexit regulatory changes 
will now be ‘sifted’ by MPs, the planned 
extensive use of ‘Henry VIII’ powers in the 
Brexit transition to make new executive 
orders with reduced parliamentary or public 
scrutiny means some Whitehall powers may 
go unchecked.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The growing use of social media (aided by 
the pervasive use of mobile phone cameras 
to generate photo and video images) has 
greatly increased the specificity and rapidity 
of citizen vigilance. The potential ‘audience 
reach’ of criticisms, and the speed and 
salience of news of mistakes, have also 
increased. Officials now confront a stronger 
discipline of public criticisms. So perhaps 
responsiveness – in better explaining 
policies, and in quickly correcting mistakes 
or services lapses – may improve.
The UK civil service will need to rebuild key 
skill sets and forms of expertise (for example, 
in trade negotiations or strategic economic 
regulation), which have been wound down 
during the 43 years of EU membership. 
These cannot be easily or quickly put in 
place, and will be costly to recreate. 
Some critics also argue that during the Brexit 
referendum and the prolonged negotiations 
in 2016–19 Brexiteers amongst ministers and 
MPs repeatedly undermined the legitimacy 
of civil service advice, alleging a pro-Remain 
bias amongst senior officials whenever 
policy papers presented information that 
they found unpalatable.
As austerity eases off, some of the pressure 
for digital changes has also ebbed away, 
with the Government Digital Service (GDS) 
budget cut back and an absence of any clear 
ministerial lead (see below). May has moved 
digital change out of the Cabinet Office to 
an expanded Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS), a ministry with a 
poor history in this area and little clout with 
other departments. 
A loss of EU migration is likely to adversely 
impact labour shortages, most particularly in 
the NHS.
‘New public management’ strategies plus 
many years of austerity policies have worn 
thin the UK state’s capacity to cope with 
crises and unexpected contingencies. The 
August 2011 riots in London and some 
other cities showed one kind of vulnerability, 
eventually requiring 16,000 police on the 
streets to bring them to an end. And the 2017 
Grenfell Tower disaster and scandals around 
building safety de-regulation demonstrated 
another facet of the same underlying fragility 
(see below).
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New public management, austerity and ‘zombie NPM’
Critics of conservative, state-shrinking policies often characterise them as ‘neo-liberal’, 
and see uncaring senior officials as complicit in over-cutting government provision. In fact 
public servants in the UK from the 1980s to around 2005 bought into a rather different set 
of doctrines called ‘new public management’ or NPM. Its central themes were
✦	 Disaggregation (chunking up large bureaucratic hierarchies into smaller organisations) 
to improve responsiveness;
✦	 Competition (especially between in-house providers and private contractors) to improve 
efficiency; and
✦	 Incentivisation (paying officials and contractors by results) to improve motivations for 
hitting targets.
NPM continued under the Blair/Brown governments – but in more ‘humanised’ ways, and 
with concessions to trade union interests.
Many commentators confidently predicted that the coalition government in 2010 would 
return NPM ideas to centre stage, not least because they had been the orthodoxy when 
Tory ministers had last been in power (back in 1996–97). But in fact, only one or two 
NPM-style changes were made – below the Whitehall level. They were implemented in 
a ‘zombie NPM’ style that soon ran into opposition, causing the intended changes to be 
heavily modified. ‘Free schools’, for instance, were supposed to boost competition and 
expand choice, but soon ran into regulatory problems, limiting their spread. The Cameron 
government also made some play with the idea of backing a ‘Big Society’ in 2010–13 
(supposedly preferable to a ‘big state’, and thus providing some ideological cover for 
austerity). This concept was always tenuous, especially as NGOs and the third sector were 
among the first to suffer from cutbacks. It disappeared for good after a Commons select 
committee found little substance to it.
The chief zombie-NPM ‘reform’ was a reorganisation of NHS administrative structures 
pushed through by Cameron’s first Health Secretary, Andrew Lansley. Eventually 
implemented in 2012–13, at a huge cost (between £2.5bn and £4bn), it created Care 
Commissioning Groups, supposedly run by consortia of GPs. CCGs ‘buy’ services from NHS 
acute hospitals, which were also mandated to ‘commission’ more services so as to allow 
more private firms to bid for ‘work packages’. The result was a massively complex ‘quasi-
market’ scheme that Cameron had to ‘pause’ and try to simplify, before it was finally put into 
action. Of the promised CCG improvements in commissioning and savings in management 
costs there has been little or no sign, and instead acute controversies have grown over a 
‘postcode lottery’ in access to costly drugs or fertility treatments. Some prominent private 
sector contracts for acute hospital services have also already failed. 
In spring 2018 May and the then Health Secretary (Jeremy Hunt) criticised the Cameron-
era changes, admitting that they were dysfunctional. The Prime Minister commented:
‘I believe that, as our NHS evolves, and delivers more joined-up care across 
different services, we should make sure the regulatory framework keeps in 
step and does not become a barrier to progress… So I think it is a problem 
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that a typical NHS Clinical Commissioning Group negotiates and monitors 
over 200 different legal contracts with other, different, parts of the NHS. It is 
too bureaucratic, inhibits joined-up care, and takes money and people away 
from the front line.’
May promised new legislation to streamline the system, but the chances of this are 
currently hard to assess.
Meanwhile in Whitehall austerity meant reversing many earlier NPM changes. The high 
salaries for leaders under ‘incentivisation’ schemes proved unaffordable, as did the 
luxury of multiple executive agencies created in the 1990s. Top pay was promptly capped 
to the level of the Prime Minister’s salary, and many agencies re-absorbed into central 
department groups. ‘Light touch’ regulation supposed to encourage competition collapsed 
in financial markets in 2008–10, prompting a huge prudential re-regulation by 2015. The 
Grenfell Tower disaster in June 2017 showed that building controls and fire safety had been 
deregulated into meaninglessness (see below).
Detailed analysis of new public management’s claims to have saved money and improved 
government efficiency also suggested that the whole NPM experiment did not realise any 
cost reductions or efficiency improvements. And while the structural costs of austerity were 
diffused, by 2017 evidence accumulated that their consequences had become potentially 
far-reaching. For example, the annual growth in UK life expectancy, which had been strong 
before 2010, slowed to a complete standstill after 2011, for no clear reason except the 
increased stress placed on the NHS.
Digital era governance in the UK
Although ministers still publicly adhered to NPM discourses, the demands of severe 
austerity proved to be key in some parts of Whitehall finally adopting a completely different 
public management strategy under Cameron, called ‘digital era governance’ (DEG). As 
its name implies, DEG strategies focused on the reform potential arising from embracing 
a wholesale transition to online and digital services. Two other elements directly reversed 
NPM by stressing the ‘reintegration’ of services, to provide more simplified and cost-
effective structures, and ‘needs-based holism’ to ensure that public services meet citizens’ 
needs in the round (and are not provided in an uncoordinated way to ‘customers’ of highly 
siloed agencies).
DEG strategies were often poorly implemented by officials trained only in NPM approaches, 
but austerity pressures were so severe that they prevailed. In 2011 the Cabinet Office 
required departments to adopt ‘digital by default’ approaches, where at least 80% of 
services are delivered to people online. The Department for Work and Pensions was 
catapulted from ignoring online services completely (as it did from 1999–2010) into 
embracing digital by default as an integral part of the Universal Credit change, a huge 
benefits and tax credit re-integration push forced through by the Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions (and former Tory leader) Iain Duncan Smith.
With the backing of Cabinet Office Minister Francis Maude and the Prime Minister, a 
Government Digital Service was established in 2011 and assigned increasing amounts of 
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funding to develop a single main government website (gov.uk) and put in place online 
services. Figure 3 shows that its funding expanded greatly, as savings from doing things 
online were realised, peaking in 2018. However, the ever-zealous Treasury, plus a backlash 
from departments bringing their IT operations back in-house, curbed its operations from 
2016. Funding has now declined appreciably.
Intelligent centre and devolved delivery
One major problem for the UK’s centralised welfare state is that of establishing a so-called 
‘intelligent centre/devolved delivery’ structure, where the digitally scalable services are 
handled once by Whitehall or national agencies, and local services focus on things that 
really require in-person delivery. For instance, England has 150 different library authorities, 
buying books together in around 70 consortia, and each developing their own very limited 
and very late ebook service. Yet 85% of the book stock is the same across local libraries, 
and many libraries are being closed by councils under intense austerity pressures. By 
contrast, there would be huge scaling savings from buying books and ebooks once at 
national level (which DCMS in Whitehall has never dreamed of doing), and with local 
libraries just focusing on liaison with local readers and users, plus their community activities 
and services.
Figure 3: The budget for the Government Digital Service, 2011–2020
Source: National Audit Office, 2017
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Public service delivery disasters
We noted (in Chapter 5.2) that the UK polity has a big problem with recurring policy 
fiascos, mistakes made at the top levels of government and the core executive. But the 
public administration system has a different if partly similar phenomenon, called ‘service 
delivery disasters’ (SDDs). These are not due directly to misguided decisions from the top 
(although these usually play some role). Rather, SDDs are unintended implementation 
catastrophes arising through the complex choices and interactions of overloaded or 
misguided ‘street-level’ bureaucrats.
A critically important recent SDD example, whose huge implications for public management 
are still unfolding at a major public inquiry, is the shocking Grenfell fire disaster in June 
2017. Here 72 people were burnt to death and hundreds more injured in a high-rise tower 
block in Kensington by a fast-moving fire. The blaze spread rapidly through the flammable 
cladding materials with which the block had been clad in a recent renovation. In the 
aftermath of the catastrophe it emerged that the building regulations system in England had 
been rendered completely ineffective by years of de-regulatory activity. Multiple changes 
had cut back fire service and later local authority involvement in regulation, in favour of 
making landlords responsible for ‘self-certifying’ safety. At the behest of aggressive building 
supply contractors, regulations on permissible materials had also been watered down into 
complete meaninglessness, with a host of radically new cladding technologies introduced 
for high-rise buildings with no effective checks of their flammability. The end result, clear by 
summer 2018, was that hundreds of high-rise buildings owned by local authorities were at 
risk of the same fate as Grenfell.
In addition to dozens of cumulative mistakes that had already created a bad situation, the 
SDD in the Grenfell case was magnified by many other failures. The responsible Whitehall 
department (DCLG) had been warned many times by coroners and MPs that fire safety 
needed new regulations, but did nothing, most notably after a 2009 fire that killed six 
people and showed the problem acutely. No fire sprinkler systems were fitted in any of 
around 500 social-housing tower blocks with a single staircase. When Kensington council 
renovated Grenfell Tower three years before the fire, they failed to spend £200,000 on 
sprinklers that might have kept its 300 families safe, and went with a lowest-price contract 
from a marginal contractor and using the very cheapest possible (and as it turns out highly 
inflammable) materials. The poor workmanship and faulty designs that made the fire 
worse were not spotted by local building regulations staff. Finally, to compound all these 
problems, the fire service teams who attended the fire spent their first two-and-three-
quarter hours there mistakenly advising residents to stay in their flats (the previous safety 
advice from smaller fires to avoid smoke), rather than to flee. Some residents were reached 
and evacuated, but of those who heeded official advice, most were unreachable and died 
where they stayed.
Other serious service delivery disasters have included the deaths of 90+ patients in a 
hospital infection outbreak at a Tunbridge Wells hospital placed under extreme NPM 
managers, and the unnecessary deaths of perhaps 400 patients at Mid-Staffordshire NHS 
Hospital Trust over a long period of years, where managers coerced staff into losing all 
respect or care for many people. The squeezing of childcare services has produced a long 
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sequence of cases where children at risk from their parents were neglected by multiple 
agencies, or not protected from abuse in children’s homes. Similarly, mistakes by the 
police and probation services in not following up information to prevent harm to vulnerable 
people, or in releasing dangerous people from custody, created public alarm. And in mid-
2017 the government decisively retreated from its earlier NPM commitment to using private 
sector prisons, as treatment and cost issues emerged.
The squeezing of social care costs under austerity has produced very rapid declines of 
standards in social care homes, which has led to multiple abuse cases and ever-gloomier 
assessments by the Care Quality Commission battling to re-regulate the sector. Together 
with poor care for the elderly in NHS settings, this area became a huge issue in the 2017 
election campaign when the Tory manifesto tried to raise more receipts from dementia 
sufferers’ estates. By mid-2017 social care was rated the most important issue in UK politics 
by 14% of opinion poll respondents.
A final, purely Whitehall scandal emerged in 2018 over the denial of UK citizenship to 
dozens of elderly black citizens who had arrived in the UK during the 1950s and early 60s 
(the so-called ‘Windrush generation’, after an early ship many travelled to the UK on) and 
been resident here ever since. In 2010 Theresa May became Home Secretary and began 
cracking down on immigration in an attempt (never remotely successful) to approximate 
the Tory pledge to reduce net immigration to ‘ten of thousands’ of people. As this policy 
increasingly seemed fruitless, in 2013 May enforced a ‘hostile climate’ for migrants. 
Immigration officials who had contact with Windrush generation people began demanding 
documentation which had never been supplied to them at the time, and refusing to accept 
evidence of long residence. By 2018 numbers of elderly black people had actually been 
deported back to Caribbean islands, before it emerged that official documentation of 
their arrival had existed in the Home Office (in the form of ‘landing cards’) but been lost 
during reorganisations in intervening years. Cross-partisan pressure from MPs forced the 
abandonment of the ‘hostile climate’ for Windrush people and their children.
Weak citizen redress
A prominent casualty of the austerity period has been the once-strong mechanisms in 
British government providing for citizen complaints and redress. A shift to regulation of 
private or quasi-market provision, and the fact that more and more services have come 
to be delivered by private firms or NGOs on behalf of public agencies, has made seeking 
redress far more complex than before. NHS complaints processes have been cut back, 
despite the escalating level of NHS liabilities for medical mistakes, and the development 
of ‘no blame’ methods common in other ‘safety bureaucracies’ has proceeded very slowly 
in healthcare. As delivery worsens, and expenditure cutbacks became more evident, so 
citizens have become inured to falling ‘service’ standards and to not getting redress for 
things going wrong. From 2005 on, efforts to get a single public sector ombudsman 
for England (on the same lines as those in Scotland and Wales) and improve complaints 
services online were repeatedly stymied by Cabinet Office indifference. 
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Conclusions
At one time, British public services were a justified source of citizens’ pride in their 
democracy (famously summed up in the 2012 Olympic opening ceremony’s celebration 
of the NHS). By 2017, however, the UK’s public services were in a poor condition. 
Overstretched, staffed by now underpaid workers, facing apparently indefinite real wage 
restraint, and with services hollowed out by seven years of austerity, they nonetheless still 
command a great deal of public respect and huge levels of staff commitment. But after two 
decades of ‘new public management’ the British state’s administrative apparatus is now a 
fragile thing, vulnerable to acute failures and ‘public service delivery disasters’, and devoid 
of many of the ‘strengths in depth’ that once sustained it.
Patrick Dunleavy is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the LSE and co-
Director of Democratic Audit there. He is also Centenary Professor in the Institute for 
Governance and Policy Analysis (IGPA), University of Canberra.
What criteria for openness, transparency and freedom from 
corruption should government and public sector bodies meet in  
a liberal democracy?
✦	 All government departments, agencies and public sector bodies should be open to 
public scrutiny through various easy-to-use means such as freedom of information 
legislation or open data, with clear channels and procedures for explaining policies 
and statistics in straightforward ways.
✦	 Openness policies should extend fully to the private contractors and other providers 
(like NGOs and ‘third sector’ bodies) delivering services under contract to public 
authorities. Elsewhere in the private sector, registers detailing company ownership 
should be fully open, enforced and complied with across UK and associated 
territories.
✦	 Extensive information on policies, change plans and options should be published 
pro-actively (voluntarily) by public bodies without the need for citizens to act or ask.
✦	 Public bodies and politicians should promote an ‘open culture’ and create a series of 
deliberative and participative tools to allow citizens to take part in policy-making and 
key decisions.
✦	 Anti-corruption policies should be well-developed, and rigorously and independently 
enforced. Citizens and enterprises should be confident that public administration 
and services will be delivered impartially, equitably and within the rule of law. 
‘Whistleblowers’ should be protected and allegations of bribery or corrupt payments 
for services or lax regulation should be rigorously investigated.
How transparent and free from 
corruption is UK government?
For citizens to get involved in governing themselves and participating in politics, they must 
be able to find out easily what government agencies and other public bodies are doing. 
Citizens, NGOs and firms also need to be sure that laws and regulations are being applied 
impartially and without corruption. Ben Worthy and the Democratic Audit team consider 
how well the UK government performs on transparency and openness, and how effectively 
anti-corruption policies operate in government and business.
5.4
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The openness and transparency of government and public institutions critically influences 
the health of democracy. Information flows between government and society are one of 
the key foundations on which public participation, the interest group process and an active 
civic culture are built. Figure 1 shows the main parts of this picture and how they interact.
Figure 1: The main types of transparency and anti-corruption policies
In the UK, a central and well-established element of government openness is provided 
by the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, passed in 2000 and operational since 2005. It 
allows people to request information covering policies, implementation, spending and 
activities by over 100,000 public bodies, from government departments and agencies to 
local government, the NHS and police. It is overseen and regulated by an independent 
Information Commissioner.
The legal presumption is that all information in the government sector should be made 
available if requested. As with similar laws across the world, there are major exemptions 
for all intelligence and security issues (which are kept completely secret). Departments 
and agencies may also refuse to supply information that covers parts of the policy-making 
process, that is commercially sensitive, or in cases where an ‘excessive cost’ would be 
involved in assembling and providing what is asked for. Although it remains a ‘complex’ legal 
grey area, FOI can also be used to obtain information material ‘held by a private company 
“on behalf of” a public authority with which it has a contract’. Alongside FOI stand a host of 
sector-specific laws, governing everything from access to medical records to food labelling, 
as well as the General Data Protection Regulation that enables access to personal data. 
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A second wider set of policies that support ‘public sector openness’ includes the 
production and publication of official statistics, legislation and regulations and public 
registers of the interests of politicians. These sit alongside older forms of publicity such 
as select committee meetings in Parliament or local government meetings that are open 
to the public. 
Most recently, governments have sought to make data available in digital formats that can 
be easily re-used – known as open data. The government portal data.gov.uk now hosts 
more than 46,000 datasets covering a whole range of topics from departmental spending 
to health and safety statistics and ministerial gifts. At local government level, all councils 
publish online any spending over £500. Here the presumption is of ‘following the money’, 
so that if taxpayers have already paid to produce information, it should be made available 
free of charge – a radical revision of ‘new public management’-era policies of charging for 
bulk official information wherever possible. Data published by the government and other 
public bodies can also drive new platforms or apps. Some important innovators include 
MySociety’s TheyWorkForYou (on MPs’ activities) or Public Whip (with MPs’ voting records), 
while others such as Spend Network gather raw data on procurement.
Turning to the issues around private sector openness, most firms require commercial 
confidentiality in certain areas to protect their business. However, some degree of 
openness is also needed for markets and the business world to operate effectively, and 
to develop trust between businesses. This has long been achieved by conventional 
business disclosure requirements – such as registering company activities, annual reports 
and accounts with Companies House, listing directors of firms and providing information 
needed for publicly listed companies. Firms, executives, suppliers and customers all 
need to know something about the counterparts with whom they are dealing if markets 
are to work well. There are also transparency requirements where government meets 
business, with, for example, greater openness around contracts and coverage of business 
information held by public bodies or over ownership (see below).
However, the conventional business disclosure requirements are perfectly consistent 
with companies and wealthy people taking elaborate precautions to disguise the full 
scope or nature of their interests and activities behind ‘front’ companies and delegated 
personnel. In some cases, corporations have created complex (often byzantine) chains of 
ownership, where the true owner of a business, property or assets may not be easy to find. 
Accordingly, the newer private sector openness policies shown in Figure 1 seek additional 
information and clarity about who owns what, both for citizens, for those doing business 
with corporations, and for tax authorities. Some civil society movements and politicians also 
seek to force more information on into the public realm on corporations’ tax payments, 
which remain confidential (see below). 
Transparency and anti-corruption policies are closely linked and overlap. Greater openness 
and publicity is seen as a vital means of preventing and exposing corrupt activity, as the 
arrows in Figure 1 indicate. Although the UK civil service, Whitehall and its agencies claim 
to be an open and ‘clean’ government, serious corruption problems have existed before 
– and they still recur across issues such as party funding, the self-regulation by politicians 
of their expenses, and the regulation of some kinds of business, from UK arms sales to 
overseas government customers to shell companies and UK tax havens.
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Recent developments
All recent Prime Ministers have promised greater openness in government. However, 
Theresa May’s actions appear to have been less than meets the eye. She has often seemed 
to want to reject the style of the Cameron core executive that preceded her, and has been a 
secretive Prime Minister, unenthusiastic about any forms of transparency that could damage 
her government – especially after the loss of her majority in the Commons in 2017. 
May inherited from David Cameron a series of ongoing anti-corruption reforms, as between 
2010 and 2016 the UK sought to position itself as a global leader in anti-corruption at home 
and abroad. As Home Secretary, May had championed openness around ‘stop and search’ 
and police disciplinary openness – although, as critics pointed out, she was keener on 
her opponents’ transparency than on her own. May also led the UK’s work as part of the 
anti-money laundering action taken by the EU. In 2016 the government published a wide-
ranging anti-corruption plan, and followed this up with a government-wide strategy in late 
2017 (see below). 
Some of these reforms appeared to lose momentum once Cameron resigned – perhaps as 
an unavoidable by-product of Brexit eating up parliamentary time, but perhaps also due to 
a lack of ministerial interest. The anti-corruption champion appointed by Cameron stepped 
down, and there was no replacement for more than six months. Other Cameron-era global 
initiatives on making business more transparent have become mired in controversy or were 
delayed (see below).
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The general climate around openness 
and transparency agendas in the UK is 
positive, with cross-party support. A mixture 
of openness laws, executive instruments 
and technology have together created a 
flourishing openness ecosystem, with some 
strong forces pressuring for openness and 
preventing corruption.
The modern UK has only recently 
transitioned from a long-established 
administrative culture that used an all-
encompassing notion of ‘official secrets’ – in 
which everything not explicitly published was 
treated as confidential.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The Labour governments of 1997–2010 put 
in place a series of important openness 
reforms. The unusual conservatism of 
the Cameron–Osborne Prime Minister 
and Chancellor team (2010–16), plus 
the presence of the Liberal Democrats 
in the coalitional government with the 
Conservatives (2010–15), produced a 
further period of UK government activism 
on transparency issues, especially around 
private sector openness, though enthusiasm 
for making government more open dwindled. 
Since 2016 momentum has been slowing, 
and public sector openness policies have 
especially appeared to slow down if not 
stagnate.
Freedom of Information has important 
effects in increasing the openness of UK 
government and changing previously 
restrictive official cultures of secrecy. 
The 2005 legislation has frequently 
been lamented and queried by Whitehall 
mandarins and Westminster politicians, not 
least Tony Blair, who pushed through the law 
then regretted it. However, it has endured 
for 15 years and most attempts to increase 
restrictions have been fought off, while it has 
expanded in some areas.
There are already considerable exemptions 
under FOI legislation that allow government 
agencies to reject requests. There has been 
a notable decline in performance regarding 
FOI, with more requests refused over 
time and some reduction in the number of 
requests being made (see below). There are 
also recent examples of high-level political 
resistance in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
in 2018.
Public sector openness has increased in 
the digital age because large amounts of 
previously closed data and information can 
now be cheaply and effectively published 
online in forms that facilitate further analysis. 
‘Open data’ policies have made an impact, 
especially in tandem with the growth of the 
Government Digital Service (GDS) during 
2010–18.
There has been a slowing in open data 
publication, with some promised information 
lagging well behind formal timelines (see 
below). GDS has had its budget cut severely 
from 2019 on (see Chapter 5.3).
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Private sector openness policies designed 
to ensure that UK companies behave 
responsibly in developing countries have 
had some impact – for example, the UK 
has signed up to the OECD convention to 
curtail the bribery of foreign officials. Within 
the UK, greater transparency has been 
achieved in forcing public disclosure of who 
is the ‘ultimate beneficial owner’ of firms 
and properties, with new plans outlined for 
extending this to foreign companies, as well 
as with UK extractive companies working 
internationally. Greater business openness 
about gender pay inequalities have improved 
business social responsiveness.
Progress on several other anti-corruption 
fronts has been limited. Policies designed 
to force more disclosure about the use of 
natural resources from companies with large 
extractive industry holdings are ongoing but 
controversial. The Cameron government 
introduced a new ‘Google tax’ designed 
to raise more revenues from US and other 
MNCs paying little or no corporation tax in 
the UK, but by 2017 it raised only £270m, a 
fraction of the ‘missing’ taxes according to 
‘tax shaming’ campaigners, and as it turns 
out not actually paid by Google or other 
similar tax-avoiding MNCs.
Anti-corruption policies in government are 
well developed. Britain regularly scores 
highly as a country free of corruption, usually 
ranking 8 to 10 in perceptions of corruption 
out of 176 states covered worldwide. 
Nonetheless, organised networks of open 
government and anti-corruption activists 
have pushed for further reforms. 
Under David Cameron, the UK was a 
founding member of the Open Government 
Partnership (OGP) in 2011. This involved a 
commitment to a UK government-wide anti-
corruption plan and, later, an anti-corruption 
strategy. DfID have proved a high-profile 
champion. Devolved governments also have 
a series of openness initiatives in train.
Despite claims of being corruption free, 
problems persist. In Northern Ireland, a 
major scandal involving a Renewable Heat 
Incentive (RHI) scheme was uncovered in 
late 2017, with severe political consequences 
for the government. Yet the discovery of 
past long-run ‘cop-culture’ cover-ups (such 
as that over the Hillsborough football 
stadium disaster or undercover cops having 
relationships with surveillees), plus more 
recent evidence of official inaction on some 
child sex abuse and other malfeasance 
cases, has raised fears of a wider official 
malaise in UK public life. The issue of 
funding of political parties has continued to 
prove controversial and, in particular, the 
funding of the ‘Leave campaign’, as has MPs’ 
links to donations. The #MeToo campaign 
(following allegations of harassment in 
Hollywood) extended to the UK and led to 
new independent procedures, introduced in 
July 2018 (see below).
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Anti-corruption policies in business are 
complex to introduce, since business law 
has to be carefully tuned so as not to 
deter investment nor hinder UK success 
in international trade. However, action has 
been taken to yield more information on UK 
companies’ beneficial ownership overseas. 
UK tax agency HMRC has also worked 
with Swiss authorities to identify potential 
British tax evaders following reduced 
banking secrecy there, and HMRC has also 
followed up on the ‘Paradise Papers’ leaks 
of apparent tax evasion structures used by 
wealthy people and companies in November 
2017. The opening up of UK dependencies 
and overseas territories that are tax havens, 
begun under David Cameron, is ongoing.
There is a lack of government support and 
interest in promoting openness or anti-
corruption in business. A number of key anti-
corruption policies appeared to have slowed 
down or lost momentum. Major questions 
have been raised but left unanswered about 
whether bribes or commissions are paid 
on some very large overseas contracts, 
especially in the area of arms sales – where 
British Aerospace (BAe) is the world’s third 
largest armaments company.
There is a general push for secrecy around 
Brexit, while a lack of UK resources and 
perhaps declining powers of scrutiny outside 
EU law may increase the potential for 
domestic corruption.
There are also obvious areas of weakness 
around the transparency of political parties’ 
funding and funding of campaigns, as shown 
with claims around ‘dark money’ and the 
Brexit referendum campaign (see Chapter 
2.4).
Future opportunities Future threats
The ongoing Whitehall commitments under 
the Open Government Partnership, plus 
experiments at devolved government level, 
offer opportunities for more transparency 
and anti-corruption activities. Local 
government is often a site of openness 
experiments and the new metro mayors may 
also offer an opportunity here. 
Brexit will take time, energy and attention 
away from many other reforms. Leaving 
the EU may also have adverse effects on 
particular pieces of previously operating 
openness legislation, especially over 
environmental disclosures and information. 
A range of potential sources of political 
corruption, such as over expenses, lobbying 
and funding of party and referendum 
campaigns, have not yet been fully 
addressed.
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Freedom of Information 
The Freedom of Information (FOI) Act has been in place since 2005. It played a part in 
opening up the MPs’ expenses scandal in 2009 and a host of important stories. Behind 
the headlines, FOI is primarily a local tool, and around four in every five requests goes to 
local government: in 2012 an FOI request even led to the mass resignation of one village 
council. Although most requests are for micro-political or small issues, FOI has had some 
unexpected benefits, such as leading to an online postbox finder. And, by pressuring for 
the release of local restaurant hygiene inspection reports, it ushered in the ‘scores on the 
doors’ system of hygiene ratings. 
The scope of the FOI law has also gradually expanded. Since 2012 it has covered exam 
bodies and databases, and in 2015 the strategic rail authority came under FOI, owing to a 
change in its accounting designation. Scotland’s separate FOI (Scotland) Act (FOISA) for 
devolved matters has also gradually extended to cover independent schools and certain 
leisure trusts.
The UK’s Third National Action Plan for the Open Government Partnership (OGP) 
committed to implementing the recommendations of a 2016 independent review 
commission, which included greater pro-active transparency over pay for public bodies 
and enhanced publication of FOI statistics. Changes were to be enshrined in a new code of 
practice issued under section 45 of the FOI Act. It was due in the summer of 2016 but was 
delayed, and was finally published in the summer of 2018. 
There has also been pressure to strengthen FOI’s legal control over private contractors 
working for government – on which UK central government spends over £180bn a year. 
Section 5 of the Act allows governments to extend the law to cover companies within the 
scope of the Act itself, a power that the Commons’ Public Accounts Committee and others 
have previously urged should be implemented. However, successive governments have 
not extended FOI to private sector contractors, despite manifesto pledges and promises to 
do so. Since 2016, the Information Commissioner has championed the inclusion of private 
sector bodies directly under FOI, something that the independent review suggested and 
that MPs have continually pushed through a series of Private Members’ Bills. 
Recently evidence has accumulated of a slowdown in FOI responses across central 
government. The numbers of requests to central government per year fell by 6% from a 
high point of 51,000 in 2013 to 46,681 in 2017. One worrying assessment concluded that 
departments are ‘withholding more information in response to FOI requests’ and showed 
that ‘since 2010, departments have become less open in response to FOI requests’. While 
39% of requests were ‘fully or partially withheld’ in 2010 a full 52% were ‘fully or partially 
withheld’ in 2017. This is probably a combination of austerity and a lack of staff but also 
dwindling enthusiasm and negative signals from above. There may also be a negative 
cycle at work whereby as more departments perform badly, so it becomes less likely that 
there will be any repercussions. Analysis by the BBC also pointed to a lack of action by the 
regulator. 
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Figure 2: The percentage of Freedom of Information requests where government 
departments refused a response, from 2010 (third quarter) to 2018 (second quarter)
Source: Institute for Government Whitehall Monitor, 2018, p.95, and updated data June 2018
Notes: IfG analysis of Cabinet Office and Ministry of Justice data; covers resolvable cases only.
As well as dwindling enthusiasm and co-operation, since 2005 there have been a series 
of ‘behind the scenes’ attempts at ‘dismantling’ or chipping away at parts of the law, with 
roughly one proposal floated every 18 months to two years. They began under Tony Blair 
with a proposed introduction of fees or change to the cost limits in 2006, followed by an 
attempt via a Private Members’ Bill to remove Parliament from the FOI law in 2007. Under 
Gordon Brown in 2010 there was a proposal to remove from the scope of FOI the monarch 
and heir (Prince Charles). The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition then mooted 
a clampdown on ‘industrial users’ of FOIs (2012–13) and the Conservative government 
suggested extending the ability of departments to refuse information (2015). In 2016–17 
the UK government proposed that fees should have to be paid for the second stage of FOI 
appeals (which had previously been free). However, a ruling on a related issue over access 
to justice from the Supreme Court in July 2017 put this policy in doubt. In June, the draft 
Patient Safety Bill also sought to make secret certain investigations in hospitals. 
Figure 3 shows that most Prime Ministers have been somewhat ambivalent about the Act. 
In his autobiography, Tony Blair famously bemoaned passing the law: 
‘The truth is that the FOI Act isn’t used, for the most part, by “the people”. 
It’s used by journalists. For political leaders, it’s like saying to someone who 
is hitting you over the head with a stick, “Hey, try this instead”, and handing 
them a mallet’ (2011, pp.516–517).
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Though the evidence does not support this claim, it tells us much about how politicians 
see it. Just as Blair regretted his innovation, so Cameron described FOI as a ‘buggeration 
factor’ and claimed it was ‘furring up the arteries of government’.
Figure 3: UK Prime Ministers and policies on FOI, 2005–2017
Prime 
Minister
Extension Pushback
Tony 
Blair
Passed FOI Act in 2000 (but in his 
memoirs regretted it).
Fees for FOI applications were mooted 
(c.2006), and Blair (tacitly) supported an 
attempt to have Parliament excluded from 
the scope of FOI in 2007.
Gordon 
Brown
An extension of the 30-year 
rule was made in 2009. A slight 
extension of FOI was made to new 
areas.
Excluding the Cabinet from FOI was 
considered. The monarch and heir were 
specifically excluded from FOI provisions 
in 2010.
David 
Cameron
An Open Government Policy 
(OGP) was adopted, especially 
an open data agenda (from 2010 
onwards) and transparency about 
the beneficial ownership of firms 
(introduced in 2013).
Considered changes to limit ‘industrial 
users’ of FOI requests (in 2012–13) and 
appointed a FOI commission to review the 
Act’s operations (2015–16).
Theresa 
May
OGP commitments were made to 
strengthen FOI, but then delayed.
Proposed removing a free right to a 
second appeal against FOI decisions in 
2016.
Despite repeated claims by politicians and officials, there is in fact little evidence that FOI 
is harming records or efficiency. However, there appears to be growing resistance and 
avoidance at the top of government, strengthening in the course of 2017–18. 
Issues around FOI have been particularly controversial in Scotland, which has its own 
FOISA law covering Scottish matters. It differs slightly from the UK-wide law. In 2018, 
following complaints by Scottish journalists, a report by the Scottish Information 
Commissioner concluded that the government had sought to create a ‘two-tier’ system 
delaying journalists or politically sensitive requests. At the same time, Northern Ireland’s 
most senior civil servant, David Sterling, informed the inquiry into the Renewable Heat 
Incentive (RHI) scheme that records had not been kept of certain sensitive political 
meetings, as politicians wished for a ‘safe space where they could think the unthinkable 
and not necessarily have it all recorded’. Given the nervousness of both the DUP and Sinn 
Féin, officials had ‘got into the habit’ of not recording all meetings.
As well as a reaction against FOI, there were a series a series of attempts to limit openness 
or control information more generally. Perhaps most significantly, the UK government 
passed the Investigatory Powers Act in 2016, which gave a legal right to bulk data 
collection by intelligence agencies and, as one newspaper put it, ‘legalises a range of tools 
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for snooping and hacking by the security services’. Although there were independent 
judicial checks built into the Act, there was considerable national and international concern 
at the potentially wide-ranging powers it gave intelligence agencies. In parallel, the Law 
Commission examined the possibility of strengthening the Official Secrets Act, which 
would, campaigners argued, make whistleblowing more difficult. This rapidly ran into 
media controversy for its flawed consultation processes and was put aside for further 
consideration until autumn 2018 (see Chapter 3.3).
Public sector openness and ‘open data’
Successive governments have also pushed a series of ‘open data’ reforms, enshrined in 
variety of codes or released via data portals. Whitehall and local government has voluntarily 
published more of its data sets to allow private sector and civil society actors to analyse 
them, and potentially to develop new applications. Early in his premiership David Cameron 
promised that all Whitehall departments would publish every spending decision worth over 
£25,000. The move aimed to help small businesses so they could see where opportunities 
for tendering might exist, and to give citizens oversight of what was being contracted 
on their behalf. At the same time local government in England was asked to publish all 
spending decisions over £500. Figure 4 shows that while many central departments 
complied, publication remains patchy and was often late, perhaps falling off also in recent 
years. 
Figure 4: How well different Whitehall departments have met the UK government’s pledge to 
publish monthly details of all spending over £25,000 
Source: Institute for Government, Whitehall Monitor 2018, and updated data up to July 2018
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One key focus for open data is procurement. Public sector contracts in the UK are currently 
worth around £93bn per year according to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). 
Successive governments have innovated with open contracts, publishing central and local 
government contracts according to the Open Contracting Standard. It has also developed 
(and subsequently re-developed) the one-stop Contracts Finder website, a searchable 
database of public contracts.
A series of parliamentary select committees and MPs have kept up the pressure for more 
openness about procurement, and have identified ‘significant gaps’ in contractual data. The 
Institute for Government pointed out that, despite Contract Finder, ‘there is no centrally 
collected data outlining the scope, cost and quality of contracted public services across 
government... it’s currently impossible to find out precisely how well contractors delivering 
government services perform’. In the wake of the collapse of the large government 
contractor Carillion, one select committee called for greater published information about 
contracts and how procurement arrangements have worked or met its targets, while also 
suggesting coverage by FOI. Campaigners have also called for greater openness of local 
government procurement: as one pointed out ‘the day after Carillion’s collapse it was only 
possible to locate less than 30 of the 400+ government contracts with Carillion through the 
national Contracts Finder dataset’. 
Elsewhere across government, the Department for International Development (DfID) have 
used open data as part of their and anti-corruption strategy, creating a development tracker 
that allows users to see development spending around the world. In 2018 the government 
also announced the publication of a tranche of OS master map data covering a range of 
property boundaries and other crucial ‘building block’ data of great use to developers. 
Other open data commitments have fared less well. A commitment to publishing local 
election results data according to a common standard proved slow-moving because of the 
need to carry with it local authorities. And an initiative to push for publication of election 
candidate diversity data under section 106 of the Equalities Act, which would enable us to 
see any gender gap in those running for office, has been delayed repeatedly.
The OGP national action plan assigned a lot of weight to extending the UK’s single official 
website, gov.uk, built by the Government Digital Service (GDS), which also consulted data 
users in shaping the future of open data, sought to identify core data assets and published 
information on grants data. There are concerns that GDS is showing signs of lacking both 
overall vision and that there was ‘an absence of really deep thinking’. This links to criticism 
of the government’s lack of an overall strategy or joined-up thinking across government 
and from 2018 the GDS budget was cut back (see Chapter 5.3 on the civil service). In 
April 2018, digital policy and control of GDS was transferred to the Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport (a department with a poor digital record in areas like libraries 
policies). DCNS is also not a core department (unlike the Cabinet Office) and there was 
further concern that the move would lead to a lessening of priority, especially with rapid 
ministerial turnover. 
There is also considerable movement on openness at the devolved level. Both the Welsh 
and Northern Irish governments (following proposals ongoing before the Assembly’s 
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collapse) are also making reforms to their own data portals, and the Welsh government’s 
Well Being Act of 2015 also mandates publication of information and targets. The Scottish 
government published a separate openness plan with commitments to more transparent 
budgets and greater local community involvement.
Anti-corruption policies in the government sector
The UK is rated highly by most international indexes on anti-corruption policies in 
government. For instance, the leading NGO, Transparency International, assigns it a 
score of 82 (out of a maximum 100 points) and ranks it as the eighth least corrupt country 
globally. The 2016 OGP national plan included pledges to ‘incubate an Anti-Corruption 
Innovation Hub to connect social innovators, technology experts and data scientists with 
law enforcement, business and civil society to collaborate on innovative approaches to 
anti-corruption’. It also pledged to ‘develop, in consultation with civil society, and publish 
a new anti-corruption strategy ensuring accountability to Parliament on progress of 
implementation’. A strategy document to 2022 was published in 2017 but contained few 
specific new actions. The Labour opposition also applied pressure on what it claimed was 
the government’s failure to push ahead with its anti-corruption agenda.
However, highly consequential corruption issues have none the less occurred, notably in 
2017–18 in Northern Ireland when the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) scheme, known as 
the ‘cash for ash’ scandal, broke. Begun in 2012, this policy initiative aimed to create an 
incentive for businesses in Northern Ireland to switch from gas and oil to wood pellets. 
However, owing to errors in the scheme, businesses could profit from it (for example, by 
farmers just burning wood pellets pointlessly to attract the subsidy). The bill for the policy 
reached £500m and, after officials expressed concern that it was being used fraudulently, 
the scheme was rolled up in 2016. Although whistleblowers sought to expose the problems 
as far back as 2014, it was not until further claims were investigated by Stormont’s 
Public Accounts Committee that the scandal broke. The inquiry remains ongoing with 
controversial claims over access, undisclosed contacts and officials failing to record key 
meetings.
A motion of no confidence in Arlene Foster, the minister who initially set up the scheme, 
but who was by the time the scandal was exposed, the leader of the Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP), the largest party in the Executive, failed due to Stormont’s cross-community 
procedures. Foster called instead for a full public inquiry, which has not materialised. The 
scandal contributed a great deal to the resignation of Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuiness and 
the collapse of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in January 2017. In June 2017 
Foster and the DUP offered Theresa May key backing to stay in office at Westminster on a 
confidence and supply basis, in return for a ‘bung’ to boost spending in Northern Ireland by 
a reputed £1.8bn. The Assembly remains suspended. 
Many civil society critics argue that corruption is deeply rooted in the link between money 
and UK politics, in particular areas such as expenses and funding of parties and campaigns.
There has been controversy over use of expenses in the House of Lords and the influence 
of donations and dark money in the Vote Leave campaign. In November 2017 the electoral 
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commission announced an investigation into donations by Arron Banks to the Leave 
campaign. In 2018 it emerged that he met with the Russian ambassador and other officials 
11 times in the run-up to the referendum, when his potential involvement in businesses in 
Russia was also discussed. In July 2018, the Electoral Commission concluded that Vote 
Leave had broken the law, and fined them £61,000 and passed the information to the 
police. The Select Committee for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport continued detailed 
scrutiny, despite refusals to appear by key witnesses including Dominic Cummings, 
campaign director of Vote Leave. Research by Peter Geoghegan and others has also 
raised a series of unanswered questions over other Leave donors, including a substantial 
contribution to the campaign routed via the DUP in Northern Ireland. The government 
legislated to open Northern Ireland political donations henceforth, but conveniently limited 
transparency to all donations made after July 2017.
In the last years of the Major government (1992–97) allegations of Tory ‘sleaze’ became 
influential, linking together both corruption issues and allegations of sexual misconduct. 
This media focus has not returned, but in October 2017 sexual harassment revelations and 
allegations about the Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein triggered internal publicity 
and the #MeToo campaign which spread to the UK. A series of allegations of harassment 
by MPs and ministers were made, with an anonymous list circulated of alleged abusers and 
scandals. As Rainbow Murray pointed out, the scandal was ‘not just about sex, it’s about 
power’ and the abuse is rooted in the silence and secrecy that surrounds the operation of 
the whips and party loyalty. 
Within a year, two Cabinet ministers (including the First Secretary of State Damian Green) 
and two whips resigned from the government over alleged sexual misconduct issues. 
MPs from across parties have faced allegations, with the whip withdrawn from several 
Conservative and Labour MPs. The Conservative Party instituted a new code of conduct 
and disciplinary procedures while Labour set up an independent inquiry. The same strand 
of scandal also spread to the Liberal Democrats and to the Scottish Parliament. Elsewhere 
in Parliament, a series of high-profile figures were accused of bullying, including the 
Speaker John Bercow and Labour MP Keith Vaz. 
In the summer of 2018, further scandal hit parliament with Transparency International 
opening up issues around hospitality from corrupt regimes including Azerbaijan, Russia 
and Bahrain. In the same month, DUP MP Ian Paisley Jr was suspended from Parliament 
over undeclared lavishly funded holidays and paid advocacy, with the possibility raised that 
the UK’s 2015 recall law could be used to trigger a by-election (although the constituency 
petition required ultimately did not receive enough signatures for this to take place).
At local government level the abolition of the audit commission, the decline of the local 
press and the relatively weak power of Overview and Scrutiny Committees inside local 
authorities generated fears that municipal corruption could become more likely or, at 
least, less detectable. Critics hope that new citizen based innovations such as the Bureau 
of Investigative journalism’s ‘bureau local’ and people’s audit can help maintain some 
scrutiny. England’s new elected metro mayors do not answer to an assembly (unlike the 
London mayor), but instead face only scrutiny by councillors from local authorities from 
across the metro area under arrangements that citizens will find hard to follow.
2515.4 How transparent and free from corruption is UK government?
Transparency in business
We noted above that legally mandated disclosure and registration of conventional business 
information is important for market actors to know whom they are dealing with when 
contracting for the supply of goods and services, accepting payments or extending credit. 
The UK system is run from Companies House and fulfils these needs reasonably well, so 
that basic information on companies and directors can be found. In addition, of course, this 
information is critically important for the efficacy of both government regulation and tax 
collection. 
However, this system contains enough loopholes for companies to stay disguised 
behind ‘shell’ and ‘nominee’ companies and interlocking holdings by wealthy people and 
corporations, while also sheltering various (legal) tax havens in some form under the UK’s 
jurisdiction. (In theory, tax authorities should be able to get further than other actors, but in 
practice their enquiries are also often frustrated.) 
At first sight, these might seem to be issues that Conservative ministers would not want to 
pursue. The Tory Party is pro-business, deplores the regulatory burden on companies, and 
so is generally against increasing it. It is also not keen on imposing barriers to innovations. 
Yet in the coalition period Cameron, Clegg and Osborne publicly took a dim view of such 
loopholes leading to tax losses. With the austerity pressures acute from 2010 to 2016, the 
potential missing revenues from non-disclosure of ownership and legal tax avoidance were 
matters of concern to ministers, as was the symbolism of closing (or critics would say, to be 
seen trying to close) ‘tax haven loopholes’ in UK overseas territories and dependencies at 
a time of deep cuts. Ministers could make political capital from the symbolism of targeting 
‘abuse’ of the system and the link to money laundering and crime. The politics of this, 
sometimes labelled the ‘Nixon goes to China’ effect, meant that such action would be 
easier for a Conservative politician to bring in than for a Labour politician.
David Cameron promised an open register of ‘beneficial owners’ of UK businesses in 
2013, under which all companies would have to identify their real owner or ‘people with 
significant control’. Since June 2016, all companies have been mandated to keep such 
a register and submit the data to Companies House. As of 2018 more than 3.6 million 
companies had registered data. 
Global Witness argued that the data had illuminated a huge area of business activity, 
attracting large public interest and setting a new agenda for more reform, especially 
over the opening up of previously opaque areas such as Scottish Limited Partnerships. 
As a measure of the success, the Companies House data had more than two billion hits 
since June 2015, compared with six million per year before. However, analysis of the 
data also revealed significant issues with data quality and compliance, with ‘thousands 
of companies...filing highly suspicious entries or not complying with the rules’, including ‘a 
statement that the company has no [person with significant control], disclosing an ineligible 
foreign company as the beneficial owner, using nominees or creating circular ownership 
structures’. 
In 2016, following consultation and an open government partnership commitment, the 
UK promised to extend beneficial ownership specifically to ‘establish a public register of 
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company beneficial ownership information for foreign companies who already own or buy 
property in the UK, or who bid on UK central government contracts’. The government aims 
to have the new extended register operational by 2021, though others have called for it to 
be sooner. 
A related issue that spans across both public and private sector openness concerns the 
(still completely confidential) tax arrangements of large companies in the UK, which often 
involve ‘booked activity shifting’ to the most tax-efficient locations in a multi-national 
corporation’s (MNC) operations. From 2008 onwards a range of social movements sought 
to ‘shame’ MNCs (especially American ones) into paying more corporation tax, which is 
extensively evaded by elaborate ownership and domicile arrangements. 
Tory ministers began to be concerned that, in addition to the Exchequer losing tax 
revenues, there were complaints from medium and small British businesses that they 
were facing unfair competition from the likes of Amazon because they paid corporation 
tax and the multi-nationals did not. To head off these criticisms without tackling the much 
larger underlying legal problems, Osborne created a special tax of 25% levied on large 
company profits that were diverted via ‘contrived arrangements’ to tax havens. Some giant 
companies (like Amazon) announced that they would stop booking profits via Luxembourg 
to avoid paying the tax, but the anticipated revenue gain to the Exchequer proved to be 
relatively small.
The push for private sector openness also led to the UK government taking part in the 
international Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative and publishing data on UK 
extractives companies. This means that ‘more than 90 oil, gas and mining companies 
incorporated in the United Kingdom or listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) now 
publish their reports on payments to governments each year under UK law’. In parallel, 
the government has developed greater openness in this area through a series of EU 
regulations. A government review in the summer of 2018 concluded that ‘the law had been 
a success in bringing greater transparency to the sector with no unnecessary costs to 
business, and found no indication that it harms companies’ commercial interests’. A working 
group continued meeting on this into 2018, but some changes have become mired in 
controversy between government and civil society.
One of the most high-profile recent controversies over business disclosure rules occurred 
over companies publishing data on gender pay gaps. A legal requirement to publish 
gender pay data was first contained in section 78 of Labour’s Equalities Act of 2010, but 
was then not implemented by the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition. The Cameron 
government then committed in 2015 to mandate all companies over 250 employees to 
publish data, with the promise that this would ‘put the UK at the forefront of gender pay 
transparency’. The May government continued (and took credit for) the bipartisan policy so 
that from April 2018 companies have had to produce the data. By July 2018 some 10,660 
business had reported and the gov.uk website includes a searchable database of all 
reports, so employees can find out how their firm is performing. 
The issue received high levels of media attention and kickstarted a Twitter campaign and 
grassroots initiatives encouraging female employees to speak up in their organisations. 
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However, a survey for the Young Women’s Trust found that many businesses were 
unconvinced: ‘44% of those making hiring decisions say the measure introduced last 
April will not lead to any change in pay levels’. In 2016, the Women and Equalities Select 
Committee concluded that pay publication focuses attention on the issue, but is not in itself 
a solution: ‘It will be a useful stimulus to action but it is not a silver bullet’. It recommended 
that ‘the government should produce a strategy for ensuring employers use gender pay-
gap reporting’.
Anti-corruption policies and business
Aided by the shifts towards more business openness, at the global level the UK under 
Cameron also sought to become a champion of anti-corruption in business, pushing 
national and international anti-corruption commitments. Reforms included extending new 
beneficial ownership regulations and, as a continuation of the coalition government’s 
efforts, some clamping down on tax havens and money laundering. 
The initiative on beneficial ownership (above) partly reflected a desire by ministers to meet 
acute concerns expressed domestically and internationally that corrupt or ‘dirty money’ was 
flooding into the UK, with the property market in London being especially used to ‘launder’ 
large amounts of cash. Investigations into anonymous foreign property ownership in 
London found that of ‘14 new landmark London developments... four in 10 have been 
sold to investors from high corruption risk countries or those hiding behind anonymous 
companies’. There was further analysis of home ownership in the elite areas of Kensington 
and Chelsea borough in the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire disaster.
David Cameron pledged in 2016 to open up information from the (many) tax havens 
numbered amongst the UK’s dependencies and overseas territories by adopting public 
registers of beneficial ownership. Under Cameron, these were only partially successful, 
resulting in data-sharing agreements and promises to create (non-public) registers, and 
further undermined by revelations of Cameron’s own tax affairs. 
Corporate corruption and issues of tax avoidance continued to dominated the headlines 
towards the end of 2017 with the leak of the so-called ‘Paradise Papers’, which comprised 
13.4 million documents from the Appleby legal firm based in Panama and detailing the 
offshore arrangements of a host of UK wealthy people and companies. Revelations 
included the offshore investments of the Queen, linked to a company accused of 
exploiting the poor, and the secret tax and company arrangements of key Conservative 
donor Lord Ashcroft, who had committed to paying UK tax in order to sit in the House 
of Lords. When Transparency International examined Scottish Limited Partnerships, it 
described them as the UK’s ‘homegrown secrecy vehicle’, with more being set up in one 
year than in the whole of the last century.
Theresa May had committed to continuing Cameron’s agenda of clamping down on tax 
avoidance, but she and the Chancellor Philip Hammond refused to promise a full register 
of off-shore trusts following the ‘Paradise Papers’ leak. In May 2018, a cross-party 
group of MPs pressured the government to open up beneficial ownership registers to 
British overseas territories such as the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. The 
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government agreed to do so but has since met resistance and even calls for ‘constitutional 
separation’ from some of the territories.
One area where the May administration has pushed a number of ‘signature’ openness 
reforms has been for greater transparency over executive pay. In mid-2017 the BBC was 
forced to make changes and publish the pay levels of its senior figures and stars paid over 
£150,000. These details generated a heated controversy over the stars’ remuneration 
and the organisation’s striking gender pay gap. However, in August 2017 the government 
watered down its election promises to open up business executive pay more generally. 
Elsewhere in the UK, there has been new anti-corruption policy innovations. In June 2017, 
the Welsh government launched a new Code of Conduct for ethical employment in 
supply chains designed to prevent modern slavery and blacklisting of workers. The new 
Code is applicable to all its suppliers and the government hopes it will spread across the 
Welsh economy. 
Brexit
Transparency and anti-corruption issues have featured heavily in the Brexit process. In 2016 
the government appeared committed to a closed process with, as May put it, no ‘running 
commentary’. The UK government sought to use the powers of the royal prerogative 
to shield the negotiations (and to cover up divisions with government). However, a 
combination of leaks, rulings from the courts and pressure from Parliament has led, so 
far, to more openness than the government intended. This has included a White Paper, 
two Prime Ministerial speeches and a series of appearances in front of select committees. 
Although the government has been slow to publish position papers compared with the EU, 
these began emerging late on. 
Freedom of Information provisions played a role with requests exposing turnover of officials 
at the new DExEU and the lack of preparation in the new Department for International 
Trade. Requests were used to attempt to access legal advice allegedly held by the 
government on whether Article 50 can be revoked. FOI and parliamentary questions and 
motions, including arcane procedures employed by the Labour opposition, were used to 
attempt to force the government to publish 50 papers on the effects of Brexit. In a single 
day in November, six select committees were examining various aspects of Brexit. In 2018, 
FOI was also used by Sky News to examine local authority Brexit contingency plans, finding 
that few could identify any benefits, and were looking into contingency planning for unrest 
or traffic chaos. 
However, as the UK seeks new trade deals across the world, questions hang over the 
future of its anti-corruption reforms. The OECD warned that a combination of distraction 
and pressure to water down bribery laws may undermine the UK’s anti-corruption policy. 
As one expert argued: ‘With Brexit, and the need to hunt out new business in developing 
markets, a process of benign neglect may set in.’ It may be that ‘there is the danger of 
(more or less deliberate) neglect of the UK’s previously high profile anti-corruption thinking’.
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Conclusions
Attitudes inside the UK’s government and public services towards transparency and 
openness have changed a great deal since 2005 and the advent of FOI. The changes 
made have attracted support from across the political spectrum, so that reforms have been 
cumulative and (so far) un-reversed. Yet the risks of openness being again eroded, or of 
matters that have become transparent closing up again, remain substantial. And, despite 
British politicians’ evident conviction that the UK’s experience holds lessons for the world, 
some serious gaps in anti-corruption policies remain.
Ben Worthy is Lecturer in Politics at Birkbeck College, London and blogs about 
transparency and open data issues at https://opendatastudy.wordpress.com/. 
What does democracy require for the way in which the British 
withdrawal from the EU is decided, implemented and achieved?
✦	 Only Parliament can finally decide the terms on which Brexit is achieved. The 2016 
referendum provided a significant statement of popular support to leave the EU. But 
giving effect to this decision is a highly technical process that only Parliament can 
navigate successfully – because there cannot be a plebiscite on each sub-issue. 
Parliament is accountable only to the electorate. The composition of voters can 
change at the next election, and previous voters can also change their minds.
✦	 Cross-party co-operation and engagement are needed, especially in a hung 
parliament, as now. The full Brexit process will not be resolved by March 2019, 
but will take several more years, perhaps even multiple parliamentary terms. 
So it necessitates careful deliberation from all MPs and parties in Parliament. 
Parliamentary democracy ought to epitomise informed debate by elected 
representatives and the capacity to compromise on the best course of action.
✦	 Government must openly communicate with the public about the achievable 
outcomes and feasible timelines for Brexit. Acknowledging the complexity of the 
task can (re)build trust with negotiating partners, and build public recognition of 
the need for an extension to the time to negotiate a withdrawal agreement or a 
transition period.
✦	 A progressive, sectoral and methodical plan of law reform is needed, prioritising 
the rule of law. Separating the UK from the EU is a highly technical and challenging 
process of law reform. There is now no pre-EU/European Community law for the UK 
to rely upon, and people have built their lives and businesses on the certainty of 
In terms of Brexit
Many political and constitutional steps are needed in order for the UK to leave the 
European Union, after 45 years as a full member. Cumulatively they form one of the biggest 
constitutional changes in British history, and one dogged by intense controversy and 
disputes. Joelle Grogan examines how far the Brexit process can meet democratic criteria 
for such a momentous transition, or may fall short of these standards.
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the law of the last 40 years. Sensibly reforming the law to reflect the UK in a post-
Brexit era entails committing to prioritise legal certainty and accountability above 
expediency and ease of policy implementation. It will also require a well-resourced 
and enlarged civil service, with open and transparent consultation processes.
✦	 Robust accountability mechanisms are needed to scrutinise government decisions 
taken under the Brexit process. The 2016 referendum gave a mandate to withdraw 
as a member of the European Union, but not to radically change the foundations of 
the British legal system. Such delegated powers as are necessary to quickly address 
deficiencies in the law arising from Brexit must be balanced by effective and robust 
oversight mechanisms. This includes acknowledging the central duty of the judiciary to 
review these decisions so as to uphold parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.
✦	 The process must fully involve the devolved legislatures. Scotland and Northern 
Ireland voted in the majority to remain, and the land border with the Republic of 
Ireland makes Brexit’s implementation of critical importance to Northern Ireland.  For 
both Scotland and Wales, the previous devolution legislation assigned all powers to 
the devolved Parliament or Assembly that were not reserved to the UK. Yet the May 
government’s Brexit process seems to involve two stages, in which all powers shift 
back to Westminster, and only then are devolved down – potentially breaching the 
previous constitutional understanding (see Chapter 5.6). Navigating this cannot be 
done by Westminster imposing a solution.
Brexit is in the eye of the beholder. The 2016 referendum result is seen by many Leavers as 
the ultimate expression of the popular will of the British people. But Remainers often picture 
it instead as the upshot of a poorly framed question put to an ill-informed, and under-
representative segment of the population – even the product of a ‘gerrymander’. In the 
context of such all or nothing Brexit paradigms, auditing the democratic legitimacy of Brexit 
is challenging. However, there are clear and manifest issues with regards to the process by 
which Brexit is accomplished, rather than the outcome and the decision itself.
Recent developments
Since the 2016 referendum, subsequent change of Prime Minister, and advent of a 
hung parliament in mid-2017 much has happened. There was hard-fought litigation on 
parliamentary sovereignty to trigger Article 50, and the government decision to go ahead 
began a two-year countdown. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act aims to solve the 
issues of the separation of the UK from the EU within two years of exit day (at the end 
of March 2019). Very little of any of these changes has directly addressed the issues 
immediately pertinent to the Brexit process.
The 2017 general election was called to ‘strengthen the mandate’ of the Conservatives in 
the EU negotiations and to provide certainty in the leadership for the Brexit process, and 
‘stability’ in government. In fact it resulted in a loss of both. While Brexit was a key election 
issue, neither of the top two parties engaged with each other on the detailed strategies to 
be pursued following the election. Both remained deeply divided on them throughout 2018 
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(see Chapter 3.1). Since the election, then, the only certainty has been uncertainty, with viable 
Brexit options evolving in ways that have made analysis of them one day obsolete the next. 
By March 2018, one year after the triggering of Article 50’s two-year timeline, there was a 
draft agreement with the EU, though with considerable differences remaining over key 
issues such as the Northern Ireland border, the process of dispute resolution, and at that 
stage little progress on a future UK-EU relationship (post transition). By early autumn 2018 
the Prime Minister had dragooned her Cabinet (after two key resignations) into accepting 
the ‘Chequers agreement’ plan for the UK to retain free trade in goods with the EU 
countries, but not in services – denounced by critics as a fudge. Whether this compromise 
would succeed against Tory backbench rebels or be accepted by the EU negotiators 
remained unclear at the time of writing, with the UK government also publishing papers 
outlining ‘a calamity’ if the UK should instead leave on a ‘no deal’ basis.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The electorate’s 2016 rejection of 
membership of the European Union is an 
assertion of the importance of national 
sovereignty, and the desire for national 
control over laws, especially the key issue of 
migration.
By respecting a slim majority vote in an 
advisory referendum, where the campaign 
itself was subject to criticism for the lack of 
informed debate and uncertain positions, 
the government is pursuing a mandate 
which is unclear in its terms, meaning or 
consequences. What national sovereignty 
concepts can mean in the contemporary 
world remains unclear.
In promptly following up the Brexit vote, 
the government shows democratic respect 
for the (narrow) majority result of the EU 
referendum.
One consequence of according so much 
weight to an unclear mandate is to weaken 
the power of Parliament. Open debate 
about the consequences of Brexit has 
been curtailed as MPs face a backlash 
by pro-Brexit media and politicians, 
whereby expressing any doubts about 
the consequences of Brexit is seen as an 
attempt to undermine the people’s verdict.
The rights of millions of EU and UK citizens 
are being devalued to ‘bargaining chips’ 
in negotiations between the EU and the 
UK. Such a debasement of the meaning of 
citizenship and individual rights is a violation 
of basic tenants of a democracy.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The long delays in developing any clear 
UK negotiating position, and its late arrival 
in summer 2018, mean that negotiations 
with the EU may come to an end without a 
deal having been achieved. Embracing the 
possibility of a ‘no deal Brexit’ is a failing in 
the withdrawal negotiation process, because 
the public cannot easily estimate what may 
follow the March 2019 deadline on this 
pathway.
Rare and unjustified public attacks on 
the judiciary by leading politicians and 
powerful media following the Miller decision 
are a concerning trend, one eroding the 
separation of powers and respect for the 
institutions of democracy.
Future opportunities Future threats
The Brexit process presents an 
unprecedented opportunity for large-scale 
legal reform over a broad range of areas. 
The flexibility that could arise from the 
separation from EU norms presents a very 
significant opportunity for new practices and 
policy to develop.
The May government’s proposed framework 
for legal separation from the EU and reform 
of UK law has significant flaws. It sacrificed 
certainty for speed by delegating broad and 
sweeping powers to government ministers 
– allowing them scope to change vast areas 
of law with little oversight or review from 
Parliament, which is undemocratic by nature 
and design.
Withdrawing from the European Union 
will result in the restitution of substantial 
legislative and administrative powers to 
national, regional and local governments. 
This presents an important potential 
opportunity for increasing decentralisation 
and devolution of power to the most 
appropriate level of government, those 
closest to citizens.
The division of powers returned from the 
European Union between the UK national 
government in Whitehall and devolved 
governments is likely to be determined by 
the Westminster Parliament. Yet the de facto 
‘legislative supremacy of government’ 
seems likely to increase further. In addition, 
concerns remain that more power will be 
centralised in Westminster, and the current 
powers of the devolved governments to act 
under EU law could be diminished (or even 
lost in some cases).
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Future opportunities Future threats
New bilateral relationships between the 
UK and other countries can be formed as 
the UK seeks to find new trading partners 
across the globe. Post-Brexit, there may be 
new demands for democratic input in the 
process of agreeing trade deals, where they 
have previously been within the prerogative 
power of the executive.
The Brexit process represents a threat to 
rights based on EU law, for example, relating 
to workers, consumers, animals and the 
environment. These rights may be vulnerable 
to repeal where it becomes politically 
expedient to do so.
Rights codified by the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights will not be converted 
into UK law, where they do not otherwise 
exist. The removal of robust remedies for the 
violation of rights systematically weakens 
current redress and remedy mechanisms 
against (ab)use of executive and legislative 
power.
Is the European Union (Withdrawal) Act undemocratic?
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is designed to deliver both the legal 
separation of the UK from the EU, but also a degree of legal certainty within the UK 
following Brexit. The process will:
1. repeal the European Communities Act 1972;
2. convert directly effective EU law into UK law; and
3. delegate significant powers to the executive to remedy or prevent deficiencies arising 
from the conversion of EU Law (a ‘Henry VIII’ power’).
The European Communities Act 1972 was the parliamentary act that previously (and until 
March 2019) gave effect and supremacy to EU law in the UK. It underlay a significant 
corpus of law in the UK by incorporating the acquis of EU membership, notably the EU 
Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, into British law. Repealing this Act 
without adequate transition mechanisms may result in a high degree of uncertainty about 
which law applies (or continues to apply), where and when. Many legal commentators have 
highlighted multiple concerns arising from the design of this process. The most significant 
issue relating to the democratic legitimacy of Brexit concerns the use of delegated 
powers by ministers. The EU (Withdrawal) Act delegates power to government ministers 
to create secondary legislation which will change, amend or remove retained EU-law on 
an unprecedented scope and scale. An estimated 800 to 1,000 statutory instruments have 
already been envisioned, but this is likely to be an underestimation of a possible ‘legislative 
tsunami’ that may result from this Act.
Constraints on the use of delegated powers to change or remove primary or secondary 
law are limited, while the power to determine where secondary legislation is needed is 
broad. Ministers will also decide the level of parliamentary scrutiny. Following criticisms in 
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the Commons and Lords during the Withdrawal bill debates, a compromise was agreed to 
create a ‘sifting committee’ of MPs who will scrutinise statutory instruments. Yet this remains 
a weak device. And in some limited cases, instruments may even be made without any 
draft being laid before Parliament. 
The likely delegation of legislative power away from Parliament raises pressing concerns 
for the accountability and transparency of the new arrangements, strengthening the 
legislative supremacy of the executive. Beyond the ‘sifting committee’ scrutiny, there is no 
proposed requirement on the government to provide explanation, justification or evaluation 
of the impact of their changes made to the law. This approach could compromise legal 
certainty and individual rights, and give government ministers leave to implement policy 
choices without Parliament. For all the intention of ‘taking back control’, such a design will 
be less democratic, create more uncertainty and ultimately weaken Parliament, as power is 
centralised in the hand of very few people in Whitehall.
Will the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice be 
undemocratic post-Brexit?
To a significant extent the main ‘Brexit issues’ will be determined by a Withdrawal 
Agreement with the EU, and not by the UK’s Parliament (or executive) acting alone. These 
issues include questions about the Northern Irish border with the Republic of Ireland; 
the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK and of UK citizens in the EU; Gibraltar; the 
settlement concerning the UK’s remaining financial liabilities to the EU; and of course the 
future terms of trade between the UK and EU. However, these matters are just the headline 
issues so far. Many more issues will need settlement, including cooperation on matters of 
security, crime, family and civil judgments.
A key question has been whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has 
any jurisdiction in the UK following Brexit. The issue captured headlines following the ‘red 
line’ announced by Theresa May. The CJEU’s function is to ensure the uniform application 
of EU law across all member states. It acts as a final arbiter in the case of disputes that 
fall within its jurisdiction, and provides an authoritative interpretation of EU law to be 
equally applied across all member states.  Asking whether it is democratically legitimate 
to have regard to the jurisdiction of the CJEU is misplaced. In most liberal democracies, 
the judiciary are generally unelected in order to insulate them from the vagaries of day-to-
day politics and to preserve judicial independence. Whether or not the UK will fall under 
the jurisdiction of the CJEU on certain EU-related issues post-Brexit remains part of the 
complex resolution of the future relationship between the UK and the EU, and will depend 
on whether it will be necessary for participation in the single market at least for goods.
Could there be another ‘Miller judgment’?
The 2016 Miller judgment by the UK’s Supreme Court was a powerful statement of the 
centrality of Parliament and the rule of law, above and beyond the powers of the executive. 
Under the judgment, the government alone does not have authority to make law which 
changes or removes domestic rights of individuals. To trigger Article 50, the government 
must be authorised to do so by an Act of Parliament. 
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The key result of Miller was a brief (137-word) Act of Parliament that gave authority to the 
Prime Minister to notify the EU of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU under Article 
50. This Act did not give authority to the Prime Minister to agree to adopt the Withdrawal 
Agreement on behalf of the UK. (From the EU perspective, the Withdrawal Agreement 
would need to be adopted by a qualified majority vote, which requires that it is supported 
by at least 72% of the remaining 27 member states and representing at least 65% of the 
total EU population.) It can therefore be assumed that any withdrawal agreement must also 
be passed by the Westminster Parliament. Not doing so would likely result in Miller 2.0.
However, further questions around the Brexit process concern the immunisation of 
executive power from judicial challenge, and the removal or weakening of individual 
rights, by virtue of how withdrawal is implemented. Both of these concerns are at issue 
in the context of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. It is highly likely there will be 
extensive litigation arising as a result of Brexit. The July 2017 Unison judgment concerning 
the constitutional right to access to justice can also be recognised as a shot across the 
bow from the Supreme Court for future Miller-type litigation. In a searing section of this 
judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed their role in ensuring that the executive carries 
out its functions in accordance with the law, and as regards its view on parliamentary 
democracy, the rule of law, and access to justice:
‘Without such access [to the Courts], laws are liable to become a dead 
letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the 
democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless 
charade.’ (R(Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, at 58 (per Lord 
Reed).
We may guess how the courts will be likely to regard any Brexit process that does not 
respect these fundamental values.
Would a second referendum deliver democratic legitimacy?
The 2016 referendum delivered a result so surprising to all sides that no clear preparations 
had been made for a Leave vote, and subsequent revelations about the Leave campaign’s 
breaches of spending limits and Russian interference in the campaign have both raised 
question marks about the legitimacy of the narrow Leave vote. However, campaigners for 
a second referendum for a long time faced barriers such as whether the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU) would accept a second referendum after Article 50 had been triggered, 
and whether a second vote might not just easily produce another (perhaps larger) Leave 
majority.
However, opinion on the ground has changed and the lack of clarity about what Brexit deal 
will happen, including the continuing possibility of a no deal outcome, have strengthened 
demands for a referendum to confirm or reject the final arrangements. Many people are 
still hoping for the UK to remain a member state of the EU, and for them it may be a case 
of what was done by a referendum can only be undone by a referendum. From an external 
perspective, the question of whether it is possible to ‘un-trigger’ Article 50 is likely to be 
answered as a political rather than a legal question, and EU elites still believe it is likely in 
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the affirmative. However, as the EU institutions and member states commit large time and 
investment in preparation for UK withdrawal, such political will may dissipate.
Critics (including this author) argue that such a referendum is at once too early and too late. 
It is too early for a deal to have been concluded (even in abstract) with the EU-27 which 
can then be put to referendum, and too late for the decision to be determined by the UK 
electorate as negotiations have begun. In practical terms, there is no frame of question 
that could be presented to the electorate that would satisfy all sides and be immune from 
accusations of bias or betrayal. 
From a fundamental constitutional perspective, there should not be a second referendum 
on Brexit – because that would only serve to further undermine the system of 
parliamentary democracy. Unless we accept a radical reformulation of the constitutional 
foundations of the UK, a democratic Brexit process is one that reasserts Parliament’s 
sovereignty over the 2016 referendum, but recognises that this sovereignty extends only to 
the UK borders – while Brexit reaches far, far beyond them.
Conclusions
Brexit has raised a great variety of legal issues and the development of the process has 
had some heartening and some worrying consequences for the UK public’s understanding 
of the role of Parliament and legislation on the one hand, and of judges and the courts on 
the other. Amongst the most worrying have been the pillorying of judges in the media as 
‘enemies of the people’ (an accusation that was not condemned by government ministers, 
and was perhaps even condoned by them), or attacks on the CJEU for a lack of democratic 
legitimacy. Both fundamentally misunderstand the whole notion of an independent 
judiciary, and the central values of the separation of judicial power from the executive and 
legislature and of the rule of law. Similarly virulent attacks on Remain MPs as ‘saboteurs’ 
for exercising judgement on implementation arrangements for Brexit reflect a poor 
understanding of what a legislature is for.
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 What does democracy require of the UK’s devolution 
arrangements?
✦	 Devolved institutions must be representative and legitimate. They must rely upon 
freely and fairly elected institutions, built on and promoting democratic principles. 
Regional and local democracy should bring decision-making closer to the citizens. 
Devolved institutions should be created with popular endorsement to strengthen 
their legitimacy.
✦	 Devolution arrangements should be transparent and intelligible to the people they 
serve. The powers and competences devolved (that is, what functions are exercised 
and by whom) should be clear and comprehensible to the wider public. And the 
relationship between devolved authorities and the central government should be 
easy to follow. Clear and coherent devolution arrangements are essential if the 
general public are to hold decision-makers accountable. They are also key for policy 
actors at all levels of government in fostering more effective decision-making.
✦	 Under the principle of subsidiarity genuine scope for decision-making should be 
located as close to citizens (as low down in a governance hierarchy) as possible. 
This is to ensure that decisions attract consent, and interventions take place at the 
most effective and appropriate level of intervention.
✦	 Autonomous development is best fostered where devolved institutions can 
decide on their own democratic arrangements – such as setting their electoral 
arrangements and the size and nature of their political institutions.
The basic structure of the devolution 
settlements
Devolution encompasses a range of quite different solutions in three countries (Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland), plus markedly smaller delegations of powers to London and 
some English cities and regions. There remain important issues around the stability and 
effectiveness of these arrangements, which were designed to meet specific demands for 
national or regional control and to bring government closer to citizens. Diana Stirbu and 
Patrick Dunleavy explore how far relations between Westminster and the key devolved 
institutions have been handled democratically and effectively.
5.6
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✦	 Devolved institutions should be inclusive, and promote citizen participation by 
creating new venues and mechanisms for engagement on a wide range of issues: 
from early constitutional deliberation on the form and nature of self-governance 
adopted, through to the final policy-making process within the new system.
✦	 Democratically elected institutions must be able to effectively scrutinise the exercise 
of power at their appropriate level of government.
✦	 Constitutional and (or) legal protection is needed if democratic devolution is to work, 
requiring a formal, fair and clear mechanism for resolving disputes over powers 
and competencies between tiers of government. A system of inter-governmental 
and inter-parliamentary relations is needed to facilitate dialogue and negotiation 
between the different levels of authority.
✦	 Building new institutions takes a long time. So the arrangements of devolved 
governance should be durable and resilient in the face of political changes internally 
in their country or region, and at the UK level.
Most liberal democracies of any size in the modern world have moved away from being 
run as ‘unitary states’, with just one main centre of government plus a set of clearly 
subordinated local or regional authorities. For instance, some big European countries, like 
France, Italy and Spain, now have constitutionally protected regional governments, where 
before they were previously run as centralised Bonapartist states. Other liberal democracies 
are longstanding federal systems, notably Germany, the USA, Canada and Australia. So the 
UK’s rapid movement since 1997 towards creating more devolved government is something 
of a belated falling into line with wider trends in other medium to large democracies.
However, the UK follows a pattern of ‘organic’ devolution with varying powers decentralised 
to different countries and regions. This approach is very different from a federal state. 
Figure 1a shows that under federalism a written constitution (one that is normally fixed and 
hard to change) specifies just two ‘bundles’ of powers and competences. The first bundle is 
allocated to the federal or central tier, and the second bundle to the component states. All 
the states in federations have the same powers. The character of these allocations, along 
with the development of tax-raising powers and financial capacity at the two tiers, then 
create a system of inter-governmental relations. 
How does change happen in federations? The federal centre may pick up new functions 
not specified in the constitution, and it may equalise financial capacities across states. It 
can also subsidise the states to do things on its behalf, or otherwise intervene in society. 
But it cannot (easily) change the constitution’s existing allocation of functions. So the 
federal tier can only realise policy objectives that clearly fall within bundle 2 by persuading 
or incentivising the states who ‘own’ those issues. In addition, a Supreme Court polices 
the activities of both tiers of government impartially, and impartially regulates inter-
governmental relations.
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Figure 1a: How a federal government system works
By contrast, in the UK there is no written constitution, and the foundational principle of 
‘parliamentary sovereignty’ still implies that the Westminster Parliament ‘cannot bind itself’ 
legally (see Chapter 5.1). Alongside this, the highly political nature of the constitution 
allows for organic development to happen over time without the constraints of traditional 
constitutional amendment. A set of major policies (especially defence, foreign affairs, and 
most tax-raising and welfare) are ‘reserved powers’ belonging solely to the UK centre. 
Different sets of policy functions have been devolved to national institutions in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, in ways that politically seem binding, and may provide some 
constitutional protections to these governments. Yet as Mark Elliot  has observed: ‘As a 
matter of strict law, the UK Parliament has merely authorised the devolved legislatures to 
make laws on certain matters, without relinquishing its own authority to make law on any 
matter it chooses — including devolved matters’. As we discuss below, Westminster actually 
still legislates changes that affect devolved policy areas, albeit so far with the consent of 
the devolved countries’ legislatures. 
The extent to which devolved powers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are 
protected constitutionally is still somewhat obscure, and the picture is different in each 
area, and has changed rapidly. The Scotland Act 1998 (and as amended since, most 
recently in 2016) set things up so that unless a policy area was explicitly reserved to 
Westminster then across most internal or domestic fields (excluding tax, social security and 
trade) all responsibilities within Scotland belonged by default to the Edinburgh Parliament 
and government. By contrast, in Wales a list of powers was initially just given as ‘conferred 
matters’ that the Cardiff Assembly and government could run. In 2017 a new Wales Act 
moved towards the Scottish model, so that in a (more restrictive) list of areas the Assembly 
is now the default legislature.
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 Figure 1b: The UK’s devolved government system 
 
In Northern Ireland there is a legacy (imperial-type) provision for devolved powers to be 
suspended and then taken over and run solely by the Westminster government – and this 
‘direct rule’ situation applied from 1972, when the old Stormont model folded, until 1998 
when the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly first began operating. Since February 
2017 the Assembly and Executive have been suspended because of political deadlock (see 
below), but (in theory) the devolved institutions remain in being and direct rule has not been 
formally triggered. This has left the Northern Ireland civil service to operate established 
policies on a ‘caretaker basis’ without any (explicit) political control.
Within England extensive powers have been devolved to the executive mayor and London 
Assembly in London, and lesser sets of powers to executive mayors in some city regions. 
However, Westminster retains an (almost) untrammeled ability to alter who is responsible 
for any policy function within England.
There is also an as yet unsophisticated system of inter-governmental relations within the 
UK, in which Westminster/England is the dominant player, accounting for five-sixths (85%) 
of the population. There are only two key co-ordination mechanisms. First, most taxes are 
raised by the UK government, and it then allocates funding to the three devolved countries 
using a crude, fixed rule-of-thumb known as the ‘Barnett formula’. The three devolved 
countries get funding as a fixed ratio of English spending. So if the UK government cuts or 
raises public expenditure in England, the same happens to the transfers from Westminster 
to fund the devolved governments’ services. 
Second, the UK centre has recognised a convention (named after a peer, Lord Sewel) which 
says that Westminster will not pass laws falling within the policy sets or responsibilities 
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of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland without the consent of their legislatures and 
governments. The Scotland Act 2016 and the Wales Act 2017 embodied the Sewel 
convention in statute law for the first time, which was seen as a symbolic under-pinning for 
the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. What this 
means in practice is much debated (see below). 
The UK’s Supreme Court has begun to play a key role in regulating inter-governmental 
relations between Westminster/Whitehall and the devolved governments. The Court is 
independent of Whitehall, and can in principle regulate how the centre behaves. But it has 
historically done so only in rather a light touch way, deferring to the need for a (national) 
executive government to operate effectively. 
Recent developments: Brexit battles 
In the Brexit referendum Scotland and Northern Ireland, plus the devolved city-region 
in London (with roughly the same population size as the other two combined), all voted 
strongly to remain in the EU. But most of the rest of England and Wales voted to leave. In 
the lead-up to the March 2017 triggering of formal ‘leave’ processes under the EU’s Article 
50 a Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) of the three devolved countries and Whitehall 
ministers was resurrected by the May government to facilitate dialogue and consultation. 
(The Committee had previously been in abeyance.) It had some success on making 
progress on detailed issues, but also generated a lot of dissatisfaction. A series of key inter-
governmental disputes have occurred throughout the Brexit process. The legal fog around 
the varying allocations of powers between tiers of government in the UK noted above 
remains pretty intense still because in essence:
✦	 On the one hand the Brexit process involves the UK as a whole leaving behind a series 
of international treaty obligations, and treaty-making is clearly a Westminster reserved 
function;
✦	in addition, Westminster ministers argue that where a common policy previously applied 
within the EU to the whole UK territory (as with international trade) then for economic 
integration reasons it must continue to have a common policy stance post-Brexit. 
However,
✦	on the other hand, many of the EU powers that are being repatriated under Brexit cover 
areas, such as agriculture, fisheries, transport, regional development and infrastructure, 
that clearly fall within the ambit of the devolved government in Scotland and (to a lesser 
degree) Wales. 
Figure 2 summarises a complex series of battles that have taken place since June 2016, up 
to the time of writing (September 2018).
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Figure 2: Three Brexit battles involving the devolved governments
Issue or 
case
What the Scottish, Welsh and 
Westminster governments argued
What happened?
Miller case In December 2016 Gina Miller argued 
at the Supreme Court that the UK 
government could not trigger Article 50 
to leave the EU without getting approval 
from the Westminster Parliament. 
Ministers argued that they did not need 
parliamentary approval, but lost this issue.
The devolved governments supported 
the Miller challenge, and raised the 
supplementary question of whether, if 
Parliament were to so legislate, would 
that Act require the consent of the 
devolved legislatures? UK ministers 
argued that, because leaving the EU was 
a treaty matter, it fell wholly within their 
reserved powers. This was the first legal 
challenge around the Sewel convention.
The result was disappointing for the 
devolved governments. The Supreme 
Court concluded rather ambiguously: 
‘[T]he UK Parliament is not seeking 
to convert the Sewel Convention into 
a rule which can be interpreted, let 
alone enforced, by the courts; rather, 
it is recognising the convention 
for what it is, namely a political 
convention, and is effectively 
declaring that it is a permanent 
feature of the relevant devolution 
settlement’ (p.48).
 EU 
Withdrawal 
Act 2018
Both devolved governments argued that 
the Act could not proceed without the 
consent of their legislatures, because many 
of the powers transferred back from the 
EU to the UK related to policy areas where 
they have default responsibilities. Leaving 
UK ministers to decide where repatriated 
powers should sit between Westminster 
and the devolved governments could 
unilaterally alter the balance of UK-tier 
versus devolved-tier powers.
The UK government argued that some 
filtering at UK level was needed to maintain 
UK-wide policies in its areas of reserved 
powers, but that agreement would be 
reached with the devolved governments. 
The Scottish Parliament voted in 
summer 2018 to withhold consent 
for the EU Withdrawal Act, supported 
by all parties except the Scottish 
Conservatives. The issue of whether 
Westminster can proceed without 
Edinburgh’s consent will be tested in 
the courts.
The Welsh government initially sided 
with Scotland, but later agreed to the 
broad legal framework proposed by 
Westminster – and on a process for 
working through the details of which 
powers will be devolved to them and 
when (which is not yet clear). Wales 
then withdrew its opposition to the Act.
Continuity 
Bills
Both the Scottish Parliament and the 
Welsh Assembly passed statutes by 2018 
asserting their sole right to legislate after 
Brexit in those areas passed back from 
the EU that fall within the scope of their 
devolved powers.
The UK government argued that both 
legislatures had exceeded their powers.
As part of its agreement with 
UK ministers on the process for 
transferring powers, the Welsh 
government promised to repeal their 
continuity statute.
The Scottish government maintained 
the legality of their continuity statute 
and the issue was before the UK 
Supreme Court at the time of writing.
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The process has become acrimonious in large part because, critics argue: ‘The devolved 
governments have been largely excluded from the process of defining the UK’s approach 
to Brexit and its negotiations with the EU, despite early promises by Westminster to the 
contrary’. How this major clash of constitutional claims, and the continuing Scotland/UK 
dispute over Brexit processes, will be decided remains unclear. But some resolution will be 
needed before the end of 2018.
Meanwhile, of course, since February 2017 the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly 
have been suspended, leaving UK ministers simply talking directly and separately with 
political parties there about how powers will be transferred post-Brexit.
Recent developments: the growth of devolved powers
Scotland: In the 2014, Scottish independence referendum voters chose to remain in the 
UK by 55% to 45%, but only after the Prime Minister David Cameron had promised major 
new powers for Scotland’s government. Devolution of tax-raising powers to Scotland has 
always been important in the context of enhancing the Edinburgh government’s autonomy 
and salience for voters. It was the centrepiece of both the 2014 Smith Commission Report, 
and the 2016 Scotland Act. This gave Edinburgh new powers to set air departure tax, to 
make an add-on to income tax rates and vary its thresholds, and to control various land 
and building taxes. The proportion of the Edinburgh government’s budget raised directly in 
Scotland will increase from 10% in 2014–15 to 52% by 2020.
In the area of social security, the Scottish government gained new powers over carers’ and 
disability welfare benefits, on topping-up reserved benefits run by the UK, and on creating 
new benefits (see below). In April 2018 the Edinburgh Parliament unanimously approved 
the SNP government’s proposals for Scotland to take over administration of these parts of 
social security spending, which will cost £2.8bn annually by 2021. The benefits covered are 
chiefly those for elderly and disabled people – personal independence payments, carer’s 
allowance, attendance allowance, disability living allowance and other disability benefits, 
winter fuel and cold weather payments, maternity grants and discretionary housing 
payments. This will be a substantial change: ‘When the social security powers are in place, 
[the Scottish government] expects to process as many [benefits] transactions in a week as it 
currently does in a year’. 
In Whitehall, raising taxes and paying out social security have long accounted for around 
half of the UK civil service and a similarly large chunk of running costs. The Westminster 
government transferred £200m to cover the transition costs for Edinburgh as it takes over 
these responsibilities, but Audit Scotland found that the total transition bill is likely to cost 
a further £60m. This seems a relatively small sum for the scale of changes, shedding an 
interesting light on the likely transition costs of Scotland becoming an independent state, 
which created controversy during the 2014 referendum. A 2018 SNP Commission Report 
(drawing on analysis by Dunleavy at Annex B5) found that transition costs will be modest. 
By 2021 Scotland will already have substantial tax and social security administrations fully 
in place. So the additional administrative costs involved in Scotland going independent in 
future could be further lessened. (For Scotland, see also Chapter 6.1.)
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Wales: The Wales Act 2017 also marks a significant reshaping of the Welsh constitutional 
settlement with a transfer of additional powers (for example over energy and harbours) 
and more autonomy for the Assembly in dealing with its own affairs, by devolving electoral 
franchise and powers over the size of the Assembly to Wales. Welsh ministers can now 
borrow up to £1bn for capital spending without needing Whitehall permission. And (like 
Scotland) the Cardiff Assembly and government now have default control over any policy 
area not specifically retained by Westminster. They have notably gained extra powers 
to regulate transport. An interesting development occurred in 2017 when the Assembly 
passed an Act that (taken at face value, and if upheld by the courts) disapplies in Welsh 
public services some provisions of a 2016 Westminster trade union law.
However, the likely durability and robustness of the Wales Act was criticised heavily, 
both while the law was under legislative scrutiny and after receiving Royal Assent. 
Constitutional preferences amongst citizens in Wales point to strong support for greater 
autonomy. Given the choice between the ‘Assembly to have more powers / Assembly to 
have same powers as now’, the largest group of respondents to the regular BBC/ICM St 
David’s Day Poll in March 2017 chose more powers. 
With the new powers to self-regulate Welsh affairs, the Presiding Officer of the National 
Assembly appointed an expert panel on Assembly electoral reform, which reported 
back in December 2017 recommending an increase in the Assembly size (to 80–90 
AMs), lowering the voting age to 16- and 17-year-olds, changing the electoral system and 
introducing prescriptive legislative gender quotas. The Assembly commission’s follow-up 
consultation (in 2018) sought the views of the Welsh public on these recommendations and 
will introduce legislative proposals in two stages to further shape the Welsh constitutional 
settlement (see Chapter 6.3).
Northern Ireland: The devolution settlement in Northern Ireland has not been working as 
intended since February 2017, when the top two parties (the Democratic Unionist Party and 
Sinn Féin) could not agree to form a power-sharing Executive (see Chapter 6.5). Despite 
new elections in March 2017, the Executive and Assembly remain suspended. If and when 
the reduced size Assembly (cut from 108 to 90 seats in 2016) and Executive restart, then 
some of its powers (on welfare reform, and corporation tax) have also been increased.
England: The process here long focused on the already powerful executive London mayor 
(and Greater London Authority), who is acquiring (over the next few years) commissioning, 
strategic planning, funding and regulation powers in health and social care. Outside the 
capital, new governance and leadership arrangements focusing on regional or metro 
mayors emerged piecemeal from 2014 onwards, initially in the absence of a clear legislative 
framework. The 2016 Cities and Local Government Devolution Act streamlined this 
process, and to date 11 devolution deals have been negotiated, and seven of them started 
working with direct mayoral elections in 2017 and 2018 (see Chapter 6.9). 
Some wide-coverage English devolution deals include areas such as all urban transport 
and infrastructure, health, skills and employment, enterprise and growth, housing, planning 
fire services – as in Greater Manchester with a powerful executive mayor. More modest 
deals bracketed as ‘devolutionary’ (because Whitehall has given up some powers) range 
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from combined authorities spanning city regions and led by an executive mayor (as in 
Liverpool City region) to combined authorities with a new elected mayor with much fewer 
powers (as in Cambridge and Peterborough), down to a unitary council and local economic 
partnership model (Cornwall).
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Devolution appears to be firmly entrenched 
in the national polities in Scotland and 
Wales, and also in London. Lesser devolution 
to elected regional or metro mayors has 
expanded radically within England in 2017–
18. Northern Ireland’s arrangements are not 
operating currently, but may restart, and 
retain basic support from voters there.
The overall UK-wide devolution project 
lacks any constitutional coherence. It has 
evolved piecemeal, in asymmetric and 
specific fashion in each case, making public 
understanding harder. The weaknesses of 
this mode of proceeding are demonstrated 
by the continuing constitutional clash over 
Brexit between the UK and Scotland, and the 
suspension of the unique Northern Ireland 
arrangements from February 2017 onwards 
forced by major parties refusing to co-
operate.
Electoral systems used in the mainland 
devolved administrations (Scotland, 
Wales and London) secure broadly 
proportional representation (see Chapter 
2.2). They arguably redress some of 
the representational defects inherent to 
Westminster’s plurality rule (FPTP) system.
The supplementary vote system used to 
elect the London mayour and new regional 
and metro mayors has also worked well to 
maximise their legitimacy.
Devolution deals in England have been 
negotiated in ways that lack transparency 
and have received little public scrutiny.
Some devolved legislatures have better 
records on gender representation than 
Westminster (see Chapter 7.2). There have 
never been under 40% women members 
in Wales, and never been under 30% in 
Scotland. Northern Ireland is still somewhat a 
laggard.
Turnouts in the new devolved mayor 
elections in England in May 2017 were 
somewhat lower than normal for local 
government (29% in Greater Manchester 
for instance). But turnout in any elections for 
new bodies (that have not yet done anything, 
and whose responsibilities are little known) is 
often lower.
All the devolved legislatures and executives 
in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland 
and London were popularly endorsed in 
referenda before being implemented. The 
same is true of some English devolution 
schemes outside London.
The English votes for English laws (EVEL) 
process has not created an institutional 
‘voice’ for England. It remains an opaque and 
complex parliamentary procedure, little used, 
very little known, and even less understood 
by the general public (see Chapter 4.1).
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Stronger levels of citizen engagement with 
national legislatures have become the norm 
in Scotland and Wales, whereas they remain 
the exception at Westminster.
Inter-governmental relations between the 
devolved countries and the UK are very 
poorly developed, and do not include 
London. Perhaps as significantly, inter-
parliamentary relations are vestigial.
Future opportunities Future threats
The Brexit process has already initiated 
another period of extensive constitutional 
flux. A positive consequence could be 
a window of opportunity to initiate an 
inclusive, nationwide deliberation about the 
constitutional future of the UK. So far, only 
a few Labour figures have called for such 
national conversation.
There are concerns that as a result of the 
Brexit process, powers repatriated from 
the EU will accrue overwhelmingly to 
Westminster and Whitehall – as the original 
draft of Clause 11 of the EU Withdrawal 
Bill specified. To date the division of 
competences has only partially been 
resolved in outline. In April 2018, the Welsh 
government reached an agreement with 
UK ministers, but the Scottish government 
has not (see above). Critics argue that after 
the top-down Brexit process run by the May 
government devolution will be ‘yet more 
variable and even more disjointed’.
As Wales moves from a conferred power 
model (where Westminster says what it 
could control) to a devolved power model 
(where responsibilities in broad policy areas  
rest with them by default, unless otherwise 
specified) so there may be a better 
constitutional alignment with devolution 
practices in Scotland.
Further territorial divisions within the UK 
could be amplified by a second Scottish 
independence referendum. This possibility 
depends on the level of public support 
north of the border, but also on the 
perceived treatment of Scotland’s interests 
in negotiating the EU exit deal and the 
repatriation of powers.
If the UK government acts to repatriate  
powers from the EU honestly and in the spirit 
of subsidiarity, there are new opportunities 
for enhancing the powers and competences 
of all the sub-national legislative assemblies 
and governments. 
The level of dispute and contestation both in 
the courts and politically has already clearly 
increased as a result of Brexit. A Westminster 
‘act alone’, UK-centric approach to 
repatriation of powers, which seeks to evade 
proper parliamentary scrutiny and genuine 
involvement with the devolved legislatures, 
could pose a serious threat to the principles 
of democratic devolution.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The SV mayoral elections in future years 
will be opportunities to revitalise local 
democracy and to improve the visibility of 
devolution deals.
The Conservative 2017 election manifesto 
unilaterally proposed scrapping the 
supplementary vote voting system used 
for elected mayors in London and various 
regions, and replacing it with first-past-the-
post, which would radically lower the mayor’s 
legitimacy. The manifesto is largely history 
now, but that such a non-consensus policy 
(also overturning local referenda) could 
have been envisaged by the Conservatives 
is an ominous sign for the future of English 
devolution.
The further unfolding of Brexit
As the Brexit process enters a new stage of detailed ‘divorce’ negotiations with the 
European Union, a raft of new legislation will be needed to give effect to the multiple 
changes involved. It will cover policy such as agriculture, fisheries, transport, and economic 
and environmental regulation where the three devolved countries are primary actors within 
their own territories. The Legislating for Brexit: White Paper (2017) suggested that existing 
EU frameworks will in the first instance be replaced by UK common frameworks, moving 
powers back to the UK centre. Subsequently, ‘there will be an opportunity to determine the 
level best placed to take decisions […] ensuring power sits closer to the people of the UK 
than ever before’ (paragraph 4.5).
If a subsidiarity principle was followed in a full-hearted way, then devolved administrations 
and legislatures would see their functions and responsibilities greatly enhanced, and could 
play a vital role in the process. However, ‘legislative consent’ by the devolved countries went 
completely unmentioned in the White Paper, nor was there any indication of inputs to be 
made by the devolved legislatures. By April 2018, after many criticisms from the House of 
Lords and the opposition parties in the Commons, the UK government was still insisting that: 
‘The offer we put forward on clause 11 at Committee stage [of the EU 
Withdrawal Bill] would see the vast majority of powers flow directly from 
Brussels to Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, just as the Scottish and Welsh 
Governments have argued. However, it is also vital we retain a mechanism 
to protect our internal market, our common resources, and our reputation as 
a credible international trading partner.’
The Sewel convention and legislative consent
If a Westminster MP seeks to ask a question of UK ministers about a matter that forms part 
of the devolved powers of the Scotland, Wales governments and Parliament/Assemblies 
(or those of Northern Ireland when operating) then the Speaker of the House of Commons 
will immediately intervene to rule the question out of order. So an outsider might have 
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expected that Westminster would simply have stopped legislating about issues that are 
now controlled by devolved legislatures.
In fact that has not happened. Looking for a moment just at the UK-Scotland case, on 
about ten occasions a year, in every year that devolution has operated, the Westminster 
Parliament has legislated in ways that change the powers of the Scottish government and 
the Edinburgh Parliament. But in each case they have done so after a Legislative Consent 
Motion (LCM) was framed by the Scottish government and accepted by the Edinburgh 
Parliament. In almost all cases the effect of the legislation has either increased or left 
intact but varied in some way the powers of the Scottish government. And these changes 
have been accepted because they improve policy-making north of the border, maintain 
consistency across the two parts of the UK, and can conveniently be ‘piggy-backed’ on 
England and Wales legislation going through the Commons.
The Sewel convention is an agreement that ‘Westminster would not normally legislate with 
regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish Parliament’. 
Initially rather informally established (like all other conventions), this was later formalised. 
A section of the Scotland Act 2016 clearly stated: ‘It is recognised that the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the 
consent of the Scottish Parliament’. It also now applies to Wales in the same form.
However, the UK government’s Devolution Guidance Note 10 interprets the Sewel 
convention very restrictively as follows:
‘[W]hether consent is needed depends on the purpose of the legislation. 
Consent need only be obtained for legislative provisions which are 
specifically for devolved purposes, although departments should consult the 
Scottish Executive on changes in devolved areas of law which are incidental 
to or consequential on provisions made for reserved purposes’  
(paragraph 2).
The difference between these two views is quite wide legally. For example, Mark Elliot has 
argued that if the Westminster government wanted to withdraw the whole UK state from 
the European Human Rights Convention (as the Conservatives in 2015–17 said they wished 
to do), then it could so – because the action does not relate solely to devolved powers (as 
Brexit does not). However, what Westminster could not do within the Sewel convention 
was then to put in place a ‘British Bill of Rights’ (as the Conservatives at one stage planned 
to do) – because this would vary the powers of the devolved country administrations and 
require their legislative consent. We have seen (above) that it remains to be clarified if the 
specific repatriation of powers from the EU proposed by the May government by summer 
2018 falls foul of the Sewel convention or not. 
The growing powers of the devolved governments 
As late as 2017 the varying powers of the devolved governments could still be diagrammed 
relatively easily, as in Figure 3 – which shows the proportion of each Whitehall 
department’s duties assigned to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (if its devolved 
276 5. How democratic and effective is UK national government? 
mechanisms were working, and not suspended, as at present). At the top of Figure 3 are 
‘domestic’ departments where most powers were devolved, and at the bottom are the UK’s 
outward facing ministries where nothing was then devolved. In between there was not 
much of a spread. A few Whitehall departments retained some minority powers in Scotland 
and Wales, while a few other central departments had ceded minute fractions of their role 
to the devolved governments. So the idea of a ‘clean split’ still confronted anomalies, such 
as Northern Ireland having zero control over justice, due to earlier sectarian problems; or 
Scotland and Wales having fewer Cabinet Office roles than Northern Ireland.
Figure 3: The estimated proportion (%) of each Whitehall departments’ functions devolved to 
the three nations in 2017
Percent of each 
department’s 
work devolved
Northern Ireland Scotland Wales
99–100% Department for Education; Department for Communities, Housing 
and Local Government; Department for Health; Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
100% Ministry of Justice
100% Department for Work 
and Pensions
91–92% Home Office; Department for Transport
81% Department for 
Transport
79–80% Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
10–15% Business, Enterprise, Innovation and Skills
4–5% Cabinet Office
1–2% Department for Work and Pensions
Less than 1% Cabinet Office
Less than 1% HMRC, HM Treasury
Zero Ministry of Justice
Zero Ministry of Defence; Foreign Office; Department for Exiting the EU; 
Department for International Trade; Department for International 
Development
Source: Rearranged from Institute for Government, 2017
2775.6 The basic structure of the devolution settlements
The mixing and overlap of roles is certain to increase because of changes already made to 
stave off Scottish independence in 2014. Figure 4 shows that the devolved governments 
have each received substantial tax-setting powers, with more to come in stages until 2019, 
and that their administration has been put in place over recent years. So a substantial set of 
powers are moving from HM Treasury.
Figure 4: Tax devolution since 2014
Source: Institute for Government, Whitehall Monitor 2018, Figure 3.16
How the Brexit process works through in the probably extended period it takes the UK 
to separate from the EU will also affect the further blurring of functions across the two 
tiers. Arrangements are only likely to get more complex, as away from the headline 
disagreements, the two tiers of government have already:
‘Agreed to the principle of establishing UK-wide “common frameworks” in 
key areas. For their part, UK ministers have repeatedly committed to the 
idea of some EU powers being exercised exclusively at devolved level after 
Brexit, and have now backed away from placing a reservation on “retained 
EU law”’.
Conclusions
Devolution in Scotland, Wales and London has strengthened representation, legitimacy 
and the inclusiveness of policy debates there. It also played a key role in Northern Ireland, 
and is likely to do so again, although arrangements there have been suspended now for 
18 months. Devolution in England outside London to regional and metro mayors has just 
begun but may help redress important democratic and scrutiny deficits within some parts 
of England. However, all types of devolution still lack clarity and coherence, with poor 
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inter-institutional relations and questionable constitutional and legal protections for even 
devolved powers in Scotland (the most powerful devolved country). As a result, the overall 
durability of democratic devolution in the UK seems still unsettled.
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What does democracy require of Scotland’s devolved Parliament 
and government?
✦	 The legislature should normally maintain full public control of government services 
and state operations, ensuring public and parliamentary accountability through 
conditionally supporting the government, and articulating reasoned opposition, via 
its proceedings.
✦	 The Scottish Parliament should be a critically important focus of Scottish political 
debate, particularly (but not limited to) issues of devolved competence, articulating 
‘public opinion’ in ways that provide useful guidance to the government in making 
complex policy choices.
✦	 Individually and collectively legislators should seek to uncover and publicise issues 
of public concern and citizens’ grievances, giving effective representation both to 
majority and minority views, and showing a consensus regard for the public interest.
✦	 The Scottish government should govern responsively, prioritising the public interest 
and reflecting Scotland’s public opinion.
Scotland: devolved government and 
national politics
Devolved government in Scotland started as a radical innovation in bringing government 
closer to citizens, and its development has generated great expectations including strong 
pressures for and against the Scottish Parliament and government becoming the core of 
a newly independent state. Malcolm Harvey and the Democratic Audit team explore how 
democratically and effectively these central institutions have performed.
6.1
Scotland’s law courts and legal system have always been separate from those in England 
and Wales, and culminate in the High Court in Edinburgh. However, the UK Supreme Court 
remains the key legal arbiter of relations between the UK and Scottish governments. Many 
of the founding ideas for Scotland’s Parliament and government were defined by the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention (1989–95), and implemented in the Blair government’s 
devolution settlement, overwhelmingly endorsed by Scottish voters in 1997. The core 
institutions are a Scottish Parliament of 129 MSPs, elected by a broadly proportional 
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representation system – the additional member system (see Chapter 2.2). A Scottish 
executive was set up to run all the devolved policy areas, using a directorate structure 
(instead of the separate departments found in Whitehall). Its policy responsibilities have 
steadily expanded and the now Scottish government supervises the £58bn of spending 
in Scotland that are devolved functions. Most domestic spending (on education, health, 
transport, housing, local government and the economy) is devolved. The key areas 
excluded from their control – and which would accrue only to an independent Scotland – 
remain most social security, most major taxation, defence and foreign affairs. However, as 
a result of greater devolution pledges made during the 2014 referendum campaign, the 
Edinburgh Parliament now has significant tax-raising powers and also runs some significant 
social security benefits domestically (see Chapter 5.6). The government is currently 
headed by the Scottish National Party (SNP) leader, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon. She has 
a small cabinet (12 members), plus another 13 ministers, all drawn from the Parliament.
Recent developments
Despite electing MSPs via proportional representation, which tends to stabilise 
political alignments, Scottish politics has undergone a period of significant political and 
constitutional upheaval over the past half decade. In 2011 the SNP returned 69 of the 
129 MSPs – a majority government, for the first time – providing the crucial catalyst for 
Scotland’s independence referendum in 2014. The SNP proposition that Scotland should 
secede from the UK (also supported by the Greens) was opposed by all the main UK parties 
in Scotland and was defeated by 55% to 45%.
Nevertheless, far from killing off the SNP and their raison d’être, the strong campaigning 
momentum of the referendum period and its aftermath saw SNP membership increase 
fivefold, from 25,000 before the referendum to around 125,000 in the six months after 
it. At the UK general election in 2015, the SNP went on to increase their seats from six in 
2010 to 56 of Scotland’s 59 seats, taking 49.97% of the vote in the process. This was a 
high watermark and in the May 2016 Scottish Parliament election the SNP won 63 seats, 
falling two shy of the 65 required for a majority, but retaining government office with Green 
support. The SNP subsequently lost a third of its Westminster seats in 2017 (down from 56 
to 35), with the Conservatives and Labour both gaining a lot at their expense.
The Scottish independence referendum also began critical changes in the fortunes of 
Scottish Labour and the Scottish Conservatives. Labour was first ousted from control 
of the Scottish executive in 2007, and its subsequent history has been nothing short of 
catastrophic. Since then the party has had 11 different leaders (five of those in a caretaker 
role) and its previous dominance of Scottish politics has rapidly leached away. A key stage 
was reform of the electoral system for Scottish local government, often Labour-dominated, 
with the single transferable vote introduced by Labour with Liberal Democrat support in 
2006. At three elections (2007, 2012 and 2017) Labour’s previously dominant control of 
councils and councillors has been drastically eroded by the SNP. Increasingly without its 
traditional hegemony in central Scotland’s local authorities, Labour’s decline accelerated 
under PR elections for the Scottish Parliament. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Scottish Westminster seats won by each party 1997–2017
Source: UK Election Statistics 1918–2017, Parliament UK
Figure 2: Percentage of Scottish Parliament seats won by each party 1999–2016
Source: UK Election Statistics 1918–2017, Parliament UK
Figure 1 shows how suddenly and completely Labour’s Westminster predominance was 
abruptly terminated in 2015, with the party losing all but one of the 41 seats it held in 2010. 
While Labour won back six more seats in 2017 (up from one), for a party that had dominated 
Scottish politics for nearly half a century, this remained a stunning reversal of fortune. Signs 
of this decline were already apparent under Gordon Brown’s premiership, but the shock 
effect was accentuated by weak UK Labour leaders (Miliband and Corbyn before 2017), 
who had little electoral appeal in Scotland.
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Labour’s once equally strong unionism was squeezed in the 2014 referendum campaign 
by the SNP’s embrace of social democratic approaches, and divisions amongst Labour 
and left/green voters, members and trade unionists on how to vote. The party leadership 
found themselves in a constitutional lose-lose situation between the SNP’s clear nationalist 
option and the Conservatives’ unabashed unionism. Labour has tried to float a position 
somewhere between the two, discussing increased autonomy, ‘devo-more’, and, most 
recently, even federalism. But the issue has become so polarised that there are now few 
voters in the middle ground. Labour achieved some gains against the SNP in 2017, and 
has since selected Richard Leonard as the Scottish Labour Party leader, who is broadly 
supportive of Corbyn.
Meanwhile, since the 2014 referendum the Scottish Conservatives have staged a significant 
revival, becoming the main opposition party to the broadly social democratic SNP. In 2017, 
the Scottish Conservatives’ leader, Ruth Davidson, ran a considerably more successful 
campaign than Theresa May. In the Scottish Parliament, as a result of the proportional 
electoral system that they had continually opposed, the Conservatives have moved sharply 
back from the electoral decline of the 1990s to be the official opposition. This was largely 
because their clearer and complete opposition to independence suddenly projected them 
as the safer option in defending the UK union. In 2017 the Conservatives were also the 
second party in Scotland in terms of Westminster seats, holding 13 to Labour’s seven and 
the Liberal Democrats’ four.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The Scottish Parliament has long held itself 
to be a parliament that is transparent in its 
operation, and the stringent measures it 
took to provide for registering interests of its 
members meant that it has largely avoided 
the negativity that befell Westminster in the 
wake of the MPs’ expense scandal.
Parties in the Scottish Parliament operate 
strict party discipline, like the House of 
Commons. MSPs rarely rebel on whipped 
votes. During the 2011–16 majority SNP 
government, many critics complained 
that rigorous SNP discipline reduced the 
Parliament to a residual role akin to the 
stunted functions of the Westminster 
Parliament – subject to the dominance of 
the executive. Some observers have argued 
that the majoritarian culture of Westminster 
has transferred to and endured within the 
devolved legislatures.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
As a key aspect of set-piece politics, the 
weekly jousting session that is First Minister’s 
Questions provides opposition parties with 
the opportunity to hold the government to 
account.
The committee system of the Scottish 
Parliament, established to fulfil the 
function of both Westminster bill and 
select committees, has proved ineffectual 
in scrutinising legislation and holding 
government ministers to account. Members 
are assigned to committees based just on 
party strength in the wider parliament.
The establishment of family-friendly hours 
– parliamentary business takes place 
from Tuesday to Thursday, 9am–6pm, 
with infrequent exceptions – means that 
members have a clearly established working 
pattern, allowing for better work-life balance, 
the ability to spend more time with family or 
other outside interests.
First Minister’s Questions provides a set-
piece session, albeit in a tired format. 
But it does not clearly fulfil objectives 
of enhancing scrutiny or accountability. 
Questions and answers frequently revert 
to partisan bickering, especially on the 
unresolved constitutional questions around 
independence.
Electronic voting allows for decisions to be 
made quickly and records to be announced 
without the need for physical divisions that 
operate in the House of Commons. The 
Parliament also has modern IT built into all its 
operations.
The additional member system for electing 
MSPs creates a distinction between 
constituency and regional list MSPs, although 
issues around ‘two classes’ of members 
are less evident than in Wales. Some list 
MSPs have been accused of ‘targeting’ 
citizens’ cases in a single local constituency 
of their region, with the next parliamentary 
election in mind. Potentially then, their 
regional constituents elsewhere might not 
be as well represented as those in the target 
constituency.
The operation of the additional member 
system has created a closed party system in 
Scotland. No new parties have entered the 
legislature since 2003. There is no official 
‘threshold’ to gain list MSPs (as there is in 
the operation of the German AMS electoral 
system), but because top-up regions are 
quite small, parties normally need to secure 
between 5% and 9% of the list vote, in order 
to secure MSPs at this stage.
The Parliament has few ethnic minority 
MSPs. The first was elected in 2007, and 
only four have succeeded ever, each initially 
elected as regional members for Glasgow.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The vote to leave the European Union 
has altered the dynamics of the Scottish 
constitutional debate. Given the nature of 
the ‘reserved powers model’ of devolution 
which established the Scottish Parliament, 
the ‘repatriation’ of powers from Brussels 
may provide the Scottish Parliament (and 
government) with the opportunity to accrue 
most of these powers, providing it with 
extensive competences. The extent of these 
new powers is a matter of dispute with the 
UK government.
Scotland has only a small, uni-cameral 
legislature. There is no upper chamber to act 
as a check or balance on the Parliament mis-
operating or over-reaching its powers.
The return to a new SNP minority 
government from 2016 may mean that 
Parliament can reassert itself, regaining 
a clearer role in scrutinising government 
legislation and holding the government to 
account.
With or without independence, the Scottish 
Parliament faces major issues about its 
capacity to deal with the significant increases 
in powers that have been delivered or are 
promised. When 25 government ministers 
and three different main opposition party 
front benches are removed (at least another 
35 MSPs here), only a limited number of 
members remain to fill existing committee 
seats. (The problem would worsen post-
independence, with more ministers and 
committees needed for five main additional 
functions.)
The Presiding Officer’s ‘MOT’ review of 
the Scottish Parliament (see below) and 
willingness to actively examine the operating 
procedures is both timely and a recognition 
that there are ways in which the parliament 
can improve.
Has the Scottish Parliament matched its own democratic ideals?
Following the success of the devolution referendum in 1997, a Consultative Steering 
Group on the Scottish Parliament was established to provide recommendations on how 
the Parliament should operate: how it would be elected, the Standing Orders that would 
operate, and the key principles it would operate under. They provided an ambitious 
agenda for an apparently more consensual democratic approach. A first ‘key principle’ was 
(unexceptionally) that the Scottish executive (now Scottish government): 
✦	 ‘should be accountable to the Scottish Parliament, and the Parliament and executive 
should be accountable to the people of Scotland’.
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Three more far-reaching ‘key principles’ required that the Scottish Parliament:
✦	 ‘should embody and reflect the sharing of power between the people of Scotland, the 
legislators and the Scottish executive;
✦	 should be accessible, open, responsive, and develop procedures which make possible 
a participative approach to the development, consideration and scrutiny of policy and 
legislation;
✦	 [and] in its operation and its appointments should recognise the need to promote equal 
opportunities for all’.
On each of these three measures, how has the Parliament performed? The picture is rather 
mixed. Power-sharing between the executive and the legislature was most obvious during 
the SNP’s period of minority government between 2007 and 2011; and, again, since the 2016 
election. These periods gave the Scottish Parliament a clear role in adapting, challenging and 
scrutinising government proposals. During the first two sessions – under the Labour–Liberal 
Democrat coalitions – Parliament’s role was more limited, though some pieces of private 
members’ legislation piloted by Tavish Scott and Tommy Sheridan were passed into law.
However, from 2011 to 2016 there was an overall SNP majority in the legislature. This was a 
period characterised by much more in the way of executive dominance (more in line with the 
‘Westminster system’ model). The Scottish Parliament was reduced to a rubber-stamping role 
as the (incredibly disciplined) SNP government utilised its majority of MSPs to full effect.
On accessibility, the Scottish Parliament appears to score more highly. It has a well-
utilised public petitions committee and a clear and transparent process of legislating, and 
it symbolically meets inside a building in which most rooms are glass-fronted. However, 
public engagement in its elections continues to hover around the 50% mark – significantly 
lower than the level of UK elections (though the independence referendum did see a 
record 84% turnout).
When it was established in 1999, the Scottish Parliament was one of the most gender-
balanced parliaments in Europe, with only the Scandinavian states returning more female 
representatives. However, since then, and despite significant (but voluntary) mechanisms 
being adopted by several political parties, female representation has fallen. Ethnic minority 
people, and those who identify as having a disability, have also not become MSPs in any 
significant numbers, so the Parliament’s success on promoting equality has been limited 
here. But it does maintain ‘family-friendly’ working hours, with almost all parliamentary 
business taking place from Tuesday to Thursday in office hours. This allows MSPs to spend 
more time with family, their constituencies or outside interests – one MSP was a qualified 
referee and regularly featured at Scottish and European games (since becoming an MP 
in 2017, he has been criticised for absences from Westminster in key debates). Chamber 
business very rarely extends beyond 6pm – in sharp contrast with the late-night sessions 
that are frequently a part of the House of Commons business.
In terms of accountability, MSPs themselves have to adhere to a strict Code of Conduct, 
and the Standards Committee can investigate any breaches of this. Scottish government 
ministers are required to respond to questions and appear in front of parliamentary 
committees regularly in order to provide information on their brief. However, ministers 
288 6. How democratic are the UK’s devolved government arrangements?
can be more or less accommodating – and the questions can be more or less pointed – 
depending on the nature of the query and the party which is asking it. There is a vigorous 
First Minister’s question time.
On becoming Presiding Officer after the 2016 Scottish Parliament election, Ken Macintosh 
announced that the parliament should undergo a ‘MOT’ to determine how well it operated 
and what could be improved. A Commission, chaired by John McCormick, reported in June 
2017 examined the ways in which the parliament can:
✦	 be assured it has the right checks and balances in place for the effective conduct of 
parliamentary business;
✦	 increase its engagement with wider society and the public; and
✦	 clarify its identity as distinct from the Scottish Government.
Its recommendations included strengthening committees by introducing direct elections 
for their conveners (chairs) by Parliament and offering additional salaries for them, as in the 
House of Commons, as well as improving the time and resources committees had available. 
It also recommended strengthening the Parliament’s processes for pre- and post-legislative 
scrutiny, increasing the stages from three to five, and removing scripted diary questions 
from First Minister’s Questions.
Is Scotland a ‘dominant party system’?
The recent electoral dominance of the SNP led several political commentators and 
politicians – most notably Adam Tomkins, the newly elected Conservative MSP – to 
complain that Scotland has become a ‘one-party state’. This characterisation is clearly 
flawed. A one-party state is a very different thing from ‘a dominant party system’, where 
regular competitive elections are held, but the same party always wins – as happened in 
Scotland in the period of Labour hegemony. But what this exaggeration does point to is 
that the relatively small Parliament is easily dominated by the executive if one party has 
an overall majority. For instance, in the period 2011–16, when the SNP formed a majority 
government, this status guaranteed the party a majority of the institution’s committee 
convenorships (important for determining the business and agendas of committees) and, 
crucially, a majority of members on each committee. So the government not only had a 
majority in the chamber – where votes on stages one and three of legislation take place 
– they also had majorities in committees, where stage two is debated and amendments 
raised. This repetition of the Westminster model (despite PR elections) was accentuated by 
loyal SNP backbenchers keen to assist the government’s agenda.
Scotland, Brexit and a second referendum
The UK-wide vote to leave the European Union in June 2016 contrasted strongly 
with Scotland’s electorate voting 62% to 38% to remain in the EU, highlighting a clear 
divergence in public attitudes in Scotland from those in England and Wales. The SNP 
argues that the fact Scotland will be forced to leave the EU with the rest of the UK, despite 
voting differently, shows that Scotland is not an ‘equal partner’ in the UK, and that its ‘voice 
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is not being heard’. It is also in dispute with the UK government about whether the Scottish 
government or Westminster should be responsible for some key policy areas that will 
return to UK control from the EU – with the Scottish government arguing that Westminster 
is undertaking a ‘power grab’ through the EU Withdrawal Act. The Edinburgh Parliament 
passed its own Continuity Bill, a Scottish equivalent of the EU Withdrawal Act, which the UK 
government is challenging. The case will be decided by the Supreme Court in autumn 2018 
(see Chapter 5.6). The referendum outcome also puts the issue of a second constitutional 
referendum ‘back on the table’, with the SNP arguing that ‘only independence’ can ensure 
that the Scottish electorate are not overruled by the wider UK electorate.
The SNP government produced a document which outlined options for Scotland to retain 
some form of access to the EU and attempted to get the UK government to examine them. 
However, the May government’s increasing momentum towards a ‘hard Brexit’ up to the 
2017 general election produced only bruising rebuffs for Sturgeon’s suggestions. These led 
in turn to the First Minister announcing that a second independence referendum should be 
held before the UK leaves the EU in April 2019 – a timetable that has been flatly rejected 
by the Conservatives, who put the earliest feasible date as 2020 – by which time Brexit 
would be a fait accompli. In the short term, opinion polls show that Scotland’s voters are 
opposed to a second referendum, and would split quite evenly but so far not convincingly 
for independence. The polls also suggested that there is a limited link between support for 
membership of the EU and support for independence – meaning that the issue of Brexit 
may not be the tipping point that the SNP hope for. 
However, in May 2018 the SNP released a report from an internal party commission (the 
Wilson report) which outlined what it claimed was a sustainable future for an independent 
Scotland in economic terms. The party was clearly seeking to revive the idea of a second 
referendum campaign, yet by August 2018 experts still felt that the public opinion support 
to buttress such a move was not yet there. SNP supporters claim that the starting point for 
an extended debate is much more favourable now for the independence cause than it was 
at the start of the 2012–14 campaign, which is true, so that ‘movement effects’ in a renewed 
second campaign could create a majority, though this remains unclear.
Dr Malcolm Harvey is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Aberdeen and an associate 
fellow of the Centre on Constitutional Change.
What does democracy require of Scotland’s local governments?
✦	 Local governments should engage the wide participation of local citizens in their 
governance via voting in regular elections, and an open interest group and local 
consultation process.
✦	 Local voting systems should accurately convert parties’ vote shares into seats on 
councils, and should be open to new parties entering into competition.
✦	 As far as possible, consistent with the need for efficient scales of operation, local 
government areas and institutions should provide an effective expression of 
local and community identities that are important in civil society (and not just in 
administrative terms).
✦	 Local governments should be genuinely independent centres of decision-making, 
with sufficient own financial revenues and policy autonomy to be able to make 
meaningful choices on behalf of their citizens.
✦	 Local governments are typically subject to some supervision on key aspects of their 
conduct and policies by a higher tier of government. But they should enjoy a degree 
of constitutional protection (or ‘entrenchment’) for key roles, and an assurance that 
cannot simply be abolished, bypassed or fully programmed by their supervisory tier 
of government.
✦	 The principle of subsidiarity says that policy issues that can be effectively handled in 
decentralised ways should be allocated to the lowest tier of government, closest to 
citizens.
Scotland: local government and 
politics 
Local authorities play key roles in the devolved government of Scotland, as the only other 
source of elected legitimacy and as checks and balances on the domestic concentration of 
power in Scotland’s central institutions. James Mitchell and the Democratic Audit team 
explore how democratically local councils have operated.
6.2
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As in other parts of the UK, the authority and powers of Scottish local government were 
eroded over many decades prior to devolution. The major parties tended to argue for 
decentralisation in opposition but then to revert to centralising ways when in power. The 
absence of any constitutionally entrenched protections for local government meant that 
there were few impediments to this trend.
There were, therefore, many hopes that the establishment of a Scottish Parliament and 
executive in 1999 would call a halt to local councils’ decline. The 32 local authorities have 
key delivery responsibilities covering most of the policy fields devolved to Edinburgh 
institutions, including:
✦	 mandatory services, such as education for students aged between 5 and 16, social work, 
and (initially) fire and rescue services.
✦	 regulatory functions, such as environment, public health, taxis, licensing of alcohol.
✦	 permissive activities, such as recreation and economic development.
A month after the first Scottish Parliament elections an all-party commission (chaired by 
Sir Neil McIntosh, formerly chief executive of Strathclyde Regional Council) offered a 
comprehensive programme of reform. However, the then dominant Labour elites in Scottish 
politics largely ignored the report, ensuring that centralisation broadly continued.
The SNP minority government elected in 2007 signed a Concordat with the Convention of 
Scottish Local Government that removed many of Scottish central government’s detailed 
controls over councils. But over time SNP ministers have tended to revert to the pattern of 
their predecessors in centralising power. Sometimes centralisation is borne out of Scottish 
government frustration that policies are undermined at local level, but at other times it 
may reflect a ‘control-freak’ impulse to impose central policies. Whatever the reason, 
for local government there is actually little in Scotland’s constitutional set-up to prevent 
centralisation happening.
Recent developments
Local elections were held across Scotland in May 2017, the third set using single 
transferable vote (see Chapter 2.3), during the early run-up to the snap general election 
of June 2017. There were some boundary changes, and though the SNP won the greatest 
percentage of seats overall (30%), after the elections all 32 councils in Scotland were now 
under ‘no overall control’.
Much the biggest recent challenges facing Scottish local authorities are financial pressures 
from UK and Scottish government austerity policies, combined with increased demands for 
services, especially with an ageing population, and some increasing staff costs including 
pensions. As Figure 1 from Audit Scotland makes clear, all local authorities face funding 
gaps and either need to make further savings or make more use of their reserves. Some 
authorities are better placed than others to address these challenges.
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Figure 1: Financial challenges for Scottish local government, 2017
Source:  Audit Scotland, Local Government in Scotland: Financial overview 2016/17, published via an 
Open Government Licence
At the same time, local authorities are struggling to develop better ways of working with 
separate Scottish public services (like the police, fire services and NHS hospitals and GPs) 
so as to deliver more effectively joined-up services. Occasional voices are still raised in 
favour of the wholesale reorganisation of local government. For example, the Scottish 
Greens advocate creating many more local community-based authorities, instead of the 
current 32 large and remote councils. However, there appears to be little appetite for any 
major reform push amongst the larger parties.
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Scottish local councils are elected using the 
single transferable vote, ensuring a spread of 
parties across local authorities. Since 2007 
the previous pattern of one-party dominance 
(benefiting mostly Labour) has pluralised at 
three successive council elections, to better 
reflect the balance of opinion in each area, 
though there are problems with its operation 
in sparsely populated areas.
Local authorities have no entrenched 
constitutional protection. Their roles, areas 
and even existence can be changed at 
will by a government with a majority in the 
Scottish Parliament.
There is a consensus on the broad 
principles of the key roles played by local 
governments across the main parties, 
although a highly adversarial party 
political battleground often obscures and 
undermines the degree of consensus.
The Scottish government provides well 
over half of local authorities’ revenues (see 
Figure 2 below), which creates a high level 
of dependency by councils, and inhibits their 
capacity for independent decision-making.
There is also a high level of underlying 
agreement between the Scottish government 
and local government on councils’ key roles 
in service provision.
In a retreat from the 2007 Concordat, a 
council tax freeze was imposed by the SNP 
government from 2007 to 2018. And yet local 
authorities are still set many targets by the 
Edinburgh government, and are expected to 
use resources determined by the centre to 
achieve goals set by the centre.
The importance of Community Planning 
Partnerships (CPPs), with local government 
at its heart, is well accepted – together with 
greater community empowerment in the 
formulation and implementation of public 
policy.
Local authorities have faced persistently low 
turnouts in local elections. This diminishes 
the authority of local councillors. The large 
wards required for PR voting in multi-member 
seats also weaken links to smaller localities.
A commitment to prioritising reducing 
inequalities in CPPs enjoys multi-party 
support. The Scottish Conservatives appear 
to accept this, or at least have chosen not to 
strenuously oppose it.
Despite some greater consensus than in 
England (see ‘Strengths’ section), this stance 
does not extend to prioritising the need for 
action around agreed principles. Different 
government tiers and CPP agencies still 
clash on identifying how to put prevention, 
engagement, collaboration and efficiency 
into practice so as to reduce inequalities.
Past problems of local government 
corruption in one-party areas have generally 
lessened in recent years.
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Future opportunities Future threats
If ‘community planning’ can be made to work 
well, services could potentially be improved, 
and duplications or conflicts of service 
provision avoided.
Further financial cutbacks seem likely, but 
expectations for service delivery from the 
public and the Scottish Government are not 
diminishing. Addressing these expectations 
is likely to become increasingly difficult, given 
continuing austerity.
Potentially, Brexit processes for repatriating 
policy responsibilities might boost local 
councils’ roles, if recentralisation in the 
Edinburgh or UK governments can be 
avoided.
Austerity might tighten further in the run-up to 
and aftermath of a second referendum where 
Scotland votes to leave the UK.
National politics intrude a lot into local 
campaigning – exemplified by the 
Conservatives’ emphasis in the 2017 council 
elections on opposing an independence 
referendum (which is wholly outside the 
competence of local government). 
The Brexit process and the second 
referendum controversy may weaken 
Scottish economic growth. Brexit may 
potentially accentuate the centralisation of 
power in Scottish or UK central government. 
Independence for Scotland might lead to a 
squeeze on councils’ resources.
Local government finances
The dependence of local authorities for Scottish central government financial support 
undermines council’s autonomy. The 2007–18 council tax freeze cut their freedom to raise 
revenues themselves, although central grants to local authorities did at least take account of 
lost revenue. In all 57% of local authority funding comes from the Scottish central government.
A Commission on Local Taxation was established by the Scottish government and 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (CoSLA) with representatives of all parties in 
Holyrood, except the Conservatives, who boycotted it. The Commission’s remit was 
limited to domestic taxation (only 17% of net funding) and it reported in December 2015. It 
concluded that the existing council tax system ‘needs substantial reform’ because ‘some 
people are paying more than they should’ and that the ‘present Council tax system must 
end’ (p.5 and p.79). However, the report failed to offer unambiguous recommendations but 
instead outlined three alternatives:
✦	 a local income tax;
✦	 a reformed Council Tax with changes in charges for banks; and
✦	 a much more progressive property tax.
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The absence of a clear consensus weakened the Commission’s impact. In March 2016 the 
Scottish government issued proposals for modest reform, involving increasing the ratios of 
upper bands to average bands. Once again, a consensus on the need for reform failed to 
translate into a consensus on what to do next.
Figure 2: The sources of Scottish councils’ income, 2016/17
Source:  Audit Scotland, Local Government in Scotland Financial Overview 2016/17, p.11, published via 
an Open Government Licence
Notes: Does not include all income collected for services delivered through council arm’s length 
external organisations and Integration Joint Boards; excludes housing benefit; customer and client 
receipts are 2015/16 totals at 2016/17 prices.
Demographic projections also suggest that Scotland’s population will grow by about 
9% over the coming quarter century, but changes will affect local authorities differently. 
Population decline is anticipated in 12 of 32 areas, while the largest increases will occur in 
Aberdeen, Edinburgh, and Perth and Kinross. All local authorities can anticipate a growing 
elderly population, though the change will vary in extent from a 47% increase in West 
Lothian and Shetland, to the smallest anticipated increase in Dundee. Twelve authorities 
will have an increase in school age populations, with significant increases in Aberdeen and 
East Lothian (NRS 2014).
Community Planning Partnerships
By law local councils must work with other bodies – public, private and third sector – at 
local level through Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) based on local authority areas. 
The 2011 Christie Commission’s report on the Future Delivery of Public Services provided 
a set of well-received principles for reforming public services in integrating ways:
✦	 ‘Reforms must aim to empower individuals and communities receiving public services by 
involving them in the design and delivery of the services they use.
✦	 Public service providers must be required to work much more closely in partnership, to 
integrate service provision and thus improve the outcomes they achieve.
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✦	 We must prioritise expenditure on public services which prevent negative outcomes 
from arising.
✦	 And our whole system of public services – public, third and private sectors – must 
become more efficient by reducing duplication and sharing services wherever possible’.
CPPs include representatives from public bodies including Police Scotland; Scottish 
Fire and Rescue Service; health boards; further and higher education. The Community 
Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 requires CPPs to:
✦	 focus on improving outcomes;
✦	 produce local outcome improvement plans (LOIPs);
✦	 identify geographic areas with the poorest outcomes;
✦	 prepare and regularly update locality plans based on priorities agreed in the CPP;
✦	 expand the list of partners;
✦	 achieve a greater focus on tackling inequalities.
Each public sector member of a CPP retains organisational autonomy, and will have its 
own specific targets and performance management regimes – so that for councils to lead 
co-operation may be tricky. While CPPs offer an institutional framework within which to 
collaborate and address complex wicked problems, targets and performance management 
regimes remain to a large extent silo-based undermining effective coordination.
A major development in collaboration affecting local government has been the integration 
of healthcare (run by the NHS) and social care (run by local authorities). The Public Bodies 
(Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2014 created a framework within which adult health and 
social care would be integrated, intended to shift towards a more community-based and 
preventative approach. New Integrated Authorities (IAs) to coordinate local health and 
social care have been established.
Some important centralising institutional developments have occurred in recent years. 
A single, national Scottish Fire and Rescue Service replaced eight services, and Police 
Scotland replaced eight regional police authorities under legislation passed in 2012. 
In both cases responsibilities transferred from local government bodies to these new 
central government bodies in April 2013. A number of controversies have surrounded the 
establishment of Police Scotland, including relations with local government where critics 
argued that well-working previous arrangements were disrupted. It remains to be seen how 
the new Integrated Authorities in health and social care will operate.
Brexit changes and a second independence referendum
The EU has impacted on Scottish local authorities via:
✦	 Euro-regulation imposing unavoidable obligations to implement, enforce and monitor 
EC legislation;
✦	 European economic integration, which created new opportunities for, and pressures 
on, local economies; and
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✦	 Euro-funds offering potential support for the local economy and for a range of local 
authority projects.
In the 1990s many councils emphasised securing EU funding via ‘grantsmanship’, seeking 
to influence EU decisions in favourable ways and to identify pockets of regional and 
‘solidarity’ funding to tap. More recent local authority engagement with the EU focused 
on Euro-regulations and the implications of economic integration. Alteration of the UK’s 
relations with the EU in terms of the four freedoms – goods, capital, services, people – will 
have significant implications for local councils as part of a complex multi-level system of 
government, best thought of as akin to a ‘marble cake’ (according to US political scientist 
Morton Grodzins). Changes of the magnitude envisaged in the Brexit process are likely to 
reverberate through the system in unintended ways.
However, Scottish local government may also be able to take some advantage from the 
changing institutional and policy environment. With clear leadership, councils could address 
aspects of EU membership that have long irritated local communities and authorities, such 
as procurement policy and perceived cumbersome bureaucratic mechanisms. There may 
also be opportunities to ensure that as institutional power returns to the UK and Scottish 
Parliaments, so that the principle of subsidiarity operates to advantage local government.
If and when it happens, a second independence referendum campaign also presents 
challenges for local government. During the 2014 vote a campaign for Our Islands, Our 
Future set out a bold prospectus for island governance, showing how well-organised 
local government interests could insinuate themselves into even such a highly adversarial 
battleground. Another (and likely crucial)  referendum might offer new opportunities to 
broaden that debate to include the role of local government.
Conclusions
In common with municipal government throughout the UK, Scottish councils face many 
challenges, especially dealing with future uncertainty. The cuts imposed on English local 
authorities by central government have been greater and have come faster than those 
north of the border. Yet in some respects Scottish local government can look over the 
border to see some of the challenges, especially financial challenges, and the variety 
of the responses that may await them. With increasing pressure and demands for local 
government services, the limits on authorities’ financial and policy autonomy still point to 
stormy times ahead.
James Mitchell holds the chair in Public Policy at Edinburgh University’s Academy of 
Government and is a member of the COSLA/Scottish Government Enabling group on the 
reform of local governance.
What does democracy require of the devolved National Assembly 
and government in Wales?
✦	 The legislature should normally maintain full public control of government services 
and state operations, ensuring public and Assembly accountability through 
conditionally supporting the government, and articulating reasoned opposition, via 
its proceedings.
✦	 The National Assembly for Wales (sometimes referred to as the Senedd, after 
the building in which it sits) should be a critically important focus of Welsh political 
debate, particularly (but not limited to) issues of devolved competence. It should 
articulate ‘public opinion’ in ways that provide useful guidance to the Welsh 
government in making complex policy choices.
✦	 Individually and collectively legislators should seek to uncover and publicise issues 
of public concern and citizens’ grievances, giving effective representation both to 
majority and minority views, and showing a consensus regard for the public interest.
✦	 The Welsh government should govern responsively, prioritising the public interest 
and reflecting public opinion across Wales.
Wales: devolved government and 
national politics 
Devolved government in Wales started as a radical innovation in bringing government 
closer to citizen. Its generally successful development has seen the National Assembly for 
Wales and the Welsh government acquiring more powers – and perhaps being reformed in 
some respects. Jac Larner and the Democratic Audit team explore how democratically and 
effectively these central institutions have performed.
6.3
The current institutions were implemented as part of the Blair government’s devolution 
settlement, and were endorsed by Welsh voters in 1997. The National Assembly for Wales 
in Cardiff has 60 AMs, elected by only a very roughly proportional representation system 
(the additional member system). It has fewer powers than the Scottish Parliament. The 
Welsh government accounts to the Assembly for how it runs all the devolved policy areas. 
The government is currently headed by the Labour Party leader, First Minister Carwyn 
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Jones (until autumn 2018, when he plans to stand down), who leads a coalition of Labour, 
plus a single Liberal Democrat and an independent AM drawn from the Assembly.
The Labour Party drew up the initial plans for the Assembly in a one-party manner, without 
any formal apparatus of public or cross-party decision, in contrast to the Constitutional 
Convention that operated in Scotland. Elections for Assembly Members use a ‘British’ 
additional member system method, with 40 constituency AMs, the vast majority of 
whom are from the Labour Party. There are only 20 seats to allocate at the top-up stage 
(33%), far less than in Scotland or London, and too few to achieve more than very rough 
proportionality. Labour has been continuously in power in Cardiff since 1999 – in sole 
power for nine years, and otherwise in coalition governments. In the early run-up to the 
2017 general election there were some predictions that its predominance in representing 
Wales at Westminster would be decisively reduced, but these turned out to be incorrect.
Recent developments
Wales has received a good deal of funding from the European Union in the last two 
decades, but the country nonetheless voted to Leave (52.5%) at the Brexit referendum. 
The Brexit process is likely to have wide-ranging effects for devolved democracy and 
governance in Wales. Chief among these is the potential transfer of policy competencies 
directly from the EU to the National Assembly. The Wales Act (2017) changed Wales’ 
devolution settlement from a conferred model (where Westminster lists what the devolved 
government can do) to a reserved model (where Westminster instead lists the powers 
reserved to the UK government). 
All other things being equal, this change means that areas of EU policy that are not 
explicitly reserved should therefore be transferred to the Assembly. Farming is a particularly 
important issue for Wales, considering that 90% of Welsh agricultural exports go to the EU, 
and that 80% of Welsh farmers’ income comes from the common agricultural policy (CAP). 
Whitehall had suggested that some of these powers (such as agricultural subsidies) may 
be stripped from devolved competency and placed centrally in the hands of Westminster. 
For this to come about, the Sewel convention (governing Westminster/devolved country 
relations) would seem to require the consent of the devolved legislatures. While this legal 
struggle between Westminster and Scotland remains, the Welsh government (with fewer 
powers at stake) reached a compromise with Westminster over the process of power 
transfers (see Chapter 5.6).
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The National Assembly for Wales has long 
been seen as a success story in terms of 
representing all four main parties in Wales.
The National Assembly has not seemed 
to be a relevant institution in the day-to-
day lives of the Welsh public. Levels of 
participation and interest in the institution 
have been low.
In 2003, the Assembly made waves 
worldwide as the first national legislature 
in the world to achieve a 50:50 gender 
balance. Following a by-election in 2006, 
Wales achieved a further milestone, with 
female AMs outnumbering their male 
counterparts in the Senedd for a brief period 
– neatly reflecting Wales’ demography 
where women make up 52% of the total. 
These results largely reflect the electoral 
dominance of Welsh Labour and the positive 
measures to promote gender equality that 
it put in place. ‘Twinning’ of constituencies 
and ‘zipping’ on the party’s top-up candidate 
lists both mean that men and women 
must alternate in being elected. Labour 
has an impressive record on women’s 
representation: 55% of Welsh Labour’s 
constituency AMs and 71% of their top-up 
list AMs since 1999 have been women. Plaid 
Cymru have also enacted some positive 
measures themselves – so 51% of Plaid 
list AMs have been women and 27% of 
constituency AMs.
Since 1999 low levels of voter engagement 
have been a constant issue for the National 
Assembly, with mean turnout for its elections 
a relatively low 43%. This is 21 percentage 
points lower than the average Welsh turnout 
for general elections in the same period. 
And it lags behind average turnout for the 
Scottish Parliament (53%), and the Northern 
Ireland Assembly (61%).
Enthusiasm for devolution has historically 
been lukewarm in Wales. The 1997 
referendum, which asked voters if they 
wanted a National Assembly for Wales, had 
a turnout of only 50% (compared to 60% in 
the equivalent Scottish referendum). The 
endorsement of the proposals was just 
50.3% of votes cast, far less enthusiastic than 
in Scotland (74%). 
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The 2011 referendum on further powers for 
Wales provided a far more positive result for 
proponents of devolution. Some 63.5% of 
the population voted in favour of giving the 
Assembly more powers – yet only 35% of 
registered voters turned out to vote.
Future opportunities Future threats
The fifth Assembly has seen a willingness 
between parties to work together to achieve 
a more accountable politics in Wales. After 
a shaky start, an early agreement between 
Welsh Labour and Plaid Cymru laid the 
groundwork for projects that the parties 
would work on together.
Brexit is likely to be the biggest challenge 
that the Assembly and Welsh government 
have faced in its relatively short existence. 
The potential repatriation of powers from the 
EU to the Assembly will test the capacity of 
the Welsh political institutions.
The publication of a non-partisan expert 
panel’s report (see below) means that there is 
now a real chance that electoral reform and a 
reshaping of the Assembly could gain cross-
party support. Any proposal for change would 
still have to pass a super-majority threshold 
of two-thirds support (built into the original 
scheme), but it is at least a possibility, with 
votes at 16 the likely first step.
The challenges of Brexit will occur almost 
simultaneously with the devolution of 
tax powers (which could encounter 
implementation difficulties) and a possible 
reduction in the number of Welsh MPs at 
Westminster (weakening Wales’ voice within 
UK institutions).
The devolution of tax powers to Cardiff will 
also bring a new level of accountability to 
the Assembly (see Chapter 5.6). For the 
first time the Welsh government will be at 
least part responsible for raising the funds 
it spends. This will bring a new relevance to 
the Assembly, and it will have to step-up and 
become an open and more effective place 
for debate and scrutiny in Welsh politics.
Leader of UKIP’s Assembly group, Gareth 
Bennett, has announced plans for the party 
to adopt a policy of advocating for the 
abolition of the Assembly. Although opposed 
by at least two AMs in his own group, such 
a policy could appeal to the small but not 
insignificant number of people in Wales 
who wish to see an end to the Assembly. 
Although this is very much a minority opinion 
among the Welsh public, any campaign that 
feeds into feelings of political alienation 
and apathy (which are considerably more 
widespread) could pose a threat to the 
legitimacy of the institution if it gains support 
amongst the electorate. 
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Voting systems and elections
The British-style additional member system (AMS) used for the Welsh Assembly (sometimes 
also called mixed-member proportional or MMP) gives voters two votes, one for a candidate 
in a constituency, with the winner decided by plurality voting (‘first-past-the-post’), and 
one for regional candidates allocated to even up overall party regional seat shares with 
their votes there (see Chapter 2.2). Critics in Wales have argued that increasing the size 
the Assembly so there could be more top-up seats would lead to far more proportional 
outcomes. An expert panel, established by the Assembly’s Presiding Officer (see below) 
and given the task of exploring reform of the electoral system, recommended changing 
this system to single transferable vote (STV; see Chapter 2.3). Substantial changes to the 
electoral system are unlikely however, as any new system needs a super-majority of two-
thirds in the Assembly. This would require a large amount of support from Welsh Labour 
AMs, who benefit greatly from the current electoral system. That said, there have been 
some signs that the Assembly and the Welsh government may be moving, albeit slowly, 
towards electoral reform. In February 2018, the Assembly established a public consultation 
on increasing the size of the Assembly to 80 or 90 members. New legislation will also be 
introduced by the Welsh government to lower the voting age to 16 in all Welsh elections, in 
line with Scotland.
There have also been moves to examine the electoral system used in local council 
elections in Wales. In a January 2017 white paper, Reforming Local Government: 
Resilient and Renewed the Welsh government focused specifically on elections and 
voting (section 7). Among other proposals, it discussed whether candidates should have 
to declare whether they are a member of a political party (even if not standing for that 
party); preventing ‘dual mandates’ where sitting AMs are also elected as councillors; 
and the voting system to be used at council elections (which is currently plurality rule or 
FPTP). Surprisingly, the white paper floated the idea that each local authority might be 
able to individually decide whether they maintain the FPTP system, or to swap to a single 
transferable vote (STV) system, as used in Scottish local government. This could mean 
that rather than a single election system for council elections in Wales, it would vary from 
one local authority area to another. Careful consideration will be needed here since Welsh 
voters are already using multiple electoral systems: first-past-the-post (FPTP) at general 
elections; multi-member FPTP at local council elections; AMS at Assembly elections, and 
the supplementary vote (SV) for police and crime commissioners. Even more variation 
within Wales might create more confusion, and hurt engagement further.
Proposals to reshape the Senedd 
In addition to providing the Assembly with power over its electoral system, the Wales 
Act (2017) also provided the Assembly with the ability to change its name. Y Llywydd (the 
Presiding Officer) has since announced the Assembly will change its name to the Welsh 
Parliament, by 2021. Proponents hope this name change will raise the salience of the 
institution among voters, impressing the relevance of the decisions made there to their 
everyday lives. If such a change in attitudes is to take place, however, it will likely take more 
substantive action than the makeover these new powers allow for.  
3036.3 Wales: devolved government and national politics 
Recent political developments have raised questions over the Assembly’s capacity to 
be an effective and accountable legislature that is able to provide scrutiny to the Welsh 
government. The potential repatriation of powers from the EU to the Assembly, Brexit 
negotiations and the devolution of tax powers over the next few years will be a significant 
test for the institution. This could be compounded by a likely reduction of up to one-quarter 
of Wales’ current MPs at Westminster, as recommended by the Boundary Commission for 
Wales (cutting their numbers from 40 to 29). This is the largest proportional reduction of 
any of the four nations of the UK. 
The media system in Wales
Unlike Scotland, Wales has never had a strong or distinctive domestic media. Welsh 
Election Study (WES) data show that in 2016 less than 7% of the electorate in Wales 
regularly read a ‘Welsh’ newspaper. Additionally, in contrast to Scotland, UK-wide 
newspapers do not provide Welsh editions. Therefore, they typically won’t contain 
information or news about the Assembly or politics in Wales. Furthermore, there is a serious 
lack of diversity among the printed press in Wales. WES data show that the three most 
widely read Welsh papers were the Western Mail, South Wales Echo and the Daily Post, all 
owned by Trinity Mirror (traditionally backing Labour in its lead title the Daily Mirror). The 
most visited Welsh news website, ‘WalesOnline’, is also owned by Trinity Mirror.
Welsh broadcasting has broader reach, but still faces constraints. On television, news 
content about the Assembly or Welsh politics must fit within a 15-minute supplement that 
follows the UK news on BBC or ITV. Some 42% of WES respondents reported watching 
Wales Today on BBC Wales, and 17% Wales Tonight on ITV Wales. Radio is a similar story 
to the Welsh press, with only 15% of respondents saying that they listened to Welsh radio 
programmes. Further analysis of this data suggests it is largely the same people who read, 
watch or listen to Welsh content. This means that a significant proportion of the Welsh 
electorate is rarely if ever exposed to information about what happens in the Assembly, 
or Welsh politics more generally. The situation looks unlikely to improve in the future. 
While the BBC has recently announced it will create a new TV channel in Scotland with a 
dedicated hour of Scottish news programming the step was not matched in Wales. Instead, 
Wales is to receive £8.5m a year in extra funding.
Support for Welsh independence
Unlike Scotland, support for Wales to become an independent country has never been 
widespread, so relatively little polling has been carried out on the issue. When asked as a 
binary question (independence: yes or no?) support in recent years has ranged from 14% in 
May 2014 to a high of 17% in September that year. Immediately after the Brexit referendum, 
this increased dramatically to 28% when respondents were primed with the idea that Wales 
could thereby remain in the EU.
A more detailed range of options shows that support for independence in Wales is perhaps 
lower still. Figure 1 shows the results of five BBC/ICM polls since early 2014 that gave more 
options to voters. The stability of constitutional preferences is striking despite the polling 
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taking place across a uniquely turbulent time in UK politics. A clear plurality of respondents 
favour more powers for the Assembly, with approximately 30% of voters thinking the 
Assembly should stay as it is. 
Figure 1: Constitutional preferences for the Welsh Assembly (BBC/ICM St David’s Day poll, 
2014–18)
Source: ICM polling research 
Conclusions
As Figure 1 shows, devolution now seems to be the ‘settled will of the Welsh people’. Yet 
the National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh government face uncertain times. Brexit 
will test the institution’s competence, capacity and ability to adapt to rapidly changing 
circumstances. New tax powers will also accrue to Cardiff, which should bring new scrutiny 
to its practices. To continue to be an effective legislature, the Assembly must convince 
the public that it is a relevant institution to their everyday lives. For now, the majority of 
the Welsh public remain generally supportive of the Assembly (although we have little 
information on the intensity of this feeling). Yet low turnout and a lack of knowledge of 
Welsh politics threaten this support.  
Jac Larner is a Fulbright Research Fellow at the Center for Political Studies at the 
University of Michigan, and a PhD Candidate at the Wales Governance Centre, Cardiff 
University. His research seeks to understand the determinants of electoral choice in Wales.   
What does democracy require of local governments in Wales?
✦	 Local councils should engage the wide participation of local citizens in their 
governance via voting in regular elections, and an open interest group and local 
consultation process.
✦	 Local voting systems should accurately convert parties’ vote shares into seats on 
councils, and be open to new parties entering into competition.
✦	 As far as possible, consistent with the need for efficient scales of operation, local 
government areas and institutions should provide an effective expression of 
local and community identities that are important in civil society (and not just in 
administrative terms).
✦	 Local governments should be genuinely independent centres of decision-making, 
with sufficient own financial revenues and policy autonomy to be able to make 
meaningful choices on behalf of their citizens.
✦	 Local governments are typically subject to some supervision on key aspects of 
their conduct and policies by a higher tier of government. However, they should 
enjoy a degree of constitutional protection (or ‘entrenchment’) for key roles, and an 
assurance that cannot simply be abolished, bypassed or fully programmed by the 
Welsh government in Cardiff.
✦	 The principle of subsidiarity says that policy issues that can be effectively handled in 
decentralised ways should be allocated to the lowest tier of government, closest to 
citizens.
Wales: local government and politics  
Within Wales, local councils provide the main focus for democratic politics below the 
devolved government in Cardiff, and organise the provision of most local services.  
James Downe looks at how well they fulfil their roles.
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Recent administrative developments
As elsewhere in the UK, the impact of austerity was the biggest challenge facing Welsh 
local government. Councils are responsible for 28% of Welsh public service expenditure. 
Yet local authority revenue fell substantially between 2009–10 (the last year of Labour 
government at Westminster) and 2016–17 (the first year of the May government). At a time 
of great uncertainty, Welsh councils had to make tough decisions about where to devote 
scarce resource and considered new ways to deliver services to people. Figure 1 shows 
that spending on education and social services were largely protected, where cuts above 
40% were made to environment and planning and community support, and 70%+ cuts in 
economic development spending.
Figure 1: Cuts to net current service spending by service in Wales, 2009–10 to 2016–17  
(at constant 2017–18 prices)
Source: Ogle et al, 2017
The ongoing squeeze on local spending in large part accounts for the repeated 
controversies over replacing the current structure of 22 local councils in Wales with a 
‘streamlined’ structure of ten or fewer councils. First proposed by a 2014 Commission, this 
idea was live in 2014–16, when the Welsh government dropped reorganisation proposals 
in favour of the existing councils simply co-operating more on services on a regional basis. 
However, in 2018 a similar plan was once again floated to save money (see below), but a 
comprehensive merger plan was dropped again.
The Brexit process is also likely to have implications for Welsh public services. Wales has 
received a good deal of funding from the European Union, amounting to £1.8bn in 2007–13. 
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It is also still due a further £2bn from EU structural funds in the period 2014–20. Yet the 
country nonetheless voted to Leave (52.5%) in the June 2016 referendum. Without access 
to the EU’s regional funding, it remains to be seen how councils will fare. Pessimistic 
voices suggest that poor outcomes are likely.
Recent political developments
Politically, many south Wales councils were historically dominated by Labour, reflecting 
its dominance of Welsh government (see Chapter 6.3) and politics at a national level. In 
2017, independents formed the second largest set of councillors after Labour, followed 
by Plaid Cymru and then the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in clear fourth and 
fifth place. The plurality rule voting system (first-past-the-post) in local elections assigned 
Labour disproportionately more seats than votes, and they still control nine councils. 
Most other councils are controlled by a coalition, reflecting Wales’s multi-party system 
and the importance of independent councillors. With effectively five parties (including 
independents) competing in most areas, plurality rule voting operated fairly proportionally 
(with a deviation from proportionality or DV score of 11%), advantaging Labour and 
disadvantaging the Conservatives, but only moderately at an all-Wales level. 
Figure 2 shows that in the May 2017 local elections (held before Jeremy Corbyn’s bounce 
back at the general election) Labour’s vote share fell appreciably (down 4.5%) and they lost 
112 councillors and control of three councils (Blaenau Gwent, Bridgend and Merthyr Tydfil), 
but retained control of seven. The Conservatives gained nearly 19% of votes, added 80 more 
councillors, becoming the second largest political party (but behind the independents) and 
winning control of a council (Monmouthshire). Plaid Cymru came third with one in six votes, 
increased their councillors (by 38) and also gained control of one authority (Gwynedd). The 
Liberal Democrats’ vote share fell below 7% and they lost ten councillors. The deviation from 
proportionality (DV) score fell a little to 9%, a good result by UK standards.
Figure 2: The outcomes of the 2017 and 2012/13 local government elections in Wales
2017 2012/13
votes% seats seats% votes% seats seats%
Labour 30.4 468 37.3 34.9 580 46.3
Independents 22.5 309 24.6 23.8 300 23.9
Conservative 18.8 184 14.7 12.5 104   8.3
Plaid Cymru 16.5 208 16.6 16.0 170 13.6
Liberal Democrats   6.8   63   5.0   8.0   73   5.8
Others   4.9   22   1.8   4.8   28   2.2
Total  100 1,254  100  100 1,254  100
Source: The Elections Centre
Note: In 2012, elections were held in all Welsh local authorities except Anglesey, where they were held in 
2013. The figures listed are the total of both years. In 2017, elections were held for all 22 local authorities.
308 6. How democratic are the UK’s devolved government arrangements?
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Compared with other EU countries, the 
ratio of councillors to the electorate in 
Wales is relatively high, and the traditional 
council areas are relatively local and well-
understood.
The public are still largely unaware of who 
makes decisions and how. Citizens are often 
reluctant to get involved in local politics, 
unless an issue directly affects them. Only 
around one in ten or 12 citizens contacts 
their council in any given year, although this 
ratio is higher in rural areas.
Councils make significant efforts to keep 
councillors and the public informed of their 
decisions (but see below).
Critics argue that the 1,254 Welsh councillors 
are disproportionally ‘pale, male and stale’. 
Studies show that most are over 60 years of 
age, and 99 in every 100 are white. Amongst 
those elected in 2017 just over a quarter 
(28%) are women (compared to a third in 
England). A Welsh government push for 
greater diversity has not improved matters 
much.
The introduction of the ‘cabinet’ system in 
local government has made clearer where 
responsibility for decisions lies (at least 
internally) – either with an individual portfolio 
holder, a senior officer with delegated 
powers, the cabinet as a collective, or the 
council leader.
Despite its commitment to less micro-
managing, the Welsh government in Cardiff 
has outlined several overly prescriptive 
actions such as insisting that a councillor 
should hold at least hold four surgeries a 
year (which they have now backed down on). 
Critics accept that the Welsh government 
must continue to make strategic decisions, 
but argue that it should allow local authorities 
the power to decide how they deliver things.
Local authorities have a generally good 
working relationship with the Welsh 
government, which has recognised that 
they ‘do not need to manage the detail of 
local authority business. We can, and should, 
leave more autonomy and decision-making 
with those who manage the delivery of 
services,’ (p.12).
Despite a Welsh government commitment 
to putting ‘the citizen at the centre’ of public 
service delivery, there has been no clear and 
coherent strategy for encouraging citizen 
engagement with local services. Webcasting 
meetings and budget meetings have proved 
unappealing to an issue-focused public 
who want to be involved at an earlier stage 
of policy-making. Councils have been slow 
to use digital innovations to engage with 
the public. So digitally adept young people 
(‘millennials’) are being asked to engage with 
an antiquated system.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Plenty of performance data has been 
produced, but not in user-friendly formats 
that enable the public to assess how well 
their councils are doing. Frequent changes 
in national performance indicators make 
comparison over time impossible. The 
Williams Commission (2014) concluded ‘the 
picture for too many of the public services in 
Wales is poor and patchy’.
After a consultation exercise that produced 
only 17 responses across the whole of Wales, 
the Welsh government removed the statutory 
duty on local authorities to collect national 
strategic indicators. The data for 2015–16 
showed an overall picture of improvement 
over 2014–15, with performance for 17 
indicators going up and twelve indicators 
showing a decline.
Future opportunities Future threats
The 2015 Well-being of Future Generations 
Act aims to improve the social, economic, 
environmental and cultural well-being of 
Wales. It sets out a range of duties for 
councils to ensure that every decision 
they make takes account of the needs of 
future generations as well as the existing 
population.
Only 15% of local government income is 
currently raised through council tax. Councils 
are likely to be forced to raise council tax 
faster than inflation. There is no clear political 
appetite for the reform of local government 
funding.
A new, robust performance framework 
needs to be put in place to ensure that 
there is sufficient evidence for the public 
to understand how Welsh councils are 
performing. More needs to be done to 
design outcomes measures which are 
meaningful to the public and performance 
need to be benchmarked against councils 
beyond Wales.
The new regional collaborative arrangements 
need to be scrutinised from the start. 
Previous public service collaborations were 
not fully held to account.
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Future opportunities Future threats
A far greater variety of service delivery 
models now exist in Welsh local government, 
which include community trusts, local 
authority trading companies, community 
asset transfers, and mutuals. These span a 
range of services including culture, leisure, 
arts and adult education. They are likely to 
increase in their use as councils explore the 
opportunities provided by regionalisation.
The Brexit process may be damaging to local 
government in Wales, where disadvantaged 
areas have received considerable regional 
subsidies from the European Union which 
will no longer be available.
Councils need to consider how the public 
could help provide or co-produce services 
in the future, but there also needs to be a 
healthy dose of realism about the size and 
potential of such involvement. Changing the 
public mindset on who delivers services is 
going to be a lengthy process.
A new Local Government (Wales) Bill (see 
below) will be introduced in 2019 to enable 
voluntary mergers to take place. The 
formation of these arrangements is currently 
being discussed.
 
The overall health of local politics in Wales
Some political scientists regard local elections as ‘second-order’ contests, because they are 
viewed by the public and media as being less important than other elections for the Welsh 
Assembly or Westminster general elections. Turnout rates for Welsh local government 
elections are generally quite high compared with other parts of the UK, touching 49% in 
1999 and 44% in 2008, but with some lower scores (42% in 2004, and 39% in 2012). (For 
comparison, general election turnout was 66% in 2015, and 69% in 2017.) They have also 
compared well with the Assembly turnouts.
In 2017 and 2012 one in twelve councillors (8%) were elected unopposed, a somewhat 
higher proportion than in other parts of the UK. In one ward in Powys, there were no 
candidates and a by-election had to be held at a later date. Amongst town and community 
councils (which work on a micro-local scale within local authorities) only one in four are 
elected in contested races. Around a third of councillors elected in 2017 were new to the 
role, and there are many independents operating without any party organisation back-up, 
primarily representing their ward or community interests.
Welsh politics is multi-party, and in addition Figure 2 above shows that at the local level 
‘independent’ councillors were the second largest group, especially so in rural areas. As 
elsewhere, the plurality rule electoral system produces some distortions. In 2012, Labour 
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gained around 46% of the councillors with a vote share of just under 36%. In 2017, a vote 
share of just over 30% gave the party more than 37% of seats. For the Conservatives in 
Wales, operating lower down the pecking order of parties, the relationship between the 
share of the vote and the number of councillors is not so favourable. In 2012, they achieved 
a 12.5% vote share which delivered around 8% of seats. And in 2017, a vote share of nearly 
19% gave them under 15% of seats. 
The Welsh government have recently consulted on introducing a range of reforms to 
modernise electoral arrangements including the proposal to allow councils to decide whether 
they would like to introduce the single transferable vote (STV) system for their local elections 
(used in Scottish council elections) in place of first-past-the-post. Labour-controlled councils 
are unlikely to opt for changes, but where and if it happens, Scotland’s experience suggests 
that the introduction of STV would be a substantial reform. The Welsh government is also 
proposing lowering the voting age to 16 for the council elections in 2022. 
Councils could clearly do more to engage citizens. Only 20% of the public agreed that they 
can influence decisions affecting their local area in a recent survey (Welsh Government, 
2017). While cabinets formally meet in public, decisions are generally made behind closed 
doors in political group meetings. So at one level there is always clear agreement in public, 
but on the other hand real decision-making takes place elsewhere in party groups. The 
continuing prominence of ‘independents’ may raise issues of whether these councillors 
take a strategic view across the whole council (and increasingly, the whole of a wider 
region) rather than focusing on being local community concerns.
Local government area reforms
There has been much debate about whether the 22 local authorities in Wales are too 
small for the effective delivery of public services. A total of three Welsh government White 
Papers in as many years have all examined options to reform local government (Welsh 
Government, 2014; 2015; 2017). In 2014, the Welsh government’s Commission on Public 
Service Governance and Delivery (known as the Williams Commission) recommended 
that councils should be merged to cut their number down to 10 or 12. The latter option 
was initially favoured by the Welsh government. But in 2015, they introduced a Bill which 
contained proposals for creating only eight or nine councils. 
However, the government in Cardiff was unable to gain enough political support to 
implement their reorganisation plans, either in the Welsh Assembly or within the local 
government sector. In 2016 the new Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Local Government 
scrapped the plans, and in their place advocated a more collaborative approach. The 
existing 22 councils would be retained but would be grouped on a regional basis to work 
together in providing key services. The Welsh government outlined a menu approach in 
2017 allowing councils to choose the most appropriate scrutiny mechanism for the new 
regional structures. 
But then, despite the previous record, in spring 2018, the Welsh government suddenly 
resurrected the idea of merging councils and offered councils three options in a Green Paper: 
voluntary mergers; phased mergers; or a single comprehensive programme of mergers, so as 
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to cut them down to just ten authorities. The consultation process revealed little support for 
fundamental reform and the Welsh government has gone back to the drawing board (again) 
by setting up a working group to find common ground and a plan for change.
Conclusions
Critics argue that a successful balance has not yet been struck between the top-down 
direction from the Welsh government and Assembly and the policy discretion that local 
councils need. Cardiff ministers’ approach to local authority reform continues to be ‘top-
down’, confused and inconsistent. Letting councils decide on different mechanisms of 
holding decision-makers to account, as well as on different voting systems, is likely to be 
confusing for citizens and prevent reforms happening where they were most needed. 
For example, it seems very unlikely that Labour-dominated councils over long periods 
will adopt STV voting, although that may be where a change would yield most benefits in 
reducing electoral disproportionality. If the current Welsh councils can survive, they will 
clearly have to try and ‘join-up’ behind the scenes and with other services (like the NHS) so 
that the public’s experience of services is not adversely affected.
James Downe is Professor in Public Policy and Management in the Wales Centre for Public 
Policy at Cardiff University (www.wcpp.org.uk).
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What does democracy require of Northern Ireland’s devolved 
Assembly and Executive?
There is a long history of community division within Northern Ireland, which is reflected 
in its voting behaviour. Given this, and since the constitutional issue – whether Northern 
Ireland should remain part of the UK or join a united Ireland – ceased to dominate 
political life, there has been wide agreement that in order to function, government 
needs to be acceptable across the community. In practice this means guaranteeing that 
parties from each side of the community can participate in government, engaging their 
political energies and obliging them to work together.
However, since devolution became established, there has been a growing focus 
on how the system measures up against more conventional criteria for effective 
democratic government, such as:
✦	 The Executive should be able to set out a coherent vision across the range of 
devolved responsibilities, and develop and implement a practical and effective set of 
policies in pursuit of it.
✦	 The Executive should in particular tackle cogently the most acute problems of the 
economy and society, and be capable of responding decisively to events.
✦	 The devolved government should provide efficient and effective public services.
Northern Ireland:   
devolved government and politics
Devolved government in Northern Ireland centres around unique institutions, a power-
sharing Executive with ministers chosen on a proportional basis, answering to an 
Assembly elected using PR. It was designed to overcome the inter-communal strife that 
has characterised Northern Ireland public life: the challenges it has faced have been 
particularly acute, and its record has, inevitably, been mixed. At the time of writing it 
is in abeyance for want of political agreement, which may not be found – at least in 
the short term. At present, there is no political control at all over the Northern Ireland 
administration. Alan Whysall and the Democratic Audit team explore how democratically 
and effectively the institutions of government have performed in Northern Ireland.
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✦	 The Assembly should effectively hold the Executive accountable, through 
conditional support or reasoned opposition, drawing out views and expertise within 
different parts of the community to improve policy-making, the delivery of public 
services and the quality of legislation.
✦	 All involved in the institutions should act in the wider public interest, and in particular 
should practice financial regularity and prudence, and avoid the reality or the 
appearance of corruption.
✦	 The institutions should be recognised by the voting public as meeting these criteria, 
and as articulating and responding to their concerns.
Since the institutions remain fragile, however, democracy also requires a degree of 
outside stewardship, notably from the British government, but also the Irish government 
and others, to help keep them functioning.
In Northern Ireland, the criteria for democratic governance are rather different from 
elsewhere. For the whole of its 96-year existence as a distinct political entity, the great 
bulk of voters have backed ‘tribal’ unionist and nationalist parties. In consequence, the 
operation of traditional Westminster rules, transplanted to Northern Ireland in the 1920s, 
led to 50 years of government by the Ulster Unionist Party alone. In response, nationalists 
denied the legitimacy of any government arrangements in Northern Ireland, arguing that it 
was an entity contrived to sustain unionist rule. This system collapsed in 1972 following a 
campaign of abstentions and protests, and physical violence by some groups. More than 
30 years of direct rule by Westminster followed. 
Devolved government definitively resumed in 2007 under arrangements set out in the 
Good Friday Agreement of 1998, lightly modified by subsequent agreements. The GFA 
provides for much besides internal government arrangements: under it, inter alia, Northern 
Ireland’s constitutional status, whether within the United Kingdom or a united Ireland – the 
dominant issue in its politics for 70 years – is established as depending on consent, with 
provision for ‘border polls’ to test it; there are guarantees of parity of esteem for the British 
and Irish identities, and for upholding equality and rights; there are elaborate arrangements 
for wider relationships, in particular those within the island of Ireland. These, as much as 
the shape of the domestic institutions, are important elements of the political equation 
underlying the settlement.
Until they were suspended in January 2017 the essence of the devolved government 
arrangements were:
✦	 An Assembly, now of 90 members, is elected using a proportional voting system 
called single transferable vote (see Chapter 2.3). Its members designate themselves 
nationalist, unionist or other.
✦	 A First Minister (FM) is nominated by the largest party in the Assembly, and a Deputy 
First Minister (DFM) by the largest party composed of members of the largest 
designation apart from the FM’s; so in present circumstances there will be a unionist and 
nationalist. The FM and DFM exercise their powers jointly and equally.
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✦	 The post of Justice Minister is, because of its special sensitivities, selected by a cross-
community vote in the Assembly; it has been held by the Alliance Party (2010–16) and an 
independent unionist (2016–17).
✦	 The remainder of the places in the power-sharing Executive, a further seven, are 
allocated among those parties in the Assembly wishing to take them up, in proportion 
to the number of seats they hold in the Assembly, using the d’Hondt system. Because 
any party of sufficient size may thus participate as of right, the Executive is sometimes 
spoken of as a ‘mandatory coalition’.
Across the political spectrum there is agreement that Northern Ireland circumstances 
require some arrangements to ensure acceptability of government across the community. 
Some disagree that the current ones are the right way of achieving the objective, though 
no major party presses for significant change to structures at present.
Recent developments
Devolution has functioned in a somewhat rocky way following its resumption in 2007. A 
succession of political crises has threatened its survival. The 2016 Assembly elections were 
held on the basis of the ‘Fresh Start’ agreement between the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) and Sinn Féin (who provided the First Minister and Deputy First Minister respectively). 
The smaller parties, who had been in the Executive previously, moved into opposition, 
for which new provision had been made. The DUP and Sinn Féin maintained a public 
appearance at least of working together until late 2016. 
At that point, serious and costly failings in a renewable heat incentive (RHI) scheme became 
public. The scheme had been introduced by the First Minister, Arlene Foster, when she was in 
a previous role; around it there were (still unproven) rumours of corruption. It provoked much 
controversy. Sinn Féin eventually withdrew from the Executive, which led to the calling of a 
further Assembly election for 2 March, 2017 (see below). This failed to produce any change in 
Sinn Féin or DUP attitudes and so the Assembly and Executive were suspended.
As this situation dragged on, it became clear that more fundamental tensions had been 
building within the Executive before the break. Partly this was over the DUP’s attitudes to 
nationalism, and the Irish identity more generally. Aggravating the tensions was Brexit, on 
which the DUP and Sinn Féin were at odds with each other, and Sinn Féin with the British 
government. 
The suspension of the Assembly and Executive
By the end of August 2018 (our time of writing), the suspension of Stormont had lasted 
for 589 days, and created a new record for the longest delay in assembling a governing 
coalition in any European country. It also generated some citizen protests as Northern 
Ireland taxpayers paid out nearly £8m (£78,000 per head) to Assembly members who were 
essentially doing nothing. In May 2018, the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn called for the 
Stormont arrangements to be revived as a high priority. But the May government has not 
been able to achieve any visible progress, and since June 2017 has depended on the DUP 
to stay in power at Westminster (see below).
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Meanwhile, the running of the country fell largely to senior civil servants. Yet the legality of 
their making decisions over major projects was called into question by a May 2018 court 
judgment that struck down a decision to proceed with a waste incinerator as exceeding 
their powers. A backlog of major projects had already begun to accumulate, for which 
political approval was required. In autumn 2018 there may also be a UK Supreme Court 
case challenging the legality of all administrative decisions taken while Stormont is 
suspended.
Brexit and Northern Ireland
In 2016’s Brexit referendum, on a turnout of 62% (lower than any other UK region), Northern 
Ireland voters chose to remain, by 56% to 44% (a smaller margin than Scotland or London, 
the two other Remain regions). The DUP campaigned to leave; the other main parties, Sinn 
Féin and the SDLP, Alliance and the Ulster Unionists (UUP), to remain. The great majority of 
nationalists who voted appear to have favoured remain, although turnout was exceptionally 
low in some nationalist areas; a proportion of unionists also did so. The DUP position 
appears to be in favour of a hard Brexit, in line with its traditional antipathy to Europe, 
whilst also opposing restrictions on freedom of movement within the island of Ireland (2017 
Westminster manifesto, section 6).
Nationalists fear these objectives are incompatible, and point to the possibility of controls 
of various sorts on the border being reintroduced, after several decades during which it 
has been scarcely visible. The British government’s statements throughout the process say 
there should be no physical infrastructure on the border. This stance was reiterated in the 
Chequers proposals of mid-2018. But their political viability and administrative feasibility 
is widely doubted, some seeing them as a device to transfer blame for a border made 
inevitable by a hard Brexit. Any such development is liable to be acutely sensitive politically 
– manifestations of a border within the island of Ireland are anathema to nationalists. But a 
sea border between the whole island of Ireland and the British mainland would equally be 
anathema to the DUP, on whose continued support May relies at Westminster.
There are also potentially very significant economic consequences to Brexit, for both 
parts of the island, and perhaps also consequences for justice cooperation within it. And 
the tensions here are putting strains on the partnership between the British and Irish 
governments, which has been the motor of the peace process.
The 2017 Assembly election
The March 2017 election was a divisive one. Even though the elections failed to break the 
Stormont stalemate, the results still marked a significant change in the Northern Ireland 
political landscape. The nationalist vote, which had been flagging in recent elections, 
strongly revived, and for the first time unionist parties lost the majority they had enjoyed 
in all previous assemblies, with only one seat more than nationalists. There was also some 
movement from both unionist parties, which did relatively badly, to the Alliance Party, which 
did particularly well.
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Figure 1: The outcomes of the March 2017 Assembly election
Party Historically seen as
Vote 
%
Assembly 
seats  
(%)
Executive 
posts 
(2016–17)
Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP)
‘More hardline’ unionist 
party
28.1 28 
(31%)
4
Sinn Féin (SF) ‘More hardline’ nationalist 
party
27.9 27 
(30%)
4
Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP)
‘More moderate’ 
nationalist party
12 12 
(13%)
 
Ulster Unionist Party 
(UUP)
‘More moderate’ unionist 
party
12.6 10 
 (11%)
 
Alliance Party (AP) Centrist, with support from 
all parts of the community
7.7 8 
(9%)
 
Green Environmentalist, also with 
mixed support
2.7 2  
TUV (Traditional 
Unionist Voice)
Hardline unionist, 
opposed to the present 
structures
2.6 1  
PBP (People before 
profit)
Left, non-sectarian 1.8 1  
Independent unionist Personal candidature   1 1
All parties   100 90 9
The Westminster election of June 2017
Attempts to resume devolved government following the Assembly election had failed to 
produce any result by the time the UK general election was called in 2017. Westminster 
elections in Northern Ireland as elsewhere use plurality voting (or first-past-the-post), which 
favours larger parties.
This election was also particularly polarising, with the sense of being under threat on each 
side of the community driving people back to traditional voting patterns. The DUP improved 
on its performance at the Assembly elections to elect ten MPs (55% of seats, on only 36% 
of the vote), and Sinn Féin gained seven MPs (39% of seats, on 29% of the vote), with one 
independent unionist.
The middle ground suffered severely: the UUP and SDLP lost all their seats. Since Sinn 
Féin do not as a matter of principle take their Westminster seats, this means that Irish 
nationalism is unrepresented in the House of Commons for the first time in centuries.
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Lacking a Commons majority, the Conservative Party concluded a ‘confidence and supply’ 
agreement with the DUP, involving £1bn in extra public spending for Northern Ireland. The 
spending plans themselves have not been criticised on partisan grounds – indeed they 
received some welcome even from nationalists – but the Conservatives’ dependence on 
the DUP has caused some to question their ability to be an honest broker among Northern 
Ireland parties.
Further efforts to resume devolved government following the election have so far been 
unsuccessful. Northern Ireland at present has no ministers – the devolved ones have gone, 
and UK ones have no legal authority over the Northern Ireland administration. The statutory 
deadline for the Secretary of State to call a further Assembly election passed, and political 
negotiations to resume the Assembly have stalled. Since the end of 2017, the Secretary of 
State has set the budget for Northern Ireland, but has stopped short of direct rule, leaving 
much of the political decision-making in the hands of Northern Irish civil servants.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
The foundations of the Northern Ireland system, unlike those in Scotland and Wales, are 
clearly fragile, and so the ability of outsiders, notably the British and Irish governments, to 
intervene is also important to the soundness of democratic arrangements.
Current strengths Current weaknesses
In historical perspective, the devolved 
institutions had been an enormous 
success up to 2017, leading to a degree 
of working across the community that was 
unthinkable 20 years ago. They permitted 
the establishment of a government locally 
accountable to Northern Ireland voters that 
had previously not been possible.
The core institutions have been beset by 
regular political turbulence, have at times in 
the past seemed near to collapse, and have 
been completely inoperative since January 
2017. Consequently they have not provided 
all the social and economic stability that was 
previously hoped for, and delivered.
The political settlement paved the way to 
cross community acceptance of policing. 
Given the acute social conflicts that went 
before, this is a remarkable advance.
When it was operating, the Executive had 
limited success in tackling the serious 
economic and social problems that beset 
Northern Ireland. The private sector 
economy remains very small, and has 
declining relative competitiveness. Northern 
Ireland is dependent on public spending – 
at levels per head that are higher than those 
of any other UK region. Public services are 
seriously struggling – significantly more 
in the case of health, for example, than in 
England.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Power-sharing devolved government has 
made it much harder for paramilitaries on 
both sides of the sectarian divide to thrive. 
They continue to be active, although on a 
much reduced scale, in occasional limited 
terrorism and more prevalent gangsterism.
Despite a general commitment to the 
principle of a ‘shared future’, Northern Ireland 
society is still in parts seriously tainted with 
sectarianism. Issues from the past remain 
unresolved, and are at times a political 
irritant, for example over ‘legacy’ issues from 
the time of Troubles, and over flying of flags 
and other symbols, which created a crisis in 
government in 2012 in some local councils 
(see Chapter 6.6).
During the time of the new institutions, most 
of the remaining inter-community conflicts 
at street-level disappeared. However, the 
summer of 2018 saw some nationalist 
crowds in Derry briefly turn violent.
In political life and the media, there has 
often seemed to be a lack of interest in 
good government and in policy-making. 
The traditional bones of inter-community 
contention have been a more attractive focus 
of attention. The Renewable Heat Initiative 
affair in its early stages is an example of lack 
of scrutiny.
More broadly, the new institutions at first 
generated a spirit of optimism and rebuilding 
that made much social progress possible.
There have been episodes of serious 
budgetary disorder before the present one. 
They have not always been regarded as 
matters of fundamental concern – perhaps in 
part because new money from the Treasury 
has often been forthcoming as part of a 
rescue package.
There has also been some economic 
success, in particular a good record 
in securing foreign direct investment. 
Unemployment is well down from the very 
high levels once found in Northern Ireland.
The Executive has been frequently unable 
to make decisions, in large part because the 
way that it is constituted means that it lacks 
common purpose. Although it has adopted 
substantial programmes for government, 
they have lacked political traction.
People in Northern Ireland do not seem 
excessively troubled by political difficulties: 
personal well-being measures are well 
above the UK national average.
The Assembly has been of limited 
effectiveness in its scrutiny of government 
policy or service delivery, has rarely come 
forward proactively with ideas of its own, and 
such formal opposition as there has been 
has tended towards the destructive, rather 
than the constructive.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
There is limited civic society involvement in 
public dialogue in Northern Ireland: many 
people keep their heads down. Nor is there 
much contribution to public policy from 
outside government: for example, nothing 
that at present could be called a think tank. 
The tradition of looking to provision by the 
state, and the British and other governments, 
has often prevailed.
A whiff of corruption remains in political life. 
The DUP Westminster MP, Ian Paisley Jr, was 
suspended from the House of Commons 
for accepting gifts from the Sri Lankan 
government. Prior to this, there have been 
significant cases of politicians sailing close 
to the wind, at times closer than they could 
have got away with elsewhere, though there 
is little hard evidence of criminality. 
Given their record, the Northern Ireland 
institutions are held in particularly low 
esteem by the electorate, though the 
principle of devolution still appears to be 
widely supported. And increasingly they 
seem to command little enthusiasm even 
among those who work in them.
The suspension of the Assembly, and the 
structure of sectarian politics, has hindered 
the advancement of rights for women and 
LGBT citizens compared with the rest of the 
UK and the Republic of Ireland. Whereas 
the Republic of Ireland has introduced 
gay marriage and will introduce legislation 
to legalise abortion, both supported via 
referenda, both remain prohibited in the 
North, putting it at odds with its neighbours 
and public opinion.
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Future opportunities Future threats
Concern for the success of the peace 
process is, in particular, evident in the EU 
approach to Brexit. If there were a united 
Northern Ireland voice on Brexit issues, it 
would be very influential.
Hitherto Northern Ireland’s crises have 
often been resolved by negotiation 
under the auspices of the British and Irish 
governments, with strong US interest. All 
those partners are now heavily committed 
elsewhere. They may now have much less 
capacity or inclination to resolve Northern 
Ireland’s longer-term problems.
There remains, despite the increasingly 
divergent positions of the two main 
Westminster party leaderships, an element 
of bipartisanship in the approach there to 
Northern Ireland, which can at times facilitate 
necessary, sometimes urgent, intervention.
The overtly unionist line that the 
Conservative Party has taken in UK 
government since 2010, and its current 
dependence on the DUP at Westminster, 
may mean that the British government now 
has particular difficulties in helping develop 
political compromise. Its good faith, always 
to some extent doubted by Northern Ireland 
parties, is now particularly seriously an issue 
with nationalists.
Parliament, too, may be weakened in its 
ability effectively to oversee Northern Ireland 
affairs, not least because of the absence of 
nationalists elected in Northern Ireland.
More widely, the understanding among 
British political players of Northern Ireland 
issues, developed over the decades of 
the Troubles and subsequent agreements, 
seems to have rapidly dissipated. Prime 
Ministers latterly have shown little interest, 
except so far as Northern Ireland impacted 
on Westminster arithmetic. Some Brexiteers 
at Westminster have seemed willing to 
downplay concerns about the Irish border 
and maintaining the achievements of the 
Good Friday Agreement during the Brexit 
process.
Can the Northern Ireland institutions be made to work again?
It is still (just) possible to see devolved government resuming in the medium term, despite 
the current lengthy suspension, and even to envisage measures to improve the way 
it functions and to bolster future stability. The Northern Ireland parties and institutions 
might then progress beyond achieving the necessary but scarcely sufficient requirement 
of embodying cross-community working, towards the objective of delivering effective 
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government, which is the main expectation of political institutions elsewhere. Still more 
ambitiously, they might set about setting out a positive vision of the future (irrespective of 
constitutional destiny).
However, for the present, and especially while key Brexit issues remain unresolved, it is not 
clear we shall reach that point. The two main parties appear to be moving further apart, and 
reverting to the rhetoric of earlier days. There may not be sufficient commitment to restore 
devolved government while the Brexit negotiations produce a succession of grounds for 
disagreement between the parties.
The British government’s standing, and its preoccupations elsewhere, mean that it would 
face very serious and perhaps destabilising challenges if it were to reintroduce direct rule, 
traditionally the alternative when agreement sufficient to sustain devolved government is 
not possible, but already much disliked by nationalists. Northern Ireland has drifted for all of 
2017 and 2018 without any devolved government. It seems unlikely that any resumption is 
imminent.
However, at some point, action to establish political authority over the civil servants who are, 
no doubt to their great discomfort, at present presiding over autopilot government, will as a 
practical matter become inevitable. If direct rule is restored, the Irish government will under 
the Good Friday Agreement have a right to make representations about the conduct of 
government in Northern Ireland – itself a potential source of much contention, and the more 
so since Brexit is opening serious strains in the relationship between the two governments.
No early majority in a referendum for a united Ireland seems likely – indeed it seems 
unlikely the Secretary of State will call one. But if such a decision eventually came about 
by a narrow majority vote, rather than as the product of negotiation involving significant 
representation of both communities in Northern Ireland, it would be highly destructive and 
divisive, in both parts of Ireland and beyond.
Conclusions
We are at a profoundly dangerous point for democracy in Northern Ireland. The consensus 
underpinning the Good Friday Agreement institutions appears to be fragmenting – and 
Brexit may speed the process. However, it is hard to see any plausible alternative to 
those arrangements that could deliver stability. The longer devolved government remains 
in abeyance, the more difficult it may be to put it back together. Though an immediate 
increase in violence is unlikely, violent people have in the past flourished when constructive 
politics was weak.
Alan Whysall is an Honorary Senior Research Associate at the Constitution Unit of 
University College London. Until 2015, he was involved with the Northern Ireland peace 
process as a senior British civil servant in the Northern Ireland Office (with spells in the 
Cabinet Office in London).
Changes for the 2018 Audit were made by the Democratic Audit team from Alan’s 2017 text. 
What does democracy require of Northern Ireland’s local 
governments?
✦	 Local governments should engage the wide participation of local citizens in their 
governance via voting in regular elections, and an open interest group and local 
consultation process.
✦	 Local voting systems should accurately convert parties’ vote shares into seats on 
councils, and should be open to new parties entering into competition.
✦	 As far as possible, consistent with the need for efficient scales of operation, local 
government areas and institutions should provide an effective expression of 
local and community identities that are important in civil society (and not just in 
administrative terms).
✦	 Local governments should be genuinely independent centres of decision-making, 
with their own sufficient financial revenues and policy autonomy to be able to make 
meaningful choices on behalf of their citizens.
✦	 Given the special history of Northern Ireland, deliberative policy-making has a 
particularly key role in building local political harmony and understanding of multiple 
viewpoints and interests.
✦	 Local governments are typically subject to some supervision on key aspects of 
their conduct and policies by a higher tier of government. However, they should 
enjoy a degree of constitutional protection (or ‘entrenchment’) for key roles, and an 
Northern Ireland: local government 
and politics 
Local authorities play key roles in the devolved government of Northern Ireland, as 
expressions of communities that were in the past highly polarised on religious and 
political lines. They are also the only other source of elected legitimacy to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly and Executive (which have not been functioning for over a year and a 
half at the time of writing). Local councils can act as checks and balances on the domestic 
concentration of power. James Pow explores how democratically local councils have 
operated in difficult conditions.
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assurance that they cannot simply be abolished, bypassed or fully programmed by 
their supervisory tier of government.
✦	 The principle of subsidiarity says that policy issues that can be effectively handled in 
decentralised ways should be allocated to the lowest tier of government, closest to 
citizens.
Recent developments
In 2014 local government areas and structures went through the biggest shake-up 
to its structure and organisation since the early 1970s. A major 2005 review initially 
recommended that 26 local government districts be radically streamlined into just seven 
‘super-councils’. After devolution was restored at Stormont in 2007, the power-sharing 
administration ultimately made a compromise to reduce the number of districts, but only 
to 11. Of these, six have predominantly unionist electorates, four have predominantly 
nationalist electorates, and one (Belfast City) is relatively balanced.
Figure 1: How structural reforms changed local government district areas
Pre 2014  Since 2014
Source: James Pow
The first elections in the council districts took place in May 2014; the transfer of power 
from outgoing administrations was complete within a year. The reformed councils removed 
many ‘legacy’ features, and so provided fresh opportunities for citizens to re-engage with 
local government politics. A key hope for these reforms was also that councils themselves 
would improve the democratic quality of their decision-making processes. Their average 
size is over 171,000 people, far larger than their predecessors, with a range from 339,000 in 
Belfast City to 115,000 in rural Fermanagh and Omagh.
Northern Ireland councils have fewer responsibilities than councils elsewhere in the UK, 
partly because the province’s relatively small population means some services can be 
delivered province-wide. In addition, the previously deeply divided nature of its society led 
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to an emphasis on using non-sectarian quasi-governmental bodies rather than politicised 
councils to deliver services. The Housing Executive is Northern Ireland’s single public 
housing authority, set up in 1971 in the wake of discriminatory housing allocations by 
district councils. It is technically an executive non-departmental public body (or NDPB), 
and operationally independent of the Northern Ireland Executive, but accountable to the 
Minister for Communities. Transport NI is the region’s sole road authority. The Education 
Authority (EA) is responsible for all educational and library services. And the provision of 
social care is overseen by six trusts. These public bodies are each accountable to the 
Northern Ireland Executive, but not to local councils. While the Executive is not functioning 
they operate in a non-political way.
Proportional elections in the new councils
Apart from general elections for the Westminster Parliament, all elections in Northern 
Ireland are conducted using the single transferable vote electoral system (known as PR-
STV in Northern Ireland). The council elections in 2014 using STV generated reasonably 
proportional results – that is, the number of first preferences received by each of the five 
main parties broadly corresponded to their total share of seats, to within a handful of 
percentage points. The results produced a deviation of proportionality (DV) score of 11.1%. 
Historically this is much lower than the normal average scores for Britain’s Westminster 
elections, using plurality rule voting (see Chapter 2.1). However, it is somewhat higher 
than the DV scores for Scottish local government using STV, or for the Northern Ireland 
Executive elections (see Chapter 2.3).
Figure 2: How the main parties’ shares of votes compared to their share of seats in the 2014 
council elections
Notes:  DUP: Democratic Unionist Party; SF: Sinn Féin; UUP: United Unionist Party; SDLP: Social 
Democratic and Labour Party.
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STV elections are preferential (so voters can number multiple choices of candidates 1, 
2, 3 etc. in an order they choose) as well as proportional. So effective vote management 
and how voters transfer preferences to other parties can influence the results. In 2014, a 
fragmented distribution of first preference votes across smaller unionist parties divided 
their votes and harmed their chances of winning seats. Once these early preferences were 
eliminated in the counting process, then second or later preferences from these parties’ 
voters were transferred to their next preferences. Figure 2 shows that the DUP gathered 
the most of these later vote transfers, thus apparently ending up ‘over-represented’ against 
their first preference votes. So voters who supported smaller parties are not necessarily left 
unrepresented – their first preference party may be knocked out, but they are represented 
by one lower down but still positive in their preferences.
Northern Ireland voters historically participate more in local government elections than 
those elsewhere across the UK. In 2014 the level fell back to just over 51% of registered 
voters, a historic low for councils in the province, but still far more than to England’s 36% 
on the same day. The continued predominance of ethno-national voting in Northern 
Ireland (at all levels) encourages voters from rival political/religious groups to try and 
maximise unionist and nationalist representation respectively. Participation is also normally 
encouraged by holding council elections concurrently, that is on the same day as either 
Westminster or Assembly elections. However, in 2014 the only other elections held on that 
day were those for the European Parliament.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Local authorities across the UK have no 
entrenched constitutional protections. 
However, following their protracted 
and controversial creation in 2014, and 
especially during the prolonged inactivity 
of the Executive and Assembly, the current 
Northern Ireland councils now seem 
insulated from further changes in the 
foreseeable future.
Despite a proportional electoral system, 
important groups are under-represented. 
Only a quarter of councillors are women, less 
than in the Assembly. Citizens who identify 
as neither nationalist nor unionist may also 
not be adequately represented.
The STV electoral system is a proportional. 
(PR) system, although in 2014 its was 
less effective than normal for STV. The 
preferential voting aspect of the system 
minimises the likelihood of wasted votes.
Relatively high levels of turnout may partly 
reflect the continuing salience of sectarian 
loyalties (linked to ethno-national political 
competition) rather than a high level of 
engagement with municipal issues per se.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Participation levels in local government 
elections are relatively high, facilitated by a 
tradition of holding them concurrently with 
elections to other levels of government.
Under STV you cannot easily hold by-
elections, since the process relies on multi-
member seats. Instead the political party 
holding the seat is allowed to nominate 
(co-opt in) a new person when councillor 
vacancies arise. This gives parties a lot of 
power, since one in ten councillors across 
Northern Ireland has been co-opted. Since the 
first sitting of the new councils in 2015, there 
have been 69 co-options across Northern 
Ireland, at least one in every district. The 
highest number was on Belfast City Council, 
where 28.3% of incumbent councillors were 
unelected as of August 2018.
Councillors are no longer permitted to hold 
multiple mandates. The shift away from 
‘double-jobbing’ is designed to promote 
clearer electoral accountabilities.
Despite recent reforms of local government, 
there has been no effort to introduce 
innovative mechanisms of public 
consultation, such as citizen juries or 
planning cells.
The transfer of local planning powers to 
councils may help to promote transparency in 
and engagement with local decision-making.
Future opportunities Future threats
The transfer of some additional powers 
to local government level may increase 
support for additional democratic reforms, 
such as developing better or new forms of 
public consultation. Gaining these additional 
powers could help focus councillors’ minds 
away from controversial issues of symbolism 
towards more substantive policy decisions 
that lack any obvious ethno-national 
connection.
The elections for the Northern Ireland 
Assembly on 2 March, 2017 were preceded 
by a bitter campaign, showing an increasing 
salience of the ethno-national dimension. 
This may trigger regressive polarising 
motions and debates in local councils in 
reaction. As the dispute over the flying of 
the flag at Belfast City Hall demonstrated, 
decisions on sensitive issues – even if they 
are the result of a democratic procedure 
– can stir fervent opposition beyond the 
council chamber.
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Future opportunities Future threats
In the event that the fragile power-sharing 
administration fails to re-start (or collapses) 
at Stormont, representatives from the local 
government level will play a greater role in 
mitigating any democratic deficit.
If direct rule has to be restored in some form, 
the oversight responsibilities for three key 
quasi-government agencies with urban roles 
– the Housing Executive, Education Authority 
and Transport NI – would likely transfer to 
Westminster, depending on the nature of 
the arrangement. This would add further 
distance between citizens and accountability 
mechanisms over major agencies of local/
regional government.
There has been some trend towards fostering 
local economic development at least in 
bipartisan ways.
There is still not a consensus on all the key 
roles played by local governments across the 
main parties, and sensitive sectarian issues 
can arise in many applied policy contexts.
Still ‘tribal’ elections?
Just over half (52%) of councillors elected in 2014 were elected to one of the main unionist 
parties, and 37% to one of the main nationalist parties. However, cross-sectional evidence 
from the annual Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey has consistently found since 
2006 that at least 40% of citizens (a plurality) identify as neither nationalist nor unionist. As 
in higher levels of government, this group of voters appears to be systematically under-
represented under the existing party system.
The reformed structures of local government have not been accompanied by a significant 
improvement in women’s representation. A quarter of councillors elected in 2014 were 
women, up just 1.6 percentage points on 2011. The aggregate level masks variation across 
the new districts. Women are a third of the members of Belfast City Council, but just one-
sixth of members on North Down and Ards Council.
Until new legislation prohibiting dual mandates came into effect in 2016, several incumbent 
members of the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLAs) were also elected to local government 
in 2014. The new rules now prevent the democratically dubious practice of ‘double-jobbing’. 
However, the one-off councillor vacancies left by MLAs vacating their seats were filled by 
‘co-option’ giving political parties, not voters, the exclusive right to nominate a successor.
Some council planning powers, but not more transparency
As part of the reorganisation of local government, the 11 new councils gained some 
additional powers from the Northern Ireland Executive. Most notably, decisions on the 
majority of planning applications and urban regeneration now rest at the level of local 
government, not the Department for Infrastructure. This transfer of power mandated by the 
2011 Planning Act (Northern Ireland) has a democratic objective:
‘[The change] will make planning more locally accountable, giving local 
politicians the opportunity to shape the areas within which they are elected. 
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Decision making processes will be improved by bringing an enhanced 
understanding of the needs and aspirations of local communities.’
A 2011 report on public and stakeholder opinion of the Northern Ireland planning system 
found it to be poorly regarded by citizens, developers and planners themselves. Citizens 
tended to see the relationship between planners and developers as too close, while 
developers tended to see the process as too inefficient. The reformed planning system 
remains in its infancy, so it is too early to tell whether or not the public and stakeholders 
perceive the revised system as more legitimate than its predecessor. At this stage, there 
is no evidence that the new councils have embraced global democratic innovations in 
planning, such as instigating citizen juries or deliberative planning cells. Regardless of 
their satisfaction with the new system, citizens and stakeholders may at least more clearly 
identify council representatives as accountable for decision-making.
Budgets remain constrained
As in Scotland and Wales, local councils receive most of their funding from the next tier 
up, here the Northern Ireland Executive. However, most of this money in turn comes from 
the UK Exchequer under the Barnett formula, which maintains a broad parity with England 
public spending. As a result of UK-level austerity policies, funding for Northern Ireland local 
authorities has declined appreciably.
Symbolically important decisions can be contested
Given councils’ carefully limited powers of local government, it may be somewhat 
surprising that their decisions still spark intense controversy and raise fundamental 
questions over democratic legitimacy. But symbolism is still important. In December 2012 
Belfast City Council voted to restrict the number of days that the Union Flag could be flown 
from City Hall. Nationalist councillors initially proposed a motion that would discontinue the 
flying of the flag altogether, but lacked a majority to carry it. The cross-community Alliance 
Party successfully proposed an amendment that would see the flag flying on 18 designated 
days during the year, in line with official government guidelines. In the end 29 councillors 
supported the amendment, but all 21 unionist councillors voted against.
The decision prompted street protests across Northern Ireland, some of which turned 
violent. Loyalists saw the decision as an attack on their British identity. A public 
consultation conducted as part of an Equality Impact Assessment suggested that a 
large number of citizens would be offended by any change to the council’s policy. The 
Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland blamed loyalist paramilitaries 
for orchestrating disorder. The Alliance Party, holding the balance of power on Belfast 
City Council, was a key target. Some of its councillors’ homes were attacked, one of its 
offices was set alight and destroyed, and its sole MP (Naomi Long) received a death threat. 
Violence eventually dissipated, but the council’s decision stood. Small, peaceful protests 
have been held outside Belfast City Hall every Saturday afternoon ever since.
This case study shows how a democratic decision, made after a major public consultation, 
can still face widespread disorder in a politically polarised society like Northern Ireland. 
330 6. How democratic are the UK’s devolved government arrangements?
Even if a decision is made following consultation and in line with majority views, the 
decision itself may lack sufficient buy-in on a cross-community basis. Each of the 11 new 
reorganised councils has made individual decisions on flag-flying policies. Some decisions 
have attracted protests, but none of the intensity or scale of those seen in Belfast in 2012.
Northern Ireland politics in flux
At the time of writing, Northern Ireland has been without a devolved power-sharing 
government for over a year and a half. After a snap Assembly election on 2 March, 2017 
and a highly acrimonious campaign, the two largest parties, the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) and Sinn Féin, failed to reach agreement for many months on the formation of a 
new administration (see Chapter 6.5). Meanwhile, civil servants have been left to manage 
government departments without ministerial direction or oversight, with the UK government 
reluctant to introduce direct rule from Westminster. If the UK government does eventually 
assume responsibility for matters devolved under the Northern Ireland Act (1998), it will 
diminish potential oversight over public services from Northern Irelands’ voters, especially 
on housing, education and road maintenance (see above), with particular alienation likely 
to be felt from Irish nationalists. Connections with local council services may suffer too, 
since the vast majority of Westminster MPs lack experience in, or any strong incentive to 
understand, local governance in Northern Ireland.
The June 2017 general election brought the DUP into supporting the Conservative’s 
minority government at Westminster. This complicated matters by potentially jeopardising 
the UK government’s ability to be seen as impartial arbiters in Northern Ireland politics.
Conclusions
Local government in Northern Ireland apparently meets many democratic criteria to an 
encouraging extent, especially in the electoral legitimacy of councillors, high turnouts 
at elections, and a continuing ability to engage citizens’ political interest. However, the 
continued predominance of the ethno-national dimension at all levels of Northern Ireland 
politics casts doubt on the extent to which citizens engage with the substantive issues 
of local government, impairs the deliberative and consensual quality of their decision 
processes, and has caused democratically controlled local powers to be kept very minimal. 
Still, at the time of writing, councillors have been the only elected officials making public 
policy decisions in Northern Ireland for over a year and a half. Despite their comparatively 
narrow remit, local governments have maintained some reality behind devolved powers 
across the region.
James Pow is a postgraduate research student at the School of History, Anthropology, 
Philosophy and Politics, Queen’s University Belfast.
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What does democracy require of London’s devolved government?
✦	 Elected politicians should normally maintain full public control of devolved 
government and public services. In the London system this means there should be 
accountable and transparent government exercised by the mayor. The Assembly 
should ensure close scrutiny of the executive, and allow other parties to articulate 
reasoned opposition via its proceedings.
✦	 The Greater London Authority (GLA, comprised of the mayor and Assembly acting 
together) should be a critically important focus of London-wide political debate, 
particularly (but not limited to) issues of devolved competence, articulating ‘public 
opinion’ in ways that provide useful guidance to decision-makers in making complex 
policy choices.
✦	 Individually and collectively Assembly members should seek to uncover and 
publicise issues of public concern and citizens’ grievances, giving effective 
representation both to majority and minority views, and showing a consensus regard 
for the public interest.
✦	 The London mayor as executive should govern responsively, prioritising the public 
interest and reflecting public opinion in the capital.
✦	 The GLA administration should be realistically and reliably funded, with resources 
so scaled that it could carry out its functions well, so long as it is efficiently and 
effectively run.
✦	 The GLA should be a stable part of the UK’s constitutional set-up, with considerable 
protection against ill-considered or partisan interventions in how it works originating 
from central government or Parliament.
London: devolved government and 
politics at metropolitan level
Devolved government in London – focusing on the executive mayor and London Assembly – 
started as a radical innovation in 2000. Its generally successful development has sparked a 
slow, ‘organic’ spread of executive mayors to other English cities and conurbations. Andrew 
Blick and Patrick Dunleavy explore how democratically and effectively the two London 
institutions have performed.
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The Greater London Authority (GLA) was established after a 1998 referendum, which saw 
Londoners endorse – by 72% on a 34% turnout – a new strategic government for the 
capital proposed by the Blair government. It consists primarily of a mayor and Assembly, 
each elected by voters across London every four years. The mayor controls the GLA’s 
executive powers, which cover strategic and London-wide functions – especially public 
transport and roads, policing via the Metropolitan Police, fire services, and strategic 
planning and economic development. The small (25 member) Assembly is elected using a 
form of proportional representation. It scrutinises the mayor’s policies, budgets and conduct 
in office, and allows different parties to develop and advocate for varying policy agendas. 
All other local government services are run by 32 London boroughs, with which the GLA 
must co-operate to achieve many goals (see below).
The GLA was deliberately set up by Tony Blair to be a slim top-tier body, with a strong 
mayor and a weak Assembly, whose members would be forced to focus on London-wide 
issues, and not local ones. The Assembly’s only clear powers are that it can reject or amend 
the strategies or the budget that the mayor proposes. However, in both cases, a two-thirds 
majority in the Assembly is required to replace the original proposal, which is very difficult 
to achieve. So in practical terms the Assembly can only scrutinise the activities of the mayor 
through a range of committees. It can also hold public hearings with the key post holders 
appointed by the mayor, but lacks the power to block their appointment.
Recent developments
The fourth round of the mayoral elections were held in 2016, again using the 
supplementary vote (SV) election system (see Chapter 2.2), which requires candidates to 
gain a majority of eligible votes. Labour’s Sadiq Khan won 58% support in the run-off stage 
to convincingly beat the Tory candidate, Zac Goldsmith. He succeeded Boris Johnson, who 
had served eight years as London mayor. Khan’s manifesto priorities were to build more 
homes (of which half would have to be ‘genuinely affordable’), freeze transport costs and 
tackle gangs and knife crime. In an effort to reduce air pollution, the mayor also announced 
a ‘T-charge’ (a levy on more polluting vehicles) within London’s congestion charging zone, 
which applied from late 2017 onwards.
The Assembly election uses a form of additional member system (see Chapter 2.2), with 
14 local constituency seats (spanning two or three London boroughs) with winners elected 
by ‘first-past-the-post’ (or plurality rule) voting. However, voters then have a second vote 
for 11 London-wide seats, which are distributed to parties so as to make their total seat 
shares align with their vote shares. In 2016 Labour and the Conservatives won all the local 
seats between them, and gained top-up seats as well – ending up with 12 and 8 total seats 
respectively. This continued a pattern that stretches back over many elections for the top 
two parties to dominate the capital’s politics. The Greens (2 seats), Liberal Democrats (1 
seat) and UKIP (2 seats) had more limited success at the top-up seat stage. Turnout in 2016 
rose to 45%, matching the 2008 peak when Boris Johnson was first elected.
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Figure 1: The percentage turnout in the five London mayoral and Assembly elections since 
2000
Source: Data.london.gov
In the June 2016 Brexit referendum, just under 60% of Londoners voted to remain in 
the EU, reflecting the city’s more youthful population, and perhaps factors such as the 
importance of EU workers for many key industries and services, and the capital’s stronger 
dependence on Europe for trade and markets. Efforts by Sadiq Khan to influence UK policy 
towards a ‘softer’ Brexit (backed by the vast majority of bigger London businesses) have so 
far been decisively rejected by Whitehall.
The GLA’s policy roles and competencies sprang into far greater prominence in the spring 
and summer of 2017 following three terrorist attacks in central London (two on iconic 
bridges), plus the catastrophic fire in the municipal Grenfell Tower block. For homeland 
security it became clear that protecting citizens from vehicular assaults would require a far-
reaching re-assessment of roadside barriers (belatedly introduced on London bridges) and 
other ‘passive’ measures. This will require much greater liaison between the Metropolitan 
Police and GLA and borough highway authorities. 
The Grenfell fire tragedy also attracted criticism for the initial response by the small 
Kensington and Chelsea borough and by Whitehall departments. From the start of the 
2018 public inquiry, attention was also directed to the funding and management of public 
housing that had gone before; the apparent inadequacy of fire regulations policed by 
the GLA-controlled fire service; and the advice to ‘stay put’ in their flats given to Grenfell 
residents by the fire service and not changed until very late in the catastrophe. There are 
implications here for the two-tier local governance of London, with the mayor and GLA 
likely to emerge with stronger abilities to guide how boroughs carry out some functions, 
and stronger political control over public services, including re-regulation of building safety.
The extent of cutbacks in the capital’s police force and fire services also became a focus 
of acute controversy, with Labour and many in the public services involved claiming that 
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citizens’ safety was compromised, and the government insisting that the centrally allowed 
spending levels were adequate. In early and mid-2018 a series of murders and violent 
crimes and an increase in knife crimes (with the latest statistics available showing knife 
crime rising 21% nationally in 2016–17), prompted disputes about which part of government 
was responsible. It seemed clear that greater liaison in responses will be needed.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Mayoral elections have proved genuinely 
competitive, with the winners being an 
independent candidate (Ken Livingstone 
in 2000), Labour candidates (Livingstone 
in 2004 and Sadiq Khan in 2016) and a 
Conservative candidate (Boris Johnson in 
2008 and 2012). In each round the top two 
candidates have been very easily identified 
by voters. Turnout has been substantial for 
new bodies, and has risen overall.
Theoretically any mayor whose party holds 
9 or more votes in the 25-member Assembly 
can never be defeated, and so need take no 
notice of its views. In practice, mayors have 
wanted to be seen as performing well in 
scrutiny meetings and as acting with majority 
support in the Assembly. But these more 
subtle means of Assembly influence are not 
widely known, and its role is not seen as 
very important by most London citizens. By 
contrast, the mayor is seen as very powerful.
The intense interest generated by these 
contests, and the strong legitimacy produced 
by winning clear majorities under the SV 
voting system, have made the London mayor 
a key politician not just in London, but across 
the UK and internationally. Each of the 
mayors has been able to represent London 
internally and externally, wielding both hard 
power (via extensive policy reach) and soft 
power (via media prominence and a clear 
mandate).
In the mayoral election, voters have first 
and second preference choices. If no one 
wins over 50% support on first preferences, 
then the top two candidates stay in the race 
and all others are eliminated. The second 
preference ballots cast by voters supporting 
eliminated candidates are examined, and 
any second votes for the candidates still in 
the race are added to their piles. However, if 
voters cast both preferences for eliminated 
candidates, these are not ‘eligible’ and do 
not influence the result.
Since it was established, the GLA has 
become a firmly established fixture of UK 
governance and its powers have expanded 
over time. For the foreseeable future, it 
is difficult to imagine any UK government 
seeking to abolish it, as Margaret Thatcher 
did with its predecessor (the Greater London 
Council) in 1986.
Despite the high level of public attention 
around mayoral elections, turnout in 
elections has fluctuated between the low 
30s and mid-40s (see Figure 1) – levels found 
in other local elections, and well below those 
in the devolved countries.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Mayors have made creative use of the 
powers they possess, especially in the 
field of transport. The congestion charge 
(introduced by Ken Livingstone) is a good 
example of innovation in this area. Their ‘soft 
power’ advocacy has also been influential, 
for instance in encouraging take-up of the 
London Living Wage.
Smaller parties, those which win less than 5% 
of the London-wide votes for the Assembly, 
are debarred from winning any seats through 
a rule inserted to discourage undue party 
fragmentation under PR. The larger parties 
gain from this.
The AMS election system for the Assembly 
has led to a greater diversity of parties being 
represented there, reflecting to a good 
extent the diversity of views within the huge 
London electorate.
When parties win top-up Assembly seats, the 
successful candidates are chosen in order 
from a ‘closed’ party list, which voters cannot 
influence.
The supplementary vote system used for the 
mayoral elections creates the opportunity for 
a larger proportion of voters both to choose 
their favoured candidates and have more 
influence on the outcome than they would 
do under a simple plurality voting system.
Theoretically, in a very tight race, the SV 
system used for the mayoral election could 
lead to a candidate who came second on 
first preferences winning at the second 
round. So far in practice the contest has 
in fact always been won by the leading 
candidate in first preferences.
The Assembly has 20% ethnic minority 
members and a generally better gender 
balance (with women forming 40% of 
members) than most UK political institutions. 
However, black and Asian minority 
ethnic people now form 40% of London’s 
population, so that much remains to be 
achieved.
Ten of the 14 Assembly local constituencies 
are such safe seats that they have never 
changed party control, which may lead to 
complacency and inertia.
Mayors must negotiate many of the policies 
with Whitehall, or with quasi-government 
agencies running functions like airports 
or national railways, or the 32 London 
boroughs running local services. Success 
here involves ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ power. 
The seven strategic plans that the mayor is 
required to produce rely a lot on others for 
their implementation – for example, despite 
strenuous efforts, mayors have made little 
discernible impact on decisions about 
London airport capacity.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The Brexit process has seemingly 
strengthened Londoners’ sense of the 
capital as having distinct economic 
interests. Although exiting the EU may 
overall harm London’s economy (see 
‘Threats’), the transferring back of powers 
from Brussels may create new opportunities 
for repatriated functions to expand the 
scope and coherence of GLA policy roles. 
Whitehall ‘overload’ post-Brexit may also 
increase favourable shifts of responsibilities.
The Brexit process promises to be turbulent 
and may adversely affect financial services, a 
key part of London’s economy and tax base. 
The 2017 Tory manifesto also indicated the 
government would move large numbers of 
civil service jobs and some cultural institutions 
out of London.
The mayor may also be able to sustain 
the domestic momentum it had previously 
generated towards the extension of GLA’s 
powers. This push could also capitalise on 
the wider trend towards greater devolution 
in the UK.
If tensions between the GLA and the London 
boroughs grow, plans to build affordable 
housing may be hampered.
Brexit could be used to justify the argument 
that London should have independent 
capacity to respond flexibly to the 
challenges leaving the EU creates.
The 2017 Conservative election manifesto 
suddenly proposed to scrap the SV system 
used for electing the executive mayors in 
London and other UK cities, replacing it with 
first-past-the-post. This would tend to wreck the 
mayor’s legitimacy and in multi-party politics 
could lead to winners with far less than majority 
support. Since the voting system was part of a 
package approved by a London referendum in 
1998, it is unclear that Westminster can make 
such a change without another referendum. The 
Tories did not win a majority in the 2017 election, 
with the manifesto rated disastrous, and in the 
hung parliament at Westminster this proposal 
seems to have been dropped for now.
A Conservative government could be 
reluctant to transfer significant new powers to 
or otherwise cooperate with the now Labour-
dominated GLA.
Further devolution to England may be 
concentrated on cities or regions that did not 
previously have it, so that London might lose out.
The Assembly’s limited role may become 
harder to justify in future, given its relative 
insignificance in constitutional and 
governmental processes.
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How the Authority works
The Greater London Authority was established under the Greater London Authority Act 
1999, with the inaugural elections to the London Assembly and for the office of mayor 
held in May 2000. The introduction of the Authority followed a period, since 1986 and the 
abolition of the Greater London Council, in which there had been no directly elected tier 
of governance for London. The Authority is often regarded as being devolved rather than 
local-level government, though it does not possess powers as extensive as those attached 
to the devolved institutions in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland that were established 
at around the same time. In particular, the Authority does not have the full primary law-
making powers that are attached to those devolved institutions.
Areas in which the mayor has the power to operate are policing, economic development, 
housing and regeneration. These powers are exercised via four functional bodies: 
Transport for London; GLA Land and Property; the London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority; and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. The mayor is also 
required to produce strategies for transport, housing, culture, economic development, 
health inequalities and spatial development. The mayor is also able to intervene in some 
local authority planning decisions. The Authority raises money from council tax precepts; 
business rates; transport charges; and an infrastructure levy.
Successive Acts of Parliament have expanded the powers of the Authority: the Greater 
London Authority Act 2007 granted new roles in skills and employment, and housing. The 
Localism Act 2011 gave the mayor more land and housing powers, and allowed the mayor 
to form Mayoral Development Corporations. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility 
Act 2011 made the mayor the police and crime commissioner for London; and the Public 
Bodies Act 2011 gave the Authority some development powers.
Financial dependency and budgets
Like all local authorities in the UK, the Greater London Authority must legally submit a 
balanced budget, where its current spending and revenues are equal. As Figure 2 shows 
the scale of GLA operations is vast, with current spending of just under £12.2bn. Because 
of transport receipts, the Authority actually generates over 70% of its own resources, but 
depends on Whitehall for grants of over a fifth of its income, and also has somewhat less 
than half its local business rates redistributed away by Whitehall to other poorer authorities. 
It collects a share of business rates and levies a council tax precept that is collected by the 
boroughs on its behalf.
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Figure 2: Current spending by the Greater London Authority in 2018–19 
Source: The Greater London Authority Consolidated Budget and Component Budgets for 2018–19, p.6
This situation may look quite favourable, but Whitehall grants were severely cut in the 
austerity period (2010–17), with drastic consequences for London police and fire services 
where personnel numbers had to be greatly reduced. Central government departments 
also control the authorisation of much of the GLA’s vital capital budgets, which are very 
large because of major transport projects.
The London Finance Commission, formed by the mayor in 2012, recommended that the 
GLA should take on complete responsibility for a wide range of taxes, such as council 
tax, stamp duty, business rates and capital gains tax (some of which are now devolved in 
Scotland). This change would be accompanied by a reduction in central funding for the 
Authority, thereby increasing its autonomy and responsibility. The Commission has also 
supported the idea of new taxes, such as a levy on tourism. A 2017 report lays out the 
scope for further functions to be devolved to the capital, building on the momentum for 
more powers to be transferred to cities or city regions within England.
Two-tier government
The GLA’s predecessor as a London-wide body was the Greater London Council, abolished 
by the Thatcher government in 1986. One of the key reasons was conflict between the 
Labour-controlled GLC and many of the 32 London boroughs under Conservative control, 
produced by an overlap of functions. The GLA created by the Blair government in 1999 
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was therefore designed to keep the mayor (and especially the constituency Assembly 
members) from interfering in purely local issues. This design aim has generally been 
achieved. Yet there are inevitably some tensions between the more dynamic GLA and 
the small and slower-moving London boroughs – for example, over plans to build more 
affordable housing to combat the capital’s crisis of housing costs that are well above 
ordinary Londoners’ ability to pay.
Conclusions
London’s strategic government has succeeded far better than its creators could have 
envisaged. The London mayor is an internationally known representative of the capital, and 
all five mayoral terms have created strong electoral legitimacy for the office-holders. Even 
the harrying of Sadiq Khan by irate and wildly inaccurate tweets and interview comments 
from US President Donald Trump is an ironic testimony to the international salience of 
the capital’s executive mayor. By contrast the Assembly has been inhibited by its lack of 
powers from playing a major role or establishing a strong public profile.
London-wide issues have been successfully addressed by the GLA, especially on transport 
improvements and road charging. But policing, homeland security, responding to Brexit and 
other areas have been hampered by continued Whitehall interference. The current system 
may seem ‘entrenched’, but rash proposals to wreck the mayoral voting system in the Tory 
2017 manifesto show that some in Westminster still refuse to recognise the reality that 
devolved powers are devolved.
Andrew Blick is Lecturer in Politics and Contemporary History at King’s College London.
Patrick Dunleavy is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the LSE and co-
Director of Democratic Audit there. He is also Centenary Professor in the Institute for 
Governance and Policy Analysis (IGPA), University of Canberra.
  
What does democracy require of London’s borough councils?
✦	 Elected politicians should normally maintain full executive control of local 
government and the public services that councils are required or empowered to 
deliver. In the London system, there are two tiers of sub-national government, the 
32 boroughs (plus the City of London) and the Greater London Authority (the GLA, 
consisting of a mayor and Assembly; see Chapter 6.7). The latter has no supervisory 
responsibility over the former.
✦	 Boroughs should represent local and neighbourhood interests whereas the GLA 
represents London-wide ones. The second-tier authorities should be the focus of 
local democracy in the delivery of municipal services and leadership.
✦	 Individually and collectively, London’s councils should not only deliver publicly 
accountable services but also, in effect, act as a democratic counter-balance to the 
city-wide power of the mayor.
✦	 Councils should have accountable, effective and responsive leadership, with an 
understanding of the needs of all their citizens and acting in ways responsive to 
public opinion.
✦	 In addition to their representative role on behalf of their constituents, the non-
executive members of the London borough councils should undertake oversight and 
scrutiny functions so as to provide strengthened performance and accountability.
✦	 London’s borough government should be consistently and predictably funded in 
such a way as to provide a link between raising of resources and their use, while 
also being sufficient to deliver legislatively required public services.
✦	 London councils should be a stable part of UK local government, with some quasi-
constitutional protection against ad hoc, inconsistent and/or partisan interventions 
from other tiers of government.   
London: government and politics in 
the boroughs 
Within London the 32 London boroughs undertake most local services provision and 
planning, and play a major role in shaping the capital’s evolution. Tony Travers looks at 
how well they fulfil their roles.
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The London boroughs represent a long-established and accessible element in the 
government of a very large mega-city. With an average population of 275,000, London 
boroughs are substantial municipalities by international standards. Two of the outer 
boroughs are forecast to have populations in excess of 400,000 by the early 2020s. The 
scale of London’s 8.9 million population makes it hard to envisage a system of government 
that did not include a local-scale tier capable of representing neighbourhood and 
community interests. The boroughs (and the still surviving City of London) are relatively 
powerful units of sub-national government in London. Taken together, their total budget 
is broadly twice the spending of the top-tier Greater London Authority. So the capital’s 
arrangement can be characterised as a bottom-heavy, two-tier system.
Each of the 32 councils is generally led by a cabinet, consisting of a sub-group of the 
elected members chosen from either the majority party, or a coalition/combination of two 
minority ones. In four cases (Hackney, Lewisham, Newham and Tower Hamlets) there is a 
separately elected executive mayor who holds executive power.
In common with local authorities throughout England, the London boroughs’ responsibilities 
for service delivery have been much reduced by the growth of micro-local agencies 
(like schools), but they have become far more active as local economic development 
institutions. Local government now has only residual responsibilities over education, for 
example, where once this was their biggest spending function. Borough councils in the 
capital each have between 45 and 70 councillors, with significant disparities in the numbers 
of registered voters (and, separately, total population) per elected member. Councillors 
stand for election every four years (when all seats are up for election). There have been 15 
of these elections since the boroughs were created in 1964.
Recent developments
As with local government elsewhere in England, London borough elections use the first-
past-the-post (‘plurality’) voting system (see Chapter 2.1). Figure 1 shows that the system 
greatly advantaged Labour in both 2018 and 2014, with the party winning a ‘leader’s bonus’ 
of an extra 18% of seats compared to its vote share in 2018 (down a little on 21% in 2014). 
The Conservatives’ vote share across London rose 2.4%, but their numbers of councillors 
elected dropped by nearly one in six. UKIP had one in eleven votes in 2014 but lost almost 
all of them in 2018. The Liberal Democrats’ vote share improved a good deal in south-west 
London, but only somewhat across the capital as a whole. The Greens’ vote share dropped 
back, but they gained a handful more seats. The ‘other’ councillors elected were for local 
residents’ groups. Overall the deviation from proportionality (DV) score (see Chapter 2.1) 
improved a little to a still high 17.6 % (compared with 20.7% in 2014).
In terms of whole councils changing hands, Figure 2 shows that Labour gained one more to 
control 21 boroughs (adding Tower Hamlets), but failed to topple Tory control in their inner-
urban strongholds of Westminster and Wandsworth. The Conservatives controlled seven 
(down by two net). The Liberal Democrats won three councils (an increase of two), with one 
council in no overall control. (The City of London largely eschews party politics, and holds 
its elections every four years on a different cycle. The most recent occurred in March 2017, 
with one of the major national parties [Labour] gaining an unprecedented five seats.) 
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Figure 1: The outcomes of the 2018 and 2014 London borough elections
Party
2018 2014
votes% seats seats% votes% seats seats% 
Labour 43.9 1,128 61.5 37.6 1,061 58.3
Conservative 28.8 508 27.7 26.4 600 33.0
Liberal Democrats 13 152 8.3 10.6 118 6.5
Green 8.6 11 0.6 9.8 4 0.2
UKIP 0.9 0 0.0 9.5 9 0.5
Others 4.8 34 1.9 6.1 27 1.5
Total 100 1,833 100 100 1,819 100
Source: Re-computed from Wikipedia, 2018
There were also four mayoral elections, in the Labour boroughs of Hackney, Lewisham, 
Tower Hamlets and Newham, all of which the party easily retained. In Newham the 23-
year leadership of Sir Robin Wales (16 of them as elected mayor) was ended when an 
election amongst Labour Party members and affiliates (attracting nearly 1,400 votes) 
chose Rokhsana Fiaz instead of him as their candidate. She duly won over 73% of the first 
preference votes in May 2018, becoming the first directly elected female mayor for any 
London borough. She has promised to hold a referendum on whether to keep a directly 
elected mayor or go back to a council with ‘party leader’ model.
Figure 2: Political control of London boroughs after the 2018 elections
Source: Wikipedia 
2018, created using 
Ordnance Survey 
maps 
Notes: Black indicates 
no overall control
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In 2018, the turnout was estimated at 36% for all the English local elections that took place. 
In years unaffected by general elections, the highest-ever turnout was 48% in 1990 and the 
lowest was 32% in 2002. Turnout in the 2014 borough contests averaged 39%. (It was 62% 
in 2010, when the borough elections were held on the same day as the general election.)
In late 2014, after complaints of election fraud and corruption in Tower Hamlets’ 
administration, the central government appointed commissioners to take over its running, 
to support the council improvement and to ensure transparent and open governance. In 
particular, the commissioners assumed direct responsibility for the borough’s grant-giving. 
In 2015, the May 2014 election of Tower Hamlets’ executive mayor Lutfur Rahman, who 
drew heavily on support from the Bangladeshi community, was declared null and void by 
the Election Court because of electoral fraud within the terms of the Representation of the 
People Act, 1983. Rahman was disbarred from public office until 2021. Some critics argued 
that the episode highlighted systemic weaknesses. However, subsequently, a new Labour 
mayor was elected and the commissioners were stood down. In 2018, the Labour mayor 
was re-elected and Tower Hamlets returned to majority Labour control.
In June 2017, a disastrous fire occurred at Grenfell Tower in Kensington and Chelsea 
borough, killing 72 people, with at least 223 people rescued. The consequences of the 
fire and a woeful aftermath in terms of meeting survivors’ needs included the (forced) 
resignation of the borough’s chief executive, followed later by the Conservative council 
leader and deputy leader. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, a joint (‘Gold 
Command’) arrangement of other borough chief executives and officers assumed control 
of recovery and administration. The government announced that a task force (with advisory 
not executive powers) would be appointed to assist the longer-term recovery from the fire 
and its impacts. Kensington and Chelsea’s new Tory leader admitted that trust in the council 
had been seriously damaged by the incident and the council’s subsequent response. A 
major public inquiry began in mid-2018 and its findings are certain to have far-reaching 
consequences for London governance, building regulation and councils’ relations with their 
tenants. Nevertheless, the borough was retained by the Conservatives in the 2018 election.
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
In many boroughs there is effective 
competition between two or more parties, 
with the real chance of a change of control 
at forthcoming elections. The Conservatives, 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats are active 
in every borough, while there has been some 
growth in minor parties in recent decades. 
However, in 2018, only 9.5% of votes cast in 
the borough elections went to parties other 
than the big three (down from over 26% in 
2014). This resulted in ‘others’ winning only 
2.5% of seats.
Because of distortions produced by plurality 
rule voting (see Chapter 2.1) there is far less 
democratic competition in some boroughs 
than others. In Lewisham, Newham and 
Barking and Dagenham Labour holds all 
the seats on the council – although Labour 
also gained 77% of votes in Barking. In 
Islington the majority party holds all but 
one and in Lambeth Labour won 54% of 
votes but holds nearly 91% of council seats: 
the five opposition councillors left cannot 
cover everything. The number of minority 
party councillors on a number of councils 
is below 10% of the total. The make-up of 
the electorate and ward boundaries often 
compound the problems. There are also 
other boroughs, such as Tory-controlled 
Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea, 
where there has never been a change of 
control, though there is a sizeable opposition 
in both.
Turnouts at 38–39% have been around 5–6% 
higher than at the turn of the century, but 
below the levels of the politically charged 
1980s and early 1990s. Political controversy 
seems to drive up turnout.
Turnout levels, which are historically around 
36–39%, are just on a par with other UK local 
elections, and low by international standards. 
In 2018 turnout across Kensington and 
Chelsea rose to 39% but was as low as 30% 
in Barking and Dagenham, though Richmond 
achieved 51%.
Stability is a key attribute of the London 
boroughs. Because they have survived with 
virtually the same boundaries and many 
of the same service responsibilities for 52 
years, they are now the oldest municipalities 
in the UK. Virtually all other public providers 
have been reorganised more frequently. 
Despite their lack of any formal constitutional 
protection, the London boroughs have 
proved resilient within a UK government 
system which is subject to regular 
administrative ‘churn’. The City of London, 
an exception to virtually all rules, is almost a 
thousand years old.
The City of London’s democratic position 
is anomalous and has been for decades. 
Its franchise includes business votes, a 
characteristic that was unique in modern 
sub-national government until business 
improvement districts came into existence 
in the 2000s. The latter are business-led, 
but have access to non-domestic rates as 
a revenue source. In addition, many larger 
London businesses are now required to 
pay a supplementary local rate to fund the 
Crossrail project.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Local responsiveness is perhaps the single 
most important virtue of London boroughs 
and their councillors. There are over 
1,800 councillors in London (compared 
to 73 MPs and to 25 London Assembly 
members, only 14 with constituency roles). 
So London borough wards cover an area or 
neighbourhood that is small enough to allow 
easy access to elected representatives. 
In a city as large as London (1,572 sq km), 
residents have a need for both local and city-
wide voice. Borough councillors make locally 
sensitive representation possible.
The processes that political parties use 
to choose candidates are not easy for the 
wider public to understand, though this 
issue is not unique to London. Parties are 
private organisations which have their own 
processes for selecting candidates for all 
types of election. The closed nature of party 
selections may from time to time encourage 
‘entryism’. Here a sub-set of party members 
within a party become able to choose 
candidates by surviving long meetings, 
procedural struggles and other ways of 
operating that discourage participation by 
the wider local membership.
London is by far the most diverse part of 
the UK. The most recent census of the 
city’s councillors (in 2013) suggested nearly 
16% were from black and minority ethnic 
communities, and this share probably 
increased in 2014 and 2018 – in line with the 
2017 general election when just over 16% of 
London’s MPs came from BME backgrounds. 
Only a third of London councillors are 
female.
There have been examples of electoral 
fraud in a number of British councils in 
recent years including, notoriously, in Tower 
Hamlets. Although London elections are 
generally well-managed and clean, there 
have been accusations of malpractice, 
though there have been very few examples 
of proven fraud. Since the Tower Hamlets 
case greater efforts have been made to 
monitor electoral registers, postal voting and 
(with police assistance) polling stations.
The boroughs are capable of representing 
themselves and their democratic position 
within UK government in negotiations with 
the mayor and Whitehall. A jointly funded 
representative body, London Councils, acts 
both to safeguard borough interests during 
the passage of legislation and in lobbying 
for greater devolution, as well as being the 
collective voice for boroughs in relation to 
national and city-wide government and to 
other institutions.
The small size and multiplicity of London 
boroughs are criticised from time to time. 
Thirty-two boroughs seems a large number of 
authorities for a relatively small geographical 
area. Some critics have suggested a move to 
14 (the number of Assembly constituencies) 
or even five ‘super boroughs’. From a 
democratic point of view, reducing the 
number of boroughs would inevitably reduce 
the number of elected representatives, and 
cut the possibility of access by the public. 
Five boroughs would mean each having 
an average population of 1.8 million, almost 
twice the size of Birmingham City Council. 
If boroughs were that large, some form 
of ‘parish’ or ‘community’ council would 
doubtless be required, thus creating three 
tiers of sub-national government within 
London.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
 (Some shire areas already have county, 
district and parish councillors, which can be 
seen as complex.) In democratic terms, any 
reform of London borough government would 
need to take access and local accountability 
into account.
Since the abolition of the Audit Commission, 
there have been no objective council-
wide assessments of London boroughs’ 
performance. But there has been little 
evidence to suggest that London boroughs 
are disproportionately susceptible to 
management, financial or service failure. 
Apart from the cases of Tower Hamlets and 
Kensington and Chelsea discussed above, 
both one-party dominated for long periods, 
there have been no examples of significant 
difficulties affecting individual councils. 
Given the scale of revenue expenditure cuts 
demanded of many London boroughs since 
2010 (see ‘Weaknesses’), their performance 
can be seen as remarkably good in the 
circumstances.
Tax-raising by the London boroughs has 
been centrally constrained since rate 
capping started in the mid-1980s. From 
2010 onwards a number of boroughs have 
had their revenue spending reduced by 
between 35% and 45% in real terms – a far 
greater cut than almost all other parts of the 
public sector. Such sharp cutbacks required 
boroughs to protect some services, such 
as social care, while allowing others to take 
even deeper cuts. Official statistics show 
central administration, roads and planning 
have faced reductions of 50% or more over 
seven years. The National Audit Office 
reported in March 2018 on the financial 
sustainability of English local authorities 
as a whole, explaining that the scale of 
change is unprecedented. Government plans 
show further reductions in non-social care 
spending at least till 2020. It is hard to see 
how London boroughs’ core capacity cannot 
be affected by reductions on such a scale.
London’s boroughs are stable and effective. 
Despite very large reductions in centrally set 
funding in recent years, they have been able 
to continue to deliver effective services and 
to regenerate former industrial parts of the 
city. Public satisfaction scores are generally 
high. Managing such a massive and complex 
city is a daily challenge, suggesting that this 
is one of the better-functioning parts of UK 
government. Stability has allowed politicians 
to concentrate on service delivery and 
regeneration.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The boroughs and the mayor have been 
jointly negotiating with central government 
over a further package to devolve powers 
over skills, employment, criminal justice, 
housing and health to London. The sense 
that devolution is a ‘process not an event’ 
has created dynamism which was reflected 
in the London Finance Commission report 
of January 2017, which argued for fiscal 
devolution to the boroughs and the mayor.
Brexit is a potential threat to the economic 
development and stability of a number of 
London boroughs which have in recent 
years had to harness major projects in order 
to pay for new local facilities and services. 
Any abrupt, ‘cliff-edge’ departure from the 
EU might adversely affect the tax base of 
London authorities, especially if and when 
more taxation powers were to be devolved.
As the primary planning authorities for the 
capital, the boroughs have the chance to 
reduce any short-term impact of Brexit by 
adjusting their policies to accommodate any 
shocks that emerge as the UK leaves the 
EU. More generally, London councils have 
significant freedom to use planning and 
regeneration policies to make good the lack 
of central government funding for investment.
Any recession, whether or not linked to 
Brexit, could also threaten the boroughs’ 
capacity to deliver the large numbers of 
new homes needed. The softening of the 
London property market during 2016–18 
changed the economics of many boroughs’ 
regeneration plans.
Housing supply is linked to the planning 
system. Given co-operation involving the 
mayor and Whitehall, it would be possible 
to increase the numbers of both affordable 
and total homes available in London. There 
is growing central government pressure on 
councils, land owners and the development 
industry to increase housing supply. The 
mayor seeks significant additional ‘genuinely 
affordable’ housing. More than any other 
part of government, the boroughs could 
create the conditions needed to deliver a 
rising number of new homes, though such an 
outcome would require additional borrowing 
freedoms and greater use of resources 
created by selling of social housing.
The fallout from the Grenfell Tower disaster 
has inevitably included a need for many 
London councils to spend substantial 
amounts of money on improving the safety 
of their high-rise housing blocks. How far 
central government will assist in funding 
of these upgrades still remains somewhat 
unclear. Boroughs affected face short- 
and longer-term costs that may run into 
billions of pounds. There is a risk to the 
availability of social housing and also to the 
maintenance of buildings other than those 
affected by post-Grenfell requirements for 
improvements.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The boroughs can assist the mayor with the 
delivery of the planned Crossrail 2 trans-
London railway. It will require significant 
amounts of development on sites within 
a number of boroughs from Enfield and 
Waltham Forest, across inner and central 
London, to Sutton and Kingston. Again, the 
creative use of the planning system will be 
essential to both tiers of government if they 
are to generate resources for improved 
services.
There is always a risk that the government 
will initiate a reorganisation of the boroughs 
as a solution to a problem – such as loss 
of capacity due to revenue spending 
reductions; or to respond to failings 
revealed by the Grenfell Tower public 
inquiry. All local government in the UK is 
almost permanently under threat of some 
potential reorganisation.
How the boroughs work and what they do
Since their creation in 1965 to today, the London boroughs have survived (while the 
former Greater London Council was abolished by the Thatcher government in 1986), partly 
because their service responsibilities matter to local residents, even though they have 
altered significantly over time. The boroughs run social care, environmental services, most 
roads, public health, part of social housing, some services and oversight for local schools, 
some special needs transport, waste disposal and the administration of elections. Council 
leaderships (generally a mayor or cabinet) make policy which is subject to voting and 
scrutiny by the whole council. In all but one borough there is a majority administration of 
one party (see Figure 1). Service delivery is the responsibility of non-political professional 
officers who are appointed by the council.
Two-tier government
For resident Londoners and businesses, the borough is the unit of government responsible 
for most local services. The mayor of London and the London Assembly have quite 
separate responsibilities. There is some overlap: boroughs must fit their local plans within 
the mayor’s overall London Plan, while the mayor is responsible for allocating resources 
to support affordable housing and can lead policy but does not have a delivery role. The 
boroughs, on the other hand, work in partnership with City Hall to deliver homes. The 
mayor’s agency, Transport for London, allocates some transport funding to boroughs.
It is relatively easy for the public to understand the differences between the boroughs’ 
responsibilities and those of the mayor. There is probably greater confusion amongst 
citizens about how the boroughs’ responsibilities for social care link to NHS health care, 
supervised by central government. Failings or deficiencies in the joined-up care of older 
people can easily lead to finger-pointing between central and local government, as across 
the rest of England.
In the 18 years since London-wide government was restored, the boroughs have come 
to accept the Greater London Authority, particularly the office of mayor, as a legitimate 
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expression of metropolitan democratic needs. There is no borough-initiated campaign 
to reform the GLA, though there have been concerns expressed by some borough 
leaderships about the London Assembly. From time to time, individual boroughs will 
disagree with the mayor of London about issues such as planning policy or house-
building. But there is an acceptance that there are two legitimate spheres of sub-national 
government within London, which will at times disagree, for good democratic reasons.
The capacity of each tier of London government to represent different interests: ‘local’ and 
‘metropolitan’ is, in effect, part of a de facto constitutional settlement for the capital that 
balances citizens’ own different needs. Despite the lack of a formal UK constitution or a 
London city charter to mediate between the two tiers of the capital’s government, relations 
are overwhelmingly managed effectively.
Financial dependency and budgets
In common with other UK local authorities, the boroughs are required to produce a 
balanced revenue (that is, day-to-day) budget each year. Only capital expenditure projects 
can be funded by borrowing, and only so long as it is consistent with an official ‘prudential 
code’.
Figure 3 shows the biggest services in London borough government (although over £6bn 
of the education amount shown is forwarded directly to schools, with councils mainly 
shaping the capital spending). The large bulk of the monies that councils directly control 
is spent on social care for the elderly, ill and children, and on housing, local roads and 
transport, plus planning/regulation services. 
Figure 3: Total expenditure across services (in £ billions) by the 32 London boroughs in 
2016–17)
Source: Re-computed from London 
Councils
Notes: All numbers are in £ billions 
and sum across revenue and capital 
spending. HRA stands for Housing 
Revenue Account, roughly housing in 
local government ownership.
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In terms of the income to cover this spending, over four-fifths of the boroughs’ revenue 
expenditure is funded by government grants from Whitehall or re-distributed business 
rates (which are still largely centrally controlled). Less than 20% of revenue spending is 
funded by the local, property-based, ‘council tax’. The latter is effectively capped at a 6% 
increase per annum for London councils (until 2018 this was 2%). To raise any more than 
this a council would have to propose and then win a local referendum. However, since 
2015 the two Conservative governments have encouraged centrally determined increases 
in council tax to pay for additional social care expenditure. (The government had plans to 
allow councils to retain 100% of their non-domestic property tax income from 2020, though 
the result of the 2017 general election appears to have reduced the chances of this reform 
taking place.) Capital expenditure represents just under a quarter of all London boroughs’ 
expenditure and is also partly grant-funded, though to a significantly lesser extent than 
revenue spending.
Conclusions
The variegated nature of London’s population means that the London boroughs reflect 
multiple differences that go beyond those related purely to a geographical area. Many 
groups of ethnic and other minority citizens are often concentrated within small numbers 
of boroughs. Looking ahead, a greater capacity for councillors to be representative of 
the many different communities represented in London is a decent goal. Expanding 
opportunities for neighbourhood involvement in local policy-making would be another.
However, there are inevitably clouds in the broadly benign picture for the boroughs. 
London remains an unequal city, and the centralised nature of UK government means the 
boroughs and the mayor do not, even jointly, control many of the resources and powers 
necessary to deliver radical change. Occasionally events occur which are seen, rightly or 
wrongly, as systemic in their implications. The widespread riots in 2011 were of this kind, 
as was the 2017 Grenfell Tower disaster. In a city as large and complex as London there 
is always the risk that an event will occur which will be interpreted as being totemic of 
broader governmental failure – a risk that London councils are now increasingly mindful of.
Tony Travers is Professor in Practice in the Department of Government at the LSE and 
Director of LSE London. He is the author of London’s Boroughs at 50 (London: Biteback).
What does democracy require of England’s local governments?
✦	 Councils and mayors should engage wide participation with local citizens in their 
own governance via voting in regular elections, and through consultation with 
individuals and interest groups. 
✦	 Local voting systems should accurately convert parties’ vote shares into seats 
on councils and should be open to new parties entering into competition. Voting 
systems for mayors and other single office-holders (like police commissioners) 
should maximise the ability of citizens to influence who gets elected.
✦	 As far as possible, consistent with the need for efficient scales of operation, local 
government areas and institutions should provide an effective expression of local 
and community identities and reflect communities of place that are important in civil 
society (and not be structured purely for administrative convenience).
✦	 Local government should be genuinely independent centres of decision-making, 
with sufficient financial resources and policy autonomy to be able to make 
meaningful choices on behalf of their citizens.
✦	 Within councils the key decision-makers should be clearly identifiable by the public 
and media. Council leaders and executive mayors should be subject to regular and 
effective scrutiny from the council members as a whole, and publicly answerable to 
local citizens and media.
✦	 Local government is typically subject to some supervision on key aspects of their 
conduct and policies; in England this is conducted directly by the UK government. 
However, councils and executive mayors should enjoy a degree of constitutional 
protection (or ‘entrenchment’) for key roles, and an assurance that they cannot 
England:  local government and 
politics
Outside the capital, England is one of the largest areas in the liberal democratic world that 
still lacks any form of regional governance and its own parliament and government, unlike 
the rest of the UK. Here, local authorities are the only other tier of elected government. 
Councils and mayors play a key role in the democratic life of cities, towns and regions. Colin 
Copus and the Democratic Audit team explore how democratically they have operated. 
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simply be abolished, bypassed or their fundamental operations altered for solely 
partisan reasons by central government.
✦	 The principle of subsidiarity says that all policy issues that can be effectively handled 
in decentralised ways should be allocated to the lowest tier of government, closest 
to citizens.
Recent developments: elections
The local elections held in 118 areas across England in May 2018 were the first major test 
of public opinion following the surprising 2017 general election outcome. Both Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats gained councillors (compared with four years earlier), while the 
Conservatives suffered modest losses. Figure 1 shows that Labour won somewhat less 
than half of the seats, while the Liberal Democrats showed greater local resilience than 
their national poll ratings, claiming more than one in seven victories. The Conservatives 
won under a third of seats, as often happens to incumbent governments in English local 
elections. The results were broadly similar to those in May 2017. 
Figure 1: The outcomes of the May 2018 elections in England (outside London)
Party
2018 Cumulative 
number of 
councils 
controlled
Councillors 
elected
Percent of 
seats elected
Labour 1,225 47.5 53
Conservative 824 31.9 39
Liberal Democrat 390 15.1 6
Independents 89 3.4 0
Green 28 1.1 0
Residents 21 0.8 0
UKIP 3 0.1 0
Liberal Democrat 1 0.0 0
No overall control 
councils     20
Total 2,581 100.0 118
Source: Wikipedia 2018
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The parties’ ‘national equivalent vote shares’ in 2018 (calculated by the BBC to allow 
the variations in which council areas are running elections in a given year) saw the top 
two parties tied on 35% each at the UK level, with the Liberal Democrats on 16%. In the 
2017 local elections in England and Scotland (which took place a month before the June 
general election), the same national equivalent vote shares had put the Conservatives on 
38% (winning many new seats), while Labour was on a historic low of 27%; and the Liberal 
Democrats defending their local ‘community’ bases secured 18% (more than double their 
eventual general election vote share a month later). The results of the May 2018 English 
local elections saw the three main British parties – Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
Democrats – end up holding some 92% of council seats across England. That figure shows 
a stunning penetration of local politics by national political parties who in turn shape the 
local political dynamic and aid the process of centralisation by pursuing national politics 
locally. 
The government headed by Theresa May delivered on previous coalition and Cameron 
government promises of promoting devolution by creating elected executive mayors to 
operate on a sub-regional level. Designed to end the decade-long stasis on devolution 
within England, the new regional or metro mayors would take on functions previously run 
from Whitehall or quasi-government agencies. In 2017 mayoral elections were successfully 
held in six areas: turnouts were low, although this might be expected for brand new roles 
unfamiliar to voters. In 2018, the Sheffield City Region held its first metro mayoral elections, 
attracting a good turnout even though in this case the devolution plans were incomplete at 
the time of the election. These developments revived the somewhat flagging momentum 
towards more use of elected mayors (see below).
Recent developments: spending pressures
The impact of UK government austerity policies since 2010 has hit home hardest in 
English councils. The National Audit Office found that there had been an overall real-terms 
reduction in Whitehall funding for all English local authorities of 49% since 2010/2011. 
Figure 2 shows that councils have chiefly, and understandably, cut back ‘discretionary’ 
spending which has affected services such as road maintenance, library, museum and 
leisure services and refuse collection. Councils have also implemented staff redundancies; 
sold off assets such as land and buildings; and spent financial reserves. Statutory duties, 
such as providing social care for old people and long-term ill and disabled people, and 
ensuring the safety of children, have been pruned too, but some central funding has been 
made available to ameliorate the worst effects. What we see here is local government as 
financially bound to and controlled by central government with little room for manoeuvre 
when it comes to replacing lost government funding.
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Figure 2: Changes in English local authority spending on different services between 2010–11 
and 2016–17
Source: Financial sustainability of local authorities 2018, National Audit Office, 2018, Figure 7 
Notes: Data shown are net current expenditure. Adult social care includes transfers from healthcare 
bodies. GFRA is the General Fund Revenue Account. This provides revenue funding for the bulk of 
local authority services and is funded primarily by government grants, business rates and council tax. 
It is separate to the housing revenue account which is used to maintain local authority housing stock 
and is funded primarily through rental income.  
The Local Government Association calculated in July 2017 that the then central revenue 
support grants of £9.9bn would be reduced to just £2.2bn by 2019–20 on Whitehall’s 
projections: ‘Local government as a whole in England [including London] would have 
£15.7bn less central government funding by 2020 than it did in 2010’. Around half of all 
local councils will get no grant support at all.
Yet social-care spending pressures in particular have steadily increased with growing 
numbers of elderly people requiring support. Public anxieties about the deteriorating 
availability and quality of social care surfaced strongly in the 2017 general election 
campaign. During that campaign the Conservative manifesto included proposals (that 
were later dropped) for raising the capital a person could own before they were required 
to contribute to their own social care costs from £23,000 to £100,000. As social care is a 
devolved responsibility these proposals would have applied only in England. 
At the same time local authorities’ ability to raise council tax is restricted by Westminster 
and monies raised from business rates remain nationalised and handed over to the 
government. Currently, a long drawn out process of business rate retention is being 
undertaken by government, allowing local government to re-localise business rates so they 
are collected by and stay with the councils concerned. Such a process however, is a long 
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way from being concluded satisfactorily for local government. In response to sustained 
austerity some councils are beginning to use their reserves to maintain essential statutory 
services. One experienced observer noted:
‘Social care continues to be the main drain on resources as 66.2% of local 
authorities with social care responsibilities were forced to use their financial 
reserves in 2016/17…. [Yet] even the richest county, Surrey, is more than 
£100m in debt, having used up its financial reserves and with no viable plan 
for the future.’ 
In early 2018, Conservative-controlled Northamptonshire County Council issued the first 
local government section 141 notice for 20 years. A 141 notice imposes strict financial 
controls on the council and prevents any expenditure except on statutory obligations (see 
below for more details). As a result of this move, itself prompted by financial decisions 
taken by the council, the Conservative government appointed two commissioners to 
oversee the county council. By mid summer it became clear that the authority’s problems 
were extremely serious and indeed that:
‘The scale of the cuts needed are huge. The council must make up £70m 
savings from its £441m budget over the next few months, and a further 
£54m savings in 2019–20. It must try to do this while demand for services 
soars, notably from children’s services and social care services for elderly 
and disabled adults’.
A two-week investigation of the council in the shape of a ‘best value’ review conducted 
by a government-appointed independent commissioner (not the two commissioners 
mentioned above) concluded in a report that:
‘the problems faced by NCC are so deep and ingrained that it is not 
possible to promote a recovery plan that could bring the council back 
to stability and safety within a reasonable time scale’ (para 4.16). ‘A way 
forward with a clean sheet, leaving all history behind is required’, (para 4.17). 
The report asserts that the above would be best achieved by abolishing the county 
council, and the seven well-performing district councils, and replacing them with two new 
unitary councils. 
The government undertook a brief consultation process on this suggestion and if two of the 
eight Northamptonshire councils agreed to the reorganisation proposals all the councils 
would be replaced with two new unitary councils probably from April 2020. Most of the 
districts agreed with great reluctance to their own abolition. The move to unitary local 
government in Northamptonshire fits with a trend across England where previous ‘two-tier 
council’ structures (with county councils as the top tier above district councils) have been 
replaced by ‘unitary’ authorities. England already has the largest units of local government 
across Europe and the British government currently wants to see new unitary councils 
formed with population ranges of 300,000 to 800,000 inhabitants (see below).
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The development of multi-party politics 
(before 2017) somewhat reduced the 
number of completely one-party councils, 
and cut the number of ‘safe’ councils. When 
councils are ‘no overall control’, cross-party 
coalitions are needed. This may increase the 
range of views being considered beyond 
those of a single party.
Local council elections in England use 
plurality rule (‘first-past-the-post’) voting 
(see Chapter 2.1). It often produces severely 
disproportional election outcomes, especially 
over-representing the largest party in a local 
area. Some councils become completely 
one-party for long periods, and others are 
dominant-party systems, where the same 
party holds power for decades. 
First-past-the-post elections sometimes 
provide for a clear winning party but it does 
not adequately reflect a wide range of 
political views. If local policy-making is to be 
a deliberative process where debate takes 
place in public, a more proportionate electoral 
system would strengthen local democracy.
The voting system used for executive 
mayors is the supplementary vote, a system 
that gives citizens first and second choice 
votes (see Chapter 2.2). It ensures that the 
person elected must secure over 50% of the 
votes from ‘eligible’ votes in each contest. 
To win, candidates normally must ‘reach out’ 
beyond their own party’s supporters to draw 
in second-vote backing from the supporters 
of other parties.
The supplementary vote used for electing 
executive mayors and police commissioners 
is majoritarian not proportionate. If a voter’s 
second preference is not for either of the top 
two candidates it will not count in the latter 
round of voting.
Councils are democratically elected, 
representative bodies. They provide an 
opportunity for over 18,000 people across 
England to take part in holding elected office. 
Local government provides avenues for 
participation in politics and for allowing for a 
wider range of people to hold elected office 
than simply the 650 elected to Parliament.
Local electoral turnout in England is 
among the lowest across Europe. It bumps 
uncomfortably along in the mid-to-high 30% 
bracket – although turnout does increase 
when local elections are held on the same 
day as a general election.
Local government is an institution that is 
able to provide a barrier between a powerful 
central state and local citizens and to at least 
attempt to attenuate the worst excesses of 
central policy.
Currently approximately 50% of local 
government revenue funding comes from 
the centre in the form of grants, many of 
which, such as grants received for schools, 
are ring-fenced and therefore cannot be 
used for purposes other than those set by 
the government. Central control leaves little 
discretion for local spending priorities to be 
realised, thus undermining the democratic 
legitimacy of local government.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
As locally elected representatives, 
councillors are located closer to the public 
than MPs and MEPs. They are, therefore, 
able to make policy decisions, or decisions 
about the provision of public services, in 
ways that closely reflect local needs and 
priorities.
Research shows that many voters in council 
elections are choosing parties to support 
on national lines. Hence local results may 
be influenced by the popularity of the 
government of the day in Westminster, rather 
than by local policies. Local elections are 
often reported in the media chiefly for what 
they can tell us about the national fortunes of 
the main political parties. These traits weaken 
the purpose of local elections, and the 
accountability of councillors to local voters.
Councillors – and the council as an 
organisation – are easily accessible to 
the public and provide channels into local 
political decision-making.
The large size of English local government 
– compared to much of Europe – makes it 
remote from local citizens and undermines it 
as a truly local institution.
Councils provide for a set of electorally 
legitimised processes for arbitrating and 
deciding between competing local views 
and issues, and resolving them.
Local government can be re-shaped, re-
structured and re-organised at the whim of 
the centre, and its boundaries altered and 
reshaped, or particular councils abolished 
or merged, with little regard to the wishes of 
local communities. Thus, local government 
as a democratic component of the state is 
constitutionally weak.
Local authorities in England have coped 
creditably with very drastic spending 
cutbacks forced on them by Whitehall.
Councils and mayors have borne huge 
reductions in spending, while their statutory 
duties remain extensive (especially in social 
care), and their ability to raise local taxes has 
been controlled by ministers. The financial 
problems experienced by Northamptonshire, 
and wider problems across all councils, 
underline the extent of service cutbacks 
made and the pressured role of local 
decision-makers.
Functions, powers, responsibilities and 
tasks of local government can be removed 
by the centre in Whitehall and placed with 
other agencies or bodies. UK ministers 
have interfered extensively and freely in 
local policy-making, removing functions and 
limiting councils’ tax-raising powers.
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Future opportunities Future threats
Central government’s policy of devolution 
has seen major public service responsibility 
and some budgets devolved from the centre 
to new combined authorities. In May 2017 
voters in six such combined authorities 
directly elected a mayor to head the new 
body. In 2018, Sheffield City Region followed. 
It is likely that further devolution to local 
government, through combined authorities, 
will form a part of government thinking.
Local government, as a creature of statute 
and with no independent right to exist, 
is under constant threat of centralising 
governments or the centralising tendencies 
of the civil service.
The Brexit negotiations designed to ensure 
the repatriation of powers, responsibilities, 
finance and sovereignty lost as a result of 
EU centralisation can be used to accelerate 
devolution to local government. A strong 
local government voice at or around the 
negotiations could make sure that repatriated 
powers do not stop at Westminster and 
Whitehall, but flow down to local government 
and to parish-level government.
Local government operates in an 
environment where it competes with a wide 
range of external agencies and bodies, which 
spend public money, make public policy 
decisions and affect the well-being of local 
communities but do so without a democratic 
mandate. Local government is open to the 
centre removing its responsibilities and 
functions and placing them with unelected 
bodies.
Local government’s experiences and 
practices of citizen engagement and 
devolution to local communities can 
bolster its support, and engage citizens in 
policy-making and local decisions far more 
effectively than similar attempts by central 
government.
The low fiscal discretion available to local 
government will continue to hinder its ability 
to respond to economic change and austerity 
policies implemented by the centre.
There may be scope in the Brexit 
negotiations for improvements in how 
councils achieve funding. Currently English 
local authorities receive 70 different forms 
of EU funding managed by different local 
government departments. The processes 
involved can be confusing, slow and 
bureaucratic. Taking back control within 
the UK will speed things up and produce 
simplified decision-making processes. 
There are no guarantees that the UK 
government will pick up and replace EU 
funding to councils as part of the Brexit 
process. The two-stage process envisaged by 
ministers, of first repatriating powers within the 
UK and only thereafter considering whether 
any of them should be delegated down to 
local authorities, is likely to re-centralise 
controls in Whitehall, certainly for the short 
term. ‘Henry VIII’ powers in Brexit legislation 
will also give ministers far more discretion in 
how they implement executive powers.
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Elected executive mayors
Throughout the 20th century, English mayors were honorific office holders, chairing council 
meetings and opening civic events, but otherwise devoid of power. Local political power 
instead lay with the majority party group on the council whose leadership typically formed a 
‘submerged executive’ little known to citizens and not visible to the local media.
The Blair government changed this historic pattern through legislation passed in 1998 to 
introduce a powerful executive mayor for Greater London. The first mayor was directly 
elected by voters in 2000 using the supplementary vote (SV), which guarantees that 
the mayor has clear majority support in their area (see Chapter 2.2 for how this voting 
system works). The success of this innovation lead to local citizens anywhere in England 
gaining the power through the Local Government Act 2000 to petition to hold a binding 
referendum on whether to create an elected mayor with executive powers for their area, 
and thus be able to directly choose the political head of the council, again using SV. Figure 
3 shows the councils where directly elected mayors exist and the year in which they were 
introduced. A legislative change in 2007 allowed councils to resolve to move to a mayoral 
system of governance without a referendum, but only Leicester and Liverpool have used 
this method. So far there have been 53 referenda and currently there are 16 directly 
elected mayors heading traditional English councils. Two authorities (Hartlepool and Stoke-
on-Trent) had directly elected mayors but subsequently abolished the office. 
Figure 3: Elected executive mayors in England in municipalities and the new metro/regional 
areas
Elected mayors in conventional local authorities Established
Bedford, Doncaster, Hackney London borough (LB), Lewisham LB,  Newham 
LB, Mansfield, Middlesbrough, North Tyneside, Watford
2002
Torbay 2005
Tower Hamlets LB 2010
Leicester 2011
Bristol, Liverpool, Salford 2012
Copeland 2015
Regional or metro-mayors  
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough; Greater Manchester; 
Liverpool City Region; Tees Valley; West of England; West Midlands
2017
Sheffield City Region 2018
Direct election of local office-holders was adopted by the coalition government for 
the police and crime commissioners (PCCs), introduced across England and Wales in 
November 2012. These SV elections attracted only a 15% turnout and of the 37 PCCs in 
England, when the Conservatives won 15, Labour 12 and independent candidates won a 
not inconsiderable 10 PCCs. In May 2016, the second PCC elections were held alongside 
the local elections. This time 21 Conservatives, 16 Labour, 3 independents and 2 Plaid 
Cymru commissioners were elected (see Chapter 2.2).
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In 2017, the Conservatives’ general election manifesto proposed to scrap SV elections 
for police commissioners and all elected mayors, and replace it with first-past-the-post, a 
move that would dramatically impair these office-holders’ legitimacy. The advent of a hung 
parliament has meant that such a move is unlikely to be given much priority. 
Regional or metro-level executive mayors
Since May 2017, a new type of mayor and a new type of sub-national political institution has 
been introduced, the combined authority, in the seven areas shown in the bottom half of 
Figure 3, with directly elected regional or metro mayors. The devolution initiative stemmed 
from the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 and the 
Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016. 
As the name suggest, the combined authorities are groupings of existing local authorities 
that have negotiated a devolution deal with the government. The key consequence of 
each deal is that the councils acting together receive devolved responsibilities for a range 
of services and devolved budgets. Several metro mayors (including Manchester) have 
taken over the role previously filled by police and crime commissioners in their area, and 
some will seek to better integrate social care with regional NHS provision – giving them 
substantial roles and influence across public services. The significance of these new types 
of sub-national combination of authorities and the directly elected mayors that head them 
cannot be overstated. They are a new way of the centre attempting to devolve powers and 
functions, and early developments were promising. 
The first elections for the new mayors were held successfully in 2017 and 2018, attracting 
an encouraging turnout for first-time elections (see Chapter 2.2). Some mayoral contests 
attracted ‘big hitter’ politicians as candidates. The former Cabinet minister Andy Burnham 
won the 2017 Greater Manchester contest for Labour against the run of polls, and was 
quickly prominent in the response to the Manchester Islamist terror bombing. The former 
John Lewis executive Andy Street won the West Midlands for the Conservatives, while 
prominent Labour MP Dan Jarvis easily won in 2018 in Sheffield.
But as with all sub-national bodies within England, they exist at the behest of the centre, 
so Whitehall’s willingness to devolve effective powers remain to be tested. At times the 
‘devolution deals’ appear to lack imagination and the process of negotiating deals has 
been a contested one among the councils as was the case in Sheffield City Region. 
The protracted debates about realising a proposed mayor for the whole of Yorkshire 
demonstrates the complex problems involved in bringing council areas together for 
regional-level functions as well as the intensity of local politics. 
Some politicians – notably the Blair government – have made siren calls for regional 
government in England. While England lacks its own Parliament such proposals would 
simply divide England, breaking it into disputing factions. There is no strong regional 
identity in England that replicates that found in other European countries, and in 2004 
when the Blair government gave voters of the North East of England – deemed by some 
to have the strongest regional identity – a referendum on regional government almost 78% 
of voters rejected the idea. Moreover, the administrative regions of England do not reflect 
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real places in the same way as German Länder or Spanish and Italian regions. Indeed, six of 
the eight English regions are merely compass points – north-east, south-west –  that just so 
happen to reflect NUTS 1 regions within the EU rather than ‘real’ parts of England. England 
also lacks its own Parliament, government and First Minister, unlike Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, and therefore England is at a great disadvantage when faced with the rest 
of the UK when it comes to a distinct English voice in the competition for resources from 
the UK government. It is a disadvantage that no type of local government or sub-regional 
entity can overcome no matter how local government may be reorganised. 
Reorganisation of local authority areas
There has been a long-term and consistent trend in English local government, almost since 
the creation of recognisably democratic councils by the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act, 
towards larger and therefore fewer, units of local government. The trend continued in a 
semi-ad hoc fashion until the Local Government Act 1972 reduced the number of English 
councils from just over 1,200 to 377 and reduced the number of councillors by around 
50% to approximately 20,000. Since then further ad hoc reorganisations have taken place, 
further reducing the number of councils to 352 (with further reduction in councillor numbers 
to around 18,000). 
Figure 4 shows the most recent reorganisation carried out in 2009 (under the Brown 
Labour government), which focused in more rural areas with two tiers of district and county 
councils. These changes saw 44 existing councils abolished and replaced by just nine new 
councils with a loss of over 1,300 councillors, a 63% reduction in the areas affected.
Figure 4: Changes made in the 2009 reorganisation
County area Main reform
Old 
councils
New 
councils
Bedfordshire County council abolished. Two districts 
now unitary authorities
3 2
Cheshire County council abolished. Two districts 
now unitary authorities
7 2
Cornwall Unitary county, 6 districts abolished 7 1
Durham Unitary county, 7 districts abolished 8 1
Northumberland Unitary county, 5 districts abolished 7 1
Shropshire Unitary county, 5 districts abolished 6 1
Wiltshire Unitary county, 4 districts abolished 5 1
Total   44 9
The unitary debate continues, with austerity and cost-saving often being used as a 
rationale for abolishing the two-tier system, replacing it with a county-based unitary model. 
Areas such as Buckinghamshire, Dorset, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and Oxfordshire, 
to name a few, are in a reorganisation battle (some are further on in that battle than others). 
The first shot in such wars is normally fired by a voracious county council seeking to abolish 
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its district councils and take on their responsibilities and functions. Some districts however, 
are not going meekly to the slaughter as in Northamptonshire mentioned above, but are 
campaigning to keep local government close to communities.   
Council reorganisations in England over many decades have created some of the 
largest units of local government across liberal democracies. They were justified in 
terms of efficiency and creating a simpler structure of unitary authorities, that is more 
understandable for citizens. While evidence does not consistently show that larger 
councils will be more efficient or effective, the British government presses ahead with its 
unitarisation policies, regardless.  Fewer councils mean fewer elected members which 
means less participation by people in local politics, a greater workload for the remaining 
members and a greater distance between them and the citizens they represent. In addition, 
larger units of local government are more remote from the public than the smaller units 
they often replaced, which can create more communicative distance between councils and 
citizens. Subsequent reorganisations of local government, and boundary reviews, have 
led to a piecemeal reduction of the number of councillors, in a ‘stealth process’ that some 
have argued lacks transparency and any democratic rationale. Critics argue that as English 
local government units get bigger and are less proximate to citizens, so citizens will tend to 
disengage and to feel less politically efficacious.
Local cabinets and scrutiny committees
The historic patterns of how councils were run in England changed with the Local 
Government Act 2000. Prior to that all councillors were collectively engaged in decision-
making through committees and no single councillor legally held decision-making powers. 
In reality however, the majority party group of councillors would get their preferred 
decisions made in committee. Committee chairs would also often meet together privately, 
or with officers and act as a form of ‘submerged’ or nascent cabinet, whose existence 
voters were largely unaware of.
From 2000 onwards, all councils were obliged by law to distinguish between councillors 
holding executive positions within a cabinet headed by an executive leader (or directly 
elected mayor), and the remainder of the council membership. Executive councillors hold 
portfolios and if the council decided, can have individual delegated authority. Councillors 
outside the cabinet no longer have day-to-day decision-making powers, but sit on overview 
and scrutiny committees, charged with holding the executive to account, reviewing policy 
and decisions, or indeed, holding to account and reviewing the actions of organisations 
beyond the council. Overview and scrutiny committees, however, cannot make decisions, 
only produce reports and recommendations for others to consider.
The Localism Act 2011
The opening section of the Localism Act 2011 provides that ‘a local authority has power 
to do anything that individuals generally may do’ unless they are specifically prohibited 
in legislation. However, this relatively new ‘general competence’ power does not free 
local government from oversight by Whitehall departments, who have been less than 
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enthusiastic in embracing the idea of new freedoms for local government. Indeed, the 
power does not fundamentally undermine the structure of public law and how councils are 
restricted in their ability to act. A conflict exists here between the legalistic view of local 
government and a political/governing attitude to local government. Yet, if English local 
government is to have any chance of genuinely focusing local views, and having governing 
autonomy to act as it thinks fit to solve the issues it faces, then the general power of 
competence is a step in the right direction.
In 2013 the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, then chaired by Graham Allen 
MP (and not re-formed after the 2015 election), published a report on the prospects of 
codifying the relationships between central and local government. It included a manifesto 
(pp.1–9) by this author, outlining how genuine localism and autonomy could be introduced. 
It proposed radically new local law-making powers for councils, constitutional protection 
against being abolished or reorganised, substantial tax-raising powers and financial 
independence from central government. The manifesto also envisaged an English 
Parliament with much the same powers as the Scottish Parliament (except for the local 
autonomy provisions above), including safeguards for local citizens to control local voting 
methods and changes in how councils are run by local referenda. Implementing such 
a manifesto, or even part of it, would considerably enhance the democratic strength of 
local government and recognise it as a permanent partner with Whitehall in the overall 
government of England.
Conclusions
The striking weakness of English regionalism may be partly due to citizens’ strong local 
loyalties to their existing councils (as well as to Englishness). Local authorities have done 
a remarkable job in trying to protect their communities from the worst consequences of 
austerity policies. But councils and mayors have no constitutional protection from Whitehall 
interference, and depend heavily on central government grants. Their relative weakness 
as a tier of government has been compounded by the ‘nationalisation’ of the UK press and 
media system and the decline of the local press (see Chapter 3.3), plus the dominance of 
UK national parties in ‘first-past-the-post’ local elections (see Chapter 2.1) that only weakly 
relate parties’ seats to their vote share.
Colin Copus is Emeritus Professor of Local Politics De Montfort University and a visiting 
Professor at the University of Ghent. 
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How must human rights and civil liberties be protected in a 
democracy?
✦	 Liberal democratic states are now expected to respect a range of fundamental 
human rights set out in international human rights treaties such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’). These extend from freedom from 
torture, to the right to fair trial and freedom from discrimination.
✦	 It is generally recognised that the functioning of any genuine democracy must be 
based on respect for these rights, without which individuals cannot participate freely 
or effectively in the political process.
Human rights and civil liberties 
A foundational principle of liberal democracy is that all citizens are equal, and so 
the protection of fundamental human rights is of critical importance for democratic 
effectiveness. In many countries a statement of citizens’ rights forms part of the constitution, 
and is especially enshrined in law and enforced by the courts. This has not happened in the 
UK, which has no codified constitution. Instead Colm O’Cinneide evaluates the more diffuse 
and eclectic ways in which the UK’s political system protects fundamental human rights 
through the Human Rights Act and other legislation, and the courts and Parliament. 
7.1
In the UK constitutional system it is generally assumed that the political branches of 
government should play a leading role in resolving disputes about the scope and 
substance of individual rights. However, the courts have become increasingly involved in 
adjudicating human rights issues over the last few decades. The protection of individual 
rights is now usually viewed as forming part of the ‘mission statement’ of the judicial branch 
of government, and human rights cases now form a considerable element of the case-load 
of the UK’s superior courts. 
The Human Rights Act
The Human Rights Act (‘the HRA’), passed in 1998 by the first Blair government, is central to 
the current system of rights protection. It avoided the knotty problem of specifying a list of 
368 7. How far are equalities essential for liberal democracy secured?
particularly ‘British’ rights by imposing a duty on all public authorities (aside from Parliament 
itself) to act compatibly with the rights covered in the European Convention of Human 
Rights (hereafter ‘the Convention’), to which the UK has been a signatory since 1951. The 
Act also gave the UK courts the power to overturn decisions by UK public authorities 
which breached Convention rights, but not to overrule legislation passed by Parliament. 
The courts were given the power to declare such legislation to be ‘incompatible’ with the 
Convention, and to interpret it where possible in a Convention-friendly manner. However, 
the ultimate decision whether or not to change legislation that has a negative impact on 
Convention rights was left in the hands of Parliament – which therefore retains the final say 
as to what constitutes British law. 
If an individual fails to get a remedy before the UK courts under the HRA, they can take a 
case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, as happened over voting rights 
for prisoners in UK jails. Any judgments made by the European Court of Human Rights 
against the UK are not binding upon UK public authorities or Parliament. However, strong 
expectations exist that such judgments by the Strasbourg Court will be complied with by 
the UK, along with all the states in the Council of Europe.
In addition to the HRA, the common law and other statutes passed by Parliament also play 
an important role in protecting individual rights by imposing important legal constraints 
upon public authorities. For example, the Equality Act 2010 prevents public authorities 
discriminating on the basis of race, sex, disability and other grounds of equal treatment. 
However, these extra sources of legal rights protection play supporting roles when 
compared to the HRA. 
Despite these various layers of legal protection, human rights nevertheless remain a 
contested concept in the British political tradition. They are capable of being interpreted and 
understood in different ways. Deep disagreement often exists as to what exactly constitutes 
a breach of a fundamental right. Furthermore, different views exist as to when and how the 
courts should intervene to protect individual rights. Politicians regularly subject the HRA to 
criticism, and bemoan the influence exerted by the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) over UK law. In 2010 and again in 2015 the Conservative election 
manifesto proposed replacing the HRA with a ‘British Bill of Rights’, although in practice Tory 
governments since 2015 have not been able to implement this idea. 
Successive UK governments have also introduced legislation that has diluted protections 
for civil liberties and fundamental rights in the spheres of national security/counter-
terrorism, immigration and socio-economic entitlements: it is likely that this pattern will 
continue. Brexit is posing further challenges, by in particular removing the safety blanket for 
certain non-discrimination, migrant and labour rights formerly provided by EU law. 
The place of both the HRA and European Convention of Human Rights within the UK’s 
legal system thus remains open to debate, as does the status of human rights values more 
generally: no consensus yet exists as to how human rights should best be protected within 
the framework of the British constitution. And while the scope of legal rights protection 
in the UK is relatively strong, it is limited. Socio-economic rights are particularly poorly 
covered, and international human rights law has very limited impact on UK law or policy. 
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The UK’s constitutional culture values civil 
liberties (at least in the abstract). There is 
a formal embrace of human rights values 
within government. Plenty of lip service is 
paid to human rights values both within 
and outside of government. The UK is also 
an advocate for extending and improving 
human rights protection internationally.
Little political consensus exists as to 
the actual substance of human rights 
guarantees. The existing framework of UK 
legal rights protection (based on the HRA 
and European Convention) is vulnerable 
to political attack, with Conservative calls 
for a ‘British Bill of Rights’ to replace them. 
Judgments by the ECHR in Strasbourg that 
go against UK policies or impede ministers’ 
executive action capabilities regularly spark 
public attacks on the Court.
Current legislation provides a strong legal 
protection for core civil and political rights 
via by the interlinked HRA and European 
Convention on Human Rights mechanisms. 
Brexit is removing the safety blanket for 
certain non-discrimination, migrant and 
labour rights formerly provided by EU law. 
The EU’s Fundamental Charter of Rights 
is terminated by the 2018 legislation to 
withdraw from the EU.
In UK civil society, there is a strong 
commitment to rights values and activism. 
Human rights and civil liberties enjoy 
relatively strong political support, in particular 
from younger age groups and in the devolved 
regions.
UK governments have been repeatedly 
able to introduce legislation diluting rights 
protection, especially in areas like national 
security, immigration and socio-economic 
entitlements.
The UK has a relatively strong institutional 
framework for protecting rights, which 
extends beyond the courts – including the 
Equalities and Human Rights Commission, 
and the Joint Committee on Human Rights in 
Parliament (see below).
The scope of legal rights protection in the 
UK is limited. Social and economic rights (for 
example, to receive appropriate healthcare) 
are the most poorly established and 
protected. International human rights law has 
had a very limited impact on UK law or policy.
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Future opportunities Future threats
Attempts to reform the existing Convention/
HRA framework led to a pushback that 
has mobilised political support in favour of 
retaining them. So far the potential political 
costs involved, and the inherent difficulties of 
creating any alterative framework, has meant 
politicians have not tried to implement major 
changes from the status quo.
Human rights remain contested concepts 
in British political culture, and vulnerable to 
political attack – especially when the rights 
of terrorist suspects, migrants, members 
of unpopular minority groups and other 
disfavoured social groupings are at issue. 
For now, the place of legal rights protection 
within the UK’s constitutional culture remains 
uncertain.
The divisive nature of Brexit process may 
actually serve to highlight the importance of 
legal rights protection.
The rise of right-wing populism as a political 
movement, with its intense anti-immigration 
focus and proneness to seeking ‘naïve 
statist’ solutions, has created a political 
climate where rights risk being swept away 
to placate ‘nativist’ sentiment. 
Enthusiasm for human rights values remains 
very strong among younger age groups: 
they also continue to attract support from 
both intellectual opinion-formers and wide 
swathes of civil society. This bedrock of 
support could provide a platform for further 
expansion of existing rights protection in the 
future, in particular in areas such as socio-
economic rights.
The UK’s slow and cautious embrace of human rights
The UK only became a democracy in a meaningful sense of that term by 1918 with the 
achievement of universal (male) suffrage after a long process of constitutional struggle. 
In the previous decades a wide political consensus had emerged to the effect that the 
Westminster Parliament should exercise its sovereign law-making powers (within the UK 
mainland itself) in a manner that respected both the rule of law and basic civil liberties. 
(For obvious reasons, the legal rules applying in the British empire’s colonies were treated 
differently – see Chapter 1.3.) These political constraints, taken together with the limited 
degree of protection afforded by the common law to personal liberty, helped to give rise to 
a culture of individual freedom that was comparatively well-developed for its era.  
Until the Second World War and even into the post-war period most lawyers shared the 
complacent view of the turn-of-the-20th-century legal scholar A. V. Dicey that ‘the securities 
for personal freedom are in England as complete as the laws can make them’. He argued:
‘In England no man can be made to suffer punishment or to pay damages 
for any conduct not definitely forbidden by law; every man’s legal rights 
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or liabilities are almost invariably determined by the ordinary Courts of 
the realm, and each man’s individual rights are far less the result of our 
constitution than the basis on which that constitution is founded.’
As Anthony Lester has commented, ‘the prevailing British constitutional ideology…
treated British subjects as “subjects of the Crown” without the benefit of fundamental 
constitutional rights’. The liberties of the subject were ‘residual and negative in their nature’. 
The individual was free to do anything that the law had not forbidden, but enjoyed no 
embedded or constitutionally protected positive entitlements that could not be altered by 
new legislation or the exercise of ministerial prerogative powers. Respect for rights and 
freedoms in the UK thus depended on Parliament showing restraint when it legislated on 
matters that affected civil liberties. Even on the political left this stance was accepted by the 
Labour Party and trade unions. They feared that formally listing human rights would restrict 
their future ability to legislate in Parliament to achieve social or economic reforms. It might 
also introduce (conservative) judges as arbiters of what legislation was permissible.
However, as the 20th century progressed, this Diceyan consensus gradually began to 
be called into question. The parliamentary restraint needed was not always forthcoming. 
For example, at various periods parliamentary legislation imposed substantial constraints 
upon civil liberties in areas such as national security and counter-terrorism, trade union 
activity, and freedom of speech and the press. The wide-ranging discretionary powers 
enjoyed by public authorities were also prone to abuse, especially when it came to colonial 
governance in the British empire, and to the treatment of immigrants, minorities and other 
groups lacking political power even within the home islands.
From the late 1960s on, this ‘legacy’ state of affairs came under increasing criticism from 
civil society organisations campaigning in the field of law reform – such as Justice, Charter 
88 and Liberty (then called the National Council for Civil Liberties). In Northern Ireland, 
during the years of the armed conflict between 1969 and 1995, agents of the state were 
clearly involved in widespread human rights abuses. Taken together with growing concerns 
about the treatment of ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups within British society, 
these developments dealt further blows to any lingering complacency about how liberties 
and rights were protected within the UK. The rolling back of the UK welfare state that 
began in the 1980s, combined with the bitter controversies generated by the trade union 
conflicts of that era, also helped to erode confidence in the status quo. 
The political momentum in favour of reform was also amplified by the emergence of 
the international human rights movement in the wake of the Second World War. As the 
language of human rights gained in popularity, states committed themselves to respecting 
an ever-growing range of fundamental rights. Beginning with the European Convention 
on Human Rights (‘the Convention’) in 1951, the UK ratified a variety of UN and Council of 
Europe treaty instruments setting out a range of binding human rights standards. Many 
of these commitments became the focus of civil society activism, and began to influence 
policy-making across a range of different fields. However, the ever-increasing salience 
of ‘rights talk’ also began to highlight areas where UK law and policy fell well short of 
established human rights standards.
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In this respect, the civil and political rights set out in the Convention and the interpretation 
given to these rights by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg became 
particularly influential. Over time, the Court’s jurisprudence established a floor of minimum 
standards that all European states were expected to respect. And, from the early 1970s on, 
judgments of the Strasbourg Court began to expose the existence of gaps in human rights 
protection in UK law. As a consequence, the Court’s jurisprudence resulted in significant 
changes being made to UK law in areas such as freedom of expression, privacy, freedom 
from discrimination, freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment and the right to fair 
trial. However, this also drew attention to the lack of a domestic counterpart to the ECHR, 
and the absence of any legal mechanism within British law which could perform the rights 
protective function being played by the Strasbourg Court.
The development of the European Union’s equality law, as interpreted and applied by 
the separate Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), had a similar impact, highlighting the gap 
that often existed between rhetoric and reality when it came to the UK’s commitment to 
principles of equality, and to non-discrimination more generally. Other areas of human 
rights law also brought into focus new shortcomings in the UK’s track record, in particular 
when it came to the positive obligations imposed upon the state to take action to protect 
vulnerable individuals and groups at especial risk of harm – such as children, persons with 
physical and mental disabilities, refugees and migrants, and the homeless.
All of these factors contributed to fuelling growing disenchantment with the UK’s historic 
approach to human rights issues, and in particular with the lack of any substantial legal 
human rights protection. In response, British courts began in the early 1990s to identify the 
existence of a limited set of ‘common law rights’ such as freedom of expression and the 
right of access to courts. They now interpreted legislation as subject to a presumption that 
Parliament did not intend to permit public authorities to violate these common law rights, 
unless the statutory text contained express or clearly implied provisions to that effect. 
However, the major shift in rights thinking was a political one. In 1995 a newly formed 
(and evanescent) group (the Labour Rights Campaign) circularised Labour constituency 
parties with a model resolution calling for the incorporation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights into UK law. This made it onto the final Conference agenda, and was 
carried overwhelmingly, becoming official Labour policy, and attracting continuing elite 
support within the party. By 1997, when the Labour Party returned to power after 18 years 
of being in opposition, the political climate was ripe for reform – which cleared the way for 
Parliament to enact the Human Rights Act (HRA) in 1998. Piloted through by Lord Irvine (but 
almost ignored in Tony Blair’s autobiography) the Act qualifies as one of the most significant 
constitutional innovations since the establishment of the UK’s modern democratic 
structures.
The UK’s current system of legal rights protection
The HRA incorporated the key rights set out in the European Convention on Human 
Rights into UK law and made it possible for individuals to sue public authorities when these 
rights are violated. It thereby introduced for the first time a comprehensive form of ‘rights 
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review’ into the British legal system. The Act also set out to strike a delicate constitutional 
balance – by leaving parliamentary sovereignty intact, while making it possible for courts to 
play an active role in protecting human rights. 
A section of the Act [s.6(1) HRA] imposes a duty on all public authorities (aside from 
Parliament) to act compatibly with Convention rights. If a public authority violates a 
Convention right, then a court can award the victim of the breach a ‘just and appropriate’ 
remedy. The courts nevertheless cannot set aside parliamentary legislation (unlike the 
case with EU law). This leaves Parliament with the final say when it comes to determining 
the law as it relates to human rights issues. But the courts are required to interpret primary 
and secondary legislation under one section [s.3 HRA] ‘as far as possible’ so as to maintain 
conformity with Convention rights. Alternatively, where that is not possible, under another 
section [s.4 HRA] the courts can issue a non-legally binding ‘declaration of incompatibility’, 
stating that the legislation in question is incompatible with the Convention. Ministers and 
Parliament are under no (legal) obligation to respond to such a declaration, beyond the 
political embarrassment involved. But it was designed to draw Parliament’s attention to the 
existence of a situation of incompatibility with the UK’s human rights obligations under the 
Convention – potentially resulting in a fast-track change of the law, if the politicians agree.
The HRA scheme of rights protection was designed to work with the grain of Britain’s 
constitutional traditions, rather than against it. It preserved parliamentary sovereignty 
while attempting to ensure that Convention rights will nevertheless ‘exert a magnetic 
force over the entire political and legal system’. Furthermore, since coming into force in 
2000, the machinery of the Act has by and large functioned according to its purpose. Its 
provisions have enhanced awareness of rights in government, while also making it easier 
for individuals to challenge national laws and practice which infringe their rights. 
For example, decisions by the UK courts applying Convention rights in line with the HRA 
framework have reformed defamation law by extending protection for freedom of speech, 
enhanced the rights of patients undergoing mental health treatment, granted new rights 
to unmarried would-be adoptive parents in Northern Ireland, and clarified the rights of 
persons with serious disabilities. Furthermore, certain major legislative reforms, including 
the Mental Health Act 2007, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012, were passed partially in response to HRA judgments – which had 
identified problems with the justice and fairness of existing laws.
The legal protection afforded by the HRA has been complemented by other institutional 
structures. For example, the Westminster Parliament has established a Joint Committee 
on Human Rights (JCHR), composed of members from both the Commons and the Lords, 
which scrutinises the human rights impact of legislative proposals and existing law. Outside 
of Parliament, the official Equality and Human Rights Commission has been established 
to promote the UK’s compliance with human rights and non-discrimination. Furthermore, 
all the devolved authorities, including the Northern Irish and Welsh Assemblies and the 
Scottish Parliament, are required to comply with Convention rights by virtue of specific 
provisions set out in the devolution statutes. This limit on the powers of the devolved 
authorities reflects the assumption underlying the HRA that Convention rights constitute a 
floor of legal rights protection that all public authorities should respect: it also demonstrates 
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the extent to which rights protection has been woven into the fabric of the UK constitution 
in the wake of Labour’s constitutional reform agenda of the late 1990s. 
Other statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Equality Act 2010, 
have also come to play an important role in protecting rights. In particular, the 2010 Act 
prohibits public authorities from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, disability and 
a range of other grounds and requires all public authorities to give due regard in the 
performance of their functions to the need to eliminate discrimination and promote equality 
of opportunity. The ongoing development of the ‘common law rights’ jurisprudence by the 
superior courts has also contributed an additional layer of legal protection, highlighted by 
the UK Supreme Court’s recent finding in R(Unison) v Lord Chancellor that the imposition of 
employment tribunal fees had breached the common law principle of access to justice.
Outside of the legal context, human rights values attract substantial support – in particular 
from civil society groups. They also have attracted a certain degree of buy-in from many 
public authorities, even if the extent of this can vary considerably. UK foreign policy remains 
committed to promoting respect for the international human rights architecture, and most 
mainstream UK political voices endorse the importance of rights – in the abstract, at least.
Challenges to the legitimacy of UK human rights protection
Yet real problems remain with the protection of human rights in the UK. Legal rights 
protection mechanisms such as the HRA focus on core set of civil and political rights. 
Other types of human rights – in particular socio-economic rights – lack substantive legal 
protection, with the majority of the UK Supreme Court confirming in R (SG) v Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions that unincorporated human rights treaty instruments do 
not form part of UK law. In many areas – in particular the spheres of immigration control, 
national security/counter-terrorism, freedom of association and speech, and the treatment 
of persons with mental disabilities and other vulnerable groups – UK law has been the 
frequent subject of criticism from human rights expert committees at the UN and the 
Council of Europe. 
Furthermore, the manner in which the ECHR and HRA serve as the keystones of the current 
British system of legal rights protection has come under sustained political attack (from 
the right or conservative forces) over the last few years. A right-wing press narrative has 
developed that portrays human rights adjudication as ‘fetishising’ or being excessively 
concerned with the rights of minorities at the expense of the public interest. The Hirst (No. 
2) decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on prisoner voting rights 
attracted considerable political hostility, as have judgments by the EU and UK courts 
which have imposed constraints on the power of ministers to deport non-nationals. Calls 
have been made for a fundamental re-think of the UK’s relationship with the Strasbourg 
Court, and by extension with the Convention/HRA scheme of rights protection more 
generally. For example, Lord Hoffmann in 2009 suggested that an international court like 
Strasbourg lacked the ‘constitutional legitimacy’ to impose its interpretation of the abstract 
rights set out in the text of the Convention on national parliaments and courts, and attacked 
what he saw as expansionist tendencies within the jurisprudence of the Court. Leading 
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politicians and conservative think tanks have voiced similar views, expressing concern 
in particular that the HRA and ECHR unduly extended judicial power at the expense of 
political decision-making. 
In turn, there has been a pushback against many of these claims. NGOs, academic 
commentators and political figures (even liberal Conservatives) have defended the 
HRA and the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. They argue that its ‘living instrument’ 
interpretative approach allows the Court to maintain the integrity of its case law by ensuring 
that it reflects contemporary moral and social understandings of the core content of human 
rights. The argument has also been made that the UK’s membership of the ECHR has been 
a positive force for good, helping to enhance respect for human rights and providing an 
important safeguarding function in the context of Northern Ireland. Supporters of the legal 
status quo also make the case that the ECHR link and the provisions of the HRA is wholly 
compatible with the UK’s constitutional values, including the principle of democratic self-
governance as reflected in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
Despite this, critics of the HRA continue to argue that radical reform is needed. Important 
elements of the Conservative Party in particular support repeal of the HRA and its 
replacement by a ‘British Bull of Rights’, which would reduce the influence of Strasbourg on 
UK law and limit the existing scope of judicial protection of rights in areas such as national 
security and immigration control. The Prime Minister, Theresa May, has even suggested that 
serious consideration should be given to the UK leaving the European Convention system 
of rights protection. 
However, formidable political obstacles lie in the way of any such radical reform. The 
devolved governments remain very hostile to any tinkering with the HRA, which would 
require adjustments to be made to devolved governance arrangements – and, in the case 
of Northern Ireland, might breach the terms of the Belfast Agreement 1998. Any move on 
the part of the UK to withdraw from the ECHR is likely to meet stiff diplomatic resistance 
from other European governments. Furthermore, any attempt to repeal the HRA is likely to 
generate substantial legal uncertainty, and to trigger considerable political push-back within 
the UK.
All of these factors mean that Conservative Party ambitions at various times and in varying 
strengths to amend/repeal the HRA have thus far not been translated into concrete 
legislative proposals. However, it remains to be seen how this situation will play out in 
the future. Brexit is already reshaping important elements of rights protection in the UK. 
The EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 gives sweeping powers to the UK government to amend or 
repeal existing legislation/regulations which give effect to EU law. Many observers fear that 
these powers could be used in the future to undermine the protection currently afforded 
by EU law in areas such as equality law, labour law and migrant rights. Furthermore, the 
international climate has grown much more hostile to human rights values more generally, 
with the rise of aggressive populism (especially nationalist-based) and majoritarian/anti-
migrant perspectives in many different states. These trends also surface regularly in 
British political debates, making the future of human rights protection in the UK look very 
uncertain.
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Conclusions
Once established on the statute books bills or charters of rights have mostly tended 
to become more and more embedded over time in the thinking and operations of the 
countries involved. The longer that they can endure and operate, the more difficult it 
becomes for their critics or opponents to abolish or replace them. The inaction so far on 
earlier Tory pledges of a ‘British Bill of Rights’ instead of the HRA since 2010 might be 
evidence of such an effect. And the bedrock of support for human rights amongst younger 
age groups, intellectual opinion-formers and wide swathes of civil society could yet provide 
a platform for further expansion of existing rights protection in the future, in particular in 
areas such as socio-economic rights where the UK currently falls short. This is also the area 
highlighted most by the Brexit process, with its polarising impacts on UK society. Potentially, 
then, repeal of the HRA or withdrawal from the ECHR may fall off the political agenda. 
In fact, the Brexit process may actually serve to highlight the importance of legal rights 
protection, and to strengthen support for the status quo accordingly. 
However, human rights law and concepts remain vulnerable to political attack – especially 
when they seem to protect anti-social minorities like terrorist suspects, or unpopular 
minority groups, like migrants. Right-wing populist political movements, and some sections 
of the press, with their intense anti-immigration focus, have created a political climate 
where rights risk being swept away to placate nativist sentiment. For now, the place of legal 
rights protection within the UK’s constitutional culture remains uncertain. Much may depend 
upon the political fall-out from EU withdrawal, and how UK society responds to the current 
crisis of neo-liberalism. 
Colm O’Cinneide is Professor of Constitutional and Human Rights Law at UCL.
What does democracy require in terms of gender equality?
✦	 Men and women must enjoy genuine equality in terms of civil rights (covering equal 
pay, employment rights, property rights, access to legal protections, childcare 
access, and marriage and partnership laws).
✦	 Political and public life should be organised to maximise the equal chances of 
women and men to be involved in democratic politics – to vote and stand for 
election, to take part in party and political processes, to contribute to public debate 
and discussion, and to stand for public office and rise to the top in political life.
✦	 Employment in the public service sector (and in firms working on public sector 
contracts) should serve as exemplars of good practice in improving gender equality 
more broadly.
✦	 No gender group (male, female or transgender) should be subject to differential 
discrimination in political or public life, nor to prejudicial or demeaning discussion in 
terms of public and media discourses.
✦	 Where barriers to gender equality are proven to exist, it is desirable for public 
regulation or interventions to at least temporarily be undertaken to secure 
appropriate and feasible ameliorative actions (consistent with maintaining the civil 
rights of all citizens).
Gender equality
Sonali Campion and the Democratic Audit team examine the extent to which gender 
equality provisions in British public life accord with democratic requirements. Are previous 
historical inequalities and discrimination against women being rectified, and is the pace of 
recent change fast enough?
7.2
Recent developments
Although equal pay legislation for men and women was first passed in the UK in 1970, a 
substantial pay gap still persists for full time workers. Career parity remains very difficult to 
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achieve for women with caring responsibilities. Systematic efforts to improve the proportion 
of women in public life are much more recent, and they have not been effectively backed 
by statutory powers or firm regulation. For instance, although political parties are not 
allowed to discriminate against women, they are not obliged to seek gender parity in the 
candidates they put before voters. 
The representation of women in some public roles (such as MPs or member of devolved 
assemblies) has improved significantly in the last five years. This is reflected by the fact 
that the Conservative Prime Minister, Scottish First Minister, and the leaders of the Scottish 
Conservatives, Plaid Cymru, the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin are all women, as 
is one of the Green Party’s two co-leaders. However, we remain a long way from achieving 
parity of representation for women in public life. 
Furthermore, some new developments, such as the use of social media or the focus of 
media attention, have shown disturbing indications of entrenched misogynistic attitudes 
among substantial groups of citizens. Similarly, although more transgender people are 
visible in public life, there remains substantial prejudice against them and the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 needs updating to reflect the principle of gender self-declaration. Yet 
government proposals here have apparently stalled.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
The proportions of women in politics, public 
life and the upper levels of the business 
world have improved noticeably, albeit often 
from a low initial base (see below).
There is still a pervasive gender bias across 
the board and the overall pace of change in 
achieving gender parity shows that existing 
or ‘legacy’ ways of operating still restrict 
women’s full participation. For instance, 
with less than two-fifths of party members 
being women it has been hard to get local 
selectorates in some parties (like UKIP 
and the Conservatives) to choose women 
candidates.
There is now broad public consensus 
that achieving an equal gender balance 
is desirable. This is reflected in increased 
efforts by both the public and private sectors, 
for example, to promote diversity in their 
recruitment processes; offer more family-
friendly policies such as flexible working 
hours; specify clear diversity targets and make 
people accountable for achieving them; and 
offering tailored mentoring and support for 
women to progress within organisations.
In tabloid newspapers and other popular 
media women in public life continue to be 
treated in unfair ways, and so, for example, 
are judged on their appearance (the infamous 
‘Legs-it’ Daily Mail cover) or family roles.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
After many years of irresolute and piecemeal 
action, most of the main political parties 
are working harder to promote women, 
particularly in Westminster and the devolved 
assemblies. The commitment is reflected by 
the growing use of gender quotas among 
parties that lean to the left.
The recent growth of social media has 
shown shocking incidents of misogynistic 
behaviour. Women politicians or participants 
in public debate (such as those advocating 
for more women on UK banknotes) have 
been harassed by virulent ‘trolls’. Police/court 
action has been prompt, but confined to a 
few cases.
Using demeaning language about women, or 
harassing them in the workplace, has clearly 
become publicly unacceptable and political 
suicide for politicians. Social media vigilance 
has increased the level of scrutiny of such 
issues, previously often swept under the 
carpet.
Elite behaviours also still show traits that are 
off-putting for women, such as the frequent 
raucous behaviour of MPs at question time 
in the House of Commons. Women are 
judged negatively for behaviour accepted or 
even encouraged among men. Credibility is 
more easily presumed among men, whereas 
women have to work harder to earn it. In 
politics and in the workplace, masculine 
styles of thinking and working are often 
represented as more ‘natural’.
Transgender people continue to suffer 
discrimination and prejudice, including 
regular unfavourable commentary from some 
sections of the press. 
Future opportunities Future threats
As women become better represented in 
public life, and the engagement with gender 
inequalities becomes more sophisticated and 
far-reaching, there is potential for greater 
changes towards ‘feminising’ institutional 
cultures and practices.
There is a danger of complacency, of seeing 
intractable issues as resolved, when many 
years’ work may still lie ahead.
With Labour leading, parties are adopting 
quotas and other activist methods to boost 
women’s representation.
Recent experience with social media; the 
escalating growth of pornography adversely 
affecting youth attitudes to women; problems 
such as honour killings, forced marriages, 
and female genital mutilation among some 
ethnic minority populations; and continued 
incidents of sexist behaviours in the media 
and public life, all show that UK social trends 
are not all favourable for gender equality.
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Future opportunities Future threats
There are now more women than men in the 
civil service and more women than men are 
joining the legal profession every year. In the 
future, a larger pool of eligible candidates 
should therefore be available for senior roles.
Public sector austerity and government 
spending cuts have hit women harder than 
men and increased relative disadvantage 
in ways that reduce incomes and childcare 
support, and may cut back women’s 
employment and opportunities more broadly.
Transgender people are gaining more 
prominence in public life, especially in 
cultural, and media fields.
Women’s representation in UK public life
Everywhere in public life women still remain a minority, despite proactive efforts in some 
areas, illustrating the very long timespans for changing historic patterns of women’s 
under-representation. The Welsh National Assembly in the early 2000s is the only public 
body in UK history where gender parity was achieved, and this ratio did not endure. This 
highlights that efforts to support women candidates and elected representatives need to 
be sustained. 
Figure 1 shows that by 2016/17 (or near that date) there were still sharp differences in the 
extent which women have been able to break into positions of seniority within UK politics 
and public services. Despite the visibility of women in top political leadership positions, 
representation in Parliament remains a long way from parity. Only one set of public service 
positions in Figure 1 (family doctors in the NHS) surpassed 50%, with three others at around 
40% (the senior civil service, secondary heads, and the boards of public bodies).
In 2015 less than a quarter of court of appeal and high court judges in England and Wales 
were women. However, even this was a significant increase on 2010, when only 8% of court 
of appeal judges and 15% of high court judges were women.
More women have become MPs recently in a large part because most of the main parties 
fielded more women candidates in 2015 and 2017, and both the Tories and Labour placed 
women in winnable seats. For example, the Conservatives ran women candidates in 38% of 
retirement seats and Labour put 53% of women candidates in winnable seats in 2015. In 2017, 
the snap election and resultant hurried candidate selection process for some seats hindered 
measures to improve representation. Labour did field 41% women candidates (up form 34% in 
2015) and Conservatives 29% (up from 26%), though not always in winnable seats.
Labour’s strong improvements have been attributed to using all-women shortlists (AWS). The 
Conservatives remain resistant to gender quotas and even the ‘A-list’ system to increase the 
diversity of Tory MPs in 2010 was not used in 2015. However, the flagging Liberal Democrats 
(previously apathetic about gender disparities) did introduce all-women shortlists for the 
first time in 2017. They increased their number of women MPs to four out of 12, up from a 
dismal one. UKIP candidates were predominantly men, and in Northern Ireland only 25% of 
candidates running for Parliament were women. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) did not 
field any women for Westminster (although their party leader is a woman).
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Figure 1: The proportion of women in a range of major roles in UK public life (2015–17 
figures)
Source: Vyara Apostolova, Carl Baker & Richard Cracknell (2017). Women in Public life, the Professions 
and the Boardroom, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper SN5170 
David Cameron fulfilled his promise that one-third of his cabinet would be women by 
2015. This contrasted starkly with previous Conservative-majority Cabinets, which had a 
maximum of two women. Theresa May’s first cabinet was 29% women. Her January 2018 
reshuffle was presented as increasing gender representation, but in fact included just six 
women out of 23 Cabinet ministers (26%). This was reduced to five following Amber Rudd’s 
resignation as Home Secretary, although four other female ministers could also attend 
Cabinet. Labour’s Shadow Cabinet has consistently comprised 40% women and for the first 
time achieved and maintained gender parity following the 2016 reshuffle, despite numerous 
changes of personnel.
The proportion of women MSPs in Scotland has been significantly better than Westminster. 
However, recent patterns across three main Scottish political parties (SNP, Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats) suggest either a stalling or falling in the number of women MSPs 
elected since 2003, a pattern that still holds. On the flipside, positive changes have 
come both from the top down, through party rules, and the bottom up, through the civic 
awakening that accompanied the referendum. For a time, the SNP, Scottish Labour and the 
Scottish Conservatives were all led by women, though Kezia Dugdale resigned as Leader of 
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the Scottish Labour Party in 2017 and was replaced by Richard Leonard. Nicola Sturgeon in 
particular has pushed for the SNP to use quota measures, with some success, and Labour 
has pledged that 50% of its Holyrood candidates will be women. Encouragingly, recent EU-
wide research proved the commonly expressed fear that voters are reluctant to support 
women candidates unfounded.
Employment and income
Figure 2 shows that the gender pay gap for median earnings of full-time employees in the 
UK was 9.1% in April 2017. Although there has been little progress in recent years, this gap 
in how much men and women are paid for the same work is the lowest since the survey 
began in 1997, when the gender pay gap was 17.4%. Furthermore, women in part-time work 
earn just over 5% more than their male counterparts – and their rates of part-time pay have 
exceeded men’s since 1998. Since April 2018 onwards, companies with more than 250 
employees have had to report their gender pay gaps (see Chapter 5.4). The figures have 
highlighted the persistence of the pay gap in different sectors, but they do not address 
problems of pay disparity associated with the inadequate representation of women in 
senior roles, and of part-time pay disparity. 
Figure 2: The gender pay gap for median gross hourly earnings (excluding overtime), UK, 
April 1997–2017
Source: Office for National Statistics, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, Figure 6. 
Notes: Earnings excludes overtime. Full-time defined as >30 paid hours per week. Dashed lines 
represent discontinuities in the 2004, 2006 and 2011 estimates; 2017 data provisional. The data shown 
are for April in each year.
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Women’s labour market participation, pay and conditions are linked to the amount of 
support they receive for their caring responsibilities. Becoming a mother can still be 
seriously damaging to women’s earnings and the range of jobs that they feel able to take. 
On average British women do about twice as much as childcare as men, and factors such 
as a lack of affordable childcare inhibit women’s ability to sustain full-time, better-paid 
employment. ONS data show that the full-time pay gap varies according to age group: the 
differences are relatively small in age groups up to 30, with part-time incomes for women 
better than their male counterparts in their 30s. It is during their late 30s, when women 
are now more likely to be having children, that the gap begins to grow. New rules to make 
parental leave more flexible for both partners are a step in the right direction, but while the 
discrepancy between earnings persists, uptake is likely to be limited.
Figure 3: Gender pay gap for median gross hourly earnings (excluding overtime) by age 
group, UK, April 2017
Source:  Office for National Statistics, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, Figure 16. 
Notes: Employees on adult rates, pay unaffected by absence; figures represent the difference between 
men’s and women’s hourly earnings as a percentage of men’s earnings; full-time defined as employees 
working more than 30 paid hours per week (or 25 or more for the teaching professions); 2017 data are 
provisional.
In addition, welfare cuts introduced since 2010 have disproportionately affected women. 
Women are statistically more likely to use public services, to be single parents or carers for 
older or disabled relatives, and to live longer and therefore need greater support in later 
life. Women’s average losses from changes to tax credits, housing and child benefits were 
twice as large as men’s as a proportion of net individual incomes, with the lowest earners 
hit hardest. Furthermore, women make up the majority of public sector workers, so cuts to 
public services and pay freezes there are also impacting women’s employment.
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Cultural barriers to change
Quotas and other policies to promote women’s participation in the workplace are important 
developments and help boost the UK’s commitments under the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation and temporary special measures, so that women can enjoy 
their human rights and fundamental freedoms fully.
However, the majority of these measures treat women as the problem, rather than tackling 
the bias that has restricted their involvement up until now. A 2015 LSE report Confronting 
Gender Inequality focused specifically on gender imbalances in the economy, politics, 
law and the media – and recommended much wider measures. These include designing 
macroeconomic policies which value the reproductive sector and unpaid care work; gender 
budgeting; applying equality legislation more effectively; improving women’s access to 
justice; monitoring and reporting on gender representation in the media; and efforts to 
educate people on the root causes of gender inequality across the public and private 
sectors and at all levels.
With transgender people more visible in public life, the discrimination and obstacles the 
trans community faces have received far more scrutiny. The Gender Recognition Act 2004 
and Equality Act 2010 should be revisited in the light of these findings.
Conclusions
Women are now more present and visible than ever before in UK politics and public life. 
However, the pace of change is slow, and men continue to dominate the most senior 
roles across the board. Furthermore, it seems debatable whether institutional cultures and 
attitudes are evolving as rapidly in Britain as elsewhere. Between 2007 and 2016 the UK 
slipped from 13th to 20th in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index. In 2017 
it rose again slightly to 15th, but still scored poorly on women’s economic participation and 
opportunities. If gender imbalances are to be tackled effectively and in a lasting manner, a 
much more holistic approach is required.
Sonali Campion is a former editor of Democratic Audit and the UCL Constitution Unit blog. 
She now works at the Commonwealth Secretariat. 
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What does democracy require in terms of ethnic and religious 
equality?
✦	 Citizens of all ethnicities and religions must enjoy genuine equality in terms of civil 
rights. They must be free to practice their beliefs and customs (as long as these do 
not restrict the rights of others).
✦	 Political and public life should be organised to maximise the equal chances of 
minorities to be involved in democratic politics – to vote and stand for election, to 
take part in party and political processes, to contribute to public debate and policy 
decisions, and to rise to the top in elected public office.
✦	 Employment in the public service sector (and in firms working on public sector 
contracts) should serve as exemplars of good practice in improving minority 
representation more broadly.
✦	 No minority group should be subject to differential discrimination in political or 
public life or by the law, nor to prejudicial discussion in terms of public and media 
discourses.
✦	 Where barriers to inclusion clearly exist, public regulation or interventions should be 
undertaken to secure appropriate and feasible ameliorative actions (consistent with 
maintaining the civil rights of all citizens).
Equality and ethnic minorities 
Sonali Campion and Ros Taylor examine the extent to which the media and political 
representation of ethnic minorities in the UK, and their consequent treatment in public 
policy terms, tend to foster democratic public life. Where previous historical inequalities 
and discrimination against ethnic minorities are being rectified, is the pace of recent 
change fast enough? Are there areas where UK society is moving backwards in terms of 
tolerance and equality for all?
7.3
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Recent developments
In the 21st century the UK is home to more ethno-religious identities than ever. This 
diversity has developed over a relatively short period of time, in significant part due to 
immigration from former UK colonies since the Second World War, and to some in-migration 
of EU citizens since 1973. Changing attitudes towards religion have also played a part, for 
example, resulting in a decline in Christian affiliations and a rise in the number of people 
who identify as Muslim and Hindu.
While increasing multiculturalism and religious variation have the potential to enrich 
British society, such social changes do present public policy challenges for western liberal 
democracies. This is particularly the case in the current geopolitical climate, where conflicts 
in the Middle East and Afghanistan and the rise of Islamic jihadist movements (see Chapter 
1.1) have fuelled tensions between communities. More recently, the European migrant 
crisis and the growth of populist/nationalist Eurosceptic and pro-Brexit sentiments have 
aggravated some existing divides and added new lines of possible conflict. 
Concerns over immigration and social change have clearly contributed to the growing 
popularity of right-wing populist politicians and there are indications that racist attitudes 
in the UK are once again on the rise after years in decline. While other social attitudes 
(such as over gay marriage) have changed quite radically, racial prejudice seems not to 
have budged at all. Over recent decades, the percentage of British people who describe 
themselves as somewhat racially prejudiced has never fallen below 25%.
Political responses to external threats have in many cases done little to alleviate 
tensions. In some areas they may have arguably exacerbated them with clumsy counter-
radicalisation policies, which focus on tackling extremism rather than addressing 
disadvantage and promoting integration. For example, the Prevent strategy has been 
criticised for its ‘stigmatising surveillance of one particular [Muslim] community’, rather than 
building the capacity to discuss contentious issues or deliver effective civic education.
One-dimensional reporting about ethnicity and religion has also fed into tensions. One 
example is The Sun’s headline in November 2015 claiming: ‘1 in 5 Brit Muslims’ sympathy 
for jihadis’. The article was based on misrepresented poll data from Survation, who were 
quick to distance themselves from the unauthorised interpretation of their study. The 
incident led to both an outcry and mockery on social media and The Sun was eventually 
forced to admit that its headline was ‘significantly misleading’. But not all discriminatory 
coverage – for example of Romanians and Bulgarians in the run up to the lifting of 
transnational controls – is called out so effectively.
The rise of UKIP as an anti-immigration, Eurosceptic party up to 2016 also seems to have 
gone hand-in-hand with a revived acceptance of ‘banal racism’ in areas of the media and 
public life. During the Brexit campaign UKIP’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster depicted a crowd 
of refugees and urged voters to ‘break free of the EU’; the image was widely circulated 
on social media (Figure 1). It was also widely condemned. The trade union Unite called it 
‘a blatant attempt to incite racial hatred and breach UK race laws’, and reported it to the 
police (without success). Key figures in the official Leave campaign, such as Michael Gove 
and Chris Grayling, sought to distance themselves and the campaign from this messaging, 
but the damage was clearly done.
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Figure 1: The controversial UKIP Brexit referendum poster
Source: UKIP
In the immediate aftermath of the referendum, both the Muslim Council of Great Britain and 
the Polish embassy reported outbreaks of racist and xenophobic incidents, including cards 
reading ‘No more Polish vermin’ pushed through eastern Europeans’ letterboxes. These 
incidents show a strong anti-immigrant minority view. Such extreme views also seem to 
receive regular legitimation from tabloid press headlines that repetitively cover immigration 
issues in an alarmist and stigmatising fashion.
Crime classified as race-related hate crime rose 74% in England and Wales between 
2011/12 and 2016/17 while crime incidents based on religion rose 268% in the same period. 
At the same time, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has noted increasing 
incidents of hate crimes, with racial, Islamophobic or anti-semitic motivations in England. In 
Scotland, religiously aggravated charges rose 14% between 2015–16 and 2016–17. (These 
were often incidents of religious abuse between Catholics and Protestants – a third of the 
charges recorded were at the Scottish Cup Final, May 2016.) Police noted peaks in race 
and religious hate crimes: after the murder of soldier Lee Rigby in 2013; after the Charlie 
Hebdo terrorist attack in Paris in 2015; in July 2016, immediately after the EU referendum 
(the biggest spike in recent years); and following the terrorist attack on Westminster bridge 
in March 2017.
Current policy debates around ethnic inequalities and religion and belief are therefore 
taking place in a highly charged environment, raising new challenges for the UK’s 
traditionally low-key ways of handling these issues.
Mainstream politics and ethnic tensions
Even mainstream politicians appeared to be adopting ‘dog-whistle’ strategies to mobilise 
ethnic and religious divisions for political ends. When Barack Obama reiterated his call 
for Britain to stay in the EU on a 2016 visit to the UK, prominent Leave campaigners Boris 
Johnson and Nigel Farage both suggested that the President’s ‘part-Kenyan’ roots were to 
blame for his ‘anti-British’ attitude.
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Early on in his failed London mayoral campaign in 2016, Zac Goldsmith started using 
the word ‘radical’ to describe his opponent Sadiq Khan, a Muslim from a Pakistani-origin 
family. Goldsmith claimed he was using the word to describe the radical politics of the 
Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn. But media commentators were quick to pick up on the 
Islamophobic undertones, especially when a Daily Mail article by Goldsmith a week 
before polling day was illustrated with pictures of London’s 7/7 bombings. Goldsmith 
was also criticised for targeting London’s Hindu, Tamil and Sikh communities with leaflets 
making ‘reductive and condescending assumptions’ about their priorities, and seeking 
to mobilise historic tensions between Pakistanis and Indians. Many commentators argued 
that Goldsmith’s defeat by Khan, and his later loss of his Richmond seat to the Liberal 
Democrats in a parliamentary by-election, can be attributed in a significant part to a 
backlash against an apparent attempt to exploit or exacerbate London’s ethnic divisions 
for political ends. Accusations of ‘Islamophobia’ amongst Tory members also resurfaced 
in 2018. Baroness Warsi called for an independent inquiry, emphasising that ‘absolutely 
nothing tangible has happened’ in response to concerns she has raised in relation to anti-
Muslim prejudice since 2015. 
Nor has Labour managed to escape rows over religion and ethnicity. In April 2016 Naz Shah, 
MP for Bradford West, was suspended for an anti-semitic graphic she shared on Facebook 
before she was elected. Former Mayor and key Corbyn ally Ken Livingstone then tried to 
defend Shah and was also suspended from the party as his comments were also viewed as 
anti-semitic: he later resigned from the party. Jeremy Corbyn at first launched an inquiry into 
racism in the Labour Party (chaired by Shami Chakrabarti, who was subsequently made a 
Labour peer), but this was denounced as a whitewash by most Jewish groups. 
The controversy continued and burst into flame in the summer of 2018, focusing on 
Jeremy Corbyn’s past declarations, apparently stalled investigations into other accused 
Labour members, and Labour’s reluctance to adopt the inclusive, international definition 
of anti-semitism outlined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). 
Despite Corbyn’s repeated denials and public rejection of anti-semitism, a range of Jewish 
leaders made exceptionally strong personal attacks on him as an alleged ‘anti-semite’, 
and in August 2018 the veteran Labour MP Frank Field resigned from the party in protest. 
In September, Labour finally adopted IHRA’s definition in full. The effects of this row on 
public attitudes remains unclear, but it seem unlikely that it will be positive in combating still 
widespread (if low level) anti-Jewish prejudice. 
The Windrush scandal and ethnic disparities in public policy
Public servants in the UK generally pride themselves on operating in ‘race-blind’ ways, and 
legislation prohibiting any form of race or ethnic discrimination, or impairment of people’s 
human rights is very specific and well-policed. Yet in 2010, when Theresa May became 
Home Secretary and initiated a ‘hostile environment’ for illegal migration, the Home Office 
effectively began discriminating against longstanding UK residents of Caribbean origin 
who formed part of the ‘Windrush generation’ that arrived in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
(see Chapter 5.3). The government eventually admitted to the policy and apologised but 
not before dozens of elderly people of Caribbean origin were detained and even deported 
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back to islands they had left decades before. More widely, it emerged that during this same 
‘hostile climate’ period Home Office officials had made 5,700 changes to the immigration 
rules, doubling the length of the immigration rulebook and creating a moving target that 
was hard for migrants and would-be citizens to keep up with.
An early promise of the May government was to conduct a racial disparity audit of UK 
political institutions in order to ‘check how race affects how [citizens] are treated on key 
issues such as health, education and employment, broken down by geographic location, 
income and gender’ and to ‘shine a light on how our public services treat people from 
different backgrounds and influence government policy to solve these problems’. The data 
was published in October 2017 (much of it collated from other government departments, 
or dating from the census in 2011), but was welcomed as an important step forward in 
some areas. For instance, Figure 2 shows that survey evidence suggested little difference 
between ethnic groups in their contributions to civil society, taken as a measure of ‘social 
capital’ – for example ethnic minorities are noticeably more confident than white people 
that they ‘can influence decisions affecting the local area’. Though intended as a means of 
compelling departments and public bodies to act, it is unclear whether the data will now be 
used to inform policy and change.
Figure 2: Measures of ‘social capital’ across ethnic groups in 2017
Source: Cabinet Office, Race Disparity Audit 2017, Figure 3.3. (Data from Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport, Community Life Survey 2016–17.)
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Politicians in the ‘mainstream’ parties 
(especially the Conservatives, Labour, 
Liberal Democrats, Greens, and the SNP 
and Plaid Cymru) have normally renounced 
any resort to ‘dog whistle’ politics that 
exploits for partisan ends voters’ evident 
concerns over immigration and the changing 
social character of some cities. With some 
prominent exceptions and lapses, political 
elites held a ‘self-restraint’ line against 
exploiting social tensions. In London, recent 
evidence suggests that this position enjoys 
wide popular support, but this is not the case 
elsewhere in the country.
Populist parties and sections of the right-
wing press are increasingly stigmatising 
sections of the population for political/
commercial gain, adding fuel to division 
and discrimination, and promoting crude 
stereotypes around minority groups.
Britain has a reasonable track record of 
promoting the integration of immigrant 
communities, particularly when compared to 
neighbours like France and Belgium.
The Leave vote in the Brexit referendum was 
clearly driven by concerns about immigration 
both of EU migrants, refugees arriving from 
Europe’s neighbours and the possibility of 
Turkish accession to the EU.
Austria, Germany, France and Denmark 
have all witnessed local or national bans on 
Muslim women’s dress that obscures the 
face. However, there have been few such 
calls in the UK. In 2018 a much reported 
press column by Boris Johnson made 
comments about women who cover their 
face, which many deemed highly offensive, 
but argued against any ban.
The rise of UKIP has put the previous elite 
‘self-restraint’ ethos on exploiting social 
tensions under more stress. The stance 
has become associated with elites’ lack 
of frankness about globalisation and 
unwillingness to recognise many voters’ 
concerns.
The proportions of ethnic minorities in UK 
politics, public life and senior business 
positions are increasing, albeit relatively 
slowly. However, some communities are 
significantly better represented than others, 
for example, those of Indian origin and 
descent.
Political responses to immigration issues 
have tended to focus on economic 
responses, without fully engaging with 
cultural concerns held by anti-immigration 
voters. 
Multicultural policies, while they are 
associated with more peaceful societies, can 
also make ethnic majorities feel unsafe and 
discriminated against.
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Future opportunities Future threats
Promoting religious literacy, both at schools 
and in the workplace, could do much to 
expand people’s awareness of other faiths.
Since 2016, terrorist attacks in Paris, 
Brussels, Manchester and London have 
prompted a rise in hate crime. Xenophobic 
violence also surged after the EU 
referendum.
The government has announced recent 
plans to promote learning English among 
migrants to offer greater support for tackling 
discrimination and disadvantage among 
minority communities – and such provision 
could easily be expanded. Poor English is 
worst amongst women in the Bangladeshi. 
Pakistani, Chinese and Indian communities.
The evolution of migration pressures on the 
EU as a whole, and specifically on the UK 
(for example, via the now demolished Calais 
‘jungle’ camp) will assuredly influence UK 
voters’ attitudes further after Brexit.
In Germany the potential problems of 
racism are far greater for historical reasons, 
and because of recurring violence against 
immigrants. The federal government there 
spends substantial sums (€100m in 2017) 
on political interventions designed to 
combat racist ideas early on, combined with 
curbs on the far right. The UK has no similar 
programmes as yet.
Uncertainty about the future residency 
status of EU migrants in Britain continues, 
with fears they may be used as a ‘bargaining 
chip’ in Brexit negotiations. The scale and 
atmosphere of EU migration to the UK (and 
of UK citizens moving to EU countries also) 
will be strongly affected by the outcome of 
Brexit negotiations, with some indications by 
summer 2018 that EU migration levels have 
noticeably decreased in advance of the UK’s 
withdrawal.
Liberal values (for example, gender equality, 
sexual minorities and free speech) could be 
better promoted among ethnic and religious 
minority communities. But this would need to 
be done not in a way that targets individual 
communities with stereotyped assumptions 
about their existing attitudes.
The major future risk may be that polarisation 
increases between majority attitudes and 
those of specific minorities, especially 
some sections of the Muslim community, 
accentuating some existing disadvantages.
The government has established a 
Controlling Migration Fund, designed to 
alleviate pressure on councils, schools and 
NHS services when a region experiences a 
large increase in inward migration, and so 
encourage community cohesion.
We look next at five ongoing issues relating representation in public life: the representation 
of minorities in political life; ethnic diversity in the media; the treatment of minorities in the 
criminal justice system, and the education, and employment and income situations of ethnic 
minorities.
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Representation in political life
Variations in the understanding of ethnicity have impaired understanding in this area. Where 
data are collected, they tend to focus on ‘black, Asian and minority ethnic’ (BAME) people, 
that is, those of non-white descent. This categorisation is of limited usefulness because it 
fails to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of the UK’s growing diversity. The umbrella 
label groups the experiences of very different minority communities into one category. It also 
fails to acknowledge the challenges faced by some white minorities, such as migrants from 
Eastern Europe. However, due to the limitations of the data and analysis available, we must 
focus predominantly here on those ethnic minorities included in the BAME category.
The 2016 Annual Population Report found that 13.6% of the population came from non-white 
backgrounds. However, minorities remain underrepresented in public life. Although more 
BAME MPs than ever before (52) were elected in the 2017 general election, the number 
would have to rise to 88 for the House of Commons to accurately reflect the population 
as a whole. More positively, the percentage of ethnic minority female MPs in the House of 
Commons increased from 1.5% to 4% between 2010 and 2017 (with a current total of 26). 
In government Sajid Javid and Priti Patel were the only non-white members in Theresa May’s 
first cabinet in 2016. Only Javid remains in 2018, though he is the first person from an ethnic 
minority to become Home Secretary, and to be discussed seriously as future Tory leader.
Figure 3: The percentage of ethnic minorities in various political bodies and populations
Source: House of Commons Library 
Diversity in the media
Ethnic minorities make up 6% of journalists, though that figure conceals major variation 
between ethnicities, with black journalists accounting for just 0.2% of the workforce. But 
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the problem extends beyond just such numbers. There is a lack of diversity in the kind of 
stories that are reported. And excluded voices are often only brought in to stories dwelling 
on extremes or ‘otherness’. On the flipside, BAME journalists who do break into the industry 
are frequently expected to comment on ‘minority issues’ or those that relate to their 
‘own communities’ while predominantly white male journalists dominate the mainstream. 
Commentator Nesrine Malik describes how a ‘fundamental misunderstanding’ of networks 
can be hermetic and self-perpetuating without being actively racist.
The portrayal of religion and belief in news and current affairs is too often clumsy and 
lacking in nuance, which has been attributed to a lack of religious literacy among reporters. 
Studies have noted a foregrounding of stories focusing on the differences between Islam 
and British/western culture. References to extreme forms of Islam are 21 times more 
common than mentions of moderate Muslims. Journalists themselves are far more likely to 
have no religion (61%) than the population at large (28%).
Treatment in the criminal justice and penal systems
Ethnic minorities continue to be over-represented throughout the criminal justice system. 
At every stage from being stopped and searched to prison populations, ethno-religious 
minorities (predominantly those who are black, of mixed parentage, or Muslim) form a 
majority. Over many years BAME people have been one-and-a-half times as likely to be 
arrested as whites, as Figure 4 shows. Black people were over three times as likely. BAME 
groups are also more likely to receive longer sentences. Average custodial sentences 
vary a bit from year to year, but were 17 months for white defendants, compared to 24–25 
months for black or Asian people, and 21 for mixed-race defendants.
Figure 4: The likelihood of being arrested by people’s self-defined ethnic group, compared 
with those from white ethnic groups: England and Wales, year ending March 2017
Source:  Home Office Figure 3.6.
Note:  A score of 1 shows an ethnic group being treated identically with white people; a score above 1 
shows a comparatively high arrest rate, and below 1 shows a low arrest rate. 
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Data from the Youth Justice Board indicated that in 2014–15, 40% of prisoners in young 
offenders’ institutions came from a BAME background. In 2016 Muslims accounted for 
14.6% of the prison population, sharply up from 7.7% in 2002. Data show that while the 
percentage of young people in custody has declined since 2004/5, the same proportion 
has increased for people from black and Asian backgrounds.
The disproportionate numbers of BAME minorities in the justice system is not new, but 
attempts to address it have so far been unsuccessful. The 2014 Young Review, which 
looked specifically at the experiences of young male black and/or Muslim offenders, 
found the disadvantage in BAME communities contributed, along with assumptions based 
on crude stereotyping or outright racism. These factors made it harder to effectively 
rehabilitate and reduce reoffending rates among these groups. The report also emphasised 
that the overrepresentation of ethno-religious minorities ‘does not exist in isolation from 
other unequal outcomes’, both in the criminal justice system and other sectors. Likewise, 
the 2017 Lammy Report found a particular problem with youth prisoners, with the 
proportion from BAME backgrounds rising from 25% to 41% in the decade 2006–16.
In a few parts of the criminal justice sector, ethnic minorities are well represented in relation 
to population – notably within the Ministry of Justice and the Crown Prosecution Service. 
However, they are poorly represented in police forces, judiciary, magistracy and Her 
Majesty’s Prison Service. To counteract this lack of ethnic diversity in the workforce, the 
Young Review urged pro-active efforts to include organisations and representatives from 
the offenders’ communities and faiths so as to tackle unequal outcomes.
Meanwhile, the proportion of foreign nationals in jail (12%) has remained fairly stable since 
2002. However, they are now much more likely to be Polish (10% of imprisoned foreign 
nationals) or Romanian (7%).
Reforms to civil law justice, such as reductions in the availability of legal aid, adversely 
affected ethnic minorities more than others, in part because people in these communities 
tend to be more reliant on legal aid financial support. The 2017 Lammy Report also 
highlighted a lack of trust in legal aid solicitors which was limiting access to justice by 
ethnic minority defendants. In addition, many types of immigration and housing cases 
relevant to BAME groups and Roma are now ineligible for public funding, with Amnesty 
reporting that migrants and refugees have been disproportionally disadvantaged by 
changes to legal aid. Monash University’s Access to Justice: A Comparative Analysis of 
Cuts to Legal Aid similarly noted that BAME lawyers were disproportionately represented 
among those practising in the legal aid sector, and so the cuts could be expected to make 
the legal profession less diverse. The restoration of legal aid for employment tribunal cases 
is the only positive sign in this area (see Chapter 7.1).
Education
In England between 2007/08 and 2015/16, the percentage of undergraduate university 
entrants from the Asian, black, mixed and other ethnic groups combined increased from 
17% to 23% However, this improving trend is less marked in Wales and Scotland. Meanwhile 
gypsy and traveller pupils continue to have the lowest attainment levels of any ethnicity, 
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and the gap here has not changed. Furthermore, children from socio-economically 
disadvantaged backgrounds in England tend to have lower attainment. Although this 
discrepancy is most pronounced among white boys eligible for free school meals, it is also 
marked among Asian, black and mixed students.
However, in terms of educational attainments some ethnic minority groups place a lot more 
emphasis on getting to university. The Race Disparity Audit noted (paragraph 2.12) that:
‘Pupils from Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds are achieving almost 
as well as, and progressing better than, White British pupils, whereas the 
attainment and progress of Black Caribbean pupils is much lower. White 
pupils from state schools had the lowest university entry rate of any ethnic 
group in 2016’.
Employment and income
Austerity measures under both the David Cameron and Theresa May governments have hit 
ethnic minorities (alongside women and people with disabilities) the hardest, although it is 
worth noting that the impact has not been uniform across ethnic groups: Chinese, Indian, 
Black African communities were affected more than Bangladeshi and Pakistani households. 
From the outset, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was critical of the 
government for failing to consider how austerity politics would impact minority groups. 
However in 2012 the government cut ERHC funding by more than half and stripped it of its 
duty to foster ‘a society with equal opportunity for all’.
Approximately two-fifths of people from ethnic minorities currently live in low-income 
households (twice the rate of white families). This statistic again varies across groups: more 
than 50% of families of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin live in low-income households, 
compared to less than 30% of Indian origin. Research by Alison Donald at Middlesex 
University attributes the disparity between the white British majority and minorities to the 
age structure of BAME groups, work status and higher rates of in-work poverty. She also 
points to changes to social security as penalising the poorest in society to a much greater 
extent than the richest.
A 2017 report by the Equality and Human Rights Commission examined the occupational 
pay gap between ethnic groups, defined as ‘the average pay gap within individual 
occupations, in which people do broadly similar work’. They concluded:
‘Among men, ethnic minorities typically earn less within occupations than 
their White British counterparts. The picture for women is more mixed, with 
certain ethnic minorities outperforming [White British] women in terms of pay. 
However, among both men and women, Bangladeshi and Pakistani people 
have experienced a large and growing occupational pay gap over time’.
The TUC has identified a 23% pay gap between black and white graduates, with the gap 
for those educated to GCSE level at 11%. Since this research, pay levels more widely have 
continued to lag behind inflation.
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Employment rates continue to be higher for the white majority than for ethnic minorities 
(75% compared to 59%). In 2015, analysis released by the Labour Party indicated that 
there had been a 49% rise in long-term unemployment among 16–24 year olds from BAME 
groups since 2010. In contrast, youth unemployment among young white people fell by 
two percentage points during this period. These findings were corroborated by the EHRC 
who found Pakistani/Bangladeshi women were less than half as likely to be in employment 
as the average UK woman. The study also found that Muslims experienced the highest 
unemployment rates and lowest hourly pay, while Jews have experienced the highest fall in 
employment rates of any religious group since 2008.
A large-scale survey conducted by Business in the Community indicated that bias against 
BAME minorities in the workplace persists, with extensive evidence of racial harassment, 
underrepresentation at every management level and barriers to opportunity despite 
greater ambition to progress. Campaigners have called for the government to show 
the same commitment to tacking ethnic inequality as they have to addressing gender 
imbalance. For instance, ministers have been urged to push companies to increase the 
diversity of FTSE 100 boards, or to require the mandatory disclosure of ethnicity pay 
gaps by companies, a change that has been implemented for gender (see Chapter 5.4). 
The Greater London Authority reported a median ethnicity pay gap of 16% between its 
BAME and white workforce. The government commissioned the McGregor-Smith review 
into race in the workplace in 2017, and then launched a review into measures the first 
review recommended in February 2018. But ministers have so far ruled out legislation on 
enforcing change. 
Conclusions
Conceptions of what counts as equality between ethnic groups have changed a great 
deal in the last decade, and much of the previous elite complacency towards the difficult 
issues around living in a multicultural society has been punctured. The UK’s record 
of legislating against discrimination within its territory is generally a creditable one 
but the implementation of improvements in inequality has been slow. Policies relating 
to immigration, borders and citizenship, together with some aspects of policing and 
imprisonment, continue to affect different ethno-religious groups unevenly. This partly 
reflects an increasingly polarised political climate and media landscape around immigration. 
The Windrush scandal also demonstrated how easily new or disguised forms of officially 
implemented racial or ethnic discrimination can arise in this environment.
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What does democracy require for the protection of workers’ 
rights?
✦ A minimum floor of workplace rights, that nobody falls through. It should ensure that 
everyone has the basic income, time off work, and dignity that they need to pursue 
the true values of human life: nature, family, participation in community life, science, 
philosophy, art, music, sport and personal development.
✦ Fair pay through a voice at work, above the minimum floor, by collective bargaining 
through free trade unions and votes in workplace governance, to guarantee 
productivity, innovation and prosperity.
✦ Equality and social inclusion, in all work relations, based on the content of one’s 
character, skills, qualifications and conduct. There must be no discrimination 
because of unjustified factors: race, gender, orientation, age, belief, union 
membership, agency, part-time, fixed-term or any other irrelevant status.
✦ Job security. This means stopping conflicted or irrational employer dismissals, so 
that: (i) workers get reasonable notice of termination; (ii) dismissal can take place 
only on fair terms, judged by one’s peers and the law of the land; and (iii) severance 
pay exists to halt socially unjustified redundancy.
✦ Full employment (around 2%) would be central to every government’s fiscal, 
monetary and trade policy. Figure 1 shows how far this was achieved in the UK 
between 1945 and 2017.
The rights of workers 
During the 20th century, developed societies increasingly accepted that democracy could 
not stop at politics, and had to extend to aspects of the economy as well. Democracy in 
the economy began – and continues – with workers’ rights. Ewan McGaughey and the 
Democratic Audit team explore how far they have been handled democratically and 
effectively in the UK. 
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In every democratic society the labour movement has always demanded rights that 
transcend the market. People at work lack bargaining power. As Adam Smith told 
us, employers can ‘hold out’ longer in any negotiation because wealth is unequally 
distributed. In a democratic society, the goal of labour law has always been to create and 
protect universal rights that are not up for sale.
Figure 1: UK unemployment 1881–2017, with major government changes
Sources: Denman and McDonald (Jan 1996), and ONS, MGSX (1995–2017).
Recent developments
Since a Conservative-led government took power in 2010, a long series of changes to 
labour law have taken place. The combined effect is that by 2014 British people had seen 
the longest sustained wage decrease in modern British history, unseen since the eras 
of revolution and plague. Statistical calculations of this decline show average changes: 
for the people below the average, the picture is worse. Since then (up to spring 2018) real 
wages stagnated. In democratic terms, it is significant that almost all major changes to 
workers’ rights were made using executive fiat, bypassing Parliament.
The government withered most minimum rights by stopping their enforcement, either 
in court, or by public bodies under government control in four ways. First, a 2013 Order 
introduced employment tribunal fees of £1200 for the typical claimant. This deterred almost 
80% of claimants at these tribunals. In July 2017, the UK Supreme Court considered the 
introduction of tribunal fees and declared them unlawful, forcing the government to pay 
back £32m in fees, but providing no redress for people who had not launched tribunal 
cases because of the fee burden. Second, even when people can afford tribunal fees, 
the statutory right to claim unfair dismissal (that is central to most claims) was cut by a 
2012 Order. People now have to work for two years, instead of one, to qualify for this 
right. Third, in 2014, the government stated that Jobseeker’s Allowance would be refused 
if people turned down (non-exclusive) ‘zero-hours’ contracts. These contracts mean an 
employer purports to have an arbitrary, unilateral power to vary working hours down to 
3997.4 The rights of workers 
zero. Used like this, zero-hours contracts have been found in court to be an unlawful sham. 
They violate the common law duty to fulfil the reasonable expectation of stable work.
Fourth, under Treasury orders, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has not enforced 
income tax, National Insurance or minimum wage duties against ‘gig economy’ 
corporations. One exception (proving the rule) has been Deliveroo. But Uber, CitySprint, 
Mechanical Turk, and more have been left alone to engage in mass tax fraud. It is fraud 
because their lawyers know the workforce has employment rights (see below). They 
deliberately wait for someone to sue before they pay.
Fifth, the government delayed all sorts of laws being brought into force, or did not 
activate them at all. In the Pensions Act 2008, the right to automatic enrolment in basic 
pensions was delayed between two and ten years – that is, for many people the right to 
an occupational pension was destroyed for a fifth of their working lives. Under the Work 
and Families Act 2006, the right of parents to share childcare leave with one another was 
delayed until 2011, and implemented only in 2015. Last, Theresa May as Home Secretary 
scrapped the Equality Act 2010 duty on public bodies to promote socio-economic equality. 
It was, she said, ‘ridiculous’.
Some changes fluctuate. As Home Secretary May halted virtually all investigations by the 
Gangmasters Licensing Authority into the exploitation of migrant and agricultural workers. 
However, as new issues of ‘slave’ labour continued to emerge, the agency was renamed 
the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority in 2016 and its powers were expanded to all 
industries, and there followed an increase in reporting of suspected cases. Its 2018 report 
noted that: ‘The UK is described as being one of the main destinations of trafficked workers 
in Europe’.
The methods used by Whitehall and ministers to frack the floor of minimum rights has often 
bypassed representative democracy by using ‘Henry VIII clauses’. Increasingly, Acts of 
Parliament are passed with the ability of any Secretary of State to amend legislation at will. 
Social rights are being treated like an on-off switch, to be varied at the executive’s whim. 
The minimum wage itself has been cut like this for people aged under 25. This is the most 
vulnerable worker age group because they are most likely to be on zero-hour contracts, 
or in precarious work. The economic theory the government uses to justify it seems to 
be that if employers can make young people unemployed more easily, there will be less 
youth unemployment. This Milton Friedman theory has no basis in evidence, and has been 
maintained solely by ideology. Parliament did use primary legislation, the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 section 78, to abolish the Agricultural Wages Board of England 
and Wales. This board maintained a higher scale of minimum wages, based on experience, 
for people doing hard manual labour on farms. When the Welsh Assembly decided to keep 
a board for Wales, the Attorney General brought court action. The government lost in the 
UK Supreme Court.
There has been progress for people over 25, in that the minimum-living wage has risen 
since 2010, and is promised to be £9 an hour by 2020. But people do not want the 
minimum-living wage, which provides only a ‘basic’ income. People want a fair day’s wage 
for a fair day’s work. Most people have no voice at work. They get told what their pay 
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and conditions will be. They are told to ‘take it or leave it’. When people protest about 
reductions in pay, their corporate managers can still easily say, ‘You’re fired.’
Figure 2 shows the consequences of labour rights reductions since 1980 (and wider 
‘deindustrialisation’ trends) for union membership and inequality. In 1979, collective 
agreements covered 82% of the British workforce, and now the figure is around 20%. Union 
membership has continued to wither, and continuous calls for more anti-union laws are still 
made in the Conservative Party. Figure 2 also shows a useful measure of social inequality, 
the share of total incomes in the UK going to the top 1% of the population. Correlation is 
not always causation. But in the UK, the relationship is clear. The loss of voice at work 
contributed to making inequality soar.
Figure 2: UK trade union membership, and income inequality
Sources: Piketty (2014) Table S9.2, and Brownlie (2012) DBIS
Three main changes were made to collective labour rights since 2010. First, as an employer 
itself, for seven years the government simply refused to engage in meaningful collective 
bargaining. Instead, from 2010, it froze public sector pay to a maximum 1% increase, cut 
pensions and made mass-redundancies: all to shrink (without any particular principle) the 
size of the state. In the 2017 general election the backlash against these austerity policies 
impressed even Tory MPs and the pay freeze began to be partially and slowly lifted by 
2018 – chiefly because of staff shortages and the economic damage that gradually accrues 
when workers can only increase wages by moving between jobs.
Second, the government fought human rights challenges to its statutory ban on solidarity 
action by trade unions, threatening to leave the European Convention on Human Rights. In 
RMT v United Kingdom [2014] ECHR 366, the Strasbourg Court caved. It held that the right 
to freedom of association in article 11 of the Convention did not protect the right of workers 
in a subsidiary company to strike against the parent company, or vice versa. The UK was 
‘at the most restrictive end of a spectrum of national regulatory approaches on this point’ 
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(along with Turkey and Russia). The reasoning was thin. With the Tory threat of leaving the 
Convention, the judges found the law within the UK’s ‘margin of appreciation’.
Third, after a majority Cameron government returned in 2015, the Trade Union Act 2016 
was passed. This introduced a requirement for a 50% turnout in strike ballots, and a 40% 
total support rate (80% turnout in close votes) if strikes were to be legal in health, school 
education, fire, transport, nuclear waste and border services. The Act maintains a ban 
on electronic voting in union ballots. A review has been conducted into e-balloting for 
unions by retired fire chief Sir Ken Knight. It recommended a pilot of e-balloting for some 
non-statutory votes. The Act requires that at any strike picket, a union supervisor holds an 
‘approval letter’ from the union, and ‘must wear something that readily identifies’ them. It 
wraps collective action in more red tape and pointless form-filling obligations, all designed 
to slow collective action and weaken bargaining power. 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Compared to the United States, Eastern 
Europe, China or other quasi- and non-
democratic jurisdictions, the UK has a 
relatively sound system of minimal labour 
rights. In the past the UK worked inside the 
European Union to ensure that many rights 
apply continent-wide.
Compared to Sweden, Denmark, Norway, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, or other 
western European countries, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand or other developed 
Commonwealth countries, the UK has 
serious deficiencies in every respect in its 
labour rights. It systematically fails core 
labour standards of the International Labour 
Organisation, ratified by and binding on the 
UK in international law.
A national minimum wage covers most 
people in law. There are 28 days of paid 
holidays a year, and health and safety 
at work has improved with the transition 
towards a service economy.
The UK has failed to sustain a policy of full 
employment since it accepted that some 
joblessness was ‘natural’ after the 1974 
OPEC crisis. Since then, unemployment has 
ranged between 4% and 11.9%. This has led 
to millions of hardened lives, in poverty and 
precarity, and squandered trillions of pounds 
in lost prosperity.
Almost everyone has the right to not be 
discriminated against on grounds of their 
race, gender, sexual orientation, religion or 
belief, age, union membership, part-time, 
fixed-term or (after 12 weeks) agency status.
The UK fails to guarantee votes at work 
through enterprise governance and sectoral 
collective bargaining. It is in a minority of 
EU countries with no workers’ voice in the 
governance of firms (outside universities).
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
There are clear rights to join a union; for 
unions to be recognised for collective 
bargaining with majority support in an 
enterprise; and for unions to take collective 
action for the defence of workers’ interests.
UK laws, as Tony Blair said in 1997, are 
‘the most restrictive on trade unions in the 
western world’. This has lowered the ability 
of people to achieve fair wages, beyond the 
minimum, in their sector. By 2018 low wage 
growth was a main restriction on the UK 
economy’s capacity for economic growth.
On job security, before any dismissal UK 
employees have the right to one week’s 
notice after one month’s work (and two 
weeks after two years, three after three, up 
to 12). After two years there is a statutory 
right to be dismissed only for a good reason, 
and a severance payment for redundancy.
The UK fails to ensure enforcement and 
universality of core labour rights, particularly 
on dismissal protection, childcare rights and 
the state pension. The pursuit of ‘flexible’ 
labour markets has shot the welfare state 
with holes, damaging growth, increasing 
stress and depriving people’s dignity 
in childhood, in their working lives and 
retirement.
For many decades the UK maintained 
state-sponsored sex discrimination in 
childcare leave, even after the 2010 Equality 
Act. Historically, there was very low paid 
maternity leave, and virtually nothing for 
paternity – which had potent effects in 
harming women’s economic advancement. 
However, from 2015 the government 
introduced shared parental leave and 
shared parental pay that can be taken up by 
either mothers or fathers. The UK’s normal 
minimal standard of income replacement 
remained, however.
Dismissal law lets employers act on 
conflicts of interest, and make irrational 
decisions, fuelling recessions and damaging 
sustainable enterprise. The UK has not yet 
made legislation for elected work councils to 
defer flawed decisions to dismiss colleagues.
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Future opportunities Future threats
Evidence is mounting, driven by big data 
across countries (like the Centre for Business 
Research’s Labour Regulation Index, at the 
University of Cambridge), about the positive 
relationship that better labour rights have 
in improving prosperity. Against escalating 
inequality and political instability, the 
opportunity for evidence-led policy is greater 
than ever.
Under the European Union (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018 the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights no longer applies in the UK, 
potentially opening the way for a post-Brexit 
Britain to transition further towards a low-
wage, minimal labour regulation (even tax 
haven) economy – a development path 
enthusiastically foretold by some prominent 
Brexiteers.
On a limited but significant number of 
issues, there is growing political consensus, 
including some Conservative MPs, about 
the need to improve labour rights. This 
covers particularly (i) raising the minimum 
wage; (ii) tentative proposals about workers 
having a voice in company board rooms; and 
(although now expired) (iii) a commitment to 
report on getting full employment included 
in the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016, 
section 1.
Major corporations, both UK and multi-
national, lobby for international deregulation 
treaties (including TTIP, CETA, TPP, and 
thousands of Bilateral Investment Treaties). 
All aim to remove financial regulation, 
liberalise the public sector, cut the cost of 
privatisation, but charge compound interest 
for public ownership plans. This has the 
knock-on consequence of weakening 
labour’s relative bargaining power, and 
redistributing wealth from people at work 
to asset managers, banks and corporate 
boardrooms.
Through new social media trade unions have 
gained unprecedented capacity to pursue 
an active strategy to expand membership, 
demand new routes to voice at work through 
collective bargaining, and in corporate 
governance, pension and asset management 
reform. This new reach can operate 
independently of politics, and potentially 
reach social groups previously hard for 
unions to contact – such as part-time or ‘gig 
economy’ workers.
Long-lived and organisationally conservative 
trade unions may fail to seize the chance to 
pursue an active strategy to expand their 
membership, independently from politics. 
They may also lag in demanding new 
routes to achieving a voice at work through 
collective bargaining, and in corporate 
governance, pension and asset management 
reform.
Global billionaires and corporate lobbies 
advocate a theory that mass unemployment 
is an inevitable consequence of automation 
and robots. Whether intentional or not, this 
psychological attack on full employment 
accompanies an apparently progressive 
call for a (minimal) basic income – and it 
threatens policy for fair incomes.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The slow collapse of American democracy 
weakens labour rights in the US, and its 
debased standards are increasingly exported 
to the UK. The Congress and President 
have been incapable of legislating on labour 
rights in any meaningful way since 1974, 
meaning an ‘ossification of American labour 
law’ – so that the USA is experiencing de-
development. Hard-line managerial practices 
are spread by US corporations worldwide, 
including standard form contracts denying 
labour rights, union busting, blacklisting, and 
aggressive tax fraud in the gig economy.
The gig economy, robots and precarity
New technologies raise no new issues for labour policy: the difference today is failure to 
deal with aggressive management practice of emerging tech firms, and evasion of labour 
rights and tax. In the ‘gig-economy’ the typical work and payment method is ‘piece-work’, 
not a yearly salary or hourly pay. People are paid for individual taxi rides, food deliveries, 
bits of programming, and so on, as if they were self-employed. A gig firm purports to be 
a neutral agency, linking worker and consumer, but not in an employment or consumer 
relationship, to evade tax and rights. In most cases, this qualifies as civil law fraud. It is 
objectively dishonest by the standards of reasonable and honest people. This does not 
mean the predatory business in the gig-economy is new, but simply that existing law seems 
not to be being enforced in these areas.
A prevalent ethos in Silicon Valley recommends ‘move fast and break things’ – and 
especially pushing regulatory systems to a limit hoping to create a customer base that will 
help companies resist regulatory pushback. For example, the ‘ride-sharing’ company Uber 
knew the majority of legal opinion states that it is an employer of its drivers. But just as it 
ran as an illegal, unregistered taxi company until it was banned in Germany, it generally 
refused to abide by the law and pay tax until made to do so. Arguably this qualifies as civil 
dishonesty, under the Fraud Act 2006 section 2. It does not matter that HMRC, under a 
Conservative administration, has failed to act itself. In the UK, it is possible for HMRC to 
change its position immediately. The ‘Taylor Review’ was unable to alter this, but in any 
case appears to have sided with multi-national corporations, and failed flexibility theory, 
over human rights and social prosperity. Fortunately, reviews are not law. 
Technological change is also predicted by some pop-writers to mandate mass redundancies 
in future: from driverless cars to financial advice or journalism. One piece of now ‘viral’ 
academia from two theorists speculated that 47% of all US jobs are ‘potentially’ at risk 
‘over some unspecified number of years’. By contrast, a report from Obama’s White House 
suggested this was a wild exaggeration. Even if so many jobs were at risk, and the losses 
were concentrated into a few years, the social problem would be considerably smaller in 
scale and kind compared, for instance, to demobilisation after the Second World War. 
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The true problem is not only a fraction of the size of that historic challenge, but also of 
considerably less social complexity. For instance, automation will not create massive 
numbers of disabled or dead people. The only important question is whether ownership of 
patented technology, and capital goods, is sufficiently distributed through the shareholding 
system in corporate governance – particularly through pensions – to guarantee everyone 
shares in the gains of growth. For this, collective bargaining, votes at work, votes in the 
economy, and an active democratic state, are crucial.
Free movement and immigration
As globalisation intensifies, and especially before every society reaches comparable levels 
of human development, the quantity of migration may increase. The UK has swung from 
being the most open country since 1997 to attempting to be one of the most closed since 
2010. Current political debate has some echoes of those that surrounded the reverse of 
the British Nationality Act 1948, including the restrictions implemented against citizens of 
Commonwealth countries by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, and Enoch Powell’s 
‘rivers of blood’ speech in 1968. Within the EU, the UK and Ireland were the countries most 
open to the ten new member states in 2004. Britain declined to apply transitional restrictions 
on free movement, but changed its stance when Romania and Bulgaria joined in 2007. 
Since 2010 and Theresa May’s ‘hostile environment’ for immigration in pursuit of 
unattainable reductions in net immigration, the climate has hardened. Even though the 
war and the rise of ‘Islamic State’ partly result from the US/UK invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
Conservative governments were slow to respond to the resulting refugee crisis. By 2018, 
ministers had agreed to take 23,000 refugees by 2020 from the civil war in Syria (of which 
11,000 have been admitted to date after the first scheme began in earnest in autumn 2015). 
The missing element of immigration policy is any serious commitment to international, 
regional and full employment. People move between states because of wars, persecution, 
economic necessity, and sometimes out of choice. Truly ‘free’ movement is much rarer than 
‘unfree movement’.
Workers’ rights and Brexit
The referendum on EU membership in 2016, and the extreme confusion over UK policy 
following the disappearance of the Tory majority at the 2017 general election, poses an 
existential threat to all workers’ rights, including those deriving from EU law. Historically, 
when the EU has agreed new directives or regulations that create worker rights, the UK 
has put some into primary Acts of Parliament. Many were already in UK law, but other 
rights were put into secondary legislation. The European Communities Act 1972 section 2(1) 
empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations to comply with standards applicable 
throughout the EU. These include:
✦ Working Time Regulations 1998 (28 paid holidays, rest breaks and limits on working 
week)
✦ Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000
✦ Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002
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✦ Agency Workers Regulations 2010
✦ Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004
✦ Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006
If the UK leaves the EU in a ‘hard’ or a ‘no deal’ Brexit’ any workers’ rights that are not 
already contained in primary legislation (an Act) could be repealed at will by a secretary of 
state. In any Brexit, British workers also lose the right to vote on the standards that apply 
across borders. Like the UK itself, they consequently lose bargaining power in a global 
economy. This does not necessarily mean that workers’ rights will be repealed, but so long 
as any major political party proves consistently and ideologically hostile to labour rights, 
nothing is safe.
This Brexit vulnerability does not mean that all EU law has been good for workers’ rights. 
The extent of EU law’s impact on the UK is disputed. If labour rights and public services 
are not equally supported everywhere, then the four core EU freedoms (movement of 
people, capital, services and establishment, or goods) can exacerbate underlying inequality 
of bargaining power. The Court of Justice of the EU in three major cases (Viking, Laval, 
Rüffert) held that trade unions’ collective action capabilities, and pro-labour government 
procurement policies, might both have to be used proportionately to (ostensible) business 
freedoms. Its theories of ‘market access’ were largely derived from arguments developed 
by British academics and lawyers (particularly in Viking). The results included marginal 
limits on cross-border union action, workers posted in from other EU countries being 
used to undercut domestic collective agreements, and some governments abandoning 
procurement policies that banned contractors to the public sector paying their workers 
‘poverty’ wages.
Within the EU, the Court’s interpretations were resisted by all European trade unions 
and social democratic parties, so that regressive policies were sometimes changed or 
circumvented. In this way, ‘social Europe’ generally proved more resilient than ‘social 
Britain’. However, the European Central Bank and Commission have also pursued a 
massive assault on collective labour rights, minimum wages, public sector employment, 
and job security in its debt collection agreements with Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. 
Again, however, the political consensus turned against austerity, because of overwhelming 
evidence that it has failed.
Because Brexit is a European problem, and the causes of Brexit are shared across Europe 
and the wider world (falling incomes, failure of development policy, deficient democratic 
structures) any solution must be an international one. Securing a fair day’s wage for a 
fair day’s work for all would mean reversing escalating inequality through voice at work; 
reversing regional decline through credible public investment; ending financial oligarchy 
with greater transparency and corporate governance reform; and restoring dignity and 
hope through returning to full employment policies.
Democratising enterprise governance
A critical issue in 21st-century society will be how votes in the economy become 
democratised. The UK is in the minority of EU countries (generally the poorer ones) without 
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general rights of workers to vote for representatives on company boards. Out of 28 EU 
member states, 16 have worker-participation laws across private and public sectors. The 
UK lags behind, and only maintains votes at work (without transparency, in highly imperfect 
ways, but still there) in its most globally successful enterprises: universities.
On the capital side, asset managers take almost all the votes on company shares, even 
though these are bought with other people’s retirement savings: in pensions, life 
insurance and mutual funds. Unions and employee-elected pension trustees are beginning 
to demand that their shareholder voting rights are only exercised according to their 
instructions. Discussion has begun about the legitimacy of asset managers and banks 
voting at all in company AGMs. In private enterprise, a new democratic constitution for the 
economy would ensure that workers have votes in their companies; that all votes on capital 
are exercised by the true investors; and that the public and consumer interest is far better 
represented in network and natural monopolies than presently.
Conclusions
Workers’ rights are at a critical juncture in the UK in 2018, reflecting major challenges 
faced by trade unions (and allied social democratic parties) worldwide. The globalisation 
consensus around ‘flexible’ labour markets, major reductions of job security, restricting 
collective bargaining narrowly within individual enterprises, and hostility to workers having 
any voice in corporate governance has begun to crack. Empirical evidence has mounted 
that hostility to labour rights and economic democracy, on the basis that markets will solve 
every problem, has been a deeply self-harming belief. Law makes markets exist or fail. 
Workers’ rights are the first step towards making markets work for society, not the other 
way round.
Ewan McGaughey (@ewanmcg) is a Senior Lecturer in Private Law at King’s College 
London.
How should a genuinely democratic society promote greater 
class equality?
✦	 Public policy should focus on addressing and mitigating the structural causes of 
social and occupational class inequalities, rather than taking refuge in individualised 
explanations.
✦	 Positive policies are needed to ensure that working-class people have an equal 
political voice.
✦	 Class is not yet a protected characteristic covered by the UK’s equality legislation – 
it should become the tenth such characteristic.
✦	 This stance needs to be backed up by policies to curb the expression of 
discriminatory views and other ‘symbolic violence’ inflicted on working-class people 
and used to stigmatise them as a group and the places where they live.
✦	 Public policies need to guarantee quality working lives for the working classes – 
providing a minimum floor to job quality so as to promote decent work. This floor 
should cover wages, work-time, job security, worker representation and support for a 
decent work-life balance.
✦	 Taxation and benefits policies should ensure a minimum income standard via 
transfers, and include a progressive system of taxation (with a levy on wealth).
✦	 In any capitalist society, social housing policies are an inescapable part of 
mitigating class inequalities. Meaningful reinvestment is needed in social housing 
– along with the democratisation of housing management and policy so as to 
fully include working-class residents in managing their own accommodation and 
neighbourhoods.
Class disparities and social 
inequalities
Class is back – class inequalities now feature centrally in multiple media, are core to 
campaigns and protest movements, and are a part of everyday conversation. Mitigating the 
adverse effects of class again plays a key role in policy formation and formal politics. James 
Pattison and Tracey Warren consider how far the UK’s approach meets or falls below the 
types and levels of action that any liberal democracy requires. 
7.5
4097.5 Class disparities and social inequalities
Class is a highly charged word which politicians, media commentators and others are often 
reluctant to use. Not so long ago now, some serious social scientists doubted the societal 
importance of class. Even when it was not denied, classed inequality was often discussed 
implicitly – as disparities of ‘income’, or via euphemistic or distracting ideas of ‘poverty’ and 
‘the poor’; ‘economic disadvantage’; or socio-economic ‘deprivation’. 
Yet now class is increasingly recognised as having enduring significance for describing the 
distribution of advantage and disadvantage. A focus on injustice, inequality and value is 
fundamental to class-based analysis. Economic inequalities are core to how class shapes 
people’s everyday lives and life-chances. Yet class inequalities are also about how we 
relate to others and to ourselves – and class ‘intersects’ with other social divisions such as 
gender, ethnicity and age.
Recent developments
The highly class-privileged – the upper class, the elite, the ‘super rich’ – have attracted attention 
in the face of deep economic inequalities post-crisis. High incomes were defined by HMRC as 
a minimum gross pay of £162,000 in 2014–15, but much executive pay in the private sector is 
far greater. In addition, inequalities of wealth far outstrip those of income in the UK. The system 
of taxation in the UK has not kept up with the ‘meteoric rise’ in the amount of wealth held by 
‘the 1%’. For 2014 data the Resolution Foundation estimated that ‘the 1%’ owned £11 trillion in 
financial, private pension, property and physical wealth (14% of the nation’s assets). 
Very high pay levels and the wealth held by ‘the 1%’ led to the birth of the Occupy protest 
movement in 2011 to work against inequality and towards improved democracy. Their 
slogan ‘We are the 99%’ promotes a unity of the many against the privileged few. Protest 
movements against severe inequalities mirror influential academic research into the 
extremes of class inequalities and the multiple negative impacts of intense inequality on 
society, by such writers as Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson, Danny Dorling, John Hills, 
Thomas Piketty and Guy Standing.
The middle class was forecast (incorrectly) to fare most poorly in a projected ‘first middle-
class recession’ from 2008 on. It also appeared, later, in the ‘squeezed middle’ narratives 
of the Labour Party under Ed Miliband – reflecting the political attractiveness of this more 
‘striving’ or ‘aspirational’ labelling. (Yet the same ‘squeezed’ group was identified by some 
observers as contributing to the Brexit Leave momentum.)
By 2016, however, the working class were central too to the discourses about the ‘just 
about managing’ and ‘ordinary working families’ in the 2016 Brexit campaign. In her first 
statement as Prime Minister, Theresa May said:
‘If you’re from an ordinary working-class family, life is much harder than 
many people in Westminster realise [..] You have a job but you don’t always 
have job security. You have your own home, but you worry about paying a 
mortgage. You can just about manage but you worry about the cost of living 
and getting your kids into a good school. If you’re one of those families, 
if you’re just managing, I want to address you directly’. (Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2016).
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Questions about class disparities in the UK were boosted post-recession, and in the lead-
up to and aftermath of the 2016 EU referendum. Again, the working class featured implicitly, 
as the vote outcome was ascribed to the impacts of austerity and globalisation on ‘left 
behind communities’. And some explicit critiques were made of the class background of 
Brexit voters. 
Mounting concerns with a very heavy concentration of wealth and privilege even made 
their way into the Conservative election manifesto in 2017, where a vision was set out of 
‘A fairer Britain that works for everyone, not just a privileged few’ (p.5). In its expressed aim 
to make Britain ‘the world’s great meritocracy’, the May government also stated (although 
again with class left implicit): ‘The greatest injustice in Britain today is that your life is largely 
determined not by your efforts and talents but by where you come from, who your parents 
are and what schools you attend,’ (p.49).
One of the more subtle ways that class disparagement works is via the vocabularies 
used. Outside the careful phrasing of manifestos, class-disadvantaged groups are 
characteristically depicted at best as the ‘deprived’ and ‘under-privileged’. In everyday 
language, talk of hipsters and chavs, or toffs and hoodies all contain classed assumptions. 
The names associated with those at the bottom of society are often particularly disparaging 
and morally loaded, ‘producing’ the working class as ‘disgusting subjects’.
The class structure of the UK
The numbers of well-paying industrial manual jobs have fallen greatly in Britain over 
time, a drop fuelled by contracting manufacturing industries. There has been a long-term 
expansion of people working in services, with manual jobs concentrated especially in such 
low-paid sectors as retail, hospitality and catering, as Figure 1 shows.
Figure 1: The official view of occupational classes in 2017, and their gender balance
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, April–June 2017
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Nearly a third of the working population are officially categorised as professionals 
or managers (the two leftmost groupings in Figure 1), while including the ‘associate 
professional and technical’ group would place almost half of the population in an upper-/ 
middle-class group. Among the remaining ‘working-class’ groups, women work especially 
in administrative/secretarial and caring/leisure jobs, while men still overwhelmingly 
predominate in the ‘skilled trades’ and ‘process, plant and machinery operatives’.
The 2011 ‘Great British Class Survey’ (involving the BBC) moved beyond the emphasis on 
occupation as a signifier of social class and collected information on the economic, social 
and cultural capital of 160,000 people. The authors concluded that traditional depictions 
of class (working, middle, upper) were out of date, and proposed instead a seven-class 
schema influenced far more equally by people’s occupations, their wealth, social contacts 
and their ‘cultural capital’ – shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The ‘Great British Class Survey’ categories and their sizes in 2011
GBC 
categories
% of UK 
population Brief description
Elite   6 Very high economic capital (especially savings), high social 
capital, very high highbrow cultural capital.
Established 
middle class
25 High economic capital, high status of mean contacts, high 
highbrow and emerging cultural capital.
Technical 
middle class
  6 High economic capital, very high mean social contacts, but 
relatively few contacts reported, moderate cultural capital.
New affluent 
workers
15 Moderately good economic capital, moderately poor mean 
score of social contacts, though high range, moderate 
highbrow but good emerging cultural capital.
Traditional 
working class
14 Moderately poor economic capital, though with reasonable 
house price, few social contacts, low highbrow and 
emerging cultural capital.
Emergent 
service 
workers
19 Moderately poor economic capital, though with reasonable 
household income, moderate social contacts, high emerging 
(but low highbrow) cultural capital.
Precariat 15 Poor economic capital, and the lowest scores on every other 
criterion.
Source: Savage et al (2012)
The elite and established middle class in Figure 2 form almost a third of UK respondents, 
with a technical middle class and new affluent workers constituting a further fifth of 
the population in the middle. Working-class people divide relatively evenly between a 
traditional working class (often owning their homes though), a group of emergent service 
workers (some with high cultural capital), and a ‘precariat’ whose economic and social 
position is fragile. 
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Despite the fall in (manual) jobs traditionally seen as ‘working class’, successive British 
Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys found that 60–63% of British respondents see themselves as 
‘working class’, with the remaining group (just under 40%) describing themselves as ‘middle 
class’. There is hardly any variation from one year to the next. And between 2005 and 2015 
people became more aware of class differences:
‘We find Britain divided along class lines. Nearly 8 in 10 of us think that the 
divide between social classes is wide or very wide. We are less likely now 
to think it possible to move between social classes than in the past’. (BSA, 
2016).
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
In terms of working lives
Unemployment in mid-2018 stood at 4%, its 
lowest level since 1975 (ONS August 2018). 
Positive consequences include reduced 
class gaps in labour force participation rates, 
and perhaps increases in levels of wages 
and income.
Concerns around deep class inequalities 
have been accentuated by the declining 
quality of new service jobs, especially 
in terms of worsening (or vanishing) job 
security, the expansion of zero-hours 
contracts and the so-called ‘gig economy’ 
(see Chapter 7.4). Low official unemployment 
rates partly reflect a growth in work-time 
underemployment (where low paid workers 
want but cannot get more paid hours – see 
below) and in marginal self-employment.
The UK has a national minimum wage 
which rose to £7.83 per hour in 2018 (for 
people over 25), almost matching the level 
in Germany. The NMW is set to increase 
substantially leading up to 2020. It will 
henceforward be officially called the National 
Living Wage.
The NMW is very low for younger workers 
– dropping to only £5.60 an hour for 18–20 
year olds. Real earnings in 2018 are lower 
than before the recession hit. The extent 
of in-work poverty is testament to the low-
paying jobs held by many of the working 
class.
Free childcare expanded to 30 hours a week 
in September 2017 (see below). The change 
can assist more women into paid work, 
although trials suggested the entitlement 
was being taking up more by middle-class 
parents.
Class inequalities persist in the support 
available for working parents. Given scarce 
supply, the extension of free childcare could 
deepen rather than reduce class inequalities 
in childcare use. Problems from the provider 
perspective (such as rising delivery costs, 
falling profits, difficulties in staff recruitment 
and limited space in venues for expanded 
numbers) also raise concerns about whether 
the policy changes are sustainable.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
In terms of living standards
According to the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (2017, p.5), the UK government 
spends around £486bn (26% of GDP, 2015–
16) on the welfare state.
Systematic cutbacks in public spending 
continued into 2017 and some are budgeted 
to continue throughout the life of this 
parliament. In 2017 the Institute of Fiscal 
Studies noted how ‘terrible’ economic 
growth since 2008 created ‘big problems’ 
for the finances of both households and 
government.
Since April 2017, the child tax element paid 
to new claimants of the ‘Universal Credit’ 
scheme has applied only for the first two 
children in a household. This is predicted to 
cut the benefits of 515,000 larger families by 
2020.
Extending the conditionality of welfare 
payments, and the use of punitive benefit 
sanctions against people whose behaviour 
is judged non-compliant with increasingly 
prescriptive benefits rules, have adversely 
impacted the lives of hundreds of thousands 
of poor people – both those who are out of 
work (often because of disabilities) and those 
in low-paid and insecure jobs.
Stark class inequalities in living standards 
persist in the UK, as signalled by the huge 
gaps in income and wealth levels between 
‘the 1%’ and the majority.
In terms of housing provision
The Conservative Party’s 2017 manifesto 
promised reinvestment in ‘short-term’ social 
housing. Some small increases in funding 
followed. In 2018, a consultation paper on 
the future of social housing was launched by 
the government.
More long-term and larger-scale solutions 
are needed to combat the current lack of 
affordable and social housing.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
One substantial disincentive to well-off 
people or companies purchasing multiple 
‘buy to let’ properties was introduced in 2016 
with a Stamp Duty surcharge.
Housing in Britain is still seen as a 
commodity rather than a basic right. 
‘Gentrification’ in cities has especially 
reduced the supply of low-cost housing in 
convenient locations for getting to jobs. The 
expansion of ‘buy to let’ housing has raised 
all house prices and meant more households 
must cope with the expense and insecurity of 
private renting. In some cities and locations 
Airbnb and similar schemes have reduced 
the supply of rental housing for local 
people.
The pursuit of deregulation and removal of 
‘red-tape’ in housing has had high human 
costs, as witnessed by the spiralling of 
multi-occupation and the shocking lapses 
in securing basic safety in social housing 
revealed by the Grenfell Tower catastrophe.
In terms of representations of class
There was a small increase in the numbers 
of MPs from less privileged backgrounds at 
the 2017 general election. Fewer MPs than 
before came from conspicuously privileged 
backgrounds, and there was the lowest 
proportion of privately educated MPs on 
record (29%).
The dominant media and political 
representations of working-class people, 
and of the places where they live, remain 
disparaging. In particular, structural or 
systematic inequalities are normally 
presented as the consequences of individual 
failings. Both the political and media 
elites (including the BBC) continue to be 
dominated by people who are themselves 
drawn from elite-class backgrounds.
There is some evidence of softening public 
attitudes towards benefit claimants.
The negative portrayal of benefits claimants, 
especially in the right-wing press disables 
working-class people in politics, legitimises 
austerity and deepens class inequality.
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Future opportunities Future threats
In terms of working lives
The government-appointed Taylor Review 
of modern working practices made clear that 
the quality of jobs is a key area for action. 
Exiting the EU may become a serious threat 
to the quantity and quality of jobs in the 
UK if rights and entitlements around work 
guaranteed in EU law are not transposed 
into UK law, or are watered down in the 
transition.
A ‘real Living Wage’ campaign has sought 
to persuade employers to voluntarily pay 
workers (aged 18 and older) a minimum of 
£8.75 an hour (or £10.20 in London, where 
living costs are greater). Its spread and 
success has ramifications for narrowing the 
wage gap in those firms.
Because it is a voluntary and non-statutory 
approach, only a minority of employers seem 
likely to sign up to a ‘real Living Wage’.
The rigid 1% cap on public sector wage rises 
(affecting nurses, teachers and civil servants 
from 2012 to early 2018) attracted mounting 
protests, and from 2018 was scheduled to 
(gradually) end.
Long-deferred public sector pay rises must 
all come out of existing government sector 
budgets. This inevitable ‘catch-up’ surge 
could squeeze finances further, or create 
pressures for compensating reductions 
in headcounts in the public sector with its 
generally better working conditions and still-
strong trade unions.
In terms of living standards
Campaigns have grown to establish an 
unconditional ‘Basic Income’, which 
advocates claim can provide a safety net 
for all classes – and buttress democracy by 
reducing state surveillance of behaviours.
Weak economic growth and cuts to welfare 
are predicted to power the biggest rise 
in inequality by 2020–21 for the last four 
decades (see below). Already planned cuts 
to benefits will impact more on low-income 
households.
Cuts to social care budgets signal threats 
to the most vulnerable in society, including 
those that require care and caregivers.
In terms of housing provision
Building on campaigns such as SHOUT – the 
campaign for social housing – may help to 
reverse the disinvestment in social housing 
over the last 30 years.
Further gentrification continues to threaten 
to displace the working classes – who may 
be priced out of more desirable areas, 
particularly in central London.
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Future opportunities Future threats
Proposals to reintroduce local rent caps 
(‘rent controls’) in areas of high housing 
stress have been aired by the Labour 
leader, Jeremy Corbyn. Widely used in other 
countries, such caps might not only keep 
rising costs in check (so making renting from 
private landlords more affordable), but also 
help to lower house prices.
Ministers have recognised that benefits 
flowing via tenants to private landlords may 
just raise local rent levels. But they have not 
moved towards controlling rents, instead 
developing proposals for controlling the 
amount of rent that is eligible for housing 
benefits across local areas. This might 
have some weak effects in keeping local 
rents down. Alternatively, it may just further 
impoverish people living on the now lowered 
benefits.
A greater democratisation of social 
housing management and policy may 
follow the Grenfell Inquiry report, where 
Kensington and Chelsea’s supposed ‘tenant 
management organisation’ in fact gave 
residents little influence.
In terms of representations of class
Class upbringing still lies outside the list of 
‘protected characteristics’ that are covered 
by the Equality Act 2010 (which include 
sex, race, age, sexual orientation). Current 
equality legislation does not prevent 
employers, education providers, government 
departments and so on from discriminating, 
harassing or victimising someone on the 
basis of their social class. This is a relatively 
easy thing to change, and doing so could 
counteract representations of working-
class people and areas that do so much to 
intensify the effects of inequalities.
The outcome of the EU referendum has been 
(inaccurately) attributed to a problematic 
‘white’ working class, reinforcing and 
potentially intensifying already existing social 
divisions along axes of class, ethnicity and 
migration status.
Achieving further increases in MPs from less 
privileged backgrounds could rebalance 
political representation.
More positive representations of working-
class life in the media and public sphere 
could counteract key forces worsening the 
experiences of a classed society. Achieving 
more diversity in key media professional 
occupations might also help.
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Living standards stress and benefits changes
Working-class lives are marked by far more strained living conditions than other classes. 
Their low and middle incomes are accompanied by weak financial safety nets, if any. In 
2016, 64% of people living in low- and middle-income households reported having less 
than £1,500 in savings. The same 2017 study found that in 2014, the lowest 15% of people 
on a wealth scale either owned no assets at all or were in debt. Working-class people 
especially scrape by, reporting relentless and demoralising everyday worries about 
spending and accumulating debts – such as some parents caring for children whilst unable 
to heat their homes or afford hot water. A 2016 estimate was that six million families were 
‘just about managing’. Financial problems grew so intense in the UK that the numbers of 
people using charitable food banks for essentials rocketed. Loan sharks offering high-
interest loans proliferated, as did pawn shops offering high-interest loans in exchange for 
personal items.
The UK is committed to meeting the United Nation’s (UN) 2030 ‘Sustainable Development 
Goals’. Target 10.1 is to: ‘progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 
40% of the population at a rate higher than the national average’. Yet research found that 
the incomes of the bottom 40% of people were growing more slowly in 2016–17 than the 
higher 60%. Median household income in 2015–16 was only 3.7% higher than before the 
recession (2007–8), after adjusting for inflation, indicating only a ‘glacially’ slow growth 
over time. Another analysis estimated ‘that typical incomes increased by just 0.9% (after 
housing costs) in 2017–18. This is weak, representing less than half the average annual 
growth rate recorded between 1994 and 2007.’
Because recent levels of unemployment have been low, fewer people in Britain were 
without any earnings at all, and this has held income inequality down. A ‘Minimum Income 
Standard’ (MIS) for the UK, which reports on how much income households need to afford 
an acceptable minimum standard of living, also identified a steadying partly because of 
the introduction of the higher ‘National Living Wage’. In 2017, the adequacy of incomes 
fell again, particularly for households with children, because of inflation and the freezing 
of benefits. Few families can reach this MIS with only one person working full-time on the 
national minimum wage. Projections to 2020–21 suggest that the biggest rise in inequality 
since the 1980s looms, powered by weak economic growth and by cuts to welfare for those 
with the lowest incomes.
The absolute poverty level is defined in the government’s official measure as falling below 
60% of median household income. Levels here changed little and showed about 22% 
of households living in poverty in 2015–16. Yet this lack of progress in reducing poverty 
is historically rare. Inflation rose sharply in 2017 while benefit cuts deepened, adding to 
the risks of more class-based financial hardship. The majority of those officially classified 
as ‘poor’ are not in households with no paid work at all: most live in a household where 
someone is in (low) paid work. According to the Child Poverty Action Group there were 4.1 
million children living in poverty in 2016–17, amounting to 30% of all children in the country.
Poverty adversely impacts people’s lives in manifold ways. For example, fully 50% of 
families in the bottom income quintile would like to take their children away on holiday for 
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just one week a year, but cannot afford to. ‘Fuel poverty’ among low-income families has 
increased, testifying to life on a low income with rising bills and an inadequate everyday 
standard of living. Between April 2017 and March 2018, the Trussell Trust supplied nearly 
1,333,000 three-day emergency food supplies, a 13% increase on the previous year, with 
the three main reasons for lack of income being debt, benefit delays and changes in 
household circumstances. 
Meanwhile the ‘poverty premium’ consists of the ‘additional costs [that] low-income 
households pay for goods and services compared to those on higher incomes’. This 
amounts to an estimated extra £490 per household per year, including the extra costs 
of living in economically disadvantaged areas (for example, paying an extra £74 for 
car insurance and an additional £227 in grocery bills in locations poorly served by 
supermarkets).
Benefit cuts and changes
‘Reforms’ in how state benefits are paid have also worsened working people’s lives. The 
Universal Credit (UC) was designed to replace six working-age benefits. It targets both 
those out of work and in paid work on a low income and with few savings, estimated to 
be eight million households. UC was devised with multiple aims: to simplify the benefits 
system, to make work pay, to increase take up of some benefits, and to reduce fraud and 
error. Yet its implementation has set off many alarms. Numerous problems have been cited 
with inefficiencies in its delivery, delaying its full rollout until 2020.
Because benefits are now paid monthly, and in arrears, there are also serious concerns 
about how people can get by in the long period before a first UC payment (up to six 
weeks), with ramifications for those who are in a ‘low-pay/no-pay’ cycle caused by insecure 
jobs. Referrals for emergency food supplies grew higher in those areas where UC was 
rolled out (a 17% average increase) compared to the national average of 7%. Queries have 
also been raised about UC’s imposition of monthly household budgeting on those low-
income households who operated weekly accounting before UC. This affects women most, 
who are commonly responsible for budgeting, shopping and feeding families. 
More fundamentally, there are serious concerns with Universal Credit’s underpinning 
assumptions, including a conditionality that is ‘backed by an extensive tiered system of 
very harsh benefit sanctions and a new range of civil penalty fines’. For working-class 
people UC extends conditionality, and harsh sanctions, to low-paid workers in insecure 
jobs. The impact of benefit sanctions on people living with a disability or chronic illness 
has also attracted condemnation. Claimed evidence that sanctions increase employment 
rates for disabled people is far from conclusive. Overall, UC’s founding assumptions are 
‘divorced from what we know’ about life for those either in ‘low-waged and often insecure 
employment’ or on a low non-waged income.
Equally slated was the so-called bedroom tax, first implemented in 2013, portrayed by 
ministers as removing a subsidy for working-age social housing tenants deemed to have a 
spare bedroom (by 14% for one spare bedroom, 25% for two or more). A formal evaluation, 
commissioned by the Department for Work and Pensions in 2015, found that affected 
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tenants were forced to cut back on essentials such as heating and food. Other research 
has shown mounting hardship and debt from the policy has adversely affected tenants’ 
mental health, caring arrangements (especially for disabled people whose carers can no 
longer stay overnight), family relationships and community networks. It has also led to 
falls in children’s performance in school linked to having less private space to study in 
circumstances of intensifying poverty.
Changing working lives in a class society
Although UK employment levels were high by mid-2018, the quality of jobs (rather than 
their quantity) is widely seen as a major UK problem. This issue is structured along class 
lines. The lead author of the Taylor Review into ‘Employment practices in the modern 
economy’ declared at its launch:
‘Our national performance on the quantity of work is strong. But quantity 
alone is not enough for a thriving economy and fair society. We believe now 
is the time to complement that commitment to creating jobs with the goal 
of creating better jobs’. (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy 2017).
In 2017 real earnings were still lower than before the recession hit. Incomes for the bottom 
earners were supported by the national minimum wage (NMW), which has clearly not 
increased UK joblessness (as many critics on the right had predicted) and has improved 
the wages of those in lower-level occupations. The proportion of workers covered by the 
NMW grew higher in 2016 for workers without qualifications, with disabilities, for women, 
ethnic minorities, migrants, part-timers and workers in cleaning, hairdressing and hospitality 
(Low Pay Commission, 2016). In the 2017 general election both parties committed to raise 
NMW substantially by 2020 (to £8.75 an hour from the Conservatives, and £10 from Labour). 
The Low Pay Commission claimed that after the government rate was implemented then 
‘measured on a like-for-like basis, the UK will have one of the highest minimum wages in 
the world’.
Surveys show that job security was the job attribute rated as important by most UK 
respondents (92% in 2015). But this was also the attribute they felt had become less 
attainable over time, with most disadvantage faced by those in the lowest social class. 
Job insecurity is known to be severe for workers in the so-called gig economy, perhaps 
most associated with driving and deliveries for Uber and Deliveroo. But it also applies 
in other occupations, such as writing, translating, coding and designing. Gig work is also 
associated with a range of other negative characteristics – notably very long, unregulated, 
and often anti-social hours; high intensity work; low pay; no employment protection, and no 
guarantee of work; and weak pensions arrangements.
Another markedly classed phenomenon has been work-time underemployment (WTU). This 
disproportionally affects workers in low-paid occupations, including part-timers who want but 
cannot find a full-time job, resulting in financial and psychological distress. To survive some 
participants can work in up to seven different jobs a week. WTU is linked with severe financial 
hardship, and was a growing cause of work-life imbalance for the working class.
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However, by 2016–17 ‘peak insecurity’ may have passed: with expansion in full-time 
employment and falls in self-employment, part-time work and zero-hours contracts as 
employers found it harder to attract staff on poor conditions. Figure 3 shows that the 
proportion of part-timers working part-time involuntarily rose steeply from 2008 to 2012, 
but then began to fall back almost as sharply. A number of legal judgments have expanded 
rights for ‘gig’ workers and policy actions to rebalance workers’ lack of clout in negotiating 
with employers are promised, although how substantial any outcomes may be remains to 
be seen.
Figure 3: The proportion of women and men part-timers working part-time involuntarily 
because they could not find a full-time job
Source: Labour Force Survey, series ID: YCDC
Parents and work
There have been significant class gaps in the UK in how parents in paid work care for 
young children. Formal mechanisms (such as nurseries and childminders) are used far more 
by middle-class families, while informal care (often by grandparents) remained dominant 
for working-class working parents. Access to good, affordable and convenient childcare 
is a key way to support parents (especially mothers), into paid work, but formal childcare 
has been prohibitively expensive for many. Government initiatives have invested in early 
education and childcare with explicit motives to promote child development, narrow the 
gap in attainment ‘between the most disadvantaged children and their better off peers’, 
enable parents to work, and help with poverty reduction.
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From September 2017, working parents of children aged four became eligible to apply for 
30 hours of funded, tax-free childcare per week for 38 weeks a year (doubling the 15 hours 
previously available in England). This scheme to ‘support parents into work or to work 
more hours should they wish to do so’ targets fathers and mothers earning or expecting 
to earn ‘the equivalent to 16 hours at national minimum or living wage over the coming 
three months’. Parents earning more than £100,000 are not eligible. However, rather than 
favouring working-class families, trials of the scheme saw more uptake among middle-class 
families. Meanwhile, government statistics shows that many Sure Start centres, set up by 
the Labour government to support working-class pre-school children, closed (350 closed in 
England in 2010–16, while just eight new ones opened).
How housing inequalities condition class
Being able to secure a stable home in a particular area has huge implications for people’s 
access to jobs, transport costs, and the environment in which they can afford to live. Yet 
greater inequalities in housing have opened up over recent years. At one extreme by 
2017 there was a 32% increase in homelessness case actions by English local authorities 
since 2009. At the other extreme the super-rich are buying up multiple properties, which 
are then left empty or underused whilst they appreciate in value for their already wealthy 
owners. Nowhere are these extremes of inequality more evident than in London, where 
the highest concentrations of wealth exist side by side with the highest concentrations of 
poverty. The conventional wisdom held that middle-class gentrifiers had the biggest impact 
on the class structure of London, but new evidence suggests that the global elites of many 
countries colonised central London, pushing less advantaged social classes towards its 
outskirts.
Growth in homeownership (once expected to be dominant in the Thatcher years) has 
ebbed away because of ‘buy to let’ purchasing, making private renting resurgent. After the 
2008 financial crash middle-class home owners and investors experienced unexpected 
greater uncertainty, historically low interest rates and government and Bank of England 
financial policies propping up asset values. Large amounts of capital switched into ‘buy 
to let’ housing, pushing prices out of reach of middle- and working-class people in many 
areas. 
Conservative and coalition government policies responding to the ‘housing crisis’ focused 
mainly on subsidies to get first-time buyers on the housing ladder – despite evidence 
that tenure alone does not prevent poverty. (Over half of those living in poverty were 
homeowners.) Yet Thatcher’s ideal of a property-owning democracy (boosting political 
stability and Tory voting) has dwindled for the lowest paid. And because social housing 
is scarce, this only leaves the private rental market, where cheap housing is insecure, 
expensive, and more likely to be of poor quality. The most vulnerable families are almost 
always renting, paying more and more to private landlords from meagre incomes, with a 
study by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation finding that ‘the poorest fifth of the population 
[are] spending more than a third of their income on housing’.
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Past social housing policies in Britain recognised that much of the working class faced 
a chronic (perhaps perpetual) housing crisis. In 1979, 42% of the UK population lived in 
council housing; today it is only 8%, chiefly because of the Thatcher government’s 1980s 
right-to-buy scheme. Although initially sold to sitting tenants, many former council houses 
are now in the hands of profit-seeking private landlords, who frequently do not maintain 
them to former standards, and charge significantly higher rents – mostly subsidised from 
public funds paying housing benefits. For instance, one study showed how a tenant on a 
former council estate was charged £800 per month by her private landlord for a unit that 
the council would charge £360 for.
This situation typifies the commodification of housing, where profit becomes the priority, 
housing prices are inflated and residents’ needs are not met. Successive governments 
have squeezed spending on social housing, putting greater pressure on the need for 
affordable social housing. The 2017 Conservative Party manifesto included a promise to 
build a ‘new generation of social housing’, a pledge partly maintained at the Conservative 
conference in 2017. However, the manifesto also envisaged that these houses would return 
to the market after 10–15 years, to be sold privately via automatic right-to-buy policy.
The Grenfell Tower disaster
Many issues of class and its intersections with other inequalities were shockingly revealed 
by the Grenfell Tower disaster, where 72 people died in a fire on 14 June 2017 that spread 
rapidly throughout the council tower block. This occurred just a few streets away from 
some of London’s wealthiest housing in Kensington and Chelsea (one of the UK’s richest 
local authorities), dramatising the extreme inequalities within the capital.
It also raised acute questions of democracy, because the warning voices of concerned 
council tenants had been systematically ignored in implementing the cheapest possible 
refurbishment of blocks (see Chapter 5.3). Years of complaints from tenants’ associations 
such as the Grenfell Action Group, highlighting the risk the building was at from disaster, 
were ignored out of hand by the Conservative local council. The cladding used during 
refurbishment was made from flammable material and had been chosen as a cost-cutting 
measure. Shifts towards ever more ‘light touch’ building and fire safety regulations were 
exposed as leaving not just Grenfell tenants but thousands of residents in hundreds of 
blocks across the country at terrible risk. The tragedy amply demonstrates how damaging 
and stigmatising representations of tenants have delegitimised and undermined working-
class voices, and so excluded them from central and local state concerns. 
Representations of the working class
The ways that working-class people and the places they live are pictured and portrayed 
for the rest of society play a vital part in how class inequalities are controlled in the UK. 
The language of class may be absent from debates, but discussions of ‘chavs’, ‘welfare’, 
‘slums’, ‘council estates’ and ‘sink estates’, and even the names of particular places, all 
contain classed assumptions. Sociologists argue that working-class people are seen by 
more powerful groups as unable to understand or usefully articulate their experiences. 
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Sometimes working-class people are reproduced as ‘disgusting subjects’ through 
discriminatory descriptions of their bodies, clothes, behaviour and taste, for example 
tracksuited ‘chavs’. 
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of social distinction illustrates how middle-class taste is 
perceived as legitimate, and produced in opposition to a ‘tasteless’ working class, by 
extending it to argue that this also represents the working class as lacking value, as 
pathological and immoral. Bourdieu termed this struggle over culture ‘symbolic violence’, 
where domination is accepted tacitly and the dominated working class are not seen as 
having the right or ability to make legitimate judgements. It manifests as the (‘natural’) 
underrepresentation of working-class political opinion amidst multiple dominant political 
ideas generated by the middle and upper classes. 
The popular ‘poverty porn’ TV sub-genre exemplifies these processes of social 
classification, symbolic violence and disgust. Beginning in 2013 programmes such as 
Benefits Street became a catalyst for public debate centred on questions of the welfare 
state. Poverty porn produces a symbolic divide between the ‘worker’ and the ‘shirker’ and 
encourages viewers to scorn the lifestyles of those featured in the programmes. Structural 
inequalities stemming from deindustrialisation and the precarity of the contemporary labour 
market are obscured, and instead poverty is represented as a lifestyle choice, with benefits 
claimants depicted as living it up at taxpayers’ expense – further undermining welfare 
provisions. The 2017 BSA survey found evidence of softening attitudes towards benefits 
recipients, yet more people remain critical of benefit fraud than tax evasion.
Politicians and policy-makers often use the areas where the working classes live as 
signifiers for dangerous people and places. They use deprived areas as backdrops to 
make political claims that certain areas entrench poverty and disadvantage – for example, 
David Cameron’s war on ‘sink estates’. These depictions deflect attention away from the 
external forces that produce the conditions of existence for residents there, and instead 
stigmatise neighbourhoods further. Such messages can divide residents from each other, 
obstruct the potential for collective resistance to poor treatment, and often shape the future 
with regulations, investment and/or disinvestment in stigmatised territories.
A final illustration of adverse representation concerns the way that working-class people 
were blamed for the Brexit vote to leave the European Union, although the picture is 
actually far more complex than this. An instant narrative was coined portraying Leave 
voters as being from disadvantaged areas, ‘left behind’ by globalisation, particularly de-
industrialised northern English towns (that is, implicitly white working-class communities) 
– an interpretation that deepened already existing social divisions along axes of class, 
ethnicity and migration status.
Conclusions
Class inequality and injustice in the UK in 2017 ‘intersects’ with other social divisions with 
ramifications for how we understand the lives and life chances of different groups of 
working-class women and men. In a liberal democracy like the UK some control over class 
disparities and narrowing of class inequality gaps can only be achieved by establishing 
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a firmer ceiling for the highly privileged (as housing market changes have shown), and 
by lifting the floor that supports the least class-advantaged in society (as the minimum 
wage and living wages have shown is feasible). In addition, making class a ‘protected 
characteristic’ in future Equality Acts could actively combat discrimination and the still-
prevalent stigmatisation of working-class people and neighbourhoods.
James Pattison is a postgraduate research student in the School of Sociology and Social 
Policy, University of Nottingham.
Tracey Warren is Professor of Sociology at the University of Nottingham.
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When people must live subject either to the power of a controlling opponent, or to 
the weight of institutions accumulated in history, they experience outcomes that are 
‘determined, objective, and an already fixed projection of the past’. Powerless people have 
‘a future poor in alternatives’, as the German social theorist Niklas Luhmann put it. For the 
part of the British public that in 2016 chose to ‘take back control’ both from the EU, and 
from the ‘globalising’ elites of the main UK parties, such considerations seemed remote. Yet 
the post-history of the Brexit vote has shown that breaking free in any long-experienced 
context is a complex business. How much more is that also true of a whole political system, 
where citizens and elites alike are struggling to live up to and evolve liberal democratic 
ideas, while yet maintaining an effective system of government and valued inherited 
institutions.
This final part has two main tasks. The first is to give an overall assessment of the UK’s 
changing liberal democracy, looking across all the areas covered in the preceding chapters. 
The second involves standing back and drawing some wider-out implications – around the 
loss of a previously influential ‘Europeanisation’ narrative, the roles of micro-institutions, 
and the sheer difficulty of achieving a sustainable democratic state.
8
In the 2012 Democratic Audit, the immediate predecessor of this volume, Stuart Wilks-Heeg 
and colleagues wrote that: ‘Democracy is not an “end state”. Few would argue that the UK 
is already as democratic as it would be possible, or desirable to be’. Yet their assessment 
then was broadly positive on the central components of the UK’s polity. They recorded 
improvements in most aspects of democratic operations since two Audits in the previous 
decade, despite the adverse impacts of austerity measures that were already emerging 
following the onset of the great financial crisis in 2008 and the 2010 election. 
In particular, although the UK in 2012 had a ‘hung’ parliament (as it does now), the smooth 
formation of a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition (with a clear majority of MPs 
in the Commons and of votes at the 2010 general election) meant that little changed 
from ‘business as usual’. The core institutions of government in Parliament/Westminster 
and the Cabinet/Whitehall apparently went on operating in ways that showed some 
remarkable continuities with the Blair–Brown governments that came before them. A 
coalition agreement seemed almost as ‘effective’ and able to grapple with hard choices as 
traditionalists had always claimed single-party majority governments to be. 
Today, after the populist upsurge of diffuse discontent captured in the Brexit referendum, 
the dramatic loss of the May government’s majority a year later, and the protracted, lagging 
and trouble-prone efforts to devise a basis for the UK to leave the European Union, it is the 
core institutions over which hang the greatest question marks. The poor ability of the party 
system to cope with Brexit; the inability of May or Corbyn to foster cross-party co-operation 
in Parliament to develop or steer through anything other than a partisan strategy for Brexit; 
and the continuation of high levels of political uncertainty around the issue that two-thirds 
of the public rate as in the top three for importance – all these have created an almost 
unique period of ineffectiveness and fraught deadlock at the centre of UK government. 
Elsewhere in the UK system there have been some important positive developments for 
liberal democracy. Devolution changes and the growth of civic nationalism in Scotland; a 
modernisation/ liberalisation of social attitudes around gender, race and identities; and a 
greater questioning of ‘established’ institutions that covered up wrongdoing – these have 
all signalled important extensions of the ‘liberal’ component of liberal democracy across 
The UK’s recent democratic gains 
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mainland Britain (but less so in Northern Ireland). Yet these changes cannot compensate for 
the critical failures around the core.
To summarise the conclusions of our analysis, Figure 1 lists a whole series of areas that are 
important for assessing the democratic quality of any political system. The middle column 
here shows these key aspects and issues, roughly in the same sequence as the chapters 
in Parts 1 to 7. For each heading, in the two rightmost columns we show our answers 
to this qualitative question: ‘Have positive and substantial pro-democratisation trends 
occurred?’ And in the two leftmost columns we show our answer to the question: ‘Have 
substantial threats or problems to democratic quality emerged in this area?’ Obviously 
the ideal situation for liberal democratic advance would be one where there have been 
clear advances, and no worrying adverse trends to offset them. Yet this is not a commonly 
occurring situation. Instead in most topic areas Figure 1 shows that there is a far more 
mixed picture, with some positive developments and other adverse changes occurring at 
the same time.
In order to tie down these judgements more firmly, we borrow a technique from an 
approach in social science called ‘qualitative comparative analysis’ (QCA) – but here 
used to look across many aspects of one big case. One key QCA step is to ask relatively 
complex and qualitative questions, such as those at the top of Figure 1, but then provide 
answers using numeric codes to try to firm up and to systematise the judgements involved. 
There are many sophisticated ways of doing this in QCA, but we have used the simplest – 
which focuses on a five-point scale:
 
Number score Which means:
  1.0 Clearly Yes to the question posed
  0.75 Tending towards Yes
  0.5 Impossible to say Yes or No to the question – indeterminate
  0.25 Tending towards No
  0 Clearly No to the question posed
(Another way of framing this coding scheme in a comparative way might be to ask for each 
aspect if the UK falls into the set of countries that show positive developments towards 
greater democracy, or into the set of countries showing signs of democratic backsliding or 
decay?) We show the code for positive developments on the right of each topic heading as 
a green-shaded cell that has one of the five values above. And we show the code value for 
adverse trends on the left of the topic heading. At the right end of each row we briefly list 
the positive developments that give rise to the green score. And at the left end of each row 
we list the changes that explain the pink-shaded problems and threats score.
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Figure 1: Positive developments and adverse developments for aspects of the UK’s 
democracy
Have substantial threats 
or problems to democratic 
quality emerged in this area?
Problems/ 
threats 
score
Institutional 
or topic area
Gains/ 
positives 
score
Have positive and 
substantial pro-
democratisation trends 
occurred in this area?
• Under plurality rule local and 
regional levels of deviation 
from proportionality (DV) 
are still high. And ‘electoral 
deserts’ are widespread.
 • The historical record and 
political science theory both 
predict higher national DV if 
multi-party politics revives.
1
Voting 
system 
fairness 
across 
parties
0.5
• National deviation from 
proportionality (DV) scores fell 
in 2017, making the result the 
most proportional for more 
than two decades. But this 
was highly contingent on four-
fifths of voters backing the top 
two parties.
• The obsolescence and 
ineffectiveness of UK electoral 
integrity laws are apparant for 
digital campaigning and the 
social media era.
• Possible Russian influence in 
the Brexit referendum. 
• Failure to control ‘Leave’ 
campaign over-spending.
0.75
Electoral 
integrity and 
participation
0.75
• Turnout improved in 2017, 
and at the 2016 Brexit 
referendum. 
• The age gap in turnout was 
reduced in 2017 and youth 
participation increased.
• Procedures for electing party 
leaders in the Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats in 
2016–18 were short-circuited 
in ways that meant party 
members never got to vote on 
choosing a leader.
• The inability to arrange a 
political succession to Theresa 
May, and some of Corbyn’s 
problems from his MPs and the 
press, show that the legitimacy 
of members electing party 
leaders is still widely impugned.
0.5
The 
democratic 
roles of 
political 
parties
0.75
• Party memberships have 
grown strongly in the Labour 
Party and SNP.
• Mass memberships and 
‘clicktivism’ via social media 
both seem to have fostered 
more member and supporter 
participation.
• Powerful business lobbies 
are still overtly obstructing 
action against evident harms, 
as with pollution from diesel 
cars, sugar in food and an 
obesogenic environment.
0.5
The interest 
group 
process
0.5
• A process more focused on 
cognitive competition may be 
developing.
• The partisan press still sets 
wider media news agendas, 
and shows a strong pro-Tory 
imbalance.
• Brexiteer press titles have 
stoked up polarisation by 
strongly adversarial press 
coverage.
0.75
Media 
support for 
democracy
0.5
• There some signs that the 
political influence of the 
strongly partisan press has 
slipped as people’s sources 
of news and opinion have 
diversified.
• Post-Leveson press 
behaviour has slightly 
improved, from a low 
base. Rights of redress 
for inaccuracy and privacy 
invasions are still weak.
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Have substantial threats 
or problems to democratic 
quality emerged in this area?
Problems/ 
threats 
score
Institutional 
or topic area
Gains/ 
positives 
score
Have positive and 
substantial pro-
democratisation trends 
occurred in this area?
• Fake news and manipulation 
of information chains, plus 
libertarian hangovers in major 
platform companies have 
dramatised major lags and 
deficiencies in the regulation 
of online spaces in the public 
interest.
• Any new medium of 
communication can give 
greater prominence and 
efficacy to harmful social 
actors, especially where 
regulation lags behind current 
social practices (as with trolling, 
hate speech, and other anti-
social communication). 
0.75
Social media 
support for 
democracy, 
and civic 
participation
0.75
• The depth, speed and 
efficacy of ordinary citizens’ 
vigilance over their elected 
representatives, government 
and the public services has 
clearly improved.
• ‘Clicktivism’ is widely 
practised and seems to 
have enhanced (rather than 
reduced) other forms of civic 
participation.
• Brexit threatens to produce a 
tidal wave of executive action/ 
statutory instrument changes 
with only reduced levels of 
parliamentary scrutiny.
0.25
The 
democratic 
effectiveness 
of  
Parliament
0.75
• The return of a ‘hung’ 
parliament in 2017, after 
only two years of majority 
government has increased the 
influence of Parliament and 
of MPs.
• Select committees in the 
Commons have grown in 
influence, and some analysts 
argue that bill committees 
are not as weak as previously 
thought. 
• The upper chamber of the 
legislature is completely 
unelected. 
• Appointments are often linked 
to party donations and leaders’ 
use of patronage.
• The Lords did not curb the 
Conservative–Liberal Democrat 
government (2010–15).
1.0
The House of 
Lords 0.5
• The Lords has restrained 
Tory governments since 2015, 
forcing significant moderating 
re-thinks on welfare and Brexit 
issues.
• The UK’s ‘homeland security’ 
apparatus has greatly 
expanded in areas that 
seem to be little covered by 
parliamentary scrutiny.
• Parliamentary scrutiny of UK 
military actions overseas (for 
example, bombing in Syria and 
drone assassinations of alleged 
terrorists) remains very weak.
0.5
Civilian 
control of 
the military, 
police, 
homeland 
security and 
intelligence
0.5
• Since August 2013 
Parliament has perhaps had 
greater de facto (if not de 
jure) control over the Prime 
Minister’s use of war powers. 
• The Intelligence and Security 
Committee under Dominic 
Grieve has become more 
effective and disclosure about 
(long) past intelligence service 
activities has improved a little.
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Have substantial threats 
or problems to democratic 
quality emerged in this area?
Problems/ 
threats 
score
Institutional 
or topic area
Gains/ 
positives 
score
Have positive and 
substantial pro-
democratisation trends 
occurred in this area?
• Specific severe policy 
disasters (for example, 
Iraq 2003–10, Afghanistan 
2007–12, Libya 2013, Universal 
Credit, defence planning, 
Brexit delays, and the Grenfell 
catastrophe) have highlighted 
enduring and widespread 
failures in central government.
 • The overly deep enforcement 
of austerity and its over-
long maintenance increased 
Whitehall’s poor grasp on its 
cumulative adverse effects, 
and created widespread 
administrative malaise.
• This in turn helped fuel Brexit 
populism. 
0.75
Effective core 
executive – 
the apex of 
governance
0
• The return to a hung 
parliament in 2017, plus intra-
party divisions over Brexit, 
and the failure to develop any 
government and opposition 
joint working on it, created 
party management and 
legislative problems that were 
debilitating and unfamiliar 
for No. 10, ministers and 
the Whitehall apparatus to 
manage.
• Austerity effects have 
contributed to a loss of 
core institutional capacity, 
exemplified by the crisis of 
light-/no-touch regulation 
around Grenfell.
1
Civil service 
and public 
services
0.25
• It is hard to see signs 
of any positive changes 
or improvements, except 
perhaps some partial 
protection of NHS services via 
inflation increases.
• A steady stream of fairly 
minor corruption or integrity 
scandals has occurred.
• UK arms sales remain an area 
with major ethical problems 
(for example, in supplying arms 
clearly used against civilians in 
Yemen).
0.5
Integrity in 
public life 0.5
• Past institutional cover-
ups (for example, over 
Hillsborough and in 
institutions like churches) have 
been exposed.
• Some areas of greater 
openness show progress (for 
example, identifying Persons 
with Significant Control of 
companies).
• Whitehall centralism over 
Brexit has engendered 
acrimonious battles over the 
transfer for EU functions.
• The 2017 Tory manifesto 
threat to the legitimacy of 
mayoral elections shows a rash 
willingness to jeopardise well-
working democratic institutions 
solely for minor partisan 
advantage.
0.25
Devolution 
within 
mainland 
Britain
1
• The strong decentralisation 
of powers to Scotland and 
Wales since 2014 have 
transferred key functions.
• The changes have also 
created a somewhat stronger 
inter-governmental process, 
with some Supreme Court 
overview.
• More powers for the London 
mayor and the creation of 
new metro/regional mayors 
have begun to address the 
gross over-concentration 
of English governance 
powers in Whitehall and the 
previous lack of regional-tier 
democracy.
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Have substantial threats 
or problems to democratic 
quality emerged in this area?
Problems/ 
threats 
score
Institutional 
or topic area
Gains/ 
positives 
score
Have positive and 
substantial pro-
democratisation trends 
occurred in this area?
• The partial collapse of 
devolution institutions and 
arrangements in Northern 
Ireland, and the border woes 
there over Brexit are worrying.
• The DUP providing 
‘confidence and supply’ to 
the May government since 
2017 puts a question mark 
over Westminster’s impartiality 
between Northern Ireland 
communities and parties.
1
Devolution 
in Northern 
Ireland
0.25
• So far there have not been 
major adverse consequences 
of the suspension of devolved 
government.
• Drastic austerity measures 
have extensively hollowed 
out local services and 
administrative competencies.
• The fiscal position of local 
authorities under austerity 
policies has become 
unsustainable.
• The value of local democratic 
politics has been eroded as 
it becomes solely about the 
management of unsustainable 
cutbacks.
1
Decentral- 
isation to 
communities 
and public 
services
0
• No easing of adverse 
financial pressures on English 
local government has yet 
occurred.
• Social care for the elderly 
was a central issue in the 
2017 election but funding 
arrangements remain 
unsustainable, severely 
squeezing all other forms of 
municipal spending.
• Government ministers have 
regularly proposed fees or 
restricted eligibility criteria for 
people to access administrative 
tribunals and other channels for 
citizen redress. 
• The very restricted availability 
of legal aid plus high legal 
costs shut out most people 
from effective access to the 
courts and legal redress.
0.75
Rule of law 
and access to 
justice
0.5
• The Supreme Court has 
been active in defending 
access to legal aid, and 
has begun to play a more 
important and active role in 
protecting citizens’ rights 
against Whitehall, shaping 
how devolution arrangements 
operate, and how Brexit is 
accomplished.
• Proposals for mass 
surveillance and cracking down 
on unauthorised access to 
official papers are recurringly 
brought forward by ministers 
or advocated by intelligence 
agencies.
0.5
Civil and 
political 
rights
0.5
• Past Conservative threats 
to the 1998 Human Rights 
Act by introducing a ‘British 
Bill of Rights’ or even leaving 
the EHRC court in Strasbourg 
appear to have receded.
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Have substantial threats 
or problems to democratic 
quality emerged in this area?
Problems/ 
threats 
score
Institutional 
or topic area
Gains/ 
positives 
score
Have positive and 
substantial pro-
democratisation trends 
occurred in this area?
• The Brexit decision as 
implemented in the 2018 EU 
Withdrawal Act means that the 
EU’s Charter of Rights is no 
longer applicable within the 
UK. Executive orders made 
under this law may radically 
reduce previous rights in areas 
like employment.
0.75
Economic 
and social 
rights
0.5
• Fees for employment 
tribunal access have been 
struck down by the Supreme 
Court.
• Some ‘gig economy’ 
workers’ rights have been 
protected by legal decisions.
• Brexit populism apparently 
fuelled a decline in toleration 
and increased political rancour.
• The prolonged delay in 
developing a clear Brexit 
position gave the lie to 
previous assumptions 
about the ‘efficiency’ or 
‘effectiveness’ of the UK’s 
democratic government.
1
The UK’s 
influence 
on the 
development 
of democracy 
worldwide
0.25
• Some moves in the UK to 
more socially liberal attitudes 
can be seen as contributing 
to similar shifts elsewhere (for 
example, in Ireland on divorce 
and abortion, and in Australia 
on legalising gay marriage).
It is also useful to consider the different topics and areas above in terms of those showing 
the strongest pro-democracy trends versus those showing the greatest cumulation of 
adverse developments. Figure 2 shows just the numeric scores for each topic area, 
showing that negative scores overall outweigh positive. 
Figure 3 lists them in order, with the highest net positive scores at the top and the worst net 
negative scores at the bottom of the table. The clearly positive areas cover devolution within 
Britain, the roles of Parliament and political parties – shown with green shaded backgrounds. 
Electoral integrity and the role of social media and civic participation also show strengths, but 
also some major problems of the digital era. A whole raft of areas have clear negative scores, 
shown shaded in light pink. In the middle of the table these categories are somewhat offset 
by equivalent positive changes, but at the bottom of the table they are not. 
Overall Figures 2 and 3 makes for somewhat grim reading. In many different respects the 
UK’s liberal democracy is still historically flawed or eroding under modern trends, and these 
areas outweigh the undoubted positives still occurring, often begun in earlier periods.
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Figure 2: Positive and adverse developments in different areas of the UK’s democratic 
life – summarised
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Figure 3: The balance of scores for positive and adverse developments in different areas 
of the UK’s democratic life
Topic or institutional area
Net 
‘democratic 
improvement’ 
score
Score for 
positive 
developments
Score for 
adverse 
developments
Devolution within mainland Britain +0.75 1.0 -0.25
The democratic effectiveness of 
Parliament
+0.5 0.75 -0.25
The democratic role of political parties +0.25 0.75 -0.5
Electoral integrity and participation 0 0.75 -0.75
Social media and civic participation 0 0.75 -0.75
Civilian control of the military, police 
homeland security and intelligence
0 0.5 -0.5
The interest group process 0 0.5 -0.5
Civil and political rights 0 0.5 -0.5
Integrity in public life 0 0.5 -0.5
Media support for democracy -0.25 0.5 -0.75
Rule of law and access to justice -0.25 0.5 -0.75
Economic and social rights -0.25 0.5 -0.75
Voting system fairness across parties -0.5 0.5 -1.0
The House of Lords -0.5 0.5 -1.0
UK influence on the development of 
democracy worldwide
-0.75 0.25 -1.0
Civil services and public services -0.75 0.25 -1.0
Devolution in Northern Ireland -0.75 0.25 -1.0
Effective core executive – the apex of 
governance
-0.75 0 -0.75
Decentralisation to communities and 
public services
-1.0 0 -1.0
8.1 The UK’s recent democratic gains and losses
The UK’s mixed, at times even shaky, record of recent changes is just the latest chapter in 
a series of evolving developments that have created a strong domestic tradition on which 
citizens, politicians and public servants can draw to adapt to new challenges. This is both a 
considerable strength and a weakness in several masked ways. 
As Chapter 1.3 argued, the modern UK state apparatus and elite decision-making cultures 
still bear many legacies of the lengthy imperial state period – principally manifest in an elite 
culture (spanning the executive, legislature and the senior judiciary) that disdains any fine-
tuning of democratic control in favour of prioritising the ability of government to govern. 
From the mid-18th century to the late 1960s, UK Prime Ministers and Cabinets grappled with 
jointly running a home island state that was constitutionalising and democratising, while 
also governing colonies overseas that were essentially run in an authoritarian fashion.
In addition, the long survival and adaptability of the ‘British political tradition’ bred a kind of 
superiority complex, in which British decision-makers (and many voters too) thought of the 
UK as a world leader in democratic practices, the home of the ‘Mother of Parliaments’, and 
so not in need of any careful introspection about domestic democracy, still less of learning 
any lessons from overseas. 
These attitudes have waned somewhat in influence but they remain powerful. The currently 
weak global situation of liberal democracies makes maintaining either stance highly 
inappropriate, and dangerously complacent. Taking democratic reform in the UK seriously 
from 2018 onwards is likely to involve three main changes, discussed in turn below. First, 
the UK’s imminent departure from the European Union may (or may not) mark the end of 
a two decades’ long process of the UK’s politics and constitutional set-up ‘Europeanising’. 
Does Brexit mean the loss of this potent ‘modernisation’ pathway for future development? 
Second, our analysis re-confirms that liberal democratic governance is far more complex 
than many previous analyses have allowed. In addition to the big and obvious macro-
institutions of a democratic state, there are also a host of micro-institutions whose set-up 
and operations can make a major difference to how the overall political system operates. 
Finally, the rise of debased semi-democracies, plus extensive backsliding amongst many 
states previously thought of as securely within the liberal democratic camp, shows the 
need for a radical reappraisal of the difficulties of sustaining liberal democratic processes 
on a pathway of growth and positive development. 
8.2
Counteracting democratic decay
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(i) Losing the ‘Europeanisation’ narrative for modernising British 
democracy 
The 2016 Brexit referendum vote has already marked a key turning point in the UK’s 
political system. Its significance also extends beyond the economic and governance 
changes that are directly involved to its likely cultural and symbolic consequences. One 
of these may be the disappearance of a previously influential narrative of what has been 
happening to British democracy, and of a template for where it will go in the years ahead. 
The advent of the Labour government under Tony Blair in 1997 sparked a whole series of 
major constitutional changes. Traditionalist critics (like Anthony King in his book The British 
Constitution) complained that there was no coherent plan behind Labour’s changes, that 
ministers had tinkered with a huge range of institutions without being clear what they were 
trying to achieve.
There is an alternative interpretation, however, namely that from 1997 to 2016 the UK was 
strongly Europeanising, falling into line with patterns of political development that were 
(and still are) common to almost countries across western Europe. The cumulative effect of 
these changes was to ‘normalise’ and ‘modernise’ UK democracy, moving away from past 
patterns of British exceptionalism and uniqueness compared with neighbouring states. 
Figure 1 shows some of the most important ‘Europeanising’ trends over these two decades, 
and asks whether they are likely to continue post-Brexit.
Can the ‘British political tradition’ provide an alternative modernisation template to the 
Europeanisation/ normalisation pathway after exit from the EU in March 2019? Some critics 
argue that Brexit, plus the SNP push for Scottish independence, plus a prevailing mood of 
‘anti-politics’ distrustful of established elites, mean that the Westminster model has never 
been more contested. Its ‘focus on strong rather than responsive government distances 
Westminster from citizens’, according to Marsh and colleagues.
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Figure 1: Six main ‘Europeanisation’ trends within the UK 1997–2016, and their likely 
future prospects
Main Europeanising trend Prospects from 2016 on
Multi-party politics – with a 
standard five or six parties 
across the country, including far 
right, greens, social democrats, 
conservatives and liberals.
The political ‘suicides’ of the Liberal Democrats (in 
joining a Tory-dominated government 2010–15) and 
of UKIP (after Brexit was won) cut back multi-partism 
in England at the 2017 Westminster elections, but not 
in the devolved polities or at local level. How long 
the current focus on the top two-parties will endure is 
difficult to guess.
Coalition or minority governments 
(in hung parliaments), because no 
party wins an overall majority.
Since 2010, only two years have seen a (slender) 
majority government. But after the Liberal Democrats 
loss of two-thirds of their voters in 2015, future coalition 
governments seem unlikely. Minority governments with 
‘confidence and supply’ arrangements seem more likely. 
Proportional representation voting 
systems – as in Scotland, Wales, 
and London.
The public’s rejection of the Liberal Democrats’ doomed 
2011 referendum attempt to introduce the alternative 
vote (AV) electoral system has probably killed off 
change in this area at a UK level. (Some voting system 
reform might still happen in Welsh local government.)
Elected executive mayors (and 
police and crime commissioners).
Executive mayors have spread incrementally under 
Labour and Conservative governments, so some further 
expansion is possible.
Civil rights codified in a 
constitution or single document 
– as with UK’s Human Rights Act 
1998.
The HRA has survived strong Tory mobilisations against 
it, and looks likely to endure – especially with the UK 
abandoning the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
2019 as part of Brexit.
Clear constitutional separation of 
executive from judiciary – as with 
the creation of UK the Supreme 
Court and Ministry of Justice.
Initially opposed by judges and lawyers, the Blair 
government’s stronger separation of executive from 
the judiciary has been a considerable success. The UK 
Supreme Court is likely to grow in influence over time.
Shifts of functions to quasi-federal 
sub-national governments – as 
with devolution to Scotland and 
Wales.
The UK’s devolution arrangements are messy and 
partial compared to most large European nations, but 
their successful expansion makes further developments 
likely in future.
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Nonetheless, given the history of the UK’s political evolution, it is not out of the question 
that Brexit leads to a re-emphasis on British exceptionalism, a renewed emphasis on 
traditional or historical themes in a ‘back to the future’ mode. Echoes of such a position 
are strongly present amongst Conservative Brexiteers, and powerfully underlie Boris 
Johnson’s (much misquoted) complaint against May’s Chequers deal, that: ‘We have 
wrapped a suicide vest around the British constitution – and handed the detonator to 
[the EU]’. What might be the elements of a resurgence of UK exceptionalism? Some 
possible pieces are already on the board, including the 2011 referendum rejection of 
the alternative vote (AV) electoral system as a ‘reform’ of plurality rule, the revival of 
two-party dominance (produced by the successive collapses in support for the Liberal 
Democrat and UKIP) in England, and the re-creation of some mass membership parties. 
Combined with the cultural backlash that Brexit represents, especially if a charismatic 
leader like Johnson becomes Prime Minister at any stage, it is conceivable that these 
and other developments may bring the Europeanisation trends above to a juddering 
halt, so that the UK’s previous ‘exceptionalism’ from European democratic patterns 
continues indefinitely. 
The final scenario is that Europeanisation trends peter out over time, but that the 
challenges posed by Brexit and some radically new problems (like adapting to digital-era 
politics and the growth of social media) mean that the UK’s political system stagnates, or 
deadlocks, or moves randomly from one uncertain situation to another, with no coherent 
map or narrative of future development. ‘Taking back control’ of economic regulation, trade, 
immigration and much more is the biggest change in UK governance for half a century. 
It has already produced enduring crises for the party system, Parliament and the core 
executive, with uniquely contested governance over critical issues, and a rapidly changing 
political landscape. There may well be more of the same ahead.
(ii) Micro-institutions matter, so fix small defects 
Past history offers many examples where social and political scientists have been 
influenced by developments in the STEMM disciplines (science, technology, 
engineering, mathematics and medicine) in how they seek to understand society. Of 
course, no direct read-across can occur – but the methods involved in STEMM research 
often inspire social scientists to do something similar, if they can. For instance, in a 
range of areas now, ‘big data’ and the application of artificial intelligence are likely to 
have extensive consequences for social science methods, just as they already have in 
STEMM and business research. And the models that STEMM scientists develop often 
furnish influential analogies – especially in understanding how complex causation of 
events can work.
In terms of causation analogies, the modern development of genetics research has been 
most recently influential. A decade or more ago geneticists confidently anticipated that they 
would be able to ‘explain’ the onset of many different human conditions and diseases by 
identifying small numbers (ten to a dozen) of genetic markers in the human genome – and 
that this in turn would open the way to potential remedies at the genetic level. The first 
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part of these expectations has been confounded however by the far greater complexity of 
genetic conditioning than anticipated. The modern picture is that: 
‘Many small genetic changes are involved in the expression of a single trait, 
and each change is correlated with a tiny tweak to the human form. To find 
the tiny effects that individual letters of the genome have on traits, disease, 
and behavior, you need enormous data sets to separate signal from noise.’
In particular, although there are some critically important ‘main effect’ genes, how they 
operate turns out to be fundamentally shaped or conditioned by many other ‘small effects’ 
genes that often switch on or off, or radically modify, the impacts of the ‘main’ genes. The 
result is a far more complex and holistically shaped set of influences, requiring the most 
careful analysis to unpick hundreds of different effects operating simultaneously.
This picture is interesting when set against the far simpler causal patterns that are still 
being explored in political science, economics and sociology. Most research about the 
pre-conditions for and influences shaping liberal democracies’ development still focuses 
on some tens or dozens of macro-institution variables – such as the kind of electoral 
system being used, the number of parties in the party system, the level of ‘consensus’ in 
legislatures or executive government, or the fiscal decentralisation of government. Much 
modern research is still just about trying to quantify macro-institution variables’ effects more 
precisely (with more statistical controls), or to understand their operation in more qualitative 
ways. But a relatively small causal repertoire is still being discussed.
The approach we have adopted here is informed by a different approach, one that assigns 
a lot of significance to multiple factors interacting in highly complex causal nets. To start 
with, creating and maintaining any state is a not a simple thing. And controlling that 
apparatus in liberal democratic ways greatly increases that complexity. It involves meeting 
many different necessary conditions, all at the same time. These inescapable linkages 
justify the approach adopted here, of making an in-depth assessment of the quality of the 
UK’s democratic life across multiple different topic areas. 
If semi-democracies have taught us anything it is that a genuinely democratic polity is 
constructed both from a small set of macro-institutions (such as a voting system, or a 
Parliament), plus dozens or even hundreds of different micro-institutions (for example, sets 
of rules governing which parties or candidates can stand for elections, or how politically 
balanced any state-controlled media must be between parties). Micro-institutions often 
play complex roles, some switching on or off the effects of macro-institutions, and others 
changing radically how macro-institutions operate. Micro-institutions are small-scale rules 
and regulations, or minor cultural practices. They often sit well outside the scope of any 
formal ‘constitution’, instead lurking in the detailed supplementary practices or mores that 
grow up around how macro-institutions operate. They are also often found in administrative 
codes that apparently have little direct connection with the macro-institution they shape. 
A clear example for the UK concerns Parliament’s role in budgeting. Since the English civil 
war was resolved by restoring the monarchy in 1659, our (uncodified) constitutional law says 
beyond any doubt that the House of Commons sets the government budget. But a tiny little 
rule, sitting in the Standing Orders of the House for decade after decade, also says that 
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no MP can present any proposal for spending even £1 of public money unless they have a 
certificate signed by a minister, which is never given. At a stroke this requirement means 
that only ministers can present a budget, and that Parliament can perhaps cut spending out 
of it, but can never add in anything new. This is a key foundation for the normal de facto 
dominance of the government over the House of Commons, no matter what the formal or 
apparent constitution may say. In principle, of course, a simple majority of MPs could amend 
the Standing Orders to remove this requirement, but the cultural and attitudinal rethink 
needed for any such change after so long means that it is not something that ever ‘comes up’. 
And of course, the elite of the top two parties have a joint incentive to keep it in being.
Even in a designed constitution micro-institutions matter a lot. For example, James 
Maddison designed the US Electoral College as an elite-level safeguard for ensuring that 
only ‘moderate candidates’ would reach the Presidency – but the subsequent development 
of strong parties quickly reduced the College to a constitutional cipher.
We have only just begun to absorb the importance of micro-institutions, so many questions 
around them are up for discussion – such as how to distinguish one, and (most importantly) 
count how many there are. Systematically mapping micro-institutions is just beginning, but 
the relevant numbers within the UK polity are likely to be numerous – on theory grounds 
alone. The implication of micro-institutions is that many more combinations of ‘big’ and 
‘small’ institutional arrangements matter than either most quantitative analyses (still testing 
‘toy models’) or institutional theory itself are prepared to admit. 
How many combinations might matter in real-life situations though? Suppose that there are 
three institutions that operate as switches with a range of settings, running in 1% increments 
from 0% (fully off) to 100% (fully on) for each switch. There would then be 833 different 
combinations of switch outcomes. Extend this scenario to ten such switches acting at the 
same time and the number of combinations exceeds two million combinations. If either of 
these seems unlikely consider that in 2010 in a Commons with eight parties there were 
only two or three ‘minimum winning coalitions’ (those with no ‘spare’ members), of which 
only the Conservative–Liberal Democrat alliance was judged feasible by elites. By 2017 no 
minimum winning coalition passed the parties’ acceptability tests, and the simplest one-
party minority government formed instead.
It behoves political scientists to be modest, and to admit that as yet we have only ‘broad 
brush’ ideas of how macro-variables interact to sustain liberal democracy or not. And we 
have barely begun to scratch the surface of assessing micro-institutions’ significance – 
especially in switching on or off, or altering, how macro-variables operate. It seems clear 
from our analysis above that many different micro-institutions matter across all the chapters, 
and that political elites and citizens should take alterations in how they are set up seriously. 
To best sustain liberal democracy, we need a whole ‘swarm’ of micro-institutions to operate 
in supportive and effective ways – and we should not tolerate persistent small defects that 
corrode overall democratic quality.
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(iii) Reappraising the difficulties of maintaining  liberal democracy
The best way of preventing ‘backsliding’ in established liberal democracies is to be 
constantly aware of the difficulties and complexities in maintaining effective political 
equality and institutional responsiveness. To be sure of moving forwards it seems sensible 
never to ‘rest on your laurels’, but instead to maintain a strong focus on making democratic 
advances – sustaining continuous improvements in how citizens can seek to influence 
political elites, raising the standards of performance we expect from our institutions, 
and removing solvable institutional defects, especially the ‘legacy’ hangovers from past 
practices that impede current progress.
‘All government is an ugly necessity’, said G. K. Chesterton.. So there will always be 
extensive room for debate and deliberation about exactly how continuous democratic 
advance is to be achieved. Yet it seems clear that in the modern world, states are 
effectively ‘immortal’, and are not going to die away, despite the free-market rhetoric of the 
neo-liberal right or the communitarian dreams of left anarchists or ‘deep green’ ecologists. 
As long as states, communities and the need to make collective choices endure, then the 
relevance of liberal democracy will also.
It is surely also long overdue for liberal democrats to reconsider the quietist stance 
of recent decades, where positively advocating free and fair elections and defending 
human rights and civil liberties have been characterised by many opponents and critics 
as at best simply ethno-centric (Western-appropriate) reasoning, and at worst a ‘cultural 
colonialist’ effort to homogenise the world on globalist lines. Effectively counteracting 
these now commonplace camouflages for semi-democracies in industrialising countries 
will involve liberal democracies in questioning their own governance assumptions and 
unacknowledged cultural limits in far-reaching ways. 
Liberal democratic states like the UK and USA can only regain their lost ‘city on a hill’ 
soft power influence when they make far clearer to any observer that they are operating 
majority rule in genuinely fair, frequent and inclusive elections, enacted with commitment, 
and genuinely seeking widely distributed control of policy-making by the state – mostly by 
achieving ‘consensus’ majorities (rather than narrow, partisan sectarianism). A commitment 
to democratising business and civil society organisations, and increasing social 
transparency, also needs to underpin the full access to civil and social rights. 
Externally, liberal democratic states surely need to show clear concern for their neighbours, 
for migrants, and for global jeopardy issues, while respecting international law and the 
autonomy of other legally run states. A dynamic of internal and external democratic 
advance has already achieved a lot in fields like environmental policy, even where the ‘law 
of the least progressive actor’ operates. Extending these lessons to try and better resolve 
regional and global issues around the inequalities generating large-scale movements of 
people across state boundaries (apparently now ‘fixed for ever’) is likely to continue to 
influence the domestic democratic quality of politics and other liberal democracies.
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